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ABSTRACT 
INTERSEX AND IMAGO: SEX, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY  
IN POSTMODERN THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 
 
Megan K. DeFranza, B.A., M.A.T.H., M.A.B.L 
 
Marquette University, 2011 
 
 
 Christian theologians regularly assume a binary model of human sex 
differentiation based on the creation narratives found in Genesis. Recent work in 
theological anthropology has grounded theological concepts such as the social view of 
the image of God, human personhood, and human relationality on the creation of humans 
as male and female in heterosexual marital relation. While these anthropologies have 
merit—particularly in correcting older versions of the imago Dei which privileged the 
male—they are inadequate for addressing the phenomena of intersex.   
 Intersex is a broad term used for persons whose bodies display some physical 
characteristics of both sexes—historically labeled “hermaphrodites” and more recently as 
persons with Disorders of Sex Development (DSD). Physicians estimate that at least one 
in every 4,500 children is born with an intersex condition. 
 Despite the good intentions of parents and doctors, many intersex persons are 
challenging the medical treatment they have received which aims at establishing their 
bodies as clearly male or female. They recount harrowing stories of surgeries gone bad, 
sex assignments rejected, records withheld, and medical treatment experienced as sexual 
abuse. Many are working to end “shame, secrecy, and unwanted genital surgeries” or 
advocating that intersex be recognized as a third sex or as a harbinger of a sexless 
society. 
While some postmodern theologians are incorporating intersex alongside persons 
who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer, more conservative 
Christians, such as Evangelicals and Roman Catholics, have yet to attend to the 
challenges intersex persons bring to their theologies and communities. In their attempts to 
justify heterosexual ethics some have turned a blind eye to the presence of intersexed 
persons or argued that intersex can and should be fixed through medical intervention. 
These same theologians often overemphasize the significance of sex difference for 
theological anthropology. 
I argue that traditional sexual ethics do not preclude recognizing the full humanity 
of intersex persons as made in the image of God. I write in order to create theological and 
practical space for intersex persons and a more balanced vision of the imago Dei as it 
relates to sex, gender, and sexuality. 
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INTERSEX AND IMAGO 
an Introduction 
 
 
In the Beginning God created the heavens and the earth…  
Then God said, “Let us make human[kind]1 in our image, according to our likeness,  
and let them rule over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, 
and over all the wild animals of the earth,  
and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.” 
So God created the human in his image, in the image of God he created [the human],2  
male and female he created them.  
And God blessed them and said to them,  
“Be fruitful and increase in number, fill the earth and subdue it.  
Rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air  
and over every living creature that moves on the ground.” 
Genesis 1:1, 26-28 
 
Every Christian account of humanity begins here, in Genesis chapter one. From 
this passage we learn that human beings are made in God’s image and likeness, that 
humans were created as male and female, and that humans are given the charge to “fill the 
earth and subdue it,” participating in God’s rule over the earth and continuing God’s 
creation through procreation. And yet, the questions, “What is the human?” and “What is 
the image?” have been answered very differently by theologians throughout history. 
                                                 
1
 The Hebrew here is adam without the article, which can be translated as human, a human, man, a 
man, or humankind. I have translated it with the inclusive, humankind, in order to match the verb which is 
plural, “let them rule.”  
2
 I have chosen to substitute the noun to which the pronoun is referring in order to avoid the 
confusion between natural and grammatical gender to which English-language readers are often prone. The 
Hebrew pronoun here is masculine because it must correspond to the masculine noun adam. We know that 
adam is an inclusive noun not only from this passage where it is then described as male and female but also 
from Gen. 5:2 “God created them male and female, and God blessed them and named them adam in the day 
when they were created.” Some translators change the Hebrew singular to an English plural in order to 
bring out the inclusive: “He created them.” I have chosen to retain the singular by substituting the noun to 
which the pronoun refers. 
 2
For centuries theologians have connected the image of God with “subduing” or 
“ruling” the earth—what has come to be called the “functional view” of imago Dei; others 
sought to search behind function to substance.  Human rationality was viewed as that 
which made ruling possible, and reason was believed to be located in the soul. Because 
the soul was believed to be made out of the same substance as the divine, this came to be 
known as the “substantive” or “structural view” of the imago Dei.3 The substance or 
structure of the soul was also believed to be the seat of other human capacities such as the 
ability to love or to pursue virtue or holiness—attributes associated with the image of God 
by different theologians in history.4 Much less often have theologians considered “filling 
the earth” or “being fruitful” as linked to of the image. Even less often have they 
considered being created “male” or “female” as relevant to the discussion; although a 
number of them did believe that males more closely reflected the image of God because 
they believed males were more rational and therefore more natural, or rightful, rulers.5 
Nevertheless, most theologians separated the image of God from being male or female or 
from human sexuality and procreation because they believed the testimony of John, who 
insisted, “God is spirit” (John 4:24). God does not have a body. Even when God did take 
on a body in the person of Jesus Christ, God did not engage in sexual activity by marrying 
or physically fathering children. 
However theologians are beginning to overcome historical aversions and mistrust 
of sex, gender, and sexuality. They are asking, what is the theological significance of sex, 
                                                 
3
 Gregory A. Boyd and Paul R. Eddy, Across the Spectrum: Understanding Issues in Evangelical 
Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002), 76. 
4
 Stanley J. Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 
168. 
5
 Frederick G. McLeod, The Image of God in the Antiochene Tradition (Washington, D.C.: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 1999), esp. chapter 6, “Are Women Images of God?” 
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gender, and sexuality? Instead of viewing sex and sexuality as ways that humans mirror 
the animals, or associating sexuality with concupiscence as the primary illustration of 
sinful (disordered) desires, Christians are asking what good has God placed within the 
human body through biological sex differentiation, culturally-influenced gender 
identity/behavior, and sexual desire/activity. In their attempts to answer these questions, 
theologians are returning to the image of God. 
Although he was not the first, Karl Barth (1886-1968) is often credited for 
challenging the traditional interpretations of the imago Dei.6 Rather than understanding 
the image as the soul’s ability to reason, or the responsibility to rule over creation, Barth 
looked to the creation of Adam and Eve as a symbolic picture, an image of the Trinity. In 
Genesis 1:27-28, God said, “Let us make humankind in our image,” and then what does 
God make? Not one but two, a man and a woman, who are to “become one flesh” (Gen. 
2:24). Just as God is a plurality and unity, three in one, so humankind, created in God’s 
image, exists as two who are called to become one.7 Thus, after Barth, we find that human 
sex differentiation and human sexuality (the means by which these two become one) have 
                                                 
6
 Barth pulled together the contributions of Martin Buber, Wilhelm Vischer, Deitrich Bonhoeffer, 
Emil Brunner, Charlotte von Kirschbaum, and Fredrich Schleiermacher to argue that the way in which 
humans image God is in their existence as relational beings. Barth wrote, “Could anything be more obvious 
than to conclude from this clear indication that the image and likeness of being created by God signifies 
existence in confrontation, i.e., in this confrontation, in the juxtaposition and conjunction of man which is 
that of male and female…?” Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics III/1 trans. J. W. Edwards, O. Bussey, and 
Harold Knight, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1958), 195. Cited in 
Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of the Imago Dei (Louisville:  
Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 271. Cf. F. LeRon Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology:  
After the Philosophical Turn to Relationality (Grand Rapids:  Eerdmans, 2003), 124; Rosemary Radford 
Ruether, “Imago Dei, Christian Tradition and Feminist Hermeneutics,” in Image of God and Gender Models 
in Jueaeo-Christian Tradition, ed. Kari Elisabeth Børresen (Oslo:  Solum Forlag, 1991); Suzanne Selinger, 
Charlotte von Kirschbaum and Karl Barth: A Study in Biography and the History of Theology (University 
Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998); Janet Martin Soskice, The Kindness of God:  
Metaphor, Gender, and Religious Language (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2007), 50. 
7
 Some theologians have even gone so far as to include procreation as a functional view of the 
imago—procreation as analogous to divine creation of the universe. Grenz cites Henri Blocher and Meredith 
Kline as representatives of this view in Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 175. 
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been taken up into theological accounts of what it means to be made in the image of God. 
This view has come to be labeled the “relational” or “social view” of the imago Dei.8 
The social view of the imago Dei has much to recommend it. First and foremost, 
as Barth pointed out, it provides a more thorough exegesis of the Biblical text. While in 
Genesis 1:26 the author connects the image to ruling and subduing, in verses 27-28 the 
image is connected first to humankind as male and female, followed by the commands to 
increase in number and fill the earth, and finally to the command to subdue the earth. A 
comprehensive theology of the imago should account for all that is within the text. 
A second strength of the social view of the imago Dei is the full inclusion of 
women as equal participants in the image of God. Theologians who stress the social view 
insist that the man as male is not, nor can he be, the complete or perfect image of God to 
which woman is an afterthought, deviation, or lesser image—interpretations that have 
long histories in Roman Catholic and Protestant theological traditions. Theologians who 
attend to the social view of the imago insist that male and female must partner, not only in 
the filling of the earth but also in its rule and care. It is a theological vision affecting 
everyday praxis. The idea that God is a community of love and created humans to image 
the community of love in (human) sameness and (sex) difference has theological weight 
as well as practical power to change the ways in which we live in the world.  
Lastly, the social view of the imago Dei, with its attention to human embodiment 
and sex differentiation, is also being connected to human sexuality. Though Barth was 
careful not to construe the I-Thou relationship between Adam and Eve as sexual, many 
                                                 
8
 This position appears under various names: relational, communal, social, etc. Stanley Grenz 
speaks of the “social God” and “relational self” in his theological anthropology by the same title, while in 
his Theology for the Community of God, he discusses the social or relational view under the heading “The 
Divine Image as Special Community” (p. 178). I find using the term social for both trinity and imago Dei 
clarifies the connection.  
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who have built on his model have extended the social imago to include sexual desire and 
sexual union, as this dissertation will show. Just as contemporary theologians are working 
hard to overcome histories of interpretation that have devalued female embodiment, so 
many theologians are also working hard to overcome centuries of religious traditions 
which have devalued sexual bodies, sexual desire, and sexual acts within and outside of 
Christian marriage. The social view of the imago has much to recommend it.  
At the same time, the social view need not eclipse other interpretations of the 
imago. Most theologians continue to highlight the significance of human reason and 
human responsibility to care for creation. Nevertheless, history has taught us that an 
overemphasis on rationality and rule has been the demise of the West. The Rule of 
Reason has been used to oppress and subjugate many who were believed to be less 
reasonable—women, ethnic minorities, cultural and religious “others.” Postmodern 
thinkers are now arguing that the Rule of Reason is not enough. Love, community, 
mutuality, the goodness of bodies, of sex, gender, and sexuality are goods too often lost 
when reason and rule are the center of our vision of God and God’s image in humanity. 
The social imago has been the means by which theologians are recovering the 
value of human community, and the value of sex, gender, and sexuality. It has been added 
to structural and functional views of the imago, not to eclipse the former but in order to 
present a more complete picture of humanity created in God’s image.  
While the social view of the image of God has recovered essential components of 
what it means to be human created in the image of God, it is not without its own 
weaknesses. First and foremost is the omission of anyone who does not fit into the 
sex/gender binary paradigm of Adam or Eve, male or female—human persons once 
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labeled androgynes or hermaphrodites whom we now call intersex. Physicians estimate 
that one in every 4,500 children is born intersex—a startlingly high number given how 
little recognition has been given to these persons in contemporary Western society.9  
Indeed, many modern Westerners do not even know what intersex is, much less the 
statistical probability that they may know intersex persons at work, in their families, or 
within their religious communities. 
John Calvin opened his systematic theology insisting that  
true and solid wisdom consists almost entirely of two parts: the knowledge of 
God and of ourselves. But as these are connected together by many ties, it is 
not easy to determine which of the two precedes and gives birth to the 
other.10  
 
Calvin recognized that theological anthropology and theology proper are intimately 
related and mutually conditioning. How we conceive of God affects how we conceive of 
the human and how we interpret the image of God. Likewise, how we conceive of humans 
affects how we conceive of the image and also impacts our understanding of God. The 
challenge for theologians today is that our knowledge of ourselves is changing.11 The 
(re)discovery of intersex is one of the ways in which our knowledge of humankind is 
changing in the postmodern period. 
Ignorance of intersex may be pardonable. Willful marginalization is not. 
Postmodernity has made us more aware of and concerned to protect and celebrate the 
genuine diversity which exists in the human family, while at the same time working to 
acknowledge our common humanity and extending “human rights” to all persons. Thus, 
                                                 
9
 I. A. Hughes, C. Houck, S. F. Ahmed, P. A. Lee, LWPES/ESPE [Lawson Wilkins Pediatric 
Endocrine Society/European Society for Paediatric Endocrinology] Consensus Group, “Consensus 
Statement on Management of Intersex Disorders,” Archives of Disease in Childhood 2 (May 2006), 1. See 
chapter 1 for more detailed discussions of the frequency of intersex. 
10
 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 1.1.1. Henry Beveridge, trans. (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1989, 1997), 37.  
11
 John R. Franke, The Character of Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), 14. 
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theological work in the postmodern period is much more attentive to differences of sex, 
gender, ethnicity, age, class, language, sexuality, as well as able and disabled bodies. It is 
within this milieu that intersex is resurfacing into public consciousness and discourse. 
Churches and theologians are beginning to ask questions about intersex—questions that 
have not been asked for centuries by Christians in the West.  
Now that theologians are rediscovering that intersex persons have been members 
of the human family in each generation, it is necessary that we take their humanity 
seriously, listen to their concerns, respond to their criticisms and claims, and consider 
what they have to teach us about the ways in which we think about biological sex, gender, 
and sexuality. This reconsideration will return us to contemporary discussions of the 
social imago. 
Mary McClintock Fulkerson summarizes the significance of the imago Dei for 
Christian anthropology: 
…the image is a symbolic condensation of what in the Christian tradition it 
means to be fully human. Its significance increases further upon recognition 
that the imago Dei has the double function of referring both to human beings 
and to God. It thereby directs us to ask not only about the way in which God 
is imaged and what that communicates, but about how such imaging 
contributes to the valuing and devaluing of human beings as well. In 
important respects the imago Dei can serve as an index of whom the tradition 
has seen as fully human.12 
 
Fulkerson focuses her argument on the fact that women (and ethnic minorities) 
have rarely been viewed (or treated) as true images of God. This dissertation extends the 
inquiry further, to the phenomena of intersex. For if women were not always recognized 
as fully human or fully created in the image of God (especially under the functional or 
                                                 
12
 Mary McClintock Fulkerson, “The Imago Dei and a Reformed Logic for Feminist/Womanist 
Critique,” in Feminist and Womanist Essays in Reformed Dogmatics, Amy Plantinga Pauw and Serene 
Jones, eds. (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006), 95. 
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structural views of the imago) how are the intersexed to be included in discussions of the 
social imago, which pays attention to sexed bodies but only the sexed bodies of males and 
females? Are the intersexed fully human? Are the intersexed true images of God? Can 
intersex persons image God if they are physically prohibited from entering into 
heterosexual marital relations, unable to embody “male-and-female-in-relation,” imaging 
divine relationality through human sexual relations? 
Some churches are including intersex as one more color within the rainbow of 
options which include persons who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and 
queer (LGBTQ). More conservative Christians, such as Evangelicals and Roman 
Catholics who continue to uphold traditional heterosexual ethics, have yet to attend to the 
challenges intersex persons bring to their theologies and communities. Many are unaware 
of the phenomena, while others have dismissed intersex because of its association with 
LGBTQ.13 For an in-depth theological investigation of intersex from an LGBTQ-
affirming position, I recommend the excellent work of Susannah Cornwall.14 This 
dissertation is an attempt to begin theological reflection in the Evangelical, Catholic, and 
Anglican traditions in the knowledge that not all intersex persons identify with LGBTQ 
perspectives.15 Even among those who may, there are those who still ask that intersex be 
differentiated from the former, saying, 
                                                 
13
 Cf. Charles Colson, “Blurred Biology: How Many Sexes Are There?” BreakPoint (October 16, 
1996), http://www.colsoncenter.org/commentaries/5213-blurred-biology. 
14
 Susannah Cornwall, “The Kenosis of Unambiguous Sex in the Body of Christ: Intersex, 
Theology, and Existing ‘for the Other’,” Theology & Sexuality 14.2 (January 2008): 181-200; “No Longer 
Male and Female: The Challenge of Intersex Conditions for Theology,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 
Exeter, 2007; “Running to Catch Up with Intersex,” Church Times 7644 (18 September 2009): 13;  “‘State 
of Mind’ versus ‘Concrete Set of Facts’: The Contrasting of Transgender and Intersex in Church Documents 
on Sexuality,” Theology & Sexuality 15, no. 1 (2009): 7-28; Sex and Uncertainty in the Body of Christ: 
Intersex Conditions and Christian Theology (London and Oakville, CT: Equinox, 2010). 
15
 Suzanne Kessler reports that two devout Christians who showed some interest in the Intersex 
Society of North America stopped participating in on-line discussions due to conflicting opinions. They 
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While LGBT communities can certainly provide forums for addressing 
intersex issues, conflating or collapsing intersexuality into LGBT agendas 
fails to acknowledge the specific and urgent issues facing intersex people.16 
 
The “specific and urgent issues facing intersex people” include education about 
intersex, legal recognition of intersex, and advocacy for better medical care. Intersex 
advocates are working to end “shame, secrecy, and unwanted genital surgeries”—
challenging medical paternalism which, until recently, kept patients (and sometimes 
parents) ignorant of their (child’s) medical conditions and made access to records difficult 
or impossible to obtain. Many intersex advocates are working to influence the medical 
community as well as parents of the next generation of intersex children to postpone 
irreversible, technological attempts to “correct” intersex (genital surgery and hormone 
therapies) until children are of the age of consent and pubertal changes (if any) have been 
allowed to manifest.  
As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 1, most intersex surgeries are not 
medically necessary. They are performed in order to help the child “appear” less 
ambiguous, in the hope that parents will be better able to bond with their infants if they 
are not “affronted” at every diaper change and so that other potentially difficult societal 
interactions (e.g., in locker rooms or at urinals) will be avoided. Despite the good 
intentions of parents and doctors, many intersex persons recount harrowing stories of 
surgeries gone bad, of sex assignments rejected, and of medical treatment experienced as 
sexual abuse. These cries are leading to changes in medical standards of treatment. 
However, when Christians insist that male and female are the only human options, 
                                                                                                                                                  
were never heard from again. Suzanne J. Kessler, Lessons from the Intersexed (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 1998), 87. 
16
 Emi Koyama and Lisa Weasel, “From Social Construction to Social Justice: Transforming How 
We Teach About Intersexuality,” Teaching Intersex Issues: A Guide for Teachers in Women’s, Gender & 
Queer Studies, 2nd ed., ed., Emi Koyama (Portland: Intersex Initiative Portland, 2003), 5. 
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theological weight is cast in favor of (early) medical intervention, ignoring the stories of 
suffering and the pleas of the intersexed for better care. Conservative Christians must give 
ear to these marginalized voices in our families, communities, and churches. As I will 
argue, Christian theological anthropologies, even the conservative anthropologies of 
Evangelicals and Roman Catholics do not necessarily stand in the way of these goals. 
As a theologian raised and educated in the Evangelical world and completing 
doctoral studies at a Roman Catholic university, it may not come as a surprised that I now 
worship with the Anglican Church in North America (ACNA)—a denomination that 
identifies itself with the historic streams of Anglo-Catholicism, Evangelicalism, and 
Charismatic renewal. These are the traditions which have formed my life of faith and 
within which I wish to speak as we continue to wrestle with the theological significance 
of sex, gender, and sexuality in the postmodern context. I do not presume to offer a 
universal Theological Anthropology in the modernist sense. Rather, as a postmodern 
theologian who recognizes the situatedness of all interpretation, I offer my arguments as 
one voice in the ongoing conversation on the meaning of sex, gender, and sexuality for 
theological anthropology in the postmodern context. 
Most Evangelicals, conservative Anglicans, and Roman Catholics continue to 
defend traditional Christian (hetero)sexual ethics, even in the face of serious cultural and 
thoughtful theological challenges.17 But in holding to the significance of sex 
                                                 
17
 Debating Christian sexual ethics is beyond the scope of this dissertation, especially as it has 
been handled adequately elsewhere. Eugene F. Rogers Jr. has provided a number of thoughtful, theological 
defenses of homosexual unions in his anthology, Theology and Sexuality, along with his own essay, 
“Sanctification, Homosexuality, and God’s Triune Life,” in Theology and Sexuality, ed. Eugene F. Rogers 
Jr. (London: Blackwell, 2002), 217-246. While I appreciate his, and others’, careful work, my own position 
remains closer to those of Thomas E. Schmidt, Straight and Narrow? Compassion and Clarity in the 
Homosexuality Debate (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1995);  Lewis Smedes, Sex for Christians  
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1976, 1994);  and especially William J. 
Webb, Slaves, Women and Homosexuals: Exploring the Hermeneutics of Cultural Analysis  (Downers 
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complementarity for marriage (one man and one woman), theologians within these 
traditions have, at times, overemphasized the significance of sex “difference,” extending 
sex complementarity to justify theological notions of gender complementarity. In their 
attempts to provide theological justification for heterosexual ethics some have turned a 
blind eye to the presence of intersexed persons in the Scriptures, in Christian history, and 
among us today while others have argued that intersex can and should be fixed through 
medical technology in order to approximate what they believe to be “creational givens.” 
It is my hope that by (re)educating ourselves on the phenomena of intersex we will 
be better able to read the Scriptures anew, upholding at the same time the goodness of 
male-female complementarity in marriage, as well as the full humanity of intersex 
persons, their place in the community of faith, and the lessons they can teach us about the 
theological significance of sex, gender, and sexuality. Intersex raises questions for 
theologians on two fronts: 1) What are the implications of Christian theology for 
understanding, care, and ministry to/with the intersexed? 2) What are the implications of 
intersex for theological anthropologies built upon a binary model of human sex 
differentiation? As this is a theological dissertation, emphasis will be placed on the latter 
set of questions in the hopes that they will remove theological stumbling blocks to the 
former. As such, I will also argue that space must be (re)opened within the binary 
                                                                                                                                                  
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001). Like Webb, who acknowledges that his vision of gender 
egalitarianism is his best reading of Scripture but could be mistaken, I acknowledge that I may also be 
mistaken in my reading of sexual activity as restricted to heterosexual marriage; nevertheless, as much as I 
have great respect and love for certain lesbians and gays whom I know, and my heart breaks with them for 
the pain most have experienced, I cannot in good conscience affirm a practicing homosexual lifestyle from 
the Bible. I am unsympathetic to more radical proposals, such as those found in Elizabeth Stuart, ed., 
Religion is a Queer Thing: A Guide to the Christian Faith for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered 
People (London and Washington: Cassell, 1997). Stuart rightly observes that debates over gay marriage are 
really discussions as to how far heterosexual marriage can be stretched. She laments that this fails to address 
bisexual persons as well as others, e.g., those who advocate polyandry and communal sexuality (Stuart, 2). I 
must agree with her that marriage does remain the model for Christian sexual ethics, including the debate 
over gay marriage. 
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framework of the Christian tradition in order to enable intersex persons to be accepted as 
they are, supported if they decide to bring their bodies in line with a male or female 
gender identity, and also embraced if they decide to forego medical interventions, 
choosing instead to identify as intersex.  
 
Methodology 
 
 Given that a growing number of works are already available either written by 
intersex persons themselves18 or drawn from interviews with intersex persons by the non-
intersexed,19 this dissertation was accomplished through text-based research of available 
materials. Nevertheless, as I was working on this project, I was privileged to talk with 
several persons with intersex conditions, who were willing to identify themselves and 
discuss their experiences with me. I thank them for their courage, trust, and contributions 
to my own thinking. 
 
Extant Theological Work on Intersex 
 
 Medical, historical, anthropological, legal, and sociological works on intersex are 
becoming increasingly available.20 Only a few theological explorations have been 
proffered.  
Patricia Jung argues that biblical texts do not require sexual dimorphism but can 
be read to support “sexual polymorphism.”21 Karen Lebacqz works from an ethic of the 
                                                 
18
 E.g. Kailana Sidrandi Alaniz, Cheryl Chase [Bo Laurent], Sally Gross, Thea Hillman, Morgan 
Holmes, Emi Koyama, Jane Spalding, Lisa Weasel. 
19
 E.g. Gerald N. Callahan, Alice Domurat Dreger, John Money, Sharon E. Preves, Elizabeth Reis. 
20
 E.g. Accord Alliance, Alice Domurat Dreger, Julia Epstein, Anne Fausto-Sterling, Julie A. 
Greenberg, Gilbert Herdt, Melissa Hines, Ieuan Hughes, et al., Intersex Society of North America, Intersex 
Support Group International, Katrina Karkazis, Suzanne Kessler, Thomas Lacqueur, Wendy McKenna, 
Sharon E. Preves, Elizabeth Reis, Leonard Sax, Sharon E. Sytsma, Claudia Wiesemann, et al., Andrew 
Zinn, Kenneth J. Zucker. 
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alleviation of suffering but does not engage with Scripture.22 J. David Hester, a biblical 
scholar, begins his study of intersex by connecting it to the ancient category of the eunuch 
and moving from the gender transgression of eunuchs to advocating “transgressive 
sexualities.”23 Virginia Ramey Mollenkott is a former fundamentalist who continues to 
identify as “Evangelical” in her approach to the Bible but left the Evangelical sub-culture 
when she came out as a lesbian in the 1970s.24 Her work, Omnigender: a trans-religious 
approach,25 focuses on the experiences of transgender to which she believes intersex is 
related as a biological justification for diversions from the binary sex/gender system. 
Susannah Cornwall offers the most comprehensive theological exploration of intersex to 
date, comparing and contrasting intersex to transgender, disability, and queer theologies.26 
These writer attend to “the specific and urgent issues facing intersex people” at the same 
time that they employ intersex as one more argument against traditional Christian sexual 
ethics. It is the dearth of theological materials from Evangelicals and Roman Catholics 
which motivated the present study.  
A few Evangelicals have written briefly on the phenomena of intersex. Chuck 
Colson’s treatment in “Blurred Biology: How Many Sexes Are There?” represents those 
                                                                                                                                                  
21
 Patricia B. Jung, “Christianity and Human Sexual Polymorphism: Are they Compatible?” in 
Ethics and Intersex, Sharon E. Sytsm, ed. (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2006), xxv. 
22
 Karen Lebacqz, “Difference or Defect?  Intersexuality and the Politics of Difference,” The 
Annual for the Society of Christian Ethics 17 (1997): 213-229. 
23
 J. David Hester, “Eunuchs and the Postgender Jesus: Matthew 19.12 and Transgressive 
Sexualities,” Journal for the Study of the New Testament  28, no. 1 (2005): 13-40; and “Intersexes and the 
End of Gender:  Corporeal Ethics and Postgender Bodies,” Journal of Gender Studies 13, no. 3 (November 
2004): 215-225. 
24
 Virginia Ramey Mollenkott and Richard Mouw with Krista Tippett, “Gay Marriage: Broken or 
Blessed? Two Evangelical Views, on “Speaking of Faith” (August 3, 2006), http://being.publicradio.org/ 
programs/gaymarriage/index.shtml.  
25
 Virginia Ramey Mollenkott, Omnigender: a trans-religious approach (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 
2001). 
26
 Cornwall, Sex and Uncertainty; Cornwall, “The Kenosis of Unambiguous Sex in the Body of 
Christ: Intersex, Theology, and Existing ‘for the Other’;” Cornwall, “No Longer Male and Female: The 
Challenge of Intersex Conditions for Theology,” Ph.D. Dissertation; and Cornwall, “Running to Catch Up 
with Intersex.” 
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who view intersex as a product of the Fall—punishment for the original sin of Adam and 
Eve. 
The Bible teaches that the Fall into sin affected biology itself—that nature is 
now marred and distorted from its original perfection. This truth gives us a 
basis for fighting evil, for working to alleviate disease and deformity—
including helping those unfortunate children born with genital deformities.27 
His theological conviction that intersex is a product of the Fall leads directly to an 
argument for medical intervention—a logical move paralleled in Dennis Hollinger’s 
Meaning of Sex: Christian Ethics and the Moral Life.28 Colson’s dismissal of intersex 
seems motivated by his fear of what he calls “the homosexual lobby.”29 He does not 
attend to intersex in its own right. 
Other Evangelicals have provided more helpful treatments. Amanda Riley Smith 
opens the door to the possibility of welcoming the intersexed as intersexed in her article, 
“What Child is this? Making Room for Intersexuality.”30 Heather Looy and Hessel 
Bouma III, psychologist and biologist respectively, argue for the consideration of the full 
humanity of intersex, their inclusion in the community of faith, and better medical, 
psychological, and pastoral care.31 Their articles begin to wrestle with the theological 
issues attending intersex but they write in order to ask theologians to contribute to the 
task. 
                                                 
27
 Charles Colson, “Blurred Biology.” 
28
 Dennis P. Hollinger, The Meaning of Sex: Christian Ethics and the Moral Life (Grand Rapids:  
Baker Academic, 2009), 74, 84. 
29
 Charles Colson, “Blurred Biology.”  
30
 Amanda Riley Smith, “What Child is this?  Making Room for Intersexuality,” Regeneration 
Quarterly  8, no. 2 (Winter 2002) : 27-30. 
31
 Heather Looy, “Male and Female God Created Them:  The Challenge of Intersexuality,”  
Journal of Psychology and Christianity  21 (2002): 10-20; Heather Looy, “Sex Differences: Evolved, 
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We must acknowledge that our expertise is as a psychologist and biologist, 
drawing on science and experience. Our search of the theological literature to 
understand creation norms for human sexuality and gender has uncovered 
little in depth or well-developed material. It is our hope that this article may 
stimulate conversations and promote the theological scholarship needed to 
help address these issues further.32 
 
 I have found no Roman Catholic treatment of intersex from a theological 
perspective other than one offered by an intersex person.33 The story of Selwyn/Sally 
Gross is worth recounting at length for it places the theological arguments made by Gross, 
myself, and others in their proper context—the lives of real people.  
Gross was born in South Africa to Jewish parents in August 1953. The birth 
heralded not joy but distress as the mother was told that her infant “was likely to die of 
dehydration.” Looking back on the moment, Sally considers, 
Now a new born infant doesn’t die of dehydration unless you don’t feed it… 
My suspicion is that back then in 1953 the reaction was: “Oh my God! What do 
we do, let’s let nature take its course.” But then someone relented.34 
 
Although born intersexed with ambiguous genitals, Gross was given the sex assignment 
of male and named Selwyn.35 Selwyn knew that he was different, especially when he hit 
puberty and his sexual drive never developed. Gross simply assumed that he was “one of 
nature’s celibates” but found little room for celibacy within Judaism where “[o]ne is 
expected to produce grandchildren.” 36 Although a committed Orthodox Jew, Gross began 
to look elsewhere to make sense of his experiences. “I did not believe at the time that 
Orthodox Judaism had religious symbols which could make sense of the way in which I 
                                                 
32
 Looy and Bouma, 176. 
33
 Sally Gross, “Intersexuality and Scripture,” Theology and Sexuality 11 (1999): 65-74. 
34
 Sally Gross, “The Journey from Selwyn to Sally,” The Natal Witness Features, South Africa  
(February 21, 2000), http://www.intersex.org.za/publications/witness1.pdf. See page 31: Congenital 
Adrenal Hyperplasia can expose an infant to the risk of dehydration but it is not clear from Gross’ case 
whether this diagnosis applies. 
35
 Intersex Society of South Africa, “Biographies: Sally Gross,” http://www.intersex.org/ 
za/biography.html. 
36
 Gross, “The Journey from Selwyn to Sally.”   
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was different, whatever it was…”37 The place which Roman Catholicism carved out for 
celibates led him to consider Christianity. 
The image of the Cross seemed to be an icon of all manner of confusion and 
suffering. The Holocaust was there, the horror of apartheid was there, and my 
own personal confusion and pain—which I could never publicly admit—was 
there as well. And in the resurrection was a symbol that this was transcended. 
And at the back of my mind, there would have been an awareness that in 
Christianity there are strands of tradition in which celibacy is valued and 
turned to positive use.38 
 
Selwyn was baptized in 1976. After working against apartheid in South Africa and 
engaging in political activism in Israel for several years, he moved to Oxford in 1981 and 
was accepted as a novitiate in the Dominican order. Selwyn was ordained to the 
priesthood in 1987, whereupon he taught moral theology, ethics, and philosophy at 
Blackfriars, Oxford and other Oxford University colleges. Later he became sub-prior at 
the priory at Cambridge.39 
 In the early 1990’s Selwyn was invited by the Dominicans to return to South 
Africa to teach. The struggle against apartheid, in which Gross had been deeply involved, 
had been won. Looking back, Sally reflects that there was finally space to consider the 
tensions in her own life:  
“There were two areas of tension: there was the issue of my Jewish/Christian 
identity and the issue of bodiliness and gender, although I thought that was 
secondary. ...At that stage I rather naively thought I’d see someone with some 
expertise in this area and after a couple of sessions I could get on with the rest of 
my priestly life, full stop.” Gross laughs. “It wasn’t as simple as that.”40 
 
Selwyn’s counselor was more experienced with transsexuality than intersexed but still 
encouraged Gross to submit to medical testing.  
                                                 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Ibid. 
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These tests showed that Gross’s testosterone levels were in the middle of the 
normal female range and less than an eighth of the bottom of the male range. 
“The counselor was absolutely spot on but nevertheless sought to regiment 
this in terms of transsexuality and a change of gender.”41 
 
Gross was granted a one-year leave from the Dominicans to explore the possibility of a 
gender change but forbidden to contact fellow brothers, parents, most friends and “denied 
moral and material support as a matter of principle.”42 However, one senior Dominican 
priest encouraged Gross to look upon this exploration as  
something which was priestly—maybe that in my bodiliness, God was 
working out a preaching of that passage in Paul: “In Christ there is neither 
Jew nor Gentile, slave nor free, male nor female.” But all of them, all 
assimilated here.43 
 
Unfortunately this latter view was not taken up by her religious superiors. When they 
learned of the congenital nature of Gross’ condition—indicating the possibility of 
being raised as female instead of a male—she was greeted with suspicion, as a threat 
which needed to be removed.  
a Papal Rescript stripped Gross of clerical status and annulled her religious 
vows, [but] not without an element of subterfuge. Rumors had been 
circulating in Catholic circles that Gross had reverted to ultra-orthodox 
Judaism. This seemed to suggest that a dismissal was being prepared on the 
grounds that she had “notoriously defected from the faith”—a cause for 
immediate dismissal and excommunication without right of appeal. Gross 
pre-empted such a hostile dismissal on such false grounds by agreeing to co-
operate in a laicisation process. …Gross was laicized on the basis of a 
notional petition for dispensation from priestly celibacy but celibacy had 
never been the issue. “I am one of nature’s celibates. It was not my petition, 
it was contrary to what I had said.” 
     Even with lay status, further prohibitions were placed on Gross, although 
without any canonical justification. “They effectively made it impossible for 
me to remain in communion.”44 
 
                                                 
41
 Sally Gross, “Shunned by the Church,” The Natal Witness Features, South Africa (February 22, 
2000), http://www.intersex.org.za/publications/witness2.pdf.  
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Ibid. 
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Gross had hoped to remain not only within the Catholic Church but within her 
religious order. 
…an order in which there are congregations of women and some mixed 
communities as well. Had there been a willingness to find a way of 
accommodating my religious vocation, a way could have been found without 
too great a difficulty, although it would have taken a lot of courage.45 
 
Sally admits that she misses the priesthood but has found a place worshipping with 
the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in the wake of the loss of her church.46  
 Gross employs her training in Judaism and Christian theology as she considers 
intersexuality in the Scriptures. She recounts the assertion, “put to me by a conspicuously 
pious, intelligent, theologically sophisticated but fundamentalistic Christian of my 
acquaintance,” who informed her, on the basis of Genesis 1:27, that “an intersexed person 
such as me does not satisfy the biblical criterion of humanity, and indeed even that it 
follows that I am congenitally unbaptizable.”47 She finds this “rather comical” given the 
rabbinical tradition indicating that the original human was a hermaphrodite before God 
removed the woman from the side of the man.48 She also notes rabbinical traditions which 
state that Abraham and Sarah were each intersexed.49 Although she admits that the 
commentaries on Abraham and Sarah “like many rabbinical exegetical glosses of an 
anecdotal rather than legal character, are perhaps a trifle far-fetched and quaint,” 
nevertheless,  
They do make it abundantly clear that those who, more than any others, 
cherished and preserved the Hebrew text of Scripture and sought faithfully to 
ensure that no scriptural ‘jot and tittle’ was changed, did not see intersex 
conditions as falling under the condemnation of the canon of Hebrew 
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 Ibid. 
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 Gross, “Intersexuality and Scripture,” 70. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid., 71-73. 
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Scripture. Quite the contrary, they contemplated with equanimity the 
possibility that leading and revered scriptural characters were intersexed.50 
 
Given the possibility of defending hermaphroditism/intersex from the Scriptures, and 
the additional prohibition of the removal of gonads (when they do not constitute a 
health risk) suggested by Deuteronomy 23:1, Gross concludes: 
Biblical literalists are indeed arguably bound by Scripture to respect the sense 
of many people who are intersexed that violence was done to them in infancy 
by the imposition of what was in effect cosmetic surgery, and to accept that it 
is right and proper that those who are born intersexed be enabled to remain 
physically as they are and to identify as intersexed.51 
 
Elsewhere she testifies, 
I am a creature of God, and … I’m created, and intersexed people are created, 
no less than anyone else, in the image and likeness of God.52  
 
Believing that she speaks the truth, I offer the following dissertation to show how space 
can and must be made, even within conservative Evangelicalism and Roman Catholicism, 
for the intersexed among us who are, truly, created in the image of God. 
 
Structure of the Argument 
 
The structure of this dissertation fits with Evangelical, Anglican, and Roman 
Catholic theological methods: 
Part I will present several challenges to the binary sex model, arguing that 
theological anthropology can no longer assume that all humans fit into the category of 
either “Adam” or “Eve.” 
Chapter 1 will explain the phenomena of intersex and the medical and sociological 
challenges which intersex brings to the idea that humans exist, or should exist, only as 
                                                 
50
 Ibid., 73. 
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 Ibid., 74. 
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 Sally Gross, speaking in Wessel Van Huyssteen, The 3rd Sex, broadcast SABC (South Africa), 
(November 2003); cited in Cornwall, Sex and Uncertainty, 1. 
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male or female. I will document the growing evidence that medical technology cannot 
“fix” all intersex conditions and that some persons are justified in their desire to be 
recognized as intersex, rather than as male or female, and should be granted the right to 
such recognition, outside and inside the church. 
Chapter 2 will detail the existence of intersex persons in history, especially as 
recorded in the Christian Scriptures and Christian history. In biblical times and during the 
early history of Christianity, many intersex conditions would have been recognized under 
the broad category of the eunuch. I will show how Jesus’ recognition of those who are 
“eunuchs from birth” in Matthew 19:12 changed the course of intersex and discussions of 
the theological significance of sex, gender, and sexuality in ways that have been lost to 
contemporary students of the Bible. 
Chapter 3 will review the history of theological anthropology paying close 
attention to how answers to the questions “What is the human?” and “What is the image?” 
relate to biological sex differentiation. I will recount how different historical figures have 
wrestled with how many sexes are or should be recognized by society as well as how 
theologians have thought about the sexes as equally human and, thus, as equally valid 
images of God. In order to do this, I will trace the development of Western theology in 
three movements: from its inception in the classical period, through the Protestant and 
Victorian Reformations in the modern period, into current, postmodern reconstructions of 
the human and the imago Dei.53   
                                                 
53
 As a theologian writing in the United States of America, the history I recount is that of Western 
Christianity. It is only in the postmodern period that Western theologians are beginning to learn the value of 
non-Western (non-white, non-middle and upper-class) contributions and critiques of Western theological 
construction. Some of these contributions will be acknowledged later in the dissertation. 
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 Having established medical, sociological, biblical, historical, and philosophical 
challenges to the binary sex model, Part II of the dissertation will explore how we must 
reconstruct theological anthropology in the postmodern period as it relates to sex, gender, 
and sexuality. To do this, I will interact with significant theological voices from two 
major traditions in American Christianity—Evangelical and Roman Catholic—in order to 
affirm what can be affirmed in these traditions, critique what must be critiqued, and move 
the conversation forward in theological construction. 
 Chapter 4 will analyze how sex and gender have been treated in Evangelical and 
Roman Catholic theological literature and argue that these traditions must move from 
thinking about women as the paradigmatic “other” to the recognition of other “others” in 
our theological anthropologies. 
 Chapter 5 will show how the binary sex model has been used to read sexuality into 
certain visions of the imago Dei such that the social imago is being transformed into the 
sexual/spousal imago. I will illustrate the dangers of these trajectories for both 
Evangelical and Roman Catholic anthropologies, suggesting alternative readings of the 
creation narratives in Genesis and a return to the social imago as a way to avoid the 
sexualization of the imago Dei. 
 Chapter 6 will conclude this project by exploring the tensions which christology 
and eschatology bring to discussions of sex, gender, and sexuality. I will argue that, rather 
than dismantling the categories of male and female, space can and should be opened up 
for the addition and inclusion of intersex whose humanity was also taken up by Jesus 
Christ in the incarnation. I will conclude by suggesting that christology does not lead to 
the erasure of sex/gender identities “in Christ” even while it does call for a de-centering of 
 22
personal identity which makes space for the healing of the self and reconciliation in the 
community of God. In such ways can we work to balance the binary in the postmodern 
“already/not yet.” 
 23
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1                                                                                                    
INTERSEX: MEDICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL CHALLENGES  
TO THE BINARY SEX MODEL 
 
 
In this chapter we will begin by exploring contemporary, medical descriptions of 
intersex. We will trace the history of intersex from the time before medical technology—
when intersex existed at the margins of society—to the virtual erasure of intersex by the 
medical establishment. We will then hear objections to the medicalization of intersex, 
paying particular attention to the voices of intersex persons themselves. Lastly, we will 
hear from those who lay the blame for the abuse of the intersexed at the foot of the binary 
sex model and ask whether Christianity is to blame for the current dichotomy. 
 
WHAT IS INTERSEX? 
 
Normal Sex Development 
 Intersex is a term used to describe persons who do not fit into standard medical 
descriptions of male or female. It is important at the outset to establish what is considered 
normal or typical by the medical community so that variations from the norm can be 
understood. In this paper “normal” is employed according to the classical sense of 
“norm,” “standard” or “type.”  Thus, “abnormal” does not indicate “freakishness” but 
atypical development. 
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Anne Fausto-Sterling, a biologist at Brown University, after researching the 
frequency rates of intersex conditions around the globe, describes what is considered 
“typical” or “normal” by medical practitioners today: 
We define the typical male as someone with an XY chromosomal composition, 
and testes located within the scrotal sac. The testes produce sperm which, via the 
vas deferens, may be transported to the urethra and ejaculated outside the body. 
Penis length at birth ranges form 2.5 to 4.5 cm; an idealized penis has a 
completely enclosed urethra which opens at the tip of the glans. During fetal 
development, the testes produce the Müllerian inhibiting factor, testosterone, and 
dihydrotestosterone, which juvenile testicular activity ensures a masculinizing 
puberty. The typical female has two X chromosomes, functional ovaries which 
ensure a feminizing puberty, oviducts connecting to a uterus, cervix and vaginal 
canal, inner and outer vaginal lips, and a clitoris, which at birth ranges in size 
from 0.20 to 0.85 cm.1 
 
 
Intersex as an Umbrella Concept 
The term “intersex” is not a diagnosis but an umbrella concept used to cover a 
wide range of variations in sex development. Many intersex conditions result in 
ambiguous genitalia, either at birth or throughout the life course of the individual; 
however, not all intersex conditions are indicated by genital inspection. The Consortium 
on the Management of Disorders of Sex Development lists the following as intersex- 
related conditions: “congenital development of ambiguous genitalia, congenital 
disjunction of internal and external sex anatomy, incomplete development of sex 
                                                 
1
 Melanie Blackless, Anthony Charusvatstra, Amanda Derryck, Anne Fausto-Sterling, Karl 
Lausanne and Ellen Lee, “How Sexually Dimorphic are We? Review and Synthesis,” American Journal of 
Human Biology 12 (2000): 152. This article will be cited as Blackless et al., according to current citation 
standards. However, Fausto-Sterling explains in her larger work [Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the 
Construction of Sexuality (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2000), 51], that she researched the literature 
“together with a group of Brown University undergraduates.” Given this admission, and so that the reader 
can more easily connect the threads of her arguments, I will list Fausto-Sterling as the author in my text. 
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anatomy, sex chromosome anomalies and disorders of gonadal development.”2 Each of 
these will be described in what follows. 
“Intersex is not a discrete or natural category.”3 While most people believe they 
know what makes a person male or female—chromosomes, gonads, genitals, secondary 
sex characteristics—it is not clear what type and how many variations to these norms it 
takes to classify a person as intersex. Should a person with external female genitalia who 
has XY chromosomes and testes be considered male, female or intersex? How large does 
a clitoris need to be before it is considered a micropenis? These decisions are made by 
humans, typically by doctors. What doctors believe about physical norms and variations, 
the usefulness of the intersex designation, and social standards for genders all factor into 
decisions about sex assignment. They also factor into debates over which conditions 
“count” for estimates of frequency rates. 
It will be helpful for the reader to become familiar with certain intersex conditions 
before entering the debate over which variations “count.” An exhaustive list of intersex 
conditions is not possible or necessary for the thesis of this paper. Instead, I will describe 
some of the more common variations and their implications for my argument. 
 
                                                 
2
 Consortium for the Management of Disorders of Sex Development, Clinical Guidelines for the 
Management of Disorders of Sex Development in Childhood (Rohnert Park, CA: Intersex society of North 
America, 2006), 2. 
3
 Intersex Society of North America, “What is intersex?,” http://www.isna.org/faq/printable, 1. 
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Types of Intersex Conditions 
 
Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS)  
AIS is an intersex conditions which occurs roughly once in every 13,000 births.4  
Androgen insensitivity comes in two types: complete (CAIS) and partial (PAIS).  Persons 
with AIS are born with XY chromosomes (i.e., that of a typical male). XY chromosomes 
set into motion the normal development of testes which begin to secrete higher levels of 
testosterone in XY individuals as early as eight weeks of gestation.5 But people with AIS 
are unable to process male hormones (androgens). Because their cells lack the proper 
receptors, persons with CAIS develop female external genitals. They retain undescended 
or partially descended testes. They usually have a short vagina and no cervix, though 
some lack a vagina altogether. Because genitals appear normal (for females) at birth, 
CAIS is not usually discovered until puberty when menstruation does not occur. Given 
this description of androgen insensitivity the reader may not find it surprising that these 
“girls” do not menstruate. What is surprising, however, is that these individuals do 
develop secondary sex characteristics typical of pubescent girls. The Intersex Society of 
North America explains how feminizing puberty is possible:  
At puberty, the testes are stimulated by the pituitary gland, and produce 
testosterone. Because testosterone is chemically very similar to estrogen, 
some of the testosterone converts back to estrogen (‘aromatizes’) in the 
bloodstream. This estrogen produces breast growth, though it may be late.6  
 
Thus, higher levels of testosterone during puberty result not in the typical masculinization 
of those with androgen receptivity (i.e., growth of underarm and pubic hair, adam’s 
                                                 
4
 Intersex Society of North America, “How Common is Intersex,” http://www.isna.org/faq 
/frequency, 1. Blackless, et al., list the frequency as .076/1,000 on page 153. This translates as 1:13,153 
(according to my calculations) which the Intersex Society of North America has rounded to 1:13,000. I 
prefer to cite frequency rates as “1 person per” so that one does not need to think of percentages of persons.  
5
 Melissa Hines, Brain Gender (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 23. 
6
 Intersex Society of North America, “Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS),” 
http://www.isna.org/faq/printable, 3-4. 
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apple, voice descent, increased muscle mass); rather, higher levels of testosterone have 
the opposite effect—increased feminization of XY individuals. CAIS has been called 
“classical testicular feminization” in recognition of this process. It has also been labeled 
“male pseudo-hermaphroditism.”   
This last designation—male pseudohermaphroditism—gained parlance in the 
Victorian era. During the 19th century, doctors looked to gonads to determine sex 
assignment when genitals were “unclear” or, in the case of CAIS individuals, when 
normal sex development—such as menstruation—did not occur.7 Gonads were seen as 
primary for two reasons. First, reproduction was viewed as the principle marker for sex 
identification. Second, scientific knowledge of gonadal hormone production and their 
influence on sex development was growing. Within the Victorian schema, the CAIS 
patient, with male gonads and female genitalia would be considered a “male” on account 
of “his” testes, but a “pseudohermaphrodite” on account of “her” genitals and secondary 
sex traits. On the flip side, a person with male external genitals and ovaries would have 
been labeled a “female pseudohermaphrodite.” The only persons labeled “true 
hermaphrodites” were those who possessed both an ovary and a testis, a rare condition 
now called “ovotestes.”8 More recent scholars reject the language “pseudo-
hermaphrodite” because it is considered offensive, confusing, and imprecise.9 
                                                 
7
 Sex assignment is the phrase used to denote what sex the child is called at birth, i.e., what is 
recorded on the birth certificate. Sex assignment is irreversible in some societies. 
8
 Alice Domurat Dreger, “Doubtful Sex: The Fate of the Hermaphrodite in Victorian Medicine,” 
Victorian Studies. (Spring 1995): 335-370. See also Anne Fausto-Sterling, “The Five Sexes: Why Male and 
Female are Not Enough,” Sexuality and Gender, ed. Christine L. Williams and Arlene Stein (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2002): 468-473. 
9
 Alice D. Dreger, Cheryl Chase, Aron Sousa, Philip A. Gruppuso and Joel Frader, “Changing the 
Nomenclature/Taxonomy for Intersex: A Scientific and Clinical Rationale,” Journal of Pediatric 
Endocrinology & Metabolism 18:8 (2005): 729-733. See also Consortium, Clinical Guidelines, 16. The 
Intersex Society of North America explains that the term hermaphrodite is a “mythological term” implying 
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While in the Victorian era persons with AIS would have been considered “men” 
by the medical establishment, today these individuals are overwhelmingly declared to be 
women. They look like girls at birth. They look like women after puberty. Paradoxically, 
CAIS women develop along the lines of the contemporary, Western ideal of womanhood: 
they are tall and lean, with little to no body hair.10 Thus, these individuals typically have 
unquestioned female gender identities and roles until confronted with their diagnosis, 
either at puberty or as adults.11   
Partial androgen insensitivity is less common than its complete form, occurring 
approximately in only one in 130,000 births.12 Whereas individuals with CAIS appear 
“unambiguously” female, persons with partial androgen insensitivity (PAIS) have bodies 
that fall anywhere along the spectrum. Charmian Quigley and Frank French, doctors at 
the Laboratories for Reproductive Biology, The University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, “proposed a grading system for the phenotypic features (external appearance) in 
AIS.13 The scale runs from AIS Grade 1 to Grade 7 with increasing severity of androgen 
resistance—and hence decreasing masculinization with increasing feminization.”14 The 
following chart may be found at www.AISSG.org, the website of one of the largest and 
most trusted support groups for persons with AIS: 
                                                                                                                                                 
“that a person is both fully male and fully female. This is a physiologic impossibility.” Intersex Society of 
North America, “Is a person who is intersex a hermaphrodite?” http://www.isna.org/faq/printable, 16.   
10
 Sharon E. Preves, Intersex and Identity: The Contested Self (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 2003), 28. 
11
 Hines, 32. See also the AIS Support Group (UK), “Terminology Problems,” http://www.aissg. 
org/21_OVERVIEW.HTM. 
12
 Intersex Society of North America, “How Common is Intersex,” 1. Blackless, et al., list the 
frequency as .0076/1,000 on page 153. This translates as 1:131,530 (according to my calculations) which 
the Intersex Society of North America has rounded to 1:130,000.  
13
 This scale is modeled on the Prader classification for Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) to 
be discussed below.  
14
 Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome Support Group (AISSG), UK, “What is AIS?: Forms of AIS 
(Complete and Partial),” http://www.aissg.org/21_OVERVIEW.HTM. Charmian A. Quigley, et al., 
“Androgen Receptor Defects: Historical, Clinical and Molecular Perspectives,” Endocrine Reviews 16:3 
(June 1995): 271-321, see page 281 for chart and explanations. 
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Grade 1 PAIS Male genitals, infertility 
Grade 2 PAIS Male genitals but mildly ‘under-masculinized’, isolated 
hypospadias15 
Grade 3 PAIS Predominantly male genitals but more severely ‘under-
masculinized’ (perineal hypospadias, small penis, cryptorchidism 
i.e. undescended testes, and/or bifid scrotum) 
Grade 4 PAIS Ambiguous genitals, severely ‘under-masculinized’ (phallic 
structure that is indeterminate between a penis and a clitoris) 
Grade 5 PAIS Essentially female genitals (including separate urethral and 
vaginal orifices, mild clitoromegaly, i.e. enlarged clitoris) 
Grade 6 PAIS Female genitals with pubic/underarm hair 
Grade 7 CAIS Female genitals with little or no pubic/underam hair 
   
At the CAIS end of the spectrum the outward appearance is completely 
female (AIS Grades 6/7) and the sex of rearing is invariably female. In PAIS 
the outward genital appearance can lie anywhere from being almost 
completely female (Grade 5), through mixed male/female, to completely male 
(Grade 1); it has been suggested that slight androgen insensitivity might 
contribute to infertility in some otherwise normal men. Some babies with 
PAIS may be raised as males but many are re-assigned as female. …Before 
puberty, individuals with Grade 6 or 7 are indistinguishable.16 
 
Some individuals with complete androgen insensitivity reject the label intersex. 
They consider themselves as females and resent association with those whose gender 
identities are less certain. On the other hand, individuals with partial androgen 
insensitivity, especially those resulting in ambiguous genitals, are more likely to resonate 
with intersex terminology and the efforts of intersex advocacy groups. Despite recent 
efforts by some AIS support groups to distance themselves from intersex concerns, the 
question of intersex remains. What should determine sex assignment? External genitalia 
or internal gonads? Reproductive structures or personal gender identity?  
The shifting opinion of the medical community over the years illustrates how sex 
designation is socially constructed for intersex conditions. When society (e.g. the medical 
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 Hypospadias is a condition of the penis where the urinary opening (meatus) is located off-center 
on the glans (mild), along the penile shaft (medium), or under the penis (severe). See description below. 
Kessler, Lessons, 166-167. 
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 Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome Support Group (AISSG), UK, “What is AIS: Forms of AIS 
(Complete and Partial),” http://www.aissg.org/21_OVERVIEW.HTM.  
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establishment) considers gonads or chromosomes as the primary markers of sex, persons 
with CAIS are “really” men. When society (e.g. the medical establishment, psychological 
consensus) considers external genitalia and/or personal gender identity as primary, 
persons with CAIS are “really” women.17 
 Given the reality of social construction for sex determination for the intersexed, it 
is valid to question the entire schema within which such construction currently takes 
place. Should persons with CAIS or PAIS be forced to choose between two options for 
sex assignment? Should they be given a third option, intersex, along with the traditional 
categories, male and female? Some have proposed an even more nuanced scheme, 
wherein one would combine labels. Thus, a person with CAIS, who identifies as a 
woman, would be considered an “intersex woman.”18 Such a designation recognizes that 
XY individuals with CAIS can appear more feminine than XX women and more 
accurately reflects the complexity of the issues for sex and gender identification.  
Anne Fausto-Sterling has argued for public recognition of the five sex categories 
used by medical doctors since the Victorian period: male, female, male pseudo-
hermaphrodite, female pseudo-hermaphrodite and true hermaphrodite.19 Suzanne Kessler 
and Wendy McKenna argue that the entire system should be tossed. If people want to 
identify as a particular sex, or intersex, let them. Some may want to identify as male or 
female during their reproductive years, so as to find a suitable partner, and then change 
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 When, in 1968, the International Olympic Committee moved from genital and breast inspection 
to buccal smears to verify the sex of athletes, AIS women were rejected from competitions and some 
medals were revoked. Ironically, because CAIS women cannot respond to any androgens, even the normal 
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competitors. Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body, 1-5. 
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 Kessler, Lessons, 88-89 
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designation at other (non-reproductive) seasons of life. What’s the harm?20 We will 
return to their proposals toward the end of this chapter after we consider a few other 
intersex conditions. We turn next from the “male pseudo-hermaphrodite” to one 
condition which fell under the old label, “female pseudo-hermaphroditism.” 
 
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) 
 
CAH is an intersex condition which occurs anywhere between one in 13,000 and 
one in 36,000 births.21 It is an “inherited enzyme deficiency condition, causing a 
malfunction of the fetus’s adrenal gland, which results in the overproduction of fetal 
androgen.”22 Thus XX individuals can have androgen levels that are similar to those of 
typical males and XY individuals can have higher than average levels.23 Higher levels of 
androgens “can make XX embryos have larger than average clitorises, or even a clitoris 
that looks rather like a penis, or labia that look like a scrotum.”24  
Virilization in girls with CAH is highly variable…and in a small number of 
cases, virilization is so extensive that genetic females are misidentified as 
males at birth and assigned and reared as boys until other consequences of the 
CAH syndrome result in a correct diagnosis. Usually, this occurs sufficiently 
early to allow reassignment to the female sex. However, in some cases it does 
not. XX individuals with CAH do not have testes or Müllerian Inhibiting 
Factor, and so they retain female internal reproductive organs and are capable 
of reproducing.25   
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In 1954 Andrea Prader created what has come to be called the Prader Scale to 
classify degrees of virilization caused by CAH.26   
 
0 normal female genitals 
1 slight enlargement of the clitoris (cliteromegaly)  
2 enlarged clitoris and partial fusion of the labia producing a “funnel-shaped” cavity for 
the urethra and vaginal openings 
3 enlargement of the clitoris such that it is often described as a “phallus.” At this stage the 
labia are so fused that they are indistinguishable from a scrotum and there is only one 
“urogenital” opening  
4 complete fusion of the scrotum with urogenital opening at the base or shaft of the 
phallus,” what is often labeled hypospadias on a genetic male 
5 mild to medium hypospadias 
6 normal male genitals 
 
Virilization does not stop after the birth of the child. CAH can trigger other 
secondary sex characteristics typical of male puberty: “dense body hair, a receding 
hairline, deep voice, prominent muscles, etc.”27 
  “Among the many causes of intersex, only CAH represents a real medical 
emergency in the newborn period.”28 CAH can cause severe dehydration leading to death 
within the first weeks of the infants’ life. At puberty, additional medical intervention is 
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needed to create a vaginal opening separate from the urethra for menstruation and so that 
urine does not pool in an internalized vagina.29 
 CAH can also occur in XY males who may also be in need of medical as well as 
psychological care.  
[U]ntreated CAH can cause boys to have their puberty earlier than other 
boys. This can be a problem because it will stop them from growing taller 
…and because it can cause them to be very sexual well before other children 
their age are having such strong sexual thoughts and desires.30 
   
 CAH is only considered an intersex condition when it occurs in XX individuals. 
The Intersex Society of North America notes that while “1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children 
are born with congenital adrenal hyperplasia… the prevalence of CAH-related intersex is 
about 1 in 20,000 to 1 in 36,000.”31 But these numbers only represent classic CAH 
conditions which begin in utero. CAH can also start later in life, something which has 
been coined late-onset CAH or LOCAH. 
 Late-onset congenital adrenal hyperplasia is an enzyme deficiency which occurs 
anytime after age five. If a child shows premature signs of puberty, clitoral growth or 
male pattern hair growth (hirsutism) doctors may check for LOCAH. After puberty, signs 
of the condition “include hirsutism, menstrual disorders, and clitoral enlargement.”32   
 Late-onset CAH is the single most common intersex condition. Fausto-Sterling 
explains that “[w]hile the incidence of late-onset 21-hydroxylase varies widely among 
                                                 
29
 Consortium, Clinical Guidelines, 6. 
30
 Intersex Society of North America, “Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH),” 5.  
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Blackless et al., 156. 
 34
different ethnic groups, its overall frequency is extremely high.” 33 Because of the degree 
of variation, it is helpful to see the distribution among groups: 34 
Ashkenazi  37/1,000 
Hispanics 19/1,000 
Yugoslavs 16/1,000 
Italians 3/1,000 
Mixed Caucasians .01/1,000 
Average by my calculations 15.002/1,000  or  1:67 
 
 That one in every 67 persons could have an intersex condition may come as a 
shock to the reader. However, while the Intersex Society of North America and others list 
LOCAH as an intersex condition others have questioned its inclusion.35 Fausto-Sterling 
calculates frequency rates for all intersex conditions with and without LOCAH.36 
Leonard Sax and Ieuan Hughes have argued to the contrary that LOCAH is not an 
intersex condition and should not be counted in estimates of intersex conditions.37 Sax 
bases his argument on the fact that these children are born with genitals which match 
their chromosomal patterns (i.e., XX babies have female genitals, XY babies have male 
genitals). He insists that the symptoms of LOCAH in adult women—“oligomenorrhea” 
(i.e., infrequent menstrual cycles), “hirsutism” (i.e., male-pattern hair growth), 
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“infertility,” “acne,” “mild clitoromegaly,” and a complete lack of symptoms in others—
disqualify LOCAH patients from classification as intersex.38  
I would agree with Sax that persons who do not present symptoms and yet inflate 
the numbers for intersex should lead researchers to show caution when calculating 
frequency rates. Still, I wonder what Sax would say to the young woman who begins to 
grow a beard, learns she is infertile and, as a result, begins to question her femininity. 
According to John Money, an early leader in the field of sexology and the medical 
management of intersex, “a girl with excessive hair growth… will generally need special 
counseling to help prevent serious social disturbance of social and personality 
development.” But he also writes, “Androgen-induced hirsutism in girls is not 
accompanied by a corresponding masculinization of the gender identity or the body 
image. Therefore the woman with hirsutism is mortified and intent on ridding herself of 
the unwanted hairiness.”39 In a culture where gender is considered foundational to one’s 
identity, such experiences can lead to severe personal disorientation. While the phrase 
“pseudo-hermaphrodite” may be rejected as politically incorrect in current parlance, such 
language may more accurately reflect the feelings of affected parties.40   
 In the West if a child born with ambiguous or masculinized genitals is discovered 
to have CAH doctors recommend that parents raise the child as a girl. Medical 
management includes the preservation of female internal reproductive organs, genital 
surgery (e.g., vaginoplasty, clitoral reduction) and hormone therapy to ensure masculine 
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secondary sex characteristics do not develop “naturally.” Doctors in Saudi Arabia, trained 
in Western medical traditions, typically follow the same procedures; however, some 
Saudi parents have rejected their recommendations. Fausto-Sterling recounts how these 
parents rejected the suggestion that they begin raising their “son” as their daughter.   
Nor would they accept feminizing surgery for their child. As the reporting 
physicians write, ‘female upbringing was resisted on social grounds. … This 
was essentially an expression of local community attitudes with … the 
preference for male offspring.’41 
 
Another commentator on this same example writes: “It has to be accepted that attitudes 
toward sex of rearing and in particular toward feminizing genitoplasties in late-diagnosed 
patients with CAH in the Middle East is going to be very different from those in 
Europe.”42   
 Westerners are keen to critique the sexism so apparent in the example above but 
feminist scholars are eager to point out that sexism pervades the Western medical 
tradition even still. In addition to the preservation of female reproductive organs, 
surgeons explain that genital surgery is simply easier for females than for males. It is 
difficult to construct a well-functioning penis. A vagina, on the other hand, is not 
considered quite as difficult. Fausto-Sterling reports one surgeon remarking: “you can 
make a hole but you can’t build a pole.”43 Suzanne Kessler describes the frustrations of 
many that though a well-functioning penis is often the criteria for male sex assignment a 
well-functioning vagina (self-lubricating, sensitive, able to change size and shape) is not. 
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A vaginal opening with the potential of receiving a penis (even if painful) is all that is 
required.44  
Once again we are reminded that sex, at least for the intersexed, is socially (and 
medically) constructed. Societies have presuppositions about gender which influence how 
they construct sex for the intersexed. When (Western) society gives preference to 
chromosomes and internal reproductive organs over external genitals and make gendered 
assumptions about the relative difficulty of genital surgeries, CAH patients are assigned 
as female and medically “managed” along the female pathway. When (Middle Eastern) 
society gives priority to external genitalia and social preference for male children, CAH 
patients are reared and medically “managed” along the masculine pathway.  
Large cultural differences, like those described above, shed light on the socially 
constructed nature of sex assignment for the intersex debate. Though some may think that 
Sax and Fausto-Sterling are being overly pedantic when they debate the inclusion of 
LOCAH in intersex tallies, given the information presented above we can at least grant 
that debate is warranted. Presuppositions must be excavated and put on the table.  
 
True Hermaphroditism or Ovo-Testes  
 
Ovo-Testes is one of the rarer intersex conditions. Though frequency rates vary 
significantly among populations, Fausto-Sterling proposes an average of one in 100,000 
live births.45 With ovo-testes, an individual is born with one ovary and one testis or a 
combination of gonads which contain both ovarian and testicular tissue. Ovo-testes 
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sometimes produces ambiguous external genitals but not always. Ovo-testes accounts for 
“fewer than 5 percent of all cases of ambiguous genitals.”46   
In the Victorian era, when gonads were seen as primary indicators of sex, this 
condition was labeled “true hermaphroditism.”47  Today, physicians and some intersex 
persons reject the label “hermaphrodite” because, unlike the mythological creature, 
persons with ovo-testes cannot impregnate themselves.  
 
Other Variations of Gonadal Development 
 
Like ovo-testes, Swyer Syndrome is a variation on typical gonadal development. 
Persons with Swyer Syndrome are born with “streak gonads,” “minimally developed 
gonad tissue present in place of testes or in place ovaries.” An XY baby born with Swyer 
will look like a typical female at birth. Unlike persons with AIS, secondary sex 
characteristics will not develop at puberty because the gonads cannot produce androgens 
or estrogens. Where medical treatment is available, children are typically reared as girls 
and given hormone replacement therapy to bring about feminizing puberty.48 Swyer 
Syndrome confirms the thesis that without higher levels of androgens (typical of male 
development) genitals will develop along the female pathway whether or not the 
individual has a Y chromosome.49   
Gonadal Dysgenesis is a “form of intersexuality characterized by 
undifferentiated gonads, sometimes resulting in atypical external genitals. It represents 
                                                 
46
 Kessler, Lessons, 13-14; quoting Mariano Castro-Magana, Moris Angulo, and Planton J. 
Collipp, “Management of the Child with Ambiguous Genitalia,” Medical Aspects of Human Sexuality 18, 
no. 4 (April 1984) : 172-188. 
47
 Dreger, “Doubtful Sex: The Fate of the Hermaphrodite in Victorian Medicine,” 335-370.  
48
 Intersex Society of North America, http://www.isna.org/faq/printable , 9. 
49
 Hines, 24-27.  
 39
about one-third of all cases of intersexuality.”50 Swyer is a type of gonadal dysgenesis for 
XY individuals.51 Turner Syndrome can also be seen as a type of gonadal dysgenesis but 
because it is caused by a variations of the chromosomes, it will be discussed below.  
Alternative Chromosome Combinations 
 
There are a number of variations from the normal patterns of XX female and XY 
male. Fausto-Sterling lists the most common variations as “XXY, XO [one X 
chromosome], XYY, XXYY, XX males, and 47XXX females.”52 Some individuals are 
“mosaics” having different genetic combinations in different cells. For the purposes of 
this paper, we need not investigate all of these variations in detail. Rather, I will select a 
few of the more common syndromes associated with genetic anomalies as examples. 
In Turner Syndrome, a genetic abnormality affecting 1:2,000—3,000 female 
births, all or part of one sex chromosome is missing.53 Therefore, its karyotype is listed as 
XO or 45,X, although it can also occur in XY individuals. In addition to causing ovarian 
failure, some people with Turner Syndrome may have other physiological abnormal-
ities.54   
Because most Turner Syndrome babies lack a Y chromosome, their bodies do not 
make typical male levels of testosterone necessary for male reproductive and genital 
development. Most Turner patients, therefore, present as female. It is for this reason that 
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Leonard Sax has argued against the inclusion of this syndrome in intersex estimates.55  
On the other hand, many individuals with Turner Syndrome have a mosaic karyotype. 
Some cells have 45,X others 46,XX. Some can even have cells with a Y chromosome. 
While Andrew Zinn claims that the presence of some cells with a Y chromosome 
is “not enough to cause male sexual features” others present evidence to the contrary.56  
Jane Spalding, an intersex woman writing under a pseudonym, explains her condition as 
XY-Turner Mosaic. Mosaicism indicates that while some cells carry one karyotype, other 
cells carry a different pattern. Jane’s karyotype (45X and 46XY) produced “masculine-
seeming genitals” but even these never caused her to question her sense of female gender 
identity. After puberty she explains that she didn’t develop the secondary sex 
characteristics of either sex: 
At 22 I looked like an underdeveloped girl with the genitals of a 14-year 
old boy. I had reached 5’6” but weighed less than 120 pounds. My arms and 
legs were disproportionately long from delayed epiphyseal closure. I had 
neither the broad shoulders of a man nor the full hips of a woman. I had no 
Adam’s apple, no muscle mass, no breast development, and no beard. Not 
even those masculine-looking genitals had completed their journey to 
manhood. 
I wasn’t homosexual. I didn’t want to be effeminate or a transvestite. I 
didn’t understand why my heart insisted that I was female when my genitals 
were clearly male. And if they were male then why wasn’t the rest of me? 
Even with short hair, people said that I looked like a girl.57 
 
Turner Syndrome is included by Blackless et al. because of the fact that it does 
not fall into either traditional karyotype: 46,XX (female) or 46,XY (male).  
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Klinefelter’s Syndrome is also included as an intersex condition because of its 
atypical chromosome patterns: XXY, XXYY.58 “XXY individuals diagnosed with 
Klinefelter syndrome have external male genitalia, small testes, impaired 
spermatogenesis” [most are infertile], and “frequent gynecomastia” [breast growth].59  
Sax writes against the inclusion of Klinefelter’s Syndome as an intersex condition 
because it can go unnoticed by many men. Some discover their diagnosis during fertility 
evaluations. Still, for others, Klinefelter’s Syndrome leads to profound ambiguity. One 
man with Klinefelter’s Syndrome explains how he appreciates the label “intersexed” 
because it fits with his experience. 
It is only fairly recently that I have discovered the term ‘intersexed’ and how 
it relates to my body. I like the term because I prefer more choices than male 
or female. …It wasn’t until I was 29 years old that a label was put on my 
physical differences, differences I never quite understood. I had large nipples 
on smallish breasts, peanut-size testicles, and cellulite-type hairless fatty 
tissue over most of my body. I was told at an infertility clinic that I had an 
extra X chromosome and a karyotype of XXY-47. This is commonly known 
as Klinefelter’s syndrome. I was informed that I was genetically sterile and 
that my ‘sex glands’ produced only 10 percent of what was considered 
normal testosterone levels for a male. I was advised to immediately start 
testosterone replacement therapy…  The medical journals called my 
condition ‘feminized male.’ I had always felt caught between the sexes 
without knowing why.60 
 
Despite arguments to the contrary, Klinefelter’s Syndrome does at times blur the 
lines of clear demarcation between the two traditional sexes. Klinefelter’s Syndrome 
occurs in roughly 1:1,000 births.61 
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Other Non-XX, Non-XY Chromosome combinations such as 47,XXY males,     
47, XYY males, 46,XX males, and 47,XXX females occur in roughly 1:1,500 births.62 
Whether these variations should be considered intersex is open for debate. Blackless et al. 
include them on the basis of their chromosome pattern alone. Sax argues against their 
inclusion because their genes do not result in genital ambiguity or gender identity 
problems. He notes that men with an extra Y chromosome have lower than average 
intelligence though their fertility is usually unaffected. Similarly, “women with an extra 
X chromosome … are fertile” but may also have lower than average intelligence.63  
 
Other Genital Anomalies 
 
 Blackless et al note that “XY babies born with testes, but complete absence of a 
penis, are extremely rare, probably occurring only 1:1,000,000 births. In contrast, 
complete or partial vaginal agenesis is fairly common.”64 
Vaginal Agenesis (also called Müllerian agenesis, congenital absence of the 
vagina or aplasia of the vagina) can be attributed to androgen insensitivity and also to 
Mayer-Rokitansky-Küster-Hauser Syndrome (MRKH).65 MRKH affects as many as 
one in 6,000 females.66 In addition to the absence of a vagina, MRKH can also cause the 
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uterus to be underdeveloped or missing. Nevertheless, these women have functional 
ovaries which stimulate feminizing puberty, though they do not menstruate.67   
Though included by Fausto-Sterling as a deviation from the Platonic ideal of male 
or female and listed by the Intersex Society of North America, some question the 
inclusion of vaginal agenesis as an intersex condition. An American medical website 
insists: “It is important to understand that young women with this syndrome are genetic 
females.”68 Leonard Sax also argues against the inclusion of vaginal agenesis in intersex 
calculations. He writes, “Surgical correction for vaginal agenesis is conceptually no 
different from surgical correction for cleft palate.”69 I would concede that vaginal 
agenesis does not represent the same kind of intersex condition as ambiguous genitalia 
but Sax’s comparison with cleft palate is overstated. It is because genitals have been 
granted such power to convey meaning and personal identity that vaginal agenesis differs 
from cleft palate not only in kind, but also in degree. The technological “fix” for cleft 
palate and vaginoplasty are also a poor comparison.70   
Surgical “success” for reconstruction of the vagina has been severely criticized by 
the intersex community. The results of a “successful” surgery will be lost if the patient 
does not keep up with regular maintenance of the neovagina which includes daily 
insertion of a dilator to keep the opening from permanently reducing in size. Adults 
choosing the procedure acknowledge the psychological difficulty of the practice but 
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rarely is the psychological well-being of the child considered. Susanne Kessler intimates 
that such procedures could be considered a form of child abuse and argues from this basis 
that vaginoplasties—and all other forms of intersex surgeries to “correct” non-life-
threatening conditions—should be delayed until after puberty when the adolescent or 
adult can give informed consent.71 
Given the limited success of vaginoplasties and recommendations that they be 
delayed or rejected altogether, it seems reasonable to at least consider vaginal agenesis 
under the rubric of intersex. Without serious medical intervention these (intersex) women 
are cut off from “normal” sexual relations and from the possibility of delivering 
children—both traditional markers of femininity.72  
Hypospadias is a condition of the penis where the urinary opening (meatus) is 
located off-center on the glans (mild), along the penile shaft (medium), or under the penis 
(severe).73 A severe hypospadias is one way of naming an ambiguous genital when the 
presumed sex of the individual is male. Thus an XY individual with testes who has a 
urogenital opening underneath a phallus is considered a male with severe hypospadias. 
An XX individual with ovaries and the same external genitals would be considered a 
female with an enlarged clitoris (clitoromegaly). John Money refers to severe 
hypospadias as an ‘open gutter’ in the ‘female position.’74 “In the most severe cases, the 
urethra is entirely absent.”75 
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 Although hypospadias is estimated as occurring in one in every 200 male 
births, it is much more rarely (one in 10,000 births) a sign of an underlying 
intersex condition.76   
 
Fausto-Sterling and her colleagues list intersex rates which both include and omit 
hypospadias. 
Kessler argues that surgeries for hypospadias are rarely medically necessary but 
are performed so that parents are not affronted by the shape of the boy’s penis and so that 
the boy may urinate “like a man” (i.e., in the standing position). She counters that urinary 
positions are cultural tests for masculinity and should not be granted such weight when 
deciding whether to seek surgical correction. Howard Devore recounts the physical and 
psychological trauma of surgeries for hypospadias. He suffered sixteen surgeries in all, 
ten before the age of ten. He explains that he could have avoided at least twelve surgeries 
had his physicians and parents been content to allow him to urinate in a sitting position.  
…I regularly get bladder infections. And I still have to sit to pee. I have never 
been without fistulae [holes in the penis where the surgery has broken down], 
and I’ve had the entire tube replaced twice, with large skin grafts. If they had 
just let me pee sitting down, neither I nor my family would have had to suffer 
all of that—the expense, the pain, the repeated surgeries, the drugs, the 
repeated tissue breakdowns and urine leaks. It would have been just fine to 
have a penis that peed out of the bottom instead of the top, and didn’t have 
the feeling damaged. …Such a large skin graft can’t heal with the blood 
supply that is available in the genitals. I believe they know that, but it seems 
that genital appearance and the promise of normalcy are more important to 
young parents than a clear-headed acceptance of reality.77 
 
Kessler asks, given the limited results of genital surgeries, why infant intersex 
surgeries still continue. She suggests two reasons: “commitment to the concept of 
medical advancement and dimorphic genitals.”78 Here we see that it is the binary sex 
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system, combined with a belief in technological correction which has fueled current 
approaches to the management of intersex conditions. 
It is curious that many of these writers criticize of social standards for masculinity 
(peeing like a man) yet fail to admit the challenge severe hypospadias presents for male 
fertility—an older form of validation of masculinity. As chapter 2 will show, the ability 
to produce offspring was the primary test of masculinity in the ancient world. 
 
Naturally Occurring Sex Change: 5-alpha reductase deficiency syndrome (5-ARDs) 
 
 Last of all, we must mention one intersex condition which varies from most of the 
above in the level of change between the physical appearance of the child at birth and 
adult phenotype (physical appearance). 5-alpha reductase deficiency syndrome (5-ARDs) 
produces a baby with female or ambiguous genitals at birth whose body is transformed at 
puberty into that of a “normal” male. “5-alpha-reductase is an enzyme that converts the 
weaker testosterone into the more potent dihydrotestosterone (DHT).”79 Lower levels of 
this enzyme allow genitalia in an XY individual to develop along the female pathway (as 
it would in an XY individual with Swyer Syndrome or streak gonads). Unlike Swyer’s, 
where testosterone levels never reach sufficient levels to masculinize the child, persons 
with 5-ARDs do experience masculinizing puberty.80 At puberty, the testes descend and 
virilization causes “enlargement of the phallus, erection and ejactulation, deepening of 
the voice, development of masculine body structure and a male psychosexual 
orientation.”81 As adults, they resemble other men in most ways except that facial hair is 
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sparse, hairlines on the forehead do not recede, they do not have acne and their prostate 
remains small.82      
This rare condition has been documented in larger numbers in ethnic groups 
“ranging from Central America to Vietnam. Indeed, more than 50 families with over 100 
affected individuals have been reported. However, no population or gene frequencies are 
available.”83 Extensive study of the condition has been documented by anthropologists 
working in the Dominican Republic and among the Sambia of Papua New Guinea. In the 
absence of advanced medical technology in these communities, persons with 5-ARDs are 
integrated into the culture.  
In the Dominican Republic, the colloquial term, Guevedoche or Guevedoces 
(literally, “eggs at twelve”), indicates the transformation of what were believed to be 
labia into descended testes.84 “Such persons have a folk classification which permits them 
the flexibility to change dress and tasks, names and decorative motif, with alterations in 
sexual partners, albeit those of the ‘appropriate’ sex object at that stage of their lives.”85 
Among the Sambia, a baby with 5-ARDs, whose genitals appear ambiguous, is 
assigned not as male or female but as kwolu-aatmwol— “a person of transformation, a 
‘female thing changing into a male thing.’” 86 Gilbert Herdt, the anthropologist 
responsible for documenting this phenomenon in Papua New Guinea, has argued that 
the kwolu-aatmwol constitutes a third sex within Sambian culture, complete with 
peculiar social and ethical attitudes and responsibilities.87 Those not identified at birth 
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are raised as females and only discovered to be kwolu-aatmwol at puberty. Upon 
discovery they are identified as kwolu-aatmwol and required to transition out of 
female roles and into male roles within the culture.  
Because the phenomenon is known, there is social space for a girl to transition 
to a boy. Sambian mythology includes a hermaphroditic ancestor—a religious help for 
those who undergo transition. Still, the change is not easy for those raised as females. 
Some girls have confessed that if they were able to remain as women, they would 
have chosen to do so.88 Herdt explains that despite the mythology, kwolu-aatmwol are 
not admired within Sambian culture and speculates that this may add to the difficulty 
for cultural females to accept their new status at puberty, not only as males but as 
kwolu-aatmwol.89 
In Western culture, where gender identity is considered less flexible, and only two 
sexes are recognized in society, individuals with 5-ARDs who strongly identify as 
females are encouraged to pursue gonadectomies before puberty, and begin hormone 
replacement therapy so that they can acquire bodies consonant with their female gender 
identities. On the other hand, there are cases where the child “naturally migrates to a male 
role” but this is not an easy task within Western culture at this time.90   
 
HOW MANY INTERSEX PERSONS ARE THERE? 
 
 The reader will be able to recognize by now that the answer to this question 
depends upon one’s definition. Should intersex be defined as any deviation from the 
Platonic ideals of male and female, as Fausto-Sterling has argued? Or should a condition 
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only be recognized as intersex if, as Leonard Sax has argued, “chromosomal sex is 
inconsistent with phenotypic sex, or in which the phenotype is not classifiable as either 
male or female.”91   
Sax’s definition excludes late-onset congenital adrenal hyperplasia, vaginal 
agenesis, Turner’s syndrome, Klinefelter’s syndrome, and other non-XX and non-XY 
chromosome patterns. True intersex conditions, he writes, only occur in 0.018% of the 
population (or 1:55,556).92 Fausto-Sterling’s definition produces a frequency of 1.7% of 
all live births or 1 to 2:100.93 This frequency rate may appear high, but it is significantly 
reduced from the 4% figure cited by Fausto-Sterling in earlier research.94 
 A consensus statement, by an international team of almost fifty medical 
practitioners specializing in intersex, records a frequency rate of 1:4500 (approximately 
0.22% of live births).95 They do not list which conditions they include or exclude, but 
their estimate (0.22%) is very close to the figure Fausto-Sterling supplies for intersex 
conditions excluding LOCAH or intersex conditions excluding hypospadias.96 She does 
not give a figure which subtracts both of these groups.  
I am inclined to follow the moderate rate proposed by the LWPES/ESPE 
Consensus Group, though it may be best to represent the figure as a range, such as .02% 
to 1.7%. For the argument of this paper, it is enough to note that even with the most 
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conservative of numbers, given by Sax, there are at least “about 50,000 true intersexuals 
living in the United States” at this time.97   
Sax continues: “These individuals are of course entitled to the same expert care 
and consideration that all patients deserve. Nothing is gained, however, by pretending 
that there are 5,000,000 such individuals.”98 But the truth is, there is much to be gained 
by greater numbers. One intersex advocate expressed frustration over the difficulty of 
wading through debates over frequency rates and questioned the point: “Just because 
organizations/donors/governments tend to give money/recognition to larger numbers 
doesn’t mean that numbers should legitimize conditions or feelings.”99 
A woman with Androgen Insensitivity responded to her comments: 
Over and over and over again I hear from women with AIS and similar 
conditions such as Swyer, Turner, MGD, PGD, MRKH 5ARDS, etc. that 
they have been told by physicians who should know better that ‘you will 
never meet another person like yourself as long as you live.’  … Rarity 
Feeds Freakishness. The knowledge that 1 in 1500 people have an intersex 
condition is EMPOWERING. …Would it offer some comfort or 
consolation that this is the case with thousands of people and that it is, 
afterall, a naturally occurring element of nature?100 
 
One writer with the ISNA summarizes the debate:  
Should a person’s rights depend on the frequency of his or her condition? 
No! But does frequency matter to individuals’ experiences of group identity 
(thus leading to an end of shame and secrecy)? Yes!101 
 
The truth is: frequency rates do matter. It is easier to dismiss intersex conditions 
as “accidents” or “freaks of nature” the less frequently they occur. One can more easily 
argue that intersex is “not normal” or “not natural” when it is rare. One of the questions 
                                                 
97
 Sax, “How Common in Intersex?,” 177. 
98
 Ibid. 
99
 Intersex Society of North America, “Do Frequency Rates Matter?,” http://www.isna.org/ 
notde/972, 1. 
100
 Ibid., 2. 
101
 Ibid., 1. 
 51
of this paper is: What happens when we take intersex seriously, rather than dismissing it 
as an anomaly? What can we learn from the intersexed—about sex, gender and sexuality, 
and about human nature? Intersex is rare but it may not be as rare as we have been 
conditioned to think it is. 
Given even the conservative rates of intersex mentioned above, one must ask why 
the average person is unfamiliar with the phenomenon. Intersex may be as common as 
schizophrenia, which occurs in 1% of births. It is at least as common as Down syndrome 
(0.125%) and more common than albinism (1:20,000).102 These other conditions are 
typically accepted as rare but regularly occurring phenomena while intersex is not. Why 
are people more likely to be familiar with albinism, Down syndrome and schizophrenia 
than intersex? The following brief history lesson will show that a decrease in cultural 
space for intersex, combined with increasingly sophisticated medical technologies have 
contributed to the virtual erasure of intersex from the consciousness of Western culture. 
 
HISTORY OF INTERSEX:  
FROM THE MARGINS TO MEDICALIZATION 
 
Classical Myths and Medical Models 
 
The idea of persons of mixed sex goes back as far as culture can remember. The 
term hermaphrodite comes from the Greek and has its roots in two different myths.103 In 
the first, Hermes (the son of Zeus; patron god of music, dreams and livestock) and 
Aphrodite (goddess of sexual love and beauty) conceive a child of mixed sex whom they 
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name after themselves, Hermaphroditos. In the second legend, their beautiful male child 
falls desperately in love with a water nymph who becomes joined to him in an eternal 
embrace. Plato translated these myths into a theory of origins, proposing that there were 
originally three sexes: male, female, and hermaphrodite. He speculated that the third had 
been lost over the generations.104 Early Jewish commentators on the creation of Eve out 
of the rib of Adam proposed that the first human was a hermaphrodite and only in the 
separation of the woman from the adam (the human) did sexual differentiation come into 
being.105  
But hermaphrodites in the ancient world were not confined to the realm of myth 
or legend. Both Greek and Jewish societies developed theories to understand and laws to 
regulate persons of mixed sex in their communities. Aristotle speculated that a 
hermaphrodite developed in the womb when the mother contributed more matter than 
was necessary for one child but not quite enough for twins. In this scheme, a 
hermaphrodite was a malformed twin who “really” belonged to one of two sexes, not a 
third. Aristotle did not look to genitals or gonads to determine true sex; rather he 
followed Hippocrates’ theory of temperature believing the “heat of the heart” revealed 
the difference. Men were warm. Women were cool. Galen (the second century C.E. 
Greek physician whose medical influence reigned until the modern era) further developed 
Aristotle’s theory of heat but took issue with the two sex model.106 Galen proposed a 
sliding scale of sex that combined the theory of male heat and dominance with the right 
side of the uterus and female coolness and passivity on the left side of the uterus. 
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“Depending upon where on the grid an embryo fell, it could range from entirely male, 
through various intermediate states, to entirely female.”107 
Sharon Preves details how Galen’s theory of bodily heat and gender influenced 
medical theory as late as the seventeenth century. The seventeenth century surgeon, 
Ambroise Pare, explained the development of male secondary sex characteristics in 
pubescent girls (perhaps a sign of late-onset congenital adrenal hyperplasia?) as the result 
of excessive heat brought about by physical exertion in girls. Girls who jumped or played 
roughly raised their body temperature enough to “push out” their female organs 
(conceived as inversions of male genitals) in masculine form.108 These medical 
explanations coexisted with folk-beliefs which blamed the conception of a hermaphrodite 
on the imagination of the mother during pregnancy.109 
 
Classical and Medieval Law 
 
 Physicians in the classical and medieval period were familiar with hermaphroditic 
bodies, and while they theorized about their origins, they did not attempt to alter them. 
The management of intersex was handled at the familial and legal level. Jewish scribes 
pulled from laws pertaining to men and women to regulate religious and domestic 
behaviors of hermaphrodites.  
The Tosefta, for example, forbids hermaphrodites from inheriting their 
fathers’ estates (like daughters), from secluding themselves with women (like 
sons), and from shaving (like men). When they menstruate they must be 
isolated from men (like women); they are disqualified from serving as 
witnesses or as priests (like women); but the laws of pederasty apply to 
them.110 
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Jewish and Christian religious perspectives on the hermaphrodite will be explored at 
greater length in the next chapter. 
Roman and European laws varied. Under Romulus, hermaphrodites were in 
danger of capital punishment.111 In the first century C.E. Pliny reports such “monsters” 
were often put to death by drowning but that “at the present day they are employed for 
sensual purposes.”112 European laws varied by country and depended upon which 
medical theory of origins prevailed in the region.113 Punishments brought upon 
hermaphrodites seemed primarily to arise when they moved from one gender role to 
another, usually discovered through sexual activity or “cross-dressing.” Thus, a man who 
married a woman only later to conceive a child of his own and women who donned 
men’s clothing and sought the right to marry other women found themselves before civil 
and ecclesiastical authorities. Hermaphrodites who successfully “passed” as one of two 
prevailing genders and comported themselves appropriately were left relatively alone.114  
Fausto-Sterling provides examples to illustrate the point:  
Sir Edward Coke, famed jurist of early modern England wrote “an 
Hermaphrodite may purchase according to that sexe which prevaileth.”  
Similarly, in the first half of the seventeenth century, French 
hermaphrodites could serve as witnesses in the court and even marry, 
providing they did so in the role assigned to them by “the sex that 
dominates their personality.”115  
 
She then summarizes legal tendencies before the 19th century:  
 
…the individual him/herself shared with medical and legal experts the right 
to decide which sex prevailed, but once having made the choice, was 
expected to stick with it. The penalty for reneging could be severe. At stake 
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was the maintenance of the social order and the rights of man (meant 
literally). Thus, although it was clear that some people straddled the male-
female divide, the social and legal structures remained fixed around a two-sex 
system.116  
 
 
The Victorian Era and Modern Medicalization 
 
 While hermaphrodites had been known to exist in the hidden corners of society 
for millenia, medical doctors in the 19th century began documenting larger and larger 
numbers of hermaphroditic patients. Alice Dreger explains how advances in gyneco-
logical science, greater willingness on the part of individuals to submit to medical 
examination, and growing concern about sex, gender, and sexual politics all collided to 
bring about a turning point in the history of hermaphroditism. Early feminist movements 
and public concern over growing numbers of homosexuals made “physicians sensitive to 
their patients’ sexual identities, anatomies, and practices.”117 
 In the face of rapidly increasing knowledge of bodily variations, scientists 
attempted to bring order out of chaos. Biologist Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire laid the 
foundation for the study of unusual births (a science he dubbed, teratology) in the hopes 
that it would also illuminate “normal” sex differences.  
Saint-Hilaire divided the body into ‘sex segments,’ three on the left and three 
on the right. He named these zones the ‘profound portion,’ which contained 
ovaries, testicles, or related structures; the ‘middle portion,’ which contained 
internal sex structures such as the uterus and seminal vesicles; and the 
‘external portion,’ which included the external genitalia. If all six segments 
were wholly male, he decreed, so too was the body. If all six were female, the 
body was clearly female. But when a mixture of male and female appeared in 
any of the six zones, a hermaphrodite resulted.118 
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As we discussed above (under AIS, CAH, and ovo-testes), priority was eventually given 
to the “profound portion”—the gonads for determining sex, due to their part in 
reproduction and the initiation of secondary sex characteristics at puberty.119 It was 
Theodore Klebs who combined Saint-Hilaire’s classification system with the priority of 
gonads to coin new terminology in 1876: the pseudo vs. true hermaphrodite.120   
No matter how womanly a patient looked, no matter if she had a vagina, fine 
and round breasts, a smooth face, and a husband she loved, if she had testes, 
she would be labeled a male—in this case a “male pseudo-hermaphrodite” …  
so strong was doctor’s belief in the Gonadal Definition of Sex and the 
primacy of the gonads that in Britain the “problem” of “women” with testes 
was sometimes “solved” by removing the testes from these women and in 
France by imploring these patients to stop their “homosexual” alliances with 
men. (As you might guess, incredulous hermaphroditic patients sometimes 
thought their doctors daft or cruel.)  Commenting on [a French fashion 
model] labeled by her doctors as “frankly homosexual” because she 
passionately loved only men, a pair of French experts observed, “The 
possession of a [single] sex [as male or female] is a necessity of our social 
order, for hermaphrodites as well as for normal subjects.”121 
 
Elsewhere, Dreger explains how the redefinition of hermaphroditism (as true or false)  
 
worked to keep chaos at bay: 
 
By equating sex identity simply with gonadal tissue, almost every body could 
be shown really to be a “true male” or a “true female” in spite of mounting 
numbers of doubtful cases. Additionally, given that biopsies of gonads were 
not done until the 1910s and that Victorian medical men insisted upon 
histological proof of ovarian and testicular tissue for claims of “true 
hermaphroditism,” the only “true hermaphrodites” tended to be dead and 
autopsied hermaphrodites.122 
  
In the face of social and ethical confusion over sex and gender and sexuality, 
physicians attempted to bolster the traditional dichotomy by restricting and virtually 
eliminating the numbers of true hermaphrodites on medical record. The irony of the 
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project should not go unnoticed. At the very time medical men were documenting larger 
numbers of persons with mixed sex characteristics, by redefining their terms, they were 
able to virtually eliminate that same number. Again, we are confronted with the reality of 
the social construction of sex for the intersexed.  
 
20th Century: From Medical Management to 
the Disappearance of Hermaphrodites 
 
  The sex classification system offered by Theodore Klebs did not go uncontested. 
Doctors and patients alike found it difficult to continue to label persons who looked 
female on the outside with testes on the inside as “men.” By the 1920’s this disjunction 
led to the development of another philosophical category: gender as separate from sex. 
As medical technologies advanced, surgeons began offering “surgical ‘corrections’ to 
bring the biological sex into line with assigned gender.”123 By the 1950’s Johns Hopkins 
University created the first multi-disciplinary team of specialists to address intersex. 
Headed by psychologist John Money, their goal became the elimination of intersex 
through medical intervention in early childhood.124  
John Money led the charge for early medical correction of intersex based on the 
belief that gender identity was malleable in early childhood given the right conditions. He 
supported this claim on the basis of the now highly publicized case of David Reimer 
(a.k.a. “John/Joan”), in which a non-intersexed, male child’s penis was ablated (i.e., 
removed) at eight months of age during a botched circumcision.125 The family was 
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eventually referred to John’s Hopkins Hospital where they received counsel to surgically 
feminize the child and raise him as a girl. What made this case a perfect experiment was 
that the boy had an identical twin.126   
Money followed up with the family during childhood and published the success of 
the experiment in his widely acclaimed book, co-written with Anke A. Ehrhardt: Man & 
Woman, Boy & Girl.127 They reportedly found a happy little girl who preferred stereo-
typical feminine clothing and behavior. The case seemed closed, at least for Money and 
Ehrhardt.128 
It was Milton Diamond, a younger sex researcher skeptical of Money’s theory of 
gender plasticity, who followed up with the John/Joan case in later years. After years of 
trying to find and convince Reimer’s doctors to come forward with follow-up 
information, he was finally able to rally H. Keith Sigmunon—one of John’s therapists—
to join him in challenging Money’s dominant interpretive position.129 At last the truth 
came out that John’s sex reassignment had never taken. Though she tried to comply with 
the wishes of her parents, Joan knew she was different. John explains that his realization 
that he was a boy seemed to solidify between the ages of nine and eleven. At age twelve 
she rebelled against feminizing hormone therapy and at age fourteen succeeded in 
convincing her therapists and parents to assist her in transitioning to life as a male. He 
received a mastectomy at age fourteen and began phallic construction between fifteen and 
                                                                                                                                                 
months as “treatment.” Intersex Society of North America, “Who was David Reimer (also, sadly, known as 
‘John/Joan’)?,” http://www.isna.org/faq/printable, 26.   
126
 Milton Diamond and H. Keith Sigmundson, “Sex Reassignment at Birth: A Long Term 
Review and Clinical Implications,” Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine 151 (March 1997) : 
298-304. 
127
 John Money and Anke A. Ehrhardt, Man & Woman, Boy & Girl (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1972). 
128
 Kessler, Lessons, 7. 
129
 See Fausto-Sterling for a lively narrative of the decades-long battle waged between Money and 
Diamond over their differing philosophies of gender, Sexing the Body, 66-71. 
 59
sixteen. He had his first sexual encounter at age eighteen and at twenty-five married a 
woman a few years older and adopted her children.130 
Diamond and Sigmundson relayed David Reimer’s story under the pseudonyms 
“John/Joan,” but David has since come forward himself to work with Diamond in 
disabusing the medical establishment (and public at large) of the success of his case. He 
does not want others to suffer the “psychic trauma” he has had to endure.131 
Money used Reimer’s case to argue that intersexuals should be given early genital 
surgery and that surgery, accompanied by unambiguous gender rearing would result in a 
well-adjusted, heterosexual male or female. But his efforts rebounded to undo the 
intended result. Some intersexed persons who had been treated according to Money’s 
philosophy rejected their sex assignment and resented (to put it mildly) the medical 
treatment they had received. Still, most persons suffered in silence, believing what they 
had been told by doctors, that their conditions were so rare that they would never meet 
anyone in the world like themselves. Trained by parents, physicians, and psychologists to 
keep quiet about their abnormalities (out of genuine concern for the well-being of the 
patient) intersexuality did not surface as a voice until the 1990’s. 
 
1990’s: Intersex Emerges out of the Closet 
 
 It was the 1993 publication of Anne Fausto-Sterling’s article, “The Five Sexes: 
Why Male and Female are Not Enough,” in The Sciences and The New York Times that 
motivated Cheryl Chase to do something.  
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In response [to Fausto-Sterling’s article], Cheryl Chase wrote a letter to The 
Sciences announcing the founding of the Intersex Society of North America 
(ISNA). She founded the group because of her own attempts to recover her 
history of sex-reassignment in infancy and medically-induced shame, and 
because of the disinterest of most of her former care providers in what had 
happened to her. Soon Chase had brought together dozens of people with 
intersex. Though ISNA began as a support group, it quickly turned into an 
advocacy group because its members realized that they had suffered from 
similar problems. Like many of the early ISNA members, Chase drew on her 
political consciousness as a lesbian woman to recognize the degree to which 
intersex had been unnecessarily socially and medically pathologized. With 
the successes of the women’s health movement and the queer rights 
movement as a backdrop, people with intersex began agitating for openness 
and reform.132 
 
Similar movement sprang up all over the globe.133 Kessler explains,  
Although there are some differences among the intersex advocacy groups, 
most members criticize the way their intersexuality was and is handled and 
argue that there needs to be a break in “the vicious cycle in which shame 
[about variant genitals] produces silence, silence condones surgery, and 
surgery produces more shame (which produces more silence).”134   
 
With the goal of ending “shame, secrecy, and unwanted genital surgeries for people born 
with an anatomy that someone has decided is not standard for male or female,” ISNA 
now focuses their work to influence the medical profession to change standard treatment 
for intersex.135   
Despite resistance, their efforts are beginning to produce positive results.136 
Diamond and Sigmundson published their guidelines for the “Management of 
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Intersexuality” in 1997 emphasizing “the key belief that the patients themselves must be 
involved in any decision as to something so crucial to their lives.”137 Since 1997 
Diamond has repeatedly called for a moratorium on infant surgeries among the American 
Academy of Pediatrics. His efforts were aided by the publication of Kessler’s Lessons 
from the Intersexed and Dreger’s Intersex in the Age of Ethics in 1998 with the result that 
in 2000 and 2001 the American Academy of Pediatrics and the British Association of 
Pediatric Surgeons did update their standards of care to reflect some of the recommend-
ations of these groups. Still, Diamond laments that neither the British or American 
pediatric societies have called for a complete halt to infant surgeries.138 
In October of 2005, a group of fifty experts from ten countries met in Chicago to 
work to produce a consensus statement for the treatment of intersex to be published in 
medical journals worldwide. ISNA distributed their own Clinical Guidelines and 
Handbook for Parents to participants at the conference.139 The consensus statement was 
published in the Archives of Disease in Childhood in May of 2006.140 While the 
statement does not argue that all non-life-saving surgical interventions should be delayed 
until the child reaches the age of consent, it does advise greater caution and the benefits 
of delaying surgery when possible.141 In addition to summarizing the current medical 
definitions and the most up-to-date management strategies, the consensus statement also 
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recommends a change in language from intersex to Disorders of Sex Development 
(DSDs) as an umbrella term and more precise terminology for individual conditions 
which avoid sex and gender labels.142   
 
WHAT IS IN A NAME? 
 
From Hermaphrodite to Intersex to 
Disorders of Sex Development (DSDs) 
 
While the moves away from hermaphroditic terminology and gendered labels for 
intersex conditions (e.g., from “testicular feminization” to Androgen Insensitivity 
Syndrome) were met with little resistance, the shift from intersex to DSD has not gone 
uncontested. Diamond and others have argued that “Variation in Sex Development 
(VSD) [is] a term that is without judgment and neither prohibits or ordains medical 
intervention.”143  
Nevertheless, the shift to DSDs is gaining ground. Even the Intersex Society of 
North America employed the new terminology in their Clinical Guidelines and 
Handbook for Parents (noting objections by certain contributors).144 Barbara Thomas, a 
German woman with AIS who participated in the Chicago Conference, expresses 
frustration at the new nomenclature but concedes its pragmatic value: 
‘disorder’ has unfortunate overtones of ‘disturbed’ in German translation, 
however, given the reluctance of health insurance firms to deliver goods to 
intersex customers, the more PC [term] ‘variation’ is not helpful when 
campaigning for better care.145 
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Why I prefer the term Intersex to Disorders of Sex Development (DSDs) 
 Given the shift in language approved by so many within the medical community, 
it is fair to ask why I continue to use the label intersex instead of DSD. One of the 
reasons intersex was rejected by physicians is that it carries with it associations of 
“identity politics and sexual connotations.”146 Disorders of Sex Development does not 
automatically flag the same concerns. Nevertheless, as the rest of my paper will show, 
sex, gender, and sexuality while distinct, cannot easily be disentangled from one another. 
Theologians must acknowledge and attend to the interconnectedness of these ideas.147   
 What the shift in nomenclature does illustrate is the climax of the narrative of the 
medicalization of intersex. This short history shows how the hermaphrodite began as a 
legendary creation of the gods, was tolerated at the margins of societies for millennia, 
only to be surgically eliminated in the last hundred years. But the sexual revolution is 
overcoming the medical establishment. Through lessons learned from LGTBQ activists, 
intersex persons are coming out of the closet and demanding better medical treatment and 
the end of secrecy and shame within wider society. Their voices are beginning to be 
heard in the medical arena and they are working hard to raise awareness in society at 
large.  
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FROM MEDICAL MANAGEMENT TO SOCIAL CHANGE:  
QUESTIONING THE BINARY SEX MODEL  
 
Multiple Sexes 
 
 Anne Fausto-Sterling’s article, “The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female are Not 
Enough,” was the catalyst which emboldened Cheryl Chase to launch the Intersex 
Society of North America. Fausto-Sterling shares the concern of ISNA to end unwanted 
genital surgeries, but her goals call for even greater reform—reform of our very concepts 
of sex and gender. Fausto-Sterling calls us to abandon the notion of two sexes and fling 
the gate wide for the multiplication of sexes. While the language she used in 1993 
(Klebs’ five sex schema including true and pseudo-hermaphrodites) has been abandoned, 
her critique of the binary sex model remains. 
 Fausto-Sterling lays the blame for the abuse of the intersexed on the belief in a 
two sex system. Rather than calling for better care within the two sex model, she posits 
an alternative solution: 
But what if things were altogether different? Imagine a world in which the 
same knowledge that has enabled medicine to intervene in the medical 
management of intersexual patients has been placed at the service of multiple 
sexualities. Imagine that the sexes have multiplied beyond currently 
imaginable limits. It would be a world of shared powers. Patient and 
physician, parent and child, male and female —all those oppositions and 
others would have to be dissolved as sources of division. A new ethic of 
medical treatment would arise, one that would permit ambiguity in a culture 
that had overcome sexual division. The central mission of medical treatment 
would be to preserve life. Thus hermaphrodites would be concerned 
primarily not about whether they can conform to society but about whether 
they might develop potentially life-threatening conditions… that sometimes 
accompany hermaphroditic development. In my ideal world medical 
intervention for intersexuality would take place only rarely before the age of 
reason; subsequent treatment would be a cooperative venture between 
physician, patient, and other advisers trained in issues of gender multi-
plicity.148 
 
                                                 
148
 Fausto-Sterling, “The Five Sexes,” 472. 
 65
Historians of intersex are quick to concede that physicians and parents advocating 
for early medical correction of intersex have done so out of genuine concern for the well-
being of children/patients. Nevertheless, Fausto-Sterling claims that these same 
physicians failed to do their homework. 
…modern investigators tend to overlook a substantial body of case 
histories… before surgical intervention became rampant. Almost without 
exception, those reports describe children who grew up knowing they were 
intersexual (though they did not advertise it) and adjusted to their unusual 
status…in any event, there is not a psychotic or a suicide in the lot.149 
 
 Her description of intersexed persons and that of John Money could not be 
more different. He calls Fausto-Sterling’s proposal “extreme”: 
Without medical intervention, the fate of many hermaphroditic babies is to 
die. Before contemporary medical interventions, many children with a birth 
defect of the sex organs were condemned to grow up as they were born, 
stigmatized and traumatized. It simply does not make sense to talk of a third 
sex, or a fourth or fifth, when the phylogenetic scheme of things is two sexes. 
Those who are genitally neither male nor female but incomplete are not a 
third sex. They are a mixed sex or an in-between sex. To advocate medical 
nonintervention is irresponsible. It runs counter to everything that this book 
stands for, which is to enhance health and well-being to the greatest extent 
possible.150 
 
 The question of course remains: Who gets to determine what it is that “enhances 
health and well-being to the greatest extent”? Some intersexed persons may be content 
with their medical treatment. Diamond and Sigmundson remind readers that “humans can 
be immensely strong and adaptable.” Some have adjusted to medical treatment because 
they cannot recover what they lost. Some are “living in silent despair but coping.” Others 
“have complained bitterly of the treatment.”151 Those who are not content and have found 
voices to complain have argued that intersex, as a naturally occurring phenomenon is not 
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the problem. What is the problem is a two-sex system which leaves no room for naturally 
occurring variations from the standards of male or female. 
In place of the binary sex model, Fausto-Sterling argues that we should view sex 
as a continuum. “The implications of my argument for a sexual continuum are profound. 
If nature really offers us more than two sexes, then it follows that our current notions of 
masculinity and femininity are cultural conceits.”152 I would counter that it would be 
more accurate to say that if nature offers us more than two sexes then we may be justified 
in adding to our current cultural constructs more sexes than male and female and more 
genders than masculine and feminine. In some ways Western culture has already done 
this at the level of gender. We have language and conceptual space for “tom-boys” and 
“sissies” though the latter is more often a category of derision than the former.153 The 
problem of course, which Fausto-Sterling and others have outlined, is where to draw the 
lines? Three sexes? Four? Five? Twenty? David Hester suggests there are “literally 
hundreds of possible sexes that humans can inhabit.”154 We are left with the challenge of 
who defines male, female, and in-between and other.  
Gilbert Herdt, in his work Third Sex, Third Gender, shows how alternative 
sexes/genders have been documented in a number of societies at different times 
throughout history. But he explains that his use of “third” is not to be taken literally; 
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rather, the notion of the third serves to undermine the absolute contrast which arises 
within a binary system.155   
 
The Elimination of Gender 
 
Suzanne Kessler is even more radical in her proposal. She recommends we do 
away with the categories of sex and gender altogether. 156 In her earlier work with Wendy 
McKenna, Kessler argued that it is gender, not sex, which is the more salient force in 
contemporary culture. In everyday interactions, humans do not respond to persons’ 
genitals but to their display of gender through clothing, hairstyles, shaving, verbal and 
non-verbal communication. How we “do” gender is much more important for everyday 
life than what exists underneath our clothing.157 Kessler’s work reveals the circular logic 
at the root of the two sex system: Human bodies come as one of two sexes. Two sexes 
imply two genders. When bodies do not fit clearly into either sex category, the belief in 
two genders is used to advocate a medical fix in order to bring bodies back in line with 
the belief in two sexes. But what if we refuse to “fix” intersex? According to Kessler, 
both our categories of sex and gender will begin to unravel. 
The consequences of refusing to alter the body in accordance with gender 
ideals are obvious. A world populated with flat-chested, hairy women with 
penis-sized clitorises and large-breasted, hairless men with micro-penises 
would be a world of blended gender, and eventually, blended gender is no 
gender.158  
 
She explains how gender ideals, once impossible for most, are descending from 
the realm of the forms into everyday lives thanks to the ever-increasing skills of cosmetic 
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surgeons. Perfect bodies can be purchased by intersexed and non-intersexed alike 
provided the price is right.159 But she warns that making cosmetic genital surgery 
available could lead to greater intolerance for variations from the norm.160 
Surgical solutions for variant genitals need to be seen in the context of a 
cultural tide that is shrinking rather than expanding the range of what is 
considered normal for all parts of the body. Endocrinologists are prescribing 
a regimen of growth hormone for children who are deemed too short. 
Orthodontists are diagnosing denture abnormalities and providing 
“necessary” corrections for virtually every middle-class child’s teeth. 
“Imperfections [are] remediable today with the early help of a skilled 
surgeon.”161 
  
Kessler exhorts her readers by saying “[i]f we want people to respect particular bodies, 
they need to be taught to lose respect for ideal ones.”162 But losing respect for the ideals 
of gender may carry consequences for which we are not prepared.  
Kessler finds the eradication of gender liberating, not only for the intersexed but 
for anyone who finds gender rules oppressive. Rather than trying to change the rules of 
the gender system, as many feminists have done, she argues that we simply dispense with 
the idea that sex is tied to genitals and allow gender to evolve or dissolve altogether. 
  By subverting genital primacy, gender will be removed from the 
biological body and placed in the social-interactional one. Even if there are 
still two genders, male and female, how you ‘do’ male and female, including 
how you ‘do’ genitals, would be open to interpretation. Physicians teach 
parents of intersexed infants that the fetus is bipotential, but they talk about 
gender as being ‘finished’ at sixteen or twenty weeks, just because the 
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genitals are. Gender need not be thought of as finished, not for people who 
identify as intersexed, nor for any of us. Once we dispense with ‘sex’ and 
acknowledge gender as located in the social-interactional body, it will be 
easier to treat it as a work-in-progress.  
This is assuming, though, that gender is something worth working on. It 
may not be. If intersexuality imparts any lesson, it is that gender is a 
responsibility and a burden—for those being categorized and those doing the 
categorizing. We rightfully complain about gender oppression in all its social 
and political manifestations, but we have not seriously grappled with the fact 
that we afflict ourselves with a need to locate a bodily basis for assertions 
about gender. We must use whatever means we have to give up on gender. 
The problems of intersexuality will vanish and we will, in this way, 
compensate intersexuals for all the lessons they have provided.163 
 
Intersexuality (as well as hetero- and homo- and bi-sexuality) only make sense when sex 
is tied to genitals.164  
 
Third Sex: For Adults Only 
 
It may come as a surprise to the reader that the Intersex Society of North America 
does not advocate for a third sex category, nor the elimination of gender—at least when it 
comes to the raising of children. Whereas Fausto-Sterling calls for a few good parents to 
brave social disapproval in raising their children as unabashed intersexuals, the ISNA is 
more cautious in its proposals.165 Those at ISNA give two reasons why they do not 
recommend raising children in a third gender or no gender. First, they recognize that 
someone has to decide where to draw the boundary lines and that this venture, attempted 
in the past, is fraught with difficulty. “Second, and much more importantly, we are trying 
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to make the world a safe place for intersex kids, and we don’t think labeling them with a 
gender category that doesn’t exist would help them.”166   
Diamond and Sigmundson concur and urge physicians to advise parents in similar 
fashion with one exception: as children grow they should be given the option to choose 
whether or not to identify themselves as intersex.167 While some intersex persons are 
perfectly content within a two-sex/gender system, others are not.168 
In our society intersex is a designation of medical fact but not yet a 
commonly accepted social designation. With age and experience, however, 
an increasing number of hermaphroditic and pseudohermaphroditic persons 
are adopting this identification. …With increasing maturity, the designation 
of intersex may be acceptable to some and not to others. It should be offered 
as an optional identity along with male and female.169 
 
 Questions remain whether intersex should become an option in our current 
society—at the legal, religious and practical levels.170 Julia Epstein summarizes:  
The law assumes a precise contrariety between two sexes, whereas medical 
science has for several centuries understood sex termination to involve a 
complex and indefinite mechanism that results in a spectrum of human sexual 
types rather than in a set of mutually exclusive categories.171 
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Third Sex and Alternative Sexualities 
  
One of the biggest obstacles to the creation of a third sex category in contempo-
rary society is the link between a biological third sex and alternative sexualities. In his 
cross-cultural and historical account of third sexes, Gilbert Herdt illustrates how, in 
Western society, the figure of the hermaphrodite became conflated with the sexual 
deviant so that in modern period the homosexual was labeled a “hermaphrodite of the 
soul.”172 His anthology is entitled, Third Sex, Third Gender, but it would have been more 
true to the materials to add one more phrase, Third Sexuality, to accurately describe the 
contents. Of course, Herdt’s inclusion of alternative sexualities is intentional as he 
believes “cross-cultural variations in sexual and gender patterns have been downplayed 
when it comes to discussions of ‘normal’ reproductive sexuality and kinship.” He lays the 
blame for this neglect upon “intellectual, social and morally defined strictures of sexual 
dimorphism.”173 Thus, according to Herdt, the binary sex model is dependent as much 
upon a heterosexual ethic as it is upon scientific observance of sex differences. His work 
echoes the arguments of Judith Butler who insisted that “gender identity” and the binary 
model upon which it is built is a “regulatory ideal” resulting from “compulsory 
heterosexuality.”174 
Fausto-Sterling’s longer treatise, Sexing the Body, documents how the “specter of 
homosexuality” has haunted sex and gender studies from the beginning.175 Despite her 
caveat that “each person experiences [intersex] differently,” Dreger still makes the 
sweeping generalization that “intersex is, and always will be, about sex, that is, sexual 
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relations.”176 Dreger does overstate her case, as the testimony of intersex woman Sally 
Gross illustrates. Gross has described her own experience of intersex, and her lack of 
sexual desire as indicating that she was one of “nature’s celibates.”177 The sexual 
experiences of intersex persons are as varied as the sexualities of any other human being. 
One cannot claim an unified “intersex sexuality.” Even so, the connection between sexual 
politics and sex differentiation is a close one. 
 It cannot be disputed that a new openness toward homosexuality in the last decade 
has led to a greater willingness on the part of physicians to improve the standard medical 
treatment of intersex. Diamond and Sigmundson argued for greater openness to 
alternative sexual expression for the intersexed in 1997 and their recommendations were 
heeded by the international consensus group in 2005.178 Thus, the consensus group 
concluded, “homosexual orientation (relative to sex of rearing) or strong cross-sex 
interest in an individual with DSD is not an indication of incorrect gender assignment.”179  
It seems that social acceptance of variations of sex development is more closely 
intertwined with social acceptance of variations of sexual orientation than many would 
like to admit. 
 
IS CHRISTIANITY TO BLAME? 
 
Fausto-Sterling and others have argued that the abuse of intersex by the medical 
establishment over the last two hundred years has resulted from the oppressive binary sex 
model dominant within Western culture and that this binary sex model is the result of a 
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heterosexual ethic. She does not lay the blame on the Judeo-Christian tradition directly 
but comes very close when she indicts Western religious sensibilities and Victorian 
sexual mores.180 Gordene MacKenzie is less subtle. In her book, Transgender Nation, she 
lays the blame for the binary model squarely at the feet of the Judeo-Christian 
tradition.181   
Is this a fair critique? Does Christianity require a two sex system? Christian 
theologians certainly function under the assumption that there are but two sexes, male 
and female, and two genders which follow, naturally, from each sex. This belief is 
grounded in the accounts of the creation of Adam and Eve found in the book of Genesis 
and reinforced throughout the Scriptures through simple description (heterosexual 
marriages and genealogies), ethical legislation to protect the boundaries of heterosexual 
marriages (do not covet your neighbor’s wife, punishment for adultery), and theological 
analogies based on the image of heterosexual marriage (Zion as the daughter/bride of 
YHWH, the Church as the Bride of Christ).  
Mainstream Christian tradition has reinforced this binary sex/gender paradigm 
through its value of heterosexual marriage and the alternative pathway of male or female 
celibate religious life. And yet, there is evidence of a third option in corners of the 
Christian tradition. As the next chapter will show, Christian language about eunuchs, 
grounded in Jesus’ recognition of three types of eunuchs, created space for those who did 
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not fit neatly into the sex categories of male or female.  Monasteries were founded for 
eunuchs in the middle ages and eunuchs emerged as a recognized third gender in the 
Byzantine Christian Empire. Marginal though the eunuch has always been, it at least 
existed within Christian culture and thought. But this is no longer true. From myth, to 
margin, to medical erasure, intersex is believed to be a thing of legend, not a presence 
among us. As a result, the eunuch no longer exists in contemporary theology and church 
life.  
 Alice Domurat Dreger believes it is no coincidence that when traditional sexual 
mores were being challenged by alternative sexualities one finds the disappearance of the 
“true” hermaphrodite in Western culture.182 She documents how medical doctors 
attempted to create clarity out of ambiguity by refusing to acknowledge intersex in the 
public sector. 
Western Christians stand at a similar crossroads today. While some “welcoming 
and affirming” churches readily employ arguments from the existence of intersex persons 
to justify the validity of transsexualities, homosexualities, and bisexualities, conservative 
Christians may be tempted to follow in the footsteps of Victorian physicians by 
attempting to shore up traditional categories of sex and gender in response.183 I will argue 
that these are not the only options. The Scriptures offer a third way for recognizing a 
third gender.  
In the next chapter we will explore the category of the eunuch, its place within the 
biblical canon, Christian history, and theology. I will argue that by recovering the concept 
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 Dreger, “Doubtful Sex,” 364. 
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and Gender Differences (Dumbarton United Methodist Church, Washington, DC. 2003). Cf. Colson, 
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of the eunuch, theologians will find fresh avenues for rethinking the meanings of sex and 
gender for theological anthropology and a starting place to address the challenge of 
intersex. 
What I am proposing is not the deconstruction of the entire narrative of sex, 
gender, and sexuality found within the Christian tradition. What I am proposing is the 
recovery of a legitimate margin. Recovering the concept of the eunuch and 
acknowledging the presence of the intersexed in our communities does not have to lead to 
the eradication of gender or the rejection of the Christian value of heterosexual 
complementarity. It does, however, require theologians to reconsider theological edifices 
they have constructed upon binary models of sex and gender. Two such edifices will be 
addressed in the chapters that follow. Chapter four will assess the value of sex and gender 
for theological notions of personhood and imago Dei. Chapter five will critique current 
constructions of relationality that have been built upon the model of heterosexual marital 
relations. Finally, in chapter six, I will propose what I believe is a more balanced model 
for theological anthropologies of sex and gender.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
EUNUCHS: BIBLICAL AND HISTORICAL  
FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERSEX 
 
 
In this chapter we turn away from the most recent medical, political and 
sociological arguments surrounding intersex and roll back the clock several millennia in 
order to examine alternate ways in which persons who do not neatly fit into a binary 
model of sex and gender have been understood. In many ways the ancient world was 
much more rigid in defining and protecting the borders between men and women than 
contemporary North American culture. Yet despite this great fear of gender blending, the 
ancients were more open to recognizing that their binary model needed supplements in 
order to deal with human bodies as they occurred in the real world. One such supplement 
was the language of the eunuch. 
The eunuch is of particular importance for this study, not only because it provided 
an alternative gender category in the ancient world but especially because it was used by 
Jesus as a model for Christian living. Matthew 19:12 reads: 
For there are eunuchs who have been so from birth, and there are eunuchs 
who have been made eunuchs by others, and there are eunuchs who have 
made themselves eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven. Let anyone 
accept this who can. 
 
In this chapter we will discover that the term eunuch, much like the term intersex, 
was used in the ancient world as an umbrella concept—a word to cover a range of 
phenomena wherein humans did not measure up to the ideal for either sex, male or 
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female. We will excavate the pre-Christian history of the eunuch in order to place Jesus’ 
statement in proper historical context. We will then trace its transformation at the hands 
of early Christians. In Eastern Christendom, eunuchs retained public recognition for over 
a millennium. Western Roman Christians were much less comfortable with the 
physicality of eunuchism and reinterpreted the eunuch from a visible caricature of gender 
ambiguity into an icon of manliness.  
I will argue that, in the history of Christian thought in the West, Jesus’ statements 
about eunuchs have not been fully appreciated. Roman ideals of “masculine splendor” 
prevented many early Christians from accepting the radical challenge that the eunuch 
posed to their cultural assumptions about sex and gender.1 Jesus’ language was tamed so 
that the eunuch came to represent non-married men; a partial, but much less radical 
challenge to social structures and personal identity based on sex, gender, and sexuality. 
Jesus’ first type of eunuch provides a biblical door through which theologians 
may pass in order to explore the radical challenges posed by intersex to our current 
concepts of human personhood, identity, image of God, sex, gender, and sexuality. The 
eunuch may also function as a window through which intersex persons can find 
themselves already recognized as valued members of the Christian story. In the 
contemporary context, space for the intersexed needs to be recovered both theoretically 
and practically. This chapter will show that already in the midst of the Christian story, the 
grand narrative beginning with Adam and Eve, there has been room for others. Whether 
contemporary Christians can recover language and space for intersex persons in our day 
is a question we have yet to answer. 
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 Matthew Kuefler, The Manly Eunuch: Masculinity, Gender Ambiguity, and Christian Ideology 
in Late Antiquity  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 19.  
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WHAT WAS A EUNUCH? 
 
Biblical Context 
Jesus’ words to his disciples in Matthew 19:12 sound utterly foreign to modern 
ears. They follow on the heels of a discussion about the legality of divorce prompted by a 
question from some Pharisees. When asked if it was lawful to divorce one’s wife for “any 
and every reason,” Jesus responds with a Scriptural quotation:  
“Haven’t you read,” he replied, “that at the beginning the Creator ‘made them 
male and female,’ and said, ‘For this reason a man will leave his father and 
mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh’? So they 
are no longer two, but one. Therefore what God has joined together, let man 
not separate.”2 
 
The Pharisees challenge Jesus’ interpretation of Genesis by arguing that Moses made 
provisions for certificates of divorce. But Jesus is unmoved. He replies: 
Moses permitted you to divorce your wives because your hearts were hard. 
But it was not this way from the beginning. I tell you that anyone who 
divorces his wife, except for marital unfaithfulness, and marries another 
woman commits adultery.3 
 
Jesus’ disciples surmise that marriage, without the option of divorce, especially in a 
culture where one’s spouse was more often chosen by others, was not a good option.4 In 
light of Jesus’ strict rule, they conclude in verse 10; “it is better not to marry.” 
Jesus does not applaud their deduction; rather, he says:  
Not everyone can accept this teaching, but only those to whom it is given. For 
there are eunuchs who have been so from birth, and there are eunuchs who 
have been made eunuchs by others, and there are eunuchs who have made 
themselves eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven. Let anyone accept 
this who can.5 
 
                                                 
2
 Matt. 19:4-6 
3
 Matt. 19:8-9 
4
 Craig S. Keener, A Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999), 471. 
5
 Matt. 19:11-12 
 79
Scholars have debated the meaning of “this teaching” (literally “this saying”).  
Does it refer back to Jesus’ teaching on the indissolubility of marriage in verses 3-6, the 
exception clause for adultery in verse 9, or forward to his statement on eunuchs in verse 
12? Modern commentators tend to soften “this teaching” about divorce; and late antique 
and medieval Christians tended to agree with the disciples that it was better not to marry; 
however, the natural flow of the text suggests that Jesus is correcting the conclusion of 
his disciples.6 Davies and Allison draw attention to the number of qualifications in the 
text: “not all,” “those to whom it is given,” “he who is able”… 
In other words, Matthew uses the saying on eunuchs to confirm celibacy as a 
calling, but his emphasis—in contradiction to his disciples—is upon its 
special character.7 
 
Given the wider context, it is understandable why some modern translations have 
abandoned the language of the eunuch altogether, opting for dynamic equivalents such as 
those found in the New American Bible:  
Some are incapable of marriage because they were born so; some, because 
they were made so by others; some, because they have renounced marriage 
for the sake of the kingdom of heaven. Whoever can accept this ought to 
accept it. 
 
In this context, the eunuch did represent the non-married; nevertheless, such 
translations are inadequate because they also hide the radical nature of the eunuch and the 
debates which followed as early Christians attempted to understand and apply Jesus’ 
teaching. Translations, like that above, are also motivated by a desire to prevent what 
many see as misapplications of the text. Origin, compelled by his desire to follow Jesus’ 
instructions perfectly and protect himself from scandal in his teaching ministry to both 
                                                 
6
 W. D. Davies and Dale C. Allison, Jr., A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel 
According to Saint Matthew, Vol. III  (Edinburgh: T & T Clark), 20-21; and Ulrich Luz, Matthew 8-20: A 
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7
 Davies and Allison, 21. 
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sexes, made himself a literal eunuch by castrating himself.8 Though Origen is the most 
famous, his application of Jesus’ saying was hardly unique. There was a substantial 
enough number of individuals taking Jesus’ words literally that the Church Fathers, as 
early as the Council of Nicaea (325), saw the need to address the issue. They declared 
that self-castration would, henceforth, disqualify an individual from ordination to the 
priesthood, while involuntary castration would not, of itself, bar a man from holy orders.9   
Nevertheless, most biblical commentators, past and present, believe that Jesus’ 
words should not be taken literally. Understood this way, Jesus is saying no more than 
the apostle Paul said in I Corinthians 7 where he recommends that the unmarried remain 
unmarried as he is (v. 7-8) in order to avoid trouble (v. 28), so that they may devote 
themselves entirely to the Lord (v. 32-35), and for their own personal happiness (v. 40). 
But why, we must ask, does Jesus not say what Paul said, or what the New 
American Bible says? Why does Jesus use the provocative language of the eunuch? Is 
there something more to the eunuch than an inability or unwillingness to marry, 
something that is essential to our understanding of Jesus’ instruction to his disciples? I 
will argue that there is. The language of the eunuch, while not opposed to the simple 
translation “remain unmarried,” is far more complex and far richer when understood in 
the context of the ancient world. 
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Historical Context 
 The term “eunuch” is Greek, from eunoukhos, and is derived from the ancient 
practice of having an individual as “the one who has [responsibility for] the bed” (ho tēn 
eunēn ekhōn); “holding,” “guarding,” “keeping” watch over the bedchamber of the 
king.10 Eunuchs were guardians of sacred spaces, guardians of haram. In Semitic 
languages “the word haram refers variously to a sacred place, a sanctuary, or a royal 
palace, a place that one is generally forbidden to enter.”11 Piotr Scholz explains how “for 
historical reasons [it] has come to be applied mostly to the apartments in oriental palaces 
allotted to females.” 12 Yet eunuchs had wider responsibilities in the Ancient East and 
Ancient Near East. 
 This etymology emphasizes the duties of eunuchs, rather than their physical 
nature, an important point for our understanding of the term. Not all eunuchs were 
castrated men (castrati),13 nor were they always “natural eunuchs,” people born with 
ambiguous or poorly formed genitalia14—whom the Jews called “eunuchs of the sun” 
(saris khama) indicating that they were discovered to be eunuchs at the moment the sun 
shone upon them, i.e., from the day of their birth.15 The Hebrew term, saris can probably 
be traced to sar which, in Babylonian (an older Semitic language) means “king.”16 The 
Hebrew, saris, can be translated as “eunuch” or “official” and retains the courtly nature 
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of the eunuch in the Ancient Near East. Context usually determines which English 
translation is preferred.17 
 In the 6th century B.C.E., Babylon fell to the Persians who are the oldest and most 
useful source for information on eunuchs in the Middle East.18 It is said that at the height 
of the Achaemenid Dynasty, which lasted from the rule of Cyrus II, “the Great,” in 550 
B.C.E. until the conquest of Alexander the Great in 330 B.C.E., more than 3,000 eunuchs 
could be found at court.19 Scholz explains that “the question whether eunuchs in the 
ancient Middle East were always castrated has never been resolved.”20 What we do know 
is that by the time the Persian Empire had passed through the Greeks into the hands of the 
Romans, despite the fact that Romans despised castration, many Roman emperors, and 
elite householders, depended upon castrated eunuchs.21 “Even in Judaea, where the 
practice of castration was frowned upon and outlawed, Herod the Great (37 B.C.–A.D. 4) 
found it impossible, as Josephus Flavius (A.D. 37-95) relates, to manage his affairs 
without eunuchs.”22 
Eunuchs handled everything from powerful administrative functions and military 
command to cup-bearing and guarding the intimate spaces of their masters and 
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mistresses. Cut off from their families of origin, raised to see the family of their master as 
their own family, and prevented from fathering children of their own, eunuchs owed their 
entire identity, complete loyalty, to their masters. Their inability to procreate barred them 
from claiming power in their own name and also from producing heirs who might 
challenge the dynastic authority of the sacred king or emperor. 23 Their gender ambiguity 
also enabled them to mediate between men and women, elite and public, sacred and 
secular.24 Thus, Kathryn Ringrose has aptly labeled eunuchs “perfect servants.”25 
Eunuchs were elite slaves, entrusted with any number of important duties, but 
they were also considered “luxury items” and “status symbols” in the Roman Empire.26  
The price for a castrato was many times more than that of an ordinary slave. Pliny the 
Elder, a historian writing during the first century C.E. (around the same time as the 
writing of the Gospel of Matthew), complains of the exorbitant price paid for one 
particularly beautiful castrato named Pæzon: 
…when Lutorius Priscus bought of Sejanus, the eunuch, Pæzon, for fifty million 
sesterces, the price was given by Hercules! rather to gratify the passion of the 
purchaser than in commendation of the beauty of the slave.27 
 
The association of eunuchs with the bed chamber, while it may have begun with 
the responsibilities of guard or attendant, did not stop there. Castrati were also valued for 
their beauty and sexual allure. It was believed that by castrating a boy before the age of 
twenty, one could preserve his youthful beauty. Scholz explains that this beauty “was 
more highly esteemed in antiquity than that of women… 
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Specifically, these ideals of beauty derived from the exaltation of the 
androgyne and the hermaphrodite. We can trace them back to the influence of 
the oriental aesthetic, which also helped to shape the Hellenistic idea of the 
beautiful.28 
 
 Nero was infamous for becoming enamored of one such boy. He met Sporus 
when the latter was a child and was struck by Sporus’ resemblance to Nero’s late wife, 
Poppaea Sabina. Nero had Sporus castrated to preserve this beauty, “married” him, 
assigned him a dowry, dressed him in the clothes of an empress and did not hesitate to 
kiss him amorously in public.29 The second century historian, Cassius Dio, recounts that 
crowds at the wedding shouted “all the customary good wishes, even to the extent of 
praying that legitimate children might be born to them.”30 Suetonius, a writer who lived 
from 70—120 C.E., lamented: “the world would have been a happier place had Nero’s 
father Domitius married that sort of wife.”31 It was not until 342 C.E., when Christianity 
had spread through the ranks of Roman authority, that marriages of men to eunuchs were 
outlawed.32 
 The sexuality of eunuchs was highly debated in the ancient world. They were 
trusted to care for women of elite households because they were believed to lack sexual 
desire, yet there is evidence that some of these women preferred eunuchs for their own 
sexual pleasure, because they could do so without fear of pregnancy.33 It is quite possible 
that, although such activities were considered scandalous and did result in severe 
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penalties when discovered,34 non-procreative sexuality was considered less of a peril to 
the empire than offspring who might threaten the powers that be.35  
Despite the growing dependence upon eunuchs in every area of domestic and 
administrative life, the presence of eunuchs in Roman households provoked much 
anxiety.36 Roman men were anxious about the affairs to which their eunuchs were 
attending. They worried whether they could trust eunuchs with their money, their women, 
their reputation, their power, their food. But they were also anxious about what eunuchs 
said about them as men. Peter Brown explains: “In the Roman world, the physical 
appearance and the reputed character of eunuchs acted as constant reminders that the 
male body was a fearsomely plastic thing.”37 Galen, the medical authority of the day, had 
argued that “lack of heat from childhood on could cause the male body to collapse back 
into a state of primary undifferentiation. No normal man might actually become a 
woman; but each man trembled forever on the brink of becoming ‘womanish.’”38 Brown 
goes on: 
It was never enough to be male: a man had to strive to become ‘virile.’  He 
had to learn to exclude from his character and from the poise and temper of 
his body all telltale traces of ‘softness’ that might betray, in him, the half-
formed state of a woman. …a man’s walk… the rhythms of his speech… the 
telltale resonance of his voice. Any of these might betray the ominous loss of 
a hot, high-spirited momentum, a flagging of the clear-cut self-restraint, and a 
relaxing of the taut elegance of voice and gesture that made a man a man, the 
unruffled master of a subject world.39 
 
                                                 
34
 Kuefler, 98. 
35
 Shaun F. Tougher, “Byzantine Eunuchs: An Overview, with Special Reference to their Creation 
and Origin,” in Women, Men and Eunuchs: Gender in Byzantium, Liz James, ed. (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1997), 170. 
36
 Kuefler, 96. 
37
 Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early 
Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 10. 
38
 Ibid., 11 
39
 Ibid. 
 86
Eunuchs represented what happened when men, the rightful masters of the world, lost 
their masculinity. The master became the servant. The man became womanish. The 
ambiguity of a eunuch’s body did not merely symbolize the loss of virtue and power, it 
explained it.40   
 Eunuchs were entrusted with the most intimate and powerful responsibilities and 
yet suffered the reputation of being untrustworthy on account of their physical condition. 
They were simultaneously considered asexual and unable to restrain themselves from 
sexual passions. The physical ambiguity of eunuchs was translated into the moral realm 
in areas well beyond sexuality. Eunuchs suffered the same aspersions of character as did 
women in the ancient world. They were “carnal, irrational, voluptuous, fickle, manipu-
lative and deceitful.”41 Women and eunuchs “were assumed to lack the ability to control 
their physical, emotional and sexual appetites.”42 Self-control was believed to be a 
masculine virtue, visible in the hardness of men’s bodies. The etymological link between 
virtus (virtue) and vir (man, male) is debated; nevertheless, the linguistic association 
remained strong among Latin speakers. Lactantius, a fourth-century writer and tutor of 
Constantine I (who ruled from 306-337), preserved “a well-known, if invented, 
etymology”: 
Thus man [vir] was so named because strength [vis] is greater in him than in 
woman; and from this, virtue [virtus] has received its name. Likewise, 
woman [mulier] … is from softness [mollitia], changed and shortened by a 
letter, as though it were softly [mollier].43 
 
Thus, when eunuchs were disparaged for being “soft,” their critics were commenting on 
much more than a lack of muscle mass resulting from lower levels of testosterone. To be 
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soft or effeminate was to be weak, not only physically but morally.44 Virtuous eunuchs 
were considered anomalies; they were against nature.45 
In addition to their presence in the sacred spaces of kings, emperors, and upper-
class households, eunuchs were also prominent in certain religious contexts. In the 
Roman era, ritual castration was a part of the cult of Cybele, which was derived from 
prehistoric fertility religions, worship of the Magna Mater (Great Mother), and integrated 
into Roman pantheon as the Mater Deum (Mother of the Gods).46 While the myth 
suffered innumerable permutations in the course of nearly two millennia, central themes 
remained the same.  
…love between Cybele and Attis, leading to the death of Attis following his 
remorse at his unfaithfulness to Cybele, and culminating in his resurrection in 
the fruitful womb of the Mater Magna.47 
 
Central to worship of the Mater Deum was the presence of eunuchs, though there 
are various explanations for the phenomenon. In several Roman versions, the god/dess 
Cybele is originally conceived as a hermaphrodite, Agdistis/Cybele. “Since the gods 
feared the power of the hermaphrodite Agdistis/Cybele, they ordered Dionysos to castrate 
him.”48 During the process of castration, parts of his severed genitals fell to the ground 
and engendered the beautiful Attis, with whom Cybele later fell in love. In one version 
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Attis was then betrothed to the daughter of a local king. Out of jealousy, Cybele drove 
Attis mad to the point of emasculating himself. When the wound led to his death, Cybele 
begged Zeus to resuscitate him but Zeus refused.49 In Ovid’s version, Attis cheated on 
Cybele with a nymph. Cybele destroyed the nymph, driving Attis to madness. He 
emasculated himself in penance for his unfaithfulness.50 Ovid explains: “This madness 
set an example and the soft acolytes toss their hair and cut off their worthless organs.”51 
Kuefler admits that we do not know to what extent (if at all) sacred prostitution 
(involving female priestesses and eunuch priests) was a part of the cult. Evidence is 
unclear but accusations of their sexual activities abounded, especially in Christian 
sources.52 
From a Jewish religious perspective, eunuchs were quintessential foreigners, the 
epitome of “other.” Castration was forbidden within Judaism. Animals who had been 
castrated could not be offered on the altar (Lev. 22:24). Castrated humans were excluded 
from the assembly of Israel (Deut. 23:1) and banned from the Israelite priesthood (Lev. 
21:20). At best, they could not fulfill Jewish obligations to marry and have children; at 
worst, they were associated with the power structures of oppressive regimes, pagan 
religious cults, and illicit sexual activities.53 Indeed, it is probably their association with 
ancient fertility religions that stands behind the exclusion of castrati from the assembly 
of the LORD in Deuteronomy 23:1.54 This passage specifies both types of emasculation 
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(crushing the testicles and cutting off the penis) but goes on to speak of forbidden 
marriages and foreign peoples: Ammonites, Moabites, Edomites, Egyptians, and their 
descendants (Deut. 23:2-8). 
Despite all of the marks against eunuchs, the prophet Isaiah predicted a time when 
even these would be included with God’s people.  
3
 Let no foreigner who has bound himself to the LORD say, “The LORD will 
surely exclude me from his people.” And let not any eunuch complain, “I am 
only a dry tree.” 4 For this is what the LORD says: “To the eunuchs who keep 
my Sabbaths, who choose what pleases me and hold fast to my covenant—    
5
 to them I will give within my temple and its walls a memorial and a name 
better than sons and daughters; I will give them an everlasting name that will 
not be cut off. 6 And foreigners who bind themselves to the LORD to serve 
him, to love the name of the LORD, and to worship him, all who keep the 
Sabbath without desecrating it and who hold fast to my covenant— 7 these I 
will bring to my holy mountain and give them joy in my house of prayer. 
Their burnt offerings and sacrifices will be accepted on my altar; for my 
house will be called a house of prayer for all nations.”55 
 
Isaiah corroborates the close connection between the eunuch and the foreigner. There 
may also be a play on words in the prophecy above. Eunuchs were those who “kept” or 
“guarded” the bedchamber and the sacred spaces of the king, but in this passage it is the 
eunuchs who “keep” or “guard” the Sabbath, the sacred time of the divine King, who will 
no longer be excluded from God’s people.56 
Jesus’ favorable treatment of eunuchs in Matthew 19:12 may have been one more 
tactic used to associate himself with the messianic predictions of Isaiah.57 Indeed the 
                                                 
55
 Isaiah 56:3-7 
56
 Both the Hebrew (smr) and the Greek (phulassō) terms have “to keep, guard” as primary lexical 
meanings, with “to observe or obey” as the metaphorical alternative. 
57
 The gospel writer quotes Isaiah explicitly in Matt. 3:3; 4:14; 8:17; 12:17; 13:14; 15:7. Isaiah is 
mentioned by name in the first gospel more than in any other New Testament book. 
 90
baptism of the Ethiopian eunuch by the apostle Philip was heralded as an indication of 
the inclusion of foreigners into God’s people.58   
Nevertheless, despite the prediction of Isaiah, its fulfillment in Acts 8, and Jesus’ 
positive view of eunuchs, Christians continued Jewish prejudices against eunuchs. On the 
whole, the eunuch continued to be understood as the quintessential foreigner—pagan and 
sexually immoral.59 These associations may explain why Christians reacted so strongly 
against castration in the Latin West.60   
But there is another reason why Jews and Christians were so mistrustful of 
eunuchs. In addition to being ethnically other, religiously other, sexually other, and 
morally other, eunuchs did not fit into traditional Roman, Jewish, or Christians ideals 
regarding gender. In the Talmud, eunuchs are derided for unmanly characteristics. They 
are “crudely and pejoratively described as having no beard, smooth skin, and lanky 
hair.”61 Boys who were castrated before puberty developed unique physical traits, distinct 
from men and women.  
Those who are young might be mistaken for adolescent boys, albeit slightly 
unusual adolescent boys, with fine, fair skin, faces that are just a bit broad, 
and tall thin bodies with narrow shoulders and graceful carriage. Older 
eunuchs often show signs of poor health. Their faces are prematurely lined, 
and youthful fairness has become pallor. Their bodies are stooped from 
osteoporosis. Even so, they sport a thick, luxuriant head of hair…62 
 
The fourth century Roman poet, Claudius Mamertinus, eloquently portrayed the 
gender ambiguity of eunuchs as “exiles from the society of the human race, belonging 
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neither to one sex nor the other.”63 A few decades after him, Claudian disparaged 
eunuchs as those “whom the male sex has discarded and the female will not adopt.”64 In 
the 3rd century, Severus Alexander went so far as to call them “a third sex of the human 
race.”65 Augustine complains not only about the paganism and sexual sins of the galli but 
also their gender transgressions. They are “effeminates [molles] consecrated to the Great 
Mother, who violate every canon of decency in men and women” visible “in the streets 
and squares of Carthage with their pomaded hair and powdered faces, gliding along with 
womanish languor.”66 According to Augustine, a eunuch priest was “neither changed into 
a woman nor allowed to remain a man.”67 
Eunuchs blurred the great divide between the virtuous virile and the molles mulier 
(soft women). Their very existence threatened legal, religious, and ethical systems built 
upon the separation of the sexes. Kuefler recounts debates over the legal status of 
eunuchs and explains that the rights of eunuchs were granted and withheld depending 
upon who was in power.68 While such debates are difficult to understand from a modern 
point of view, one should not forget that legal processes, such as testifying in court and 
creating a last will and testament are etymologically dependent on testis, the male organ. 
Gen. 24:9 and 47:29 recount the practice placing one hand on the genitals 
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(euphemistically translated “under the thigh”) when taking an oath.69 Eunuchs and 
women simply did not have the anatomical equipment to take oaths, bear witness or make 
bequests. 
Eunuchs were legally other, morally other, sexually other, socially other, 
religiously other, and ethnically other. They were, to quote Claudius Mamertinus once 
again, “exiles from the society of the human race.”70    
 
Returning to the Biblical Context:  
Childlikeness, Christian Perfection, and Angels 
 
 Given such a background, it is a wonder that Jesus was willing to use the term 
eunuch at all! But what would Jesus’ Jewish audiences have heard? Would they have 
envisioned officials in elite, pagan households, whether Persian, Greek, or Roman? 
Sexual consorts of the upper-echelons of Roman society? Passive male sexuality? Gender 
transgressors? Cultic castration?   
 Matthew records Jesus’ words in the context of divorce, marriage, and sacrifices 
for the sake of the kingdom of heaven. This setting does not emphasize the political or 
cultic contexts of eunuchism but speaks of the relation of the eunuch to social bonds 
created by sex, gender, and sexuality. But Jesus’ statements on the eunuch also precede 
other parables of the kingdom.  
Matthew 19:14 declares that the Kingdom of God will be inherited by those who 
are childlike. In this literary context, one wonders at the significance of the child. Did 
children represent those unfettered by the concerns of marriage and the pain of divorce? 
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Did those who had not yet reached puberty represent those without gender or the 
innocence associated with a lack of sexual desire?71   
The verses which follow shift attention from this life to the next and raise the bar 
for ideas of Christian perfection. When asked which good works are necessary for 
gaining eternal life, Jesus answered that one must obey the commandments and love 
one’s neighbor as oneself. But when pressed for more, Jesus adds in verse 21: “If you 
want to be perfect, go, sell your possessions and give to the poor, and you will have 
treasure in heaven. Then come, follow me.”  Apparently, the disciples wanted to know 
what kind of “treasure” Jesus was talking about: 
Peter answered him, “We have left everything to follow you! What then will 
there be for us?” Jesus said to them, “I tell you the truth, at the renewal of all 
things, when the Son of Man sits on his glorious throne, you who have 
followed me will also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of 
Israel. And everyone who has left houses or brothers or sisters or father or 
mother or children or fields for my sake will receive a hundred times as much 
and will inherit eternal life.”72    
 
It is difficult to know how Jesus’ audience interpreted his words about three types 
of eunuchs only a few verses earlier, but we do know that the Gospel writer either 
preserved this original context or set these sayings alongside one another because he 
believed they were related. The broad themes of this passage—the question of what one 
could do above and beyond the standard commandments, in order to be “perfect,” and the 
eschatological order of things—found fertile soil in the ascetic minds of early Christians.  
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We know that in the early church, “eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom” came to 
be understood as those who were willing to leave behind the burdens and earthly joys of 
family, in the hopes of everlasting reward. While Matthew only lists siblings, parents, 
and children, early Christians soon added “wife” as the most pivotal renunciation of all.  
The associations and responsibilities of family life (marriage, sexuality, children, 
inheritance, ownership of property) came to be viewed as the evil powers of this “present 
age.”73 And Jesus had taught that these would be left behind in the age to come. A few 
chapters later, in Matthew 22:30, the gospel writer records Jesus’ teaching that “At the 
resurrection people will neither marry nor be given in marriage; they will be like the 
angels in heaven.”  
The connection between non-married persons, eunuchs, and angels is an 
important one. Eunuchs came to be associated with angels on account of their (assumed) 
sexual continence, their freedom from the obligations of marriage, and their gender 
status.74  Byzantine iconography depicts angels as beardless and genderless.75 
Hagiographical accounts describe eunuchs and angels being confused for one another on 
account of similar physical features and dress. Both acted as mediators and messengers 
for the sacred king, bridging the divide between the sacred and the profane.76 Eunuchs 
were angelic, not only in appearance but also in voice. Because women were prohibited 
from singing in church, boys were castrated to ensure soprano singers in Eastern and 
Western Christendom—a practice that can be dated at least as far back as the 4th century 
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C.E. and which was not abandoned until the last century.77 The voice of the “last angel of 
Rome” Alessandro Moreschi (1858-1922) was preserved by one of the earliest sound 
recordings of the 20th century.78 
Whether intended by Jesus or not, these interpretations of the early church 
radically altered the way eunuchs have been understood in Western culture. Rather than 
as the elite slaves of the emperor and castrated (but sexually active) priests of Cybele, 
eunuchs came to signify non-castrated but sexually continent priests and the castrato-
singers of the Church—perfect servants of the King of Kings. Free from the fetters and 
distractions of family, innocent and asexual as children and angels, with angelic voices 
that raised audiences to the heavens—eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom soon became 
the new model of Christian perfection.  
 
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE EUNUCH IN  
WESTERN AND EASTERN CHRISTENDOM 
 
 Peter Brown, in his detailed study, Body and Society: Men, Women and Sexual 
Renunciation in Early Christianity, argues that sexuality and its denial carried 
“profoundly different” meanings in the early centuries compared to the meanings given in 
middle ages and modern period (with which we are more familiar).79 Sexuality also 
carried various meanings in particular regions.80 It will be impossible to cover all of the 
nuances of each group in this volume, so we will highlight a few significant differences 
as they relate to our own study. 
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Eunuchs and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity 
 
Paul 
Brown explains how Jesus’ words about becoming eunuchs for the sake of the 
kingdom of heaven were interpreted through the lens of Paul’s first letter to the 
Corinthian church, wherein he presents married sexuality as a concession for those who 
cannot control their burning passion (I Cor. 7:5-9). Brown highlights Paul’s concern that 
married persons are divided in their loyalties (I Cor. 7:32-34) and provides evidence that 
the “undivided heart” was a traditional Jewish and early Christian metaphor for 
holiness.81 Brown writes, “Ascetic readers of Paul in late antiquity did not mis-hear his 
tone of voice.”82 Despite Paul’s affirmation of the sacramental value of marriage in 
Ephesians chapter 5, the early Christian belief that perfection depended upon a rejection 
of marriage was rooted in Paul’s epistles and the saying of Jesus in Matthew 19:12. 
But the Pauline legacy included another radical text, a baptismal formula recorded 
in Galatians 3:28 which declares: “There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer 
slave or free, there is no longer male and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus.”  
Along with the symbol of the eunuch in Matthew 19 and the devaluation of married 
sexuality in I Corinthians 7, this text also brought into question the significance of sex 
and gender for Christians. What remained to be debated in the centuries which followed 
were the ramifications of such notions. Did baptism and the rejection of marriage undo 
all societal roles based on gender? Some Christians believed that they did.   
Brown believes that these notions stood at the root of some of the “problems” 
Paul was attempting to address in the Corinthian church. Women were removing their 
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veils—symbols of their female subordination, coverings for their sexual allure—in order 
to prophesy in the Spirit (I Cor. 11). But the Corinthians were not the only group to apply 
these texts in a practical way that symbolically dissolved gender markers in church. There 
is evidence of similar practices in the church of Carthage toward the end of the 2nd 
century C.E. These Christians encouraged their continent women to stand in church 
without veils as living symbols of Christian hope. Their conquest of sexuality stood as a 
pictorial promise of the sanctification of all believers. “I am not veiled because the veil of 
corruption is taken from me;  …I am not ashamed, because the deed of shame has been 
removed far from me.”83 Virgins were lifted above the shame associated not simply with 
sexual activity, but above the shame of their very gender.  
 
Tertullian (160?-220) 
 
Tertullian would have none of it. In his treatise, On the Veiling of Virgins, he 
demanded that after puberty, women, even virgins, remain covered. Hope for the 
redemption of human sexuality was for the next life, not this one. In this life, “A girl 
above shame was, quite bluntly a ‘sport of nature, a third sex.’”84 Brown argues that 
Tertullian was the first, but hardly the last, to argue that humans, even Christians, could 
never overcome the “facts of sex.”85   
On the other hand, Tertullian did believe that humans would shed sex distinctions 
in the life to come, becoming like the angels:  
I have to return after death to the place where there is no giving in marriage, 
where I have to be clothed upon rather than to be despoiled—where, even if I am 
despoiled of my sex, I am classed with angels—not a male angel, nor a female 
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one. There will be no one to do aught against me, nor will they find any male 
energy in me.86                                                                                           
 
It is difficult to untangle Tertullian’s legacy given that he changed positions over 
the course of his life. He both affirms and denies the significance of sex differences. He 
provides examples of the worst of Christian misogyny and yet, at the end of his life, after 
joining the Montanists, he concedes female participation in ritual leadership.87 This 
ambivalence can also be found in his comments on eunuchs.88   
Tertullian ridiculed his opponent, Marcion, for being “no better than a eunuch” 
and yet, he is one of the few writers willing to speak of Jesus as a eunuch. Tertullian 
exhorted his followers by saying that Jesus “‘stands before you, if you are willing to copy 
Him, as a voluntary eunuch in the flesh.’ Christ in fact ‘opens the kingdoms of the 
heavens to eunuchs, as being Himself, withal, a eunuch.’”89 Kuefler notes that 
Tertullian’s words about Jesus as a ‘eunuch in the flesh’ are ambiguous, leaving open the 
possibility of Jesus as a physical, not merely spiritual, eunuch.90   
Tertullian’s legacy is mixed on account of shifts in his own opinions over time. 
His authority for later Christian teachers was also undermined on account of his 
association with the Montanist sect, and while Kuefler claims that later Latin writers 
“never… referred to Jesus as a eunuch”91 many of Tertullian’s ideas lived on in later 
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writers. Unfortunately for the history of Christianity, it was his misogyny, rather than his 
emphasis on the sexless eschatological life, that is most often remembered. Kuefler 
speculates that it was Roman ideals about gender which persuaded Western Christians to 
preserve the former and ignore the latter. 
Notions of male superiority and female inferiority were too deeply embedded 
in Roman cultural values for a religious philosophy arguing for their 
eradication to have succeeded in the West, even if that eradication had roots 
in earliest Christianity. Admitting the possibility of gender ambiguity in the 
soul while condemning it in the body was a means of rendering the 
genderless ideal of earliest Christianity quaint but harmless.92 
 
This focus on the life to come can be found most profoundly in the works of Origen, 
whose “towering genius…dominates all accounts of the further development of notions 
on sexuality and the human person in the Greek world.”93   
 
Origen (185-254) 
 
Origen was keenly aware of the passing nature of the present form of human life. 
He learned as a teenager, somewhere between the ages of sixteen or seventeen, to give 
priority to spiritual family, rather than the fleeting ties of blood, when his father was 
martyred. This perspective is crucial for understanding Origen’s teaching on human 
persons, sex and gender distinctions, as well as his own self-castration. Matthew Kuefler 
explains:  
In an age that idealized the willingness to shed one’s own blood for the sake 
of religion in the glorification of martyrs, self-castration may not have 
seemed either too strange or too demanding. …Moreover, in the same way 
that martyrdom was admired by Christians because it showed courage greater 
than most were capable of and lent to those willing to suffer it a charismatic 
authority unequalled by others, men willing to castrate themselves might 
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have been respected and obeyed precisely because their behavior was 
atypical.94 
 
Most historians explain Origen’s self-castration as an attempt to protect himself 
from slander on account of his willingness to include women among his disciples.95 But 
Peter Brown believes that Origen would have known that castration performed after 
puberty would not necessarily relieve him of sexual desire or sexual ability. He writes,  
What Origen may have sought, at that time, was something more deeply 
unsettling. The eunuch was notorious (and repulsive to many) because he had 
dared to shift the massive boundary between the sexes. He had opted out of 
being male. By losing the sexual ‘head’ that was held to cause his facial hair 
to grow, the eunuch was no longer recognizable as a man. …Deprived of the 
standard professional credential of a philosopher in late antique circles—a 
flowing beard—Origen would have appeared in public with a smooth face, 
like a woman or like a boy frozen into a state of prepubertal innocence. He 
was a walking lesson in the basic indeterminacy of the body.96 
 
For Origen, the loss of male sexual identity in this life was no bother, considering 
that he believed human souls were sexless before being placed in bodies and that bodies 
and souls would be transformed in the future so that the limitations of sex differentiation 
would be shed once again.97 “This body did not have to be defined by its sexual 
components, still less by the social roles that were conventionally derived from those 
components. Rather, the body should act as a blazon of the freedom of the spirit.”98  
 Brown explains that chastity was a sign of human freedom, resisting the pressures 
of the world.99   
To reject sexuality, therefore, did not mean, for Origen, simply to suppress 
the sexual drives. It meant the assertion of a basic freedom so intense, a sense 
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of identity so deeply rooted, as to cause to evaporate the normal social and 
physical constraints that tied the Christian to his or her gender.100   
 
Virginity was the state of souls before their relocation in bodies. Therefore, to remain a 
virgin was to recall this past and speed up its future.101  
Origen challenged his students to believe in the possibility of their sanctification; 
a sanctification rooted in future glory but capable of powerful work in the present life. 
“Resolve to know that in you there is a capacity to be transformed.”102 Among early 
Christian writers, Origen’s optimism is exceptional. As we look forward, and westward, 
we will find that others were much less confident that the heavenly future could make a 
difference in this life. 
Sexual Renunciation in the West 
 
Ambrose (337?-397) 
 
Ambrose followed Origen’s dualism, reading Pauline language about the war 
between flesh and spirit through the lens of mind and body.103 Sexuality was central to 
Ambrose’s notion of the flesh that was “put off” in baptism. The Christian was clothed 
with Christ in baptism, Christ who was born of a virgin and lived a continent life. 
According to Ambrose, baptism and the virginal life enabled those born from the taint of 
the sexual act to be remade in the image of Christ, a foretaste of heavenly glory.104 
 For Ambrose, the eunuch represented the virginal man or woman. He wrote to 
convince Christians of his day that physical castration was not the proper application of 
Jesus’ words in Matthew 19:12. 
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And there are eunuchs who have castrated themselves… [but] by will and not 
by necessity, and therefore great is the grace of continence in them, because it 
is the will, not incapacity, which makes a man continent. For it is seemly to 
preserve the gift of divine working whole…  The case is not the same of those 
who use a knife on themselves, and I touch upon this point advisedly, for there 
are some who look upon it as a state of virtue to restrain guilt with a knife… 
but then consider whether this tends not rather to a declaration of weakness 
than to a reputation for strength. …No one, then, ought, as many suppose, to 
mutilate himself, but rather gain the victory: for the Church gathers in those 
who conquer, not those who are defeated. …For why should the means of 
gaining the crown and of the practice of virtue be lost to a man who is born to 
honor, equipped for victory? How can he through courage of soul castrate 
himself?105 
 
Ambrose’s words provide us with more evidence that Christian self-castration was still 
practiced and honored in the 4th century.106 Given his emphasis on the sexual as 
representative of sinful flesh, it may not be so surprising to find that Christians were 
willing to castrate themselves to ensure their participation in the Kingdom of God. An 
inability to control their sexual drive any other way may have led some to desperate 
measures. Others prayed for God to deliver them from their sexual organs. “[H]oly men 
dreamt of being castrated by angels.”107 
 
Jerome (347-420) 
 
Like Ambrose, Jerome was also indebted to Origen. Jerome’s earlier writings 
(from the 380’s C.E.) were modeled on Origin’s view of human persons (i.e. sex and 
gender were passing phases, inconsequential to the sexless spirit). Jerome allowed 
himself the companionship of educated women who were committed to sexual 
continence and the study of the Scriptures. Nevertheless, he did not think that many men 
could live as he lived—in close, chaste association with women. Unlike Origen, and the 
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Desert Fathers (whose harsh seclusion Jerome had abandoned after only two years), he 
was not convinced that the sexual urge could be conquered in this life.108 
Like Origen before him, Jerome associated the life of virginity with the life of 
angels109 and even suggested that the virginal state removed the distinctions of sex: 
“Observe what the happiness of that state must be in which even the distinction of sex is 
lost. The virgin is no longer called a woman.”110   
But in 393, Jerome’s hero was condemned of heresy. Origen’s works had come 
under attack. His views of the sexless eschatological life were believed to undermine 
Christian claims of the resurrection of the body.  
Jerome was forced to choose. He could no longer base his persona as a 
spiritual guide to noble ladies on so unpopular a figure. After 395, he came 
down firmly on the side of views that stressed the lasting differences between 
men and women.111 
 
In 398 Jerome defended his belief in the resurrection and sex distinctions.  
 
…I will openly confess the faith of the Church. The reality of a resurrection 
without flesh and bones, without blood and members, is unintelligible. Where 
there are flesh and bones, where there are blood and members, there must of 
necessity be diversity of sex. Where there is diversity of sex, there John is 
John, Mary is Mary. You need not fear the marriage of those who, even 
before death, lived in their own sex without discharging the functions of sex. 
When it is said, “In that day they shall neither marry, nor be given in 
marriage,” the words refer to those who can marry, and yet will not do so. 
…but where there is sex, there you have man and woman. …Who can have 
any glory from a life of chastity if we have no sex which would make 
unchastity possible? … Likeness to the angels is promised us, that is, the 
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blessedness of their angelic existence without flesh and sex will be bestowed 
on us in our flesh and with our sex. …Moreover, likeness to the angels does 
not imply a changing of men into angels, but their growth in immortality and 
glory.112   
 
While Jerome maintained that there would be no sexual activity in heaven, despite the 
ability of men and women to marry and engage in sexual functions, he says nothing in 
this treatise about gender distinctions such as the hierarchy of male over female. It may 
be that this hierarchy was also to be left behind given that Jerome understood marriage as 
one of the primary agents of female servitude.113 The eunuch, understood as exemplar of 
the virginal life, continued to represent a freedom, if not from sex distinctions, at least 
from some of the gender distinctions associated with marital life in that day.114   
 After the condemnations of Origen, Western Christian writers were much more 
careful to make a distinction between “eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom” and real, 
physical eunuchs. Matthew Kuefler, in his study of “masculinity, gender ambiguity and 
Christian ideology in late antiquity,” explains how Latin Church fathers employed the 
rhetoric of manliness and unmanliness to defend their view of a true eunuch. “[U]nmanly 
eunuchs [were those] who castrated their bodies and manly eunuchs [were those] who 
castrated their spirits but left their bodies intact.”115 Jerome could speak of the eunuch as 
a sort of “shorthand” for Christian perfection. “‘When you make yourself a eunuch for 
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the kingdom of Heaven’s sake,’ Jerome wrote to one man, ‘what else did you seek to 
achieve than the perfect life?’”116   
 
Augustine (354-430) 
 
Augustine sat under the teaching of Ambrose and was baptized by the latter when 
he finally converted to Christianity. Like Ambrose and Jerome, he associated true 
Christianity with the virginal life. The virtue of marriage consisted of a hierarchically 
ordered household within a hierarchically ordered city overseen by a hierarchically 
ordered Church. Differences between the sexes and class distinctions formed the basis for 
these hierarchies. 
Within his massive corpus, Augustine does not elaborate on Jesus’ teaching about 
eunuchs in Matthew 19:12. When he did speak about eunuchs Augustine was almost 
always railing against the galli, castrated priests of the cult of Cybele prominent in the 
city of Carthage where he had spent more than ten years of his life. He despised the galli 
not only for their religious beliefs and their sexual exploits, but also for their 
transgression of gender boundaries. He called them “effeminates [molles] consecrated to 
the Great Mother, who violate every canon of decency in men and women” visible “in the 
streets and squares of Carthage with their pomaded hair and powdered faces, gliding 
along with womanish languor.”117 According to Augustine, a eunuch priest was “neither 
changed into a woman nor allowed to remain a man.”118 
Gender transgression was something that Augustine would not tolerate. When 
confronted with Christian ascetics who called themselves “eunuchs for the sake of the 
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kingdom” and wore their hair long to display their disregard for gendered comportment, 
Augustine responded with rhetorical force:  
How lamentably ridiculous is that other argument, if it can be called such, 
which they have brought forward in defense of their long hair. They say that 
the Apostle forbade men to wear their hair long, but, they argue, those who 
have castrated themselves for the sake of the kingdom of Heaven are no 
longer men. O astonishing madness! …They have heard, or at least have 
read, what was written: ‘For all you who have been baptized into Christ, have 
put on Christ. There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor 
freeman, there is neither male nor female.’ Yet they do not know that this was 
said according to the concupiscence of carnal sex, because in the interior 
man, where we are renewed in the newness of our minds, there is no sex of 
this sort. There, let them not deny that holy people are men because they do 
nothing of a sexual nature.119 
 
These monks knew of Paul’s words that long hair was a “disgrace” to men. They knew 
that anything conceived as gender transgression would be considered a disgrace for men 
but they assumed disgrace willingly: “We assume this disgrace, because of our sins.”120 
Augustine was more than ready to make use of feminine metaphors (i.e., the bride 
of Christ) for the spiritual life of priests, bishops and monks; nevertheless, he was careful 
to uphold gender distinctions in hierarchy and comportment in the public sphere. The 
feminine spirituality of bishops before God only worked to bolster their masculine 
authority in the church and over the city.121 
Gender distinctions were an important part of the ordered fabric of society, and 
yet, Augustine was willing to look ahead to a time when the ways of this world would 
give way to the order of the world to come. Augustine attempts to explain Jesus’ teaching 
in Luke 14:26 (“If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, 
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and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my 
disciple.”) by an appeal to Matthew 22:30 (“For in the resurrection they neither marry, 
nor are given in marriage.”) and Galatians 3:28 and Colossians 3:11 (“there is neither Jew 
nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female;” “but Christ is 
all, and in all.”). 
Hence it is necessary that whoever wishes here and now to aim after the life 
of that kingdom, should hate not the persons themselves, but those temporal 
relationships by which this life of ours, which is transitory and is comprised 
in being born and dying, is upheld; because he who does not hate them, does 
not yet love that life where there is no condition of being born and dying, 
which unites parties in earthly wedlock.122 
 
Marriage was seen as part of the earthly system, bringing about birth in response 
to death. But in the next life, marriage, sexual activity, and the birth of children would be 
abandoned. Augustine asks husbands if they look forward to having their wives with 
them in heaven. He explains that a good husband will look forward to sharing the 
heavenly life with his wife but not as respects her being his wife. 
Were I to ask him again, whether he would like his wife to live with him 
there, after the resurrection, when she had undergone that angelic change 
which is promised to the saints, he would reply that he desired this as 
strongly as he reprobated the other. Thus a good Christian is found in one and 
the same woman to love the creature of God, whom he desires to be 
transformed and renewed; but to hate the corruptible and mortal conjugal 
connection and sexual intercourse: i.e. to love in her what is characteristic of 
a human being, to hate what belongs to her as a wife.123 
 
In this passage, Augustine highlights the fundamental humanity of women, a 
humanity that is revealed in the next life, when gender distinctions, marriage and 
sexuality fall by the way side. Unlike Tertullian, Augustine does not highlight the fact 
                                                 
122 Augustine, Sermon on the Mount, Part 1, Chapter XV, 40, translated by William Findlay, 
Revised and Annotated by D. S. Schaff , Christian Classics Ethereal Library, http://www.ccel.org/ 
ccel/schaff/npnf106.v.ii.xv.html?scrBook= Matt&scrCh=22&scrV=30#v.ii.xv-p7.1. 
123
 Ibid, 41. 
 108
that men might actually lose “what belongs to them as husbands.” But even while 
Augustine was willing to speak about gender distinctions losing their value in the life to 
come, he was far from willing to allow a blurring of the sexes in the present time.  
Augustine shows us how even the gender ambiguity of hermaphrodites was 
smoothed over in the ancient world. 
As for Androgynes [androgyni], also called Hermaphrodites [hermaphroditi], 
they are certainly very rare, and yet it is difficult to find periods when there 
are no examples of human beings possessing the characteristics of both sexes, 
in such a way that it is a matter of doubt how they should be classified. 
However, the prevalent usage has called them masculine, assigning them to 
the better [melior] sex.124 
 
It is ironic that Augustine claims that castrated males are “neither changed into a 
woman nor allowed to remain a man”125 while at the same time arguing that 
hermaphrodites should be classed as men. Augustine cites grammatical gender as the 
reason for this classification but Kuefler gives a more complete explanation.126 Here we 
must remember that androgynes/hermaphrodites were defined as having the sexual 
characteristics of both sexes—not deficient genitals of one sex. Within the androcentric 
economy of the ancient world, it was really only the male genitals that mattered.127  
Unlike eunuchs, some hermaphrodites were capable of begetting children—an act which 
proved they were manlier than castrated eunuchs could ever be.128   
Along with others in the West, Augustine argued that the only positive value of 
the eunuch was as an exemplar of the virtue of virginity. Gender distinctions were an 
essential part of life in the present order of things, even if, in the eschaton, a common 
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humanity would be all that mattered. Similar to Tertullian’s affirmation of a sexless soul, 
Augustine’s presentation of a sexless resurrection—or an eschatological life that focused 
on a shared humanity and downplayed sex distinctions, while at the same time affirming 
sex distinctions in the present eon—protected the power structures of the present age, 
“rendering the genderless ideal of earliest Christianity quaint but harmless.”129 
 Kuefler summarizes the Western tradition, saying that Latin Church fathers 
“offered a host of alternative meanings for the ‘eunuchs who have made themselves that 
way for the kingdom of Heaven.’” 130  
…Spiritual eunuchs might be virgins, continent persons, men or women in 
sexless marriages, or widows. The variety of interpretations, all related to 
sexual renunciation, and the willingness of the Church fathers to refer to 
women as well as men as spiritual eunuchs, merely highlights the real 
exegetical imperative behind the statements: eunuch must mean anything but 
a castrated man. (We must assume that the extension of the image of 
castration to women, according them an identity as eunuchs, was a much less 
dangerous gender ambiguity than the gender ambiguity of physically 
castrated men.)131 
 
 Augustine’s views dominated the exegetical tradition to follow in the Western 
part of the Christian Empire. However, things in the East differed in the fact that physical 
eunuchs remained a part of public life in Byzantine Christianity. Though in the early days 
of the Byzantine Empire, Eastern Church Fathers tended to display the same sort of 
disdain for eunuchs as those in the West, over the course of several centuries opinions 
about eunuchs changed significantly for the better. 
 
                                                 
129
 Ibid., 230. 
130
 Ibid., 268. 
131
 Ibid., 268. 
 110
Eunuchs in the Early East 
  
 Peter Brown explains that although Christians in the East and West both 
understood the eunuch as the exemplar of the ascetic, virginal life, the theological 
tradition of the East did not view sexuality as the centerpiece of human sinfulness. Desert 
monastics, formative of the spirituality in the Eastern Christian Empire, viewed sex not as 
an evil in itself but as that which tied the believer to the power structures of the world.132   
 
John Cassian (360-435) 
 
John Cassian was a Roman Christian who receives the credit for bringing much 
of the wisdom of the Eastern Desert monastics to the West. He attempted to refute 
Augustine’s views on concupiscence and the bondage of the will. Whereas Augustine 
“had placed sexuality irremovably at the center of the human person,” Cassian believed 
that sexual fantasies and temptations actually revealed more dangerous vices lodged 
within the soul: “anger, greed, avarice, and vainglory.”133 In his view, the sexual drive 
was received as a gift of God, natural because it is present in all men and a gift because it 
is a tool to help Christians learn holiness.  
Despite differences of opinion on the nature of sexuality and human sin, Cassian 
agreed with other Western Christian Fathers that Jesus’ words about eunuchs were not to 
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be taken literally. We do not cut off “our hands or feet or our genitals”… but the “body of 
sin.”134 
 
Basil of Caesarea (330–379)  
 
Basil represents the standard opinion of physical eunuchism in the earlier Eastern 
tradition. Kathryn Ringrose, who has written an exhaustive study of eunuchs in the 
Christian East, explains that in a letter Basil sent to Simplicia he set down what was to 
become “a standard part of the repertoire used by authors critical of eunuchs.”135   
The tone of the letter is angry and negative, …and was aimed at a group that 
he clearly dismissed as less than human. St. Basil says that the eunuch is 
damned by the knife and that although he is chaste, his chastity will go 
unrewarded. He claims that eunuchs cannot make moral judgments because 
their ‘feet are twisted’.136 Backward feet were a sign of being in league with 
the forces of evil, particularly the Devil. Finally, St. Basil claims that eunuchs 
did experience sexual passion and that they raved with intemperate passion in 
general, but this passion could not achieve fruition. St. Basil’s writings were 
widely cited by later commentators as the definitive ‘word’ on eunuchs…137 
 
Because of the desire of the early Fathers to associate eunuchs with the life of 
continence, away from more literal interpretations, they read these values back into their 
interpretations of Matthew 19:12.  
 
Gregory of Nazianzos (329-389)  
 
Gregory of Nazianzos commented on Matthew 19:12 explaining that the first type 
of eunuch represented those  
born without sexual desire. The second group, those who are ‘castrated by 
others,’ refers to men who have been taught celibacy by others. The third 
group, those who choose celibacy on their own, have the spiritual power to 
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teach it to themselves. Castrated eunuchs have no place at all in Gregory of 
Nazianzos’s gloss.138    
 
Elsewhere, however, Nazianzos describes eunuchs as “womanlike and, among men, are 
not manly, of dubious sex.”139 
 
John Chrysostom (347-407)  
 
Chrysostom shared Basil’s negative assessment of eunuchs. He is remembered for 
having a lengthy political battle with Eutropios, a powerful court eunuch, while the 
former was patriarch of Constantinople and for having preached a sermon against the 
latter from his pulpit in the Hagia Sophia.140 Chrysostom argued that physical eunuchs 
would gain no reward for their celibacy. Only those who castrate themselves metaphor-
ically, exerting effort to live the continent life, would be rewarded.  
While Chrysostom argued that “virginity made plain that ‘the things of the 
resurrection stand at the door’,”141 literal castration was the “Devil’s work.” Castration 
“injures God’s creation and allows men to fall into sin.” In this context, Chrysostom 
probably means sexual sin.142 
 Chrysostom distanced Jesus’ statement from literal eunuchs and also worked hard 
to defend the case that Daniel and his friends should not be understood as eunuchs of the 
Babylonian court, despite the fact that they were chosen for their beauty and given 
responsibilities which paralleled those given to eunuchs in the Byzantine Empire.143 For 
Chrysostom, physical eunuchs could not be representatives of holiness.  
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Summary of Eunuchs in the Early East 
Katherine Ringrose explains that “The low esteem in which eunuchs were held in 
Late Antiquity and early Byzantium is reflected in the near absence of eunuchs from 
church offices in the early centuries of the Byzantine Empire.”144 Monasteries also 
regularly set down rules that boys, eunuchs, and beardless men, were not to be admitted. 
It was believed that the androgynous beauty of eunuchs and boys would tempt other 
monks into sexual sin.145  
Nevertheless, despite this predominantly negative picture of eunuchs—as those 
outside the means of holiness—eunuchs were not represented in such negative lights in 
Late Antique hagiography.  
These texts present eunuchs as sexually continent and scholarly… [they] have 
noble character, are kind to colleagues and servants, are good-tempered, and 
exhibit personal integrity. They are characterized as sincere, brotherly, pious, 
without malice, careful of what they say, abstemious of food and drink, 
unwilling to take bribes or play favorites, and generous in their philanthropy. 
In many cases these eunuch saints are fictional characters, but the 
characterization remains useful.146 
 
 
Eunuchs in Middle and Late Byzantium  
 
Changing Attitudes toward Eunuchs 
Over the course of a few centuries, historians of Byzantine literature have found a 
change in attitudes toward eunuchs. Ringrose dates it to about the eighth century, “when 
eunuchs begin to appear in prominent religious positions.”147 In the eighth and ninth 
centuries, eunuchs were found even among the patriarchs of the Byzantine church. 
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Religious historians praised eunuchs as church leaders as well as holy eunuchs in 
imperial service. Saints Nikephoros and Niketas Patrikios are remembered as holy 
eunuchs of the tenth century, they are of particular interest because they were castrated 
by their parents as young children who brought them to be trained as servants of the 
imperial household. Both eunuchs eventually left the court to serve the church. Niketas 
had a successful political career and served as a military commander. He eventually left 
these posts to become a monk and is remembered for his ability to heal men “tormented 
by sexual desires.”148   
Ringrose suggests that such men represent the “normality of castration” during 
this period.149 It was not unusual for parents to castrate their own boys as infants or 
young children with the hopes that they would be able to make a career as a eunuch of 
the court or church. Such children were then trained, not only in particular tasks 
associated with their duties but also acculturated “into patterns of behavior considered to 
be ‘normal’ for [eunuchs].”150 Ringrose argues that these patterns of behavior (e.g., 
expectations regarding their dress, manner of walking, speed of talking, and facial 
expressions), accompanied by physical features distinctive of eunuchs, explain how 
eunuchs came to be understood as a third gender, if not a third sex within Byzantine 
culture.151 
Parents who castrated their children were not prosecuted by the state despite the 
fact that castration was against the law in the Byzantine Empire.152 On the other hand, it 
was considered an offense to castrate an adult. Castrating an adult was understood as 
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changing his nature. Castrating a child on the other hand was simply a method for 
retaining the values natural in children: “his beauty, his lack of sexuality, his lack of 
aggressive behavior, his willingness to serve.”153 As in the West, boys were also made 
into eunuchs to preserve their “angelic voices.” A monastery was founded near the Hagia 
Sophia in order to train young castrati singers for service there and at other churches. 154  
Children were not looked upon as “’unripened’ men and women but… unformed, 
malleable beings…  the idea that society molds a male child into a model of perfect 
masculinity is very well established in Greek society.”155 
 
Symeon Metaphrastes (10th century) 
 
The growing acceptance of eunuchs at court, in monasteries156 and in churches 
brought about a change in the way some Byzantine exegetes read the Scriptures. Unlike 
Chrysostom, who had a negative perspective on eunuchs and was careful never to suggest 
that Daniel and his companions were “cut men,” Symeon Metaphrastes saw no difficulty 
in Daniel and his friends living as both court eunuchs and holy men. Throughout his 
commentary on the Book of Daniel, Metaphrastes reworks the material to show the 
similarities between Daniel and court eunuchs of his own day. A ninth-century Byzantine 
icon of Daniel presents him as “beardless, reclining on a couch and wearing Persian court 
dress. To Byzantine eyes the iconography would clearly identify him as a court 
eunuch.”157 Ringrose highlights the contrasts between Metaphrastes’ and Chrysostom’s 
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commentaries on the Book of Daniel to illustrate the significant shifts in attitudes toward 
eunuchs in the intervening centuries.158 Still, this shift was not universal.  
 
Photios I (810-893) 
Eunuchs continued to be treated harshly, especially when their behavior accorded 
with negative assumptions about their character. In the ninth century, the patriarch 
Photios accused the eunuch, John Angourios, the head of the imperial department of 
finances, of laughing in church. His letter employed standard critiques of eunuchs to 
denounce his behavior: 
To John the patrician descended from Angourioi. Those who are wise among 
the Greeks liken you to Attis, calling you one of the galli. Our wise men 
confine you in the women’s quarters and consider and call you androgynous. 
Whence [from the women’s quarters] you have overstepped the rules on 
either side and intruded yourself upon the mysteries of God’s church, turning 
everything upside down and through your corrupt nature, making the most 
fertile and prolific church of Christ fruitless and useless.159 
 
Photius employs the standard comparison between physical and spiritual fruitfulness as 
well as the comparison of eunuchs to women. Later in this same letter he likens the 
eunuch to the “Devil’s gateway,” a phrase employed by Tertullian to speak of women as 
the daughters of Eve. 
Ringrose shows how, over the course of centuries, the Byzantine perspective on 
eunuchs changed considerably. While in Late Antiquity, eunuchs were almost universally 
judged as morally bankrupt, between the eighth and eleventh centuries, eunuchs could 
also be described as the holiest of God’s servants.160    
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Theophylaktos of Ohrid (1050-1126) 
 
One of the most interesting works on eunuchs appears from the pen of a twelfth 
century bishop, Theophylaktos of Ohrid. He took up the issue in an entire treatise 
entitled, Defense of Eunuchs. Theophylaktos’ gloss on Matthew 9:12 reflects the 
commentary of Gregory of Nazianzos. The first type of eunuch are those either,  
lacking sexual desire or without functioning genitalia. Those who are made 
eunuchs by men are those who have learned celibacy from others. Those who 
are ‘eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven’ are those who have been 
able to teach themselves celibacy.161   
 
Noticeably absent is any mention of castration. Ringrose explains this by referencing his 
Defense of Eunuchs where he notes that there are good and bad eunuchs. Thus, castration 
has no bearing on chastity. The castrated man, though it may be easier for him than 
others, must learn celibacy, either from others, or directly from the Spirit.162 Given this 
exegesis, even a eunuch must learn to become a eunuch. 
 When Theophylaktos does discuss castration he also makes distinctions. 
Castration done to an adult man is wrong. He likens it to murder and argues that it is 
“against nature.” Ringrose suspects that his “real objection” may be that  
it represents a voluntary change in a man’s gender assignment after he has 
passed puberty. Given prevailing ideas about acculturation and gender 
hierarchies, Theophylaktos probably found this culturally unacceptable.163   
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On the other hand, castration done at a young age, to help a child “fulfill God’s plan for 
his life” is “praiseworthy.” This kind of castration, rather than being “against nature” 
allows a person to live “beyond nature.”164 Ringrose explains  
…in the Late Antique and Byzantine contexts, men who gave up their 
reproductive powers were thought to acquire expanded spiritual and 
intellectual powers as a kind of compensation. Consequently, eunuchs, and 
especially those castrated in childhood, were often thought to have access to 
realms outside mundane space and time. …they were sometimes depicted as 
able to penetrate heavenly realms…165 
 
 The bishop defines a eunuch more narrowly than most in the ancient world as one 
whose testicles have been either crushed or surgically removed, “excluding people who 
were ‘born lacking in desire,’ those born with defective genitalia and those who practice 
voluntary celibacy.”166 
 Theophylaktos makes use of a number of arguments about nature. He argues that 
it is natural for a gardener to cut down plants that do not produce fruit. Thus, it seems 
natural, or at least not “against nature” to cut off testicles for those men who have 
rejected the desire to produce offspring. “We do not charge those who remove a sixth 
finger. You cannot say the one who does this does so against nature.”167  
Theophylaktos refutes those who argue that castration ruins the moral character 
of a man. Instead of suggesting that eunuchs are tarnished by association with women— 
thus acculturated into the weaknesses of women—he states the contrary. By close 
association with godly empresses, “they might draw themselves in the glory of the divine 
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image and become a likeness of the Divine word and propriety…”168 The assumption 
here is that eunuchs are influenced by whomever they serve, for good or for ill. 
Theophylaktos turns a number of assumptions about eunuchs on their head. 
Instead of speaking of eunuchs as “against nature,” he argues that good eunuchs live 
“beyond nature.”169 He even creates a new etymology. Instead of “the guardian of the bed 
chamber” (ho tēn eunēn ekhōn), he proposes that eunuch come from eunoos, “well-” or 
“high-minded.”170 At the core of the bishop’s defense of eunuchs is the argument that 
there is more than one type of eunuch. There are good eunuchs and there are bad 
eunuchs. Each must be judged for his own merit rather than the state of his body.171   
 
Summary of Eunuchs in the Ancient World 
 
Before Jesus’ words about eunuchs in Matthew 19:12, eunuchs were considered 
the epitome of “other”—to Greeks, Romans, and especially Jews. They were foreigners, 
pagans, morally suspect, sexually illicit, neither male nor female, “exiles from the society 
of the human race.” But Jesus’ positive evaluation of eunuchs in the context of his 
teaching on marriage transformed the discussion of eunuchs into a declaration of the 
virtues of the virginal life. The metaphorical eunuch became the new icon of Christian 
perfection. East and West shared this theological assumption, but while the East 
eventually permitted physical eunuchs in prominent places in politics and the church, 
Western Christendom tended to employ literal eunuchs only as castrati singers in the 
churches. There is no Western treatise comparable to Theophylaktos of Ohrid’s Defense 
of Eunuchs. 
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 Both East and West show Christian writers attempting to distance Jesus’ 
statement about eunuchs from the practice of castration and gender ambiguity. Both East 
and West drew from ancient wells of gendered prejudice which associated manliness with 
perfection. Therefore, if the eunuch was to represent Christian perfection, the eunuch had 
to be transformed from a symbol of gender ambiguity and effeminacy to an alternative 
version of manliness. In the West, this manliness was defended as metaphorical 
eunuchism—the virtuous virginal life—described in masculine language of warfare 
against the Devil and the Devil’s agents: women, eunuchs, prepubescent boys and vices 
lodged deep within the soul. Eastern Church Fathers shared many of these assumptions; 
however, as eunuchs became more prominent in Byzantine life and proved themselves as 
“perfect servants,” Byzantine writers became increasingly willing to ascribe virtue and 
holiness to literal eunuchs. By the 12th century, Theophylaktos of Ohrid was able to 
defend the position that there are two alternative paths to masculine perfection.  
… two different ladders, each leading to a different conception of full 
masculine perfection. It is clear that the older pattern of classical Graeco-
Roman society, in which young aristocratic males were acculturated with 
great care to ensure that they would become proper men, has now been 
adapted to an ecclesiastical context that emphasizes early childhood rearing 
and may include physical mutilation to ensure celibacy.172 
 
Rather than using the category of the eunuch to overturn the importance of manliness for 
ecclesiastical privilege, Theophylaktos and others expanded the category of manliness to 
include eunuchs. The narrative represents an ironic twist. It maintains the association of 
perfection and masculinity, even if physical manliness becomes less important in the 
process. Cultural construction of gender (i.e., the equation masculinity with perfection) 
became more important than the “hard facts” of biological masculinity.  
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Whereas Origen could make himself a eunuch in order to display his sexless 
spirit, Theophylaktos presented castration as an alternative path to spiritual (i.e., 
masculine) perfection.173 Thus, both East and West distanced the eunuch from its origins 
as a representative of androgyny, reconstructing the eunuch as a model of manliness. 
Perfection, even within the Christian tradition, continued to be construed as a ladder of 
ascent toward manliness. 
 
INTERSEX AS EUNUCH:  
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES 
 
Given the diverse history of the eunuch, it is fair to ask whether it is even helpful 
to recover such a concept when beginning to think about intersex in our own day. 
Susannah Cornwall dismisses the connection between eunuchs and intersex.174 
Meanwhile, some intersex Christians look to Matthew 19:12 as the starting point for 
exploring their intersexuality from a biblical framework.175 Is the eunuch a valid lens for 
intersexuality? The answer must be yes and no. 
Intersex and “natural eunuch” are not univocal terms. As ancient writers do not 
give descriptions of the genitals of those they classified as “natural eunuchs,” it is 
difficult to assess where they would have drawn the boundary lines.176 Nevertheless, 
from their discussions of eunuchs, we are able to argue that people in the ancient world 
were more familiar with variations of sex development than contemporary readers and 
that they supplemented their binary model of human sex/gender with the marginal 
category of the eunuch.  
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Some intersex conditions, like Klinefelter's syndrome, bring about physical 
characteristics almost identical to descriptions of castrated eunuchs found in the ancient 
world. Mr. Cameron, an intersex man with Klinefelter’s syndrome, describes himself as 
tall and explains how testosterone stops the growth of long bones in arms and legs, so 
that those with lower levels of testosterone grow taller than the average man.177 He goes 
on to detail his bodily features and his experience of feeling “caught between the sexes”: 
It is only fairly recently that I have discovered the term ‘intersexed’ and how 
it relates to my body. I like the term because I prefer more choices than male 
or female. …It wasn’t until I was 29 years old that a label was put on my 
physical differences, differences I never quite understood. I had large nipples 
on smallish breasts, peanut-size testicles, and cellulite-type hairless fatty 
tissue over most of my body. I was told at an infertility clinic that I had an 
extra X chromosome and a karyotype of XXY-47. This is commonly known 
as Klinefelter’s syndrome. I was informed that I was genetically sterile and 
that my ‘sex glands’ produced only 10 percent of what was considered 
normal testosterone levels for a male. I was advised to immediately start 
testosterone replacement therapy…  The medical journals called my 
condition ‘feminized male.’ I had always felt caught between the sexes 
without knowing why.178 
 
Mr. Cameron’s experience of Klinefelter’s Syndrome is strikingly similar to ancient 
descriptions of eunuchs.  
Other intersex conditions produce bodies that probably would have been 
classified under other ancient terms. Persons with ambiguous genitals resulting from ovo-
testes, partial androgen insensitivity, and severe forms of congenital adrenal hyperplasia 
would probably have been classified as “hermaphrodites” or “androgynes” whereas those 
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with complete androgen insensitivity would more likely have been labeled “barren 
women”—another term of shame in the ancient world.179 
Where the category of eunuch differs from the hermaphrodite or the barren 
woman is that it remained a term of “in-between-ness.” As Augustine explained, 
hermaphrodites could be labeled as men. Barren women remained women—although 
they suffered shame from their inability to perform the duties of their sex. The category 
of the eunuch also differs from the others in that it developed into a publicly recognized 
third gender, especially the Byzantine East. Though eunuchs had been derided for their 
non-conformity to male and female gender stereotypes, they developed their own 
gendered traits which enabled them to contribute to society as “perfect servants” of the 
imperial household, or “perfect servants” of God.180 Eunuchs did not forever remain in 
the “shadows.”181 
The ability of eunuchs to stand as a public challenge to the two-sex, two-gender 
paradigm of the ancient world, while it is not identical to the challenge of intersex, 
certainly illuminates the possibility of carving out public recognition of intersex even 
within a Christian culture holding to the goodness of heterosexual complementarity. 
Contemporary Christians need not emulate the ways in which a third category was 
employed in the Byzantine East but they can certainly look learn from those willing to 
supplement the sex/gender binary model in order to make space for all human beings. 
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The history of the interpretation of the eunuch should also stand as a warning. The 
power structures of the ancient world were built upon a hierarchical chain of gendered 
being. Men were at the top. Women were at the bottom. Eunuchs were somewhere in 
between. Early Christian men reinterpreted the eunuch as the manly Christian, trading in 
old, Roman versions of masculinity such as sexuality and violence for the new Christian 
virtues of continence and martyrdom. Nevertheless, these virtues continued to be 
presented as manly. The subject had changed but the rhetoric—the hierarchical gendered 
power structure—did not. 
Given this interpretive shift, it is essential to understand Jesus’ language about 
eunuchs in their original context. The physicality of eunuchs, naturally born and 
castrated, forced Christian writers in the ancient world to wrestle with questions of the 
nature and significance of sex, gender, and sexuality for what it means to be human and 
what it means to be Christian.  Intersex today forces contemporary theologians to do the 
same.  
By analyzing Jesus’ statement about natural eunuchs through the lens of intersex, 
one can draw several conclusions. First, Jesus was not afraid of eunuchs. He was not 
disgusted by them. He did not ridicule them as did Jews, Romans and Greeks; nor did he 
speak of them as “proof of the fall.”  David Hester notes an important contrast. 
Jesus heals the blind, the paralyzed, the possessed, the fevered, the leprous, 
the hemorrhaging, even the dead, in every case restoring them to full societal 
membership. In the case of the eunuch, however, there is no implication 
whatsoever of ‘illness’ or social ‘deformity’ in need of restoration. Instead, 
the eunuch is held up as the model to follow.182 
Out of his great compassion for outcasts, Jesus took up the shameful identity of 
the eunuch and turned it upside down into an identity for his disciples—a personal 
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identity that did not conform to the gender ideals of the ancient world. Just as Jesus 
transformed the cross from a symbol of defeat into a symbol of victory; he brought 
eunuchs in from outside and raised them up from shame and suspicion to become icons 
of radical discipleship. 
 In the metaphor of the eunuch, Jesus presented, for the first time in Jewish 
literature, the possibility of renouncing marriage for the sake of the kingdom, but he did 
not do so within a patriarchal framework. He did not call for the “strong men,” men who 
did not need women, to come follow him. Rather, he challenged their most valued 
identity, the identity of masculinity within a patriarchal world. He called them to leave 
the power of the paterfamilias, to reject the honor associated with the husband, father, 
grandfather, and to take up shame instead—the ambiguous, scandalous reputation of the 
eunuch. 
Those who renounced marriage for the sake of the kingdom would no longer be 
defined by traditional gender markers. They would not be fathers or mothers, husbands or 
wives. Nor would they be potential spouses and parents, as young virgins were assumed 
to be. Their primary identity would not be a gendered identity. Or, if it was, it was to be a 
confused gender identity. They would embrace service, an unmanly trait. They would 
leave behind power, prestige, wealth—prerogatives of the male—in order to embrace 
another kind of life—“a life hidden with Christ in God.”  They would become “exiles 
from the human race,” “strangers and aliens in a foreign land.” 
In calling his disciples to learn from eunuchs, Jesus was calling his disciples to 
learn from those whose gender identity was not secure, to learn that gender identity is not 
an ultimate value in the kingdom of heaven. Jesus was undermining the power structures 
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of the day: family ties, inheritance of wealth and property, gender privilege. Many early 
Christians found that some of these were easier to renounce than others. The history of 
the church reveals that many found it easier to abandon sexual pleasure than masculine 
power and privilege. Christians today may find the reverse to be true. That the eunuch 
was reworked into a masculine metaphor is a tragedy yet to be corrected. 
It is true that contemporary readers may find Jesus’ words about eunuchs difficult 
to understand. But Jesus’ teaching should certainly be read as “good news” for the 
intersexed. Many intersex persons have testified to feeling like “exiles from the human 
race”—the very phrase used by Claudius Mamertinus, to describe the social condition of 
eunuchs.183 An intersex woman with Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome described her 
own experience by saying: 
The world has tried to make us feel like freaks. We have felt like freaks. I felt 
like a freak most of my life, but look at me. I’m just a human being just like 
everybody else. …I really have a place in the world. I really am a human 
being, a very valid human being. It’s just wonderful. I am very proud to come 
out as an AIS person…184 
 
Kathryn Ringrose explains that “Biological and medical lore treated eunuchs as neither 
fully male nor fully female…  In his ambiguity, the eunuch challenged the church’s 
definition of humanity.”185 Today, intersex continues to challenge current theological 
constructions of humanity.  
In this chapter, we have seen how the category of the eunuch was constructed as a 
supplement to the binary model of human sex and gender. The eunuch emerged as a 
symbol of the sexless spirit, Christian perfection, the angelic life, and life in the 
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resurrection—when distinctions of gender would be shed and men and women would 
relate to one another according to a common humanity, an identity hidden in Christ. As 
an icon of the continent life, the eunuch also stood as a corrective to the exaltation of 
sexuality—whether for procreation or pleasure. In this way eunuchs also challenged the 
centrality of sexuality for human personhood and human fulfillment.  
These contributions will be developed in light of current constructions of human 
persons with regard to sex and gender in chapter four and regarding sexuality in chapter 
five. Chapter six will return to develop the notion of identities hidden in Christ in light of 
Christological and eschatological contributions. But before we move on to theological 
critique and construction, we must recover one more piece to the puzzle—the historical 
development of anthropology in Western philosophy and theology as they relate to sex, 
gender, and sexuality. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE:  
FROM SUBSTANCE DUALISM TO RELATIONAL ONTOLOGY  
AND THE MULTIPLICATION OF THE SEXES 
 
 
Having heard the voices of some intersexed persons who are calling for 
recognition and inclusion in the community as intersex, and after discovering that 
intersex conditions were known and accommodated in early and medieval Christian 
society—recognized and honored by Jesus, and ascending to positions of leadership in 
the church, the state, and aristocratic households—we now turn to philosophical and 
theological accounts of what is means to be human and how the image of God has been 
construed as relating to sex, gender, and sexuality. In this chapter we will review the 
history of theological anthropology, paying close attention to how answers to the 
questions “What is the human?” and “What is the image?” relate to the sexes, how many 
sexes are or should be recognized by society and how Western philosophers and 
theologians have thought about the sexes as participating in full humanity and imago Dei. 
In order to do this, we will trace the development of Western theology in three 
movements: from its inception in the classical period, through the Protestant and 
Victorian reformations in the modern period, and into current, postmodern 
reconstructions of the human.1 In each period we will examine the connections between 
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ontology (What is the human with its sex?) and cosmology (Whence the human and the 
sexes?), evaluating the philosophical and theological accounts constructed on the answers 
to these questions. 
 
THE CLASSICAL PERIOD:  
SUBSTANCE DUALISM AND A SINGLE SEX 
 
Classical Greek Ontology 
 
 When asked, “What is the human?” Classical Greek philosophers proffered 
various answers. Plato argued that the human was a rational, immortal soul which had 
fallen from the realm of the forms, was imprisoned in a body, and which must strive for 
release from the body through the cultivation of reason and the rule of reason over the 
passions of the body. Aristotle, on the other hand, argued that the soul is the “form” of 
the body such that the two are not so easily separable.2 Nevertheless, Aristotle also 
identified three types of soul which make up the human: the vegetable (nutritive) soul, 
animal (sensitive) soul, and human (rational) soul.3 Thus, while both philosophers 
disagreed about the relation of body and soul, both located reason in the soul as the 
primary difference between humans and animals. While Aristotle conceded that animals 
have the first two types of soul, and that humans and animals both have bodies, humans 
are ultimately differentiated from animals on account of the possession of a rational soul. 
Their contributions laid the foundation for the Western conversation about human sex 
differentiation for the centuries that follow. 
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Plato’s Cosmologies  
 
 Plato gives several accounts of the origin of the sexes. In the Timaeus, he argued 
that women came into existence after men failed to cultivate reason and virtue. These 
lesser men—souls which had failed to develop the mind in order to control the passions 
of the body—were reincarnated as women.4    
In the Symposium, however, Plato places a long discourse in the mouth of the 
poet, Aristophanes, a contemporary and colleague of Socrates, to explain the creation of 
the sexes. According to Plato’s Aristophanes,  
In the first place… the original human nature was not like the present, but 
different. The sexes were not two as they are now, but originally three in 
number; there was man, woman, and the union of the two, having a name 
corresponding to this double nature, which had once a real existence, but is 
now lost, and the word “Androgynous” is only preserved as a term of 
reproach. In the second place, the primeval man was round, his back and 
sides forming a circle; and he had four hands and four feet, one head with two 
faces, looking opposite ways, set on a round neck and precisely alike… 
…Now the sexes were three, and such as I have described them; because 
the sun, moon, and earth are three; and the man was originally the child of the 
sun, the woman of the earth, and the man-woman of the moon, which is made 
up of sun and earth… 
Terrible was their might and strength, and the thoughts of their hearts 
were great, and they made an attack upon the gods …dared to scale heaven, 
and would have laid hands upon the gods…5 
 
Fearing that they had created humans as too powerful, the gods debated annihilating them 
until Zeus proposed a plan to “humble their pride and improve their manners.” Thus, 
Zeus declared, “men shall continue to exist, but I will cut them in two and then they will 
be diminished in strength and increased in numbers; this will have the advantage of 
making them more profitable to us.” So, Zeus divided the spherical creatures in half and  
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turned the parts of generation round to the front, for this had not been always 
their position … and after the transposition the male generated in the female 
in order that by the mutual embraces of man and woman they might breed, 
and the race might continue; or if man came to man they might be satisfied, 
and rest, and go their ways to the business of life: so ancient is the desire of 
one another which is implanted in us, reuniting our original nature, making 
one of two, and healing the state of man.6 
 
Thus, heterosexual coupling was explained on the basis of the reuniting of 
originally androgynous humans. Homosexual coupling was simply the reuniting of the 
two parts of the original male or the original female, each of which had two sets of male 
genitals or two sets of female genitals, respectively. Each was reunited with the “true 
other half” of itself. Thus, Plato plants the idea that there is really one person in the world 
who will complete another.7 
 Despite assigning males the place of honor as creatures of the sun, while women 
were creatures of the earth and androgynes creatures of the moon, Plato did not always 
emphasize the differences between the sexes. At one point in the Republic he writes,  
But if it appears that they differ only in this respect that the female bears and 
the male begets, we shall say that no proof has yet been produced that the 
woman differs from the man for our purposes, but we shall continue to think 
that our guardians and their wives ought to follow the same pursuits.8 
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Thomas Laqueur in, Making Sex: The Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud, 
explains that these pursuits were those which benefited the common life of the 
republic (e.g., “equal participation in governance, gymnastic exercises, and even 
war”) and that it was Plato’s emphasis on the communal nature of child rearing that 
allowed him to underplay reproductive differences.9  
If something characteristic of men or women can be found which fits one or 
the other for particular arts and crafts, by all means assign them accordingly. 
But no such distinction exists, he maintains, and what Aristotle would take to 
be the critical difference between bearing and begetting counts for nothing.10 
 
It may be possible to account for Plato’s ambivalence about sex differences by 
looking to his emphasis on the soul as the seat of human personhood. For the soul existed 
without the body. Stronger, more rational, more virtuous souls were given male bodies. 
Weaker, less rational, less virtuous souls were reincarnated as women. Still, the goal of 
all souls was to leave the body, with its sex, behind. While this may be more difficult for 
women than for men, Plato argued that women should nevertheless be given similar 
opportunities to reunite themselves (i.e., their souls) with the forms.11  
Summing up the significance of Plato’s cosmology for Western philosophy and 
theology, Rosemary Radford Ruether writes: 
The soul is seen as sharing the same life principle of the cosmos, itself 
derivative in part from the eternal or divine substance of the Ideas. Later 
Greek philosophy will identify the eternal Ideas of Plato with the governing 
divine Mind of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and the cosmic Logos of Stoicism. 
So the life principle of the soul becomes more explicitly a sharing in the life 
principle of God.12 
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Aristotle’s Metaphysics   
Aristotle reasoned from the ground up; from the diversity of the material, 
temporal world to the immaterial, the eternal, the One. Because he posited an eternal 
universe, his “One,” his “god,” was not a creator but the goal toward which all material, 
temporal things aspire.13 
For Aristotle the soul was not a separate rational substance but the life, the 
actualization of the potentialities of particular bodies.14 Nevertheless, it is the nous, the 
mind, the rational part of the soul which is separable from the body, eternal, immortal, 
and like Ultimate Reality. But this mind is not a personal existence. When separated from 
the body, it can have no personal knowledge.15 Even while Aristotle attempts to distance 
himself from Plato’s formulation of substance dualism, he falls into an alternative 
substance dualism of his own. And because Christians would emphasize, with Plato, a 
conscious, personal existence after death, the Platonic version of substance dualism was 
taken up by many early Christian writers in their attempts to prove the reasonability of 
life after death. 
 Aristotle’s God is pure mind, contemplating its own thoughts. It is loved but does 
not love. It is self-sufficient, while all else are driven by love and imitation of it. To be 
rational, to be virtuous are good because they lead to happiness, which is what God 
experiences all the time.16  
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Aristotle and Galen: Biological Implications of Greek Cosmologies 
 
 Aristotle’s account of the closer relationship of soul and body may explain the 
greater emphasis he placed on sex distinctions. Rather than challenging souls to work 
toward reunion with the forms, Aristotle believed that the soul is the form of the body. 
While Plato philosophized “from above” in the Timaeus, asserting that less rational souls 
were reincarnated as women, Aristotle spent most of his time reasoning “from below,” 
from particulars to universals. The weakness of women’s bodies was taken as evidence of 
the weakness of women’s souls. And since the soul is the seat of reason, women’s lesser 
bodily strength must correspond with lesser strength of soul or mind. Thus, Aristotle 
surmised that by virtue of their physical and rational powers, men were suited to rule over 
women and children and slaves. In fact, Aristotle was so concerned about rule and roles 
that some have concluded that gender roles were more important to Aristotle than the 
physical data of biological sex. Laqueur notes that “Aristotle, who was immensely 
concerned about the sex of free men and women, recognized no sex among slaves. …in 
other words, slaves are without sex because their gender does not matter politically.”17  
Rather than giving an account of the cosmological origins of the sexes, Aristotle’s 
account is biological. Women are born when something goes wrong with the pregnancy. 
They are “misbegotten” or “mutilated” males.18 Androgynous persons are given a similar 
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explanation; they are misbegotten twins. Aristotle believed that the father’s sperm 
provides the soul which then guides the formation of matter (the contribution of the 
mother). In the case of androgynes or hermaphrodites,19 the mother provides too much 
matter for the growth of one child and not enough for twins. The excess matter creates 
excess genitalia.20 In this scheme, a hermaphrodite, rather than harkening back to one of 
the original three human sexes, was a malformed twin who “really” belonged to one of 
two sexes, not a third.  
Unlike modern physicians, Aristotle did not look to genitals or gonads to 
determine true sex; rather he followed Hippocrates’ theory of temperature, believing the 
“heat of the heart” revealed the difference. Men were warm. Women were cool.  
Galen, the renowned physician of the first century CE, whose medical influence 
lasted well into the modern period, built upon but also challenged Aristotle’s biological 
account. Galen continued Aristotle’s emphasis on heat while rejecting Aristotle’s formula 
that the male produced seed (containing the soul/form) while the woman contributed only 
matter.21 Galen believed that both the male and the female contributed seed and that these 
seeds engaged in a power struggle in utero in order to determine which would prevail. He 
combined the theory of male heat and dominance with the right side of the uterus and 
female coolness and passivity on the left side of the uterus. If the hot male seed prevailed 
                                                 
19
 While Piotr Scholz argues for a difference between androgyny (“a mystical manifestation of the 
existence of God”) and hermaphroditism (“nothing more than the fantasy of a perverted sexuality,” i.e. 
bisexuality), I follow the majority of scholars who employ androgyne and hermaphrodite synonymously. 
Scholz, 13. 
20
 Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body, 33. 
21
 “The physical part, the body comes from the female, and the Soul comes from the male, since 
the Soul is the essence of a particular body” Aristotle, 2.4.185. “We should look upon the female state as 
being as it were a deformity, though one which occurs in the ordinary course of nature” (4. 6. 461). 
Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals. From Janice Delaney, Mary Jane Lupton, Emily Toth, The Curse: 
A Cultural History of Menstruation, Revised and Expanded (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 
1988), 45-46. 
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the seed would settle on the right side of the uterus, the strong side. If the cool female 
seed prevailed, the seed would settle on the left, the weak side. Masculine women were 
conceived left of center while effeminate males were conceived right of center. Herma-
phrodites were conceived when the seeds of male and female combined in the middle, 
neither prevailing over the other.22 Galen’s horizontal sex spectrum (from weak left to 
strong right) corresponded with the vertical sex/gender hierarchy which existed on the 
societal level. 
 
Sex Hierarchy in the Classical Period 
In the classical world, sex and gender were understood as a ladder of ascent 
toward perfection. At the top were manly men—understood as the pinnacle not only of 
male perfection but of human perfection. At the bottom were women and children. 
Unmanly men, hermaphrodites, and eunuchs were somewhere in the middle. Male 
children could ascend the ladder as their bodies naturally matured and as they carefully 
crafted their bodies and their actions according to standards of male perfection. Peter 
Brown explains, 
It was never enough to be male: a man had to strive to become ‘virile.’  
He had to learn to exclude from his character and from the poise and 
temper of his body all telltale traces of ‘softness’ that might betray, in 
him, the half-formed state of a woman…  [how he walked, the] rhythms 
of his speech…the telltale resonance of his voice. Any of these might 
betray the ominous loss of a hot, high-spirited momentum, a flagging of 
the clear-cut self-restraint, and a relaxing of the taut elegance of voice and 
gesture that made a man a man, the unruffled master of a subject world.23 
                                                 
22
 Sharon Preves details how Galen’s theory of bodily heat and gender influenced medical theory 
as late as the seventeenth century. The seventeenth century surgeon, Ambroise Pare, explained the 
development of male secondary sex characteristics in pubescent girls [perhaps a sign of late-onset 
congenital adrenal hyperplasia?] as the result of excessive heat brought about by physical exertion in girls. 
Girls who jumped or played roughly raised their body temperature enough to “push out” their inverted 
female organs so that they became masculine. Preves, Intersex and Identity, 34. See also Fausto-Sterling, 
Sexing the Body, 33-34. 
23
 Brown, 11. 
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Women, too, could move up the ladder toward manly perfection, but they could 
only move so far. Saintly, virtuous women were venerated in manly terms. Gillian Cloke 
quotes the biography of “Melania the Younger, who performed ‘manly deeds’ and was 
received by the Fathers of Nitria ‘like a man’: since ‘she had surpassed the limits of her 
sex and taken on a mentality that was manly, or rather angelic.’”24 
 Eunuchs were caught somewhere in the middle. They had a virtual arrested 
development, preserving the beauty and sexual allure of a pre-pubescent boy as well as 
his angelic voice but unable to attain full masculine perfection of body, mind, or virtue. 
This hierarchical structure of the sexes was seen as corresponding to the structure of the 
universe, especially as it was developed in what some have called the “last great system 
of Greek speculative philosophy:” 25 the cosmology of Plotinus. 
 
Plotinus’ Cosmology 
 
Though his name is less familiar to most than Plato and Aristotle, Plotinus’ work 
may have been more influential on the Western church up until Aquinas’ rediscovery of 
Aristotle in the 13th century. His name is often lost under the general category of neo-
platonism, the reformation of Plato’s thought by later writers. Plotinus himself lived in 
the third century C.E., from 204-270. He was a philosophical mystic who used ascetic 
practices and philosophical contemplation in order to dispose himself to the ecstatic—
God’s self-manifestation which leads to union with the divine. Like Plato and Aristotle he 
                                                 
24
 Cloke, quoting the Life of Melania the Younger, prologue and 39, in ‘This Female Man of God,’ 
214. 
25
 “The Philosophy of Plotinus,” Center for Applied Philosophy: The Radical Academy, 1998-99, 
2001-2003, http://www.radicalacademy.com/philplotinus.htm. 
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wondered at the nature of the world, its mixture of physical and spiritual, eternal and 
temporal, and attempted to reconcile these opposites through his cosmology.26 
Plotinus proposed that God is not separate from creation, but the pinnacle of 
Being, from which all that exists emanates in lesser degrees. God is One but the Many 
emanate from the One in a great chain of being.27 
To explain the emanations Plotinus compared them to the superabundance of 
a flowing river, and a beam of light. Just as a beam of light, as it goes farther 
from its source, grows weaker and finally vanishes into darkness, so it is with 
the emanations which, after leaving the “One,” lose their unity and finally 
vanish into matter and evil.28 
 
It was this hierarchical understanding which provided the philosophical and theological 
defense of the caste system of the Medieval period as well as the “hierarchical ordering 
of husband, wife, children, and servants.”29   
 
Substance Dualism and a Single Sex 
 
Given this hierarchical understanding of human nature (and all reality), Thomas 
Laqueur has argued that there was only one sex recognized in the ancient world, the 
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male, and a true male was a rare specimen. Most people existed as more or less perfect 
males, in other words, more or less perfect humans. Aristotle’s famous dictum that a 
woman was a “misbegotten” or “mutilated” male supports such an argument as did 
ancient anatomical texts. Laqueur shows how medical texts from the ancient world all the 
way up through the Renaissance maintained that female reproductive organs were simply 
the inversion of male organs in the way they diagrammed and named female reproductive 
structures.30 Women were men, turned inward, physically but also socially. 
Hermaphrodites were imperfect men and imperfect inverted men.  
The male existed as the only true sex, the only true human. Women, eunuchs, and 
hermaphrodites had lesser bodies and lesser souls. Their souls were defective in reason 
and virtue, for virtue was believed to be derived from vir (the male). Nevertheless, 
despite their status as lesser humans, women, eunuchs and hermaphrodites were usually31 
granted human status and were believed to at least possess some measure of (rational) 
soul, no matter how deficient. Therefore, if each pursued virtue and reason, they could 
hope to progress through various stages of reincarnations to release from the body and its 
sex, finally participating in the sexless realm of the forms. 
                                                 
30
 After reproducing picture after picture of female anatomy drawn as versions of the male in 
Renaissance medical textbooks, Laqueur concludes: “The absence of precise anatomical nomenclature for 
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 Notwithstanding the regular exposure of hermaphroditic babies before the time of Pliny, as well 
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Substance dualism provided ambivalent results for the sexes. The possession of a 
soul did not protect women, eunuchs, and hermaphrodites from the status of “lesser 
men,” because their inferior bodies were interpreted as evidence of inferior souls. 
Nevertheless, the possession of a soul did secure them some measure of humanity and 
suggested the possibility of release from the prison of the sexed body at some future date. 
 
The One Sex Model and Early Christian Theology 
 
Although substance dualism (humanity as the combination of body and soul) is 
familiar to most Western Christians, the idea of one sex sounds foreign to modern ears 
and distant from the biblical record. But this distance, I will argue, appears for the 
modern reader as a result of the fact that the one sex model was significantly altered in 
the course of Western history. The early Church Fathers, schooled in Greco-Roman 
philosophy, perceived no such distance.  
It is important to see how the second creation account, found in Genesis chapter 
two, can be read as supporting the idea that the male is the perfect human while the 
female is something secondary or other.32 The second creation account identifies the male 
as ha adam (the human). Even after the woman is brought to the man and one finds for 
the first time the gendered words, ishshah for the woman and ish for the male, the male in 
the narrative continues to be referred to as ha adam (the human), who has an ishshah (a 
woman or wife); rather than an ish who has an ishshah. 
The early Christian Fathers certainly recognized this and found it very easy to 
accept the pagan beliefs, circulating in Greece and Rome, that the male is the perfect 
human while women, eunuchs, and hermaphrodites are imperfect, mutilated, 
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misbegotten, or inverted humans. We find Aristotle’s famous dictum: that a woman is a 
“misbegotten male” repeated 1,600 years later in Thomas Aquinas (13th century C.E.) as 
he wrestled with the nature of woman. Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that women’s 
bodies are defective. 
As regards the individual nature, woman is defective and misbegotten, for the 
active force in the male seed tends to the production of a perfect likeness in 
the masculine sex; while the production of woman comes from defect in the 
active force or from some material indisposition, or even from some external 
influence; such as that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher 
observes (De Gener. Animal. iv, 2). On the other hand, as regards human 
nature in general, woman is not misbegotten, but is included in nature's 
intention as directed to the work of generation.33 
 
Joseph Magee attempts to defend Aquinas by explaining that “Aquinas’ words 
which are usually translated as ‘defective and misbegotten’ are in Latin deficiens et 
occasionatus, which can mean ‘unfinished and caused accidentally.’” He notes that 
“Some have argued that, because of this alternate reading, Aquinas is free of the negative 
connotations which attach to some translations of his works.” Magee also highlights 
Aquinas’ concession that “Aristotle's point that woman is ‘misbegotten,’ but only 
considered as an individual and only with respect to the body or matter, and not the 
soul.”34 For Aquinas, as for many of the Fathers who preceded him, the soul maintained 
the common humanity shared by the sexes and was identified as proper location of the 
image of God in humans. 
 Early Christians reasoned that because God does not have a body, whatever 
likeness exists between humans and the divine cannot be located in the body. Therefore, 
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they turned to concepts of the soul to tease out the meaning of the imago Dei.35 
Following Plato and Aristotle, early Christians identified reason and virtue with the soul. 
God as “all-wise” and “all-good” was imaged in the rationality and virtue of humans.  
Irenaeus divided reason and virtue, identifying reason with “image” and virtue 
with “likeness.” Thus, he argued that after the fall humans retained a marred image (i.e., 
distorted rationality) but lost their likeness to God (i.e., humans were no longer naturally 
virtuous). Colin Gunton assesses the significance of this theological move: 
In his famous distinction between image and likeness there began the process 
of making reason both a chief ontological characteristic and criterion of 
difference between human and non-human. By the time of Aquinas the 
tendency had hardened into a dogma. Perhaps most revealing is his citation of 
John of Damascus: ‘being after God’s image signifies his capacity for 
understanding, and for making free decisions and his mastery of himself.’36 
 
 Here we find the image of God being defined in almost identical terms to Greek 
philosophers’ definitions of the soul: reason, freedom, and the ability to rule. The 
challenge for our discussion of the sexes, of course, is that women, eunuchs, and some 
hermaphrodites were believed to possess these characteristics in lesser measures than 
men, if at all. Their lesser souls seemed to indicate that they were lesser images of God if 
they were images of God at all. 
The Fathers debated whether women could really be considered images of God. 
Frederick McLeod, in his investigation, The Image of God in the Antiochene Tradition, 
explains that the Fathers were “ambivalent” about the relation of women to the image of 
God.37   
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In our investigation of ‘image,’ the Antiochenes were found to have divided 
into two camps on how to interpret the scriptural statement about ‘man’ 
having been created in God’s image and likeness. Diodore, Chrysostom, and 
Theodoret looked upon image as applying to men qua males. They believed 
that God has entrusted males with total power to rule over the material 
universe as God’s viceroys. While women share in this power, they were 
regarded as subordinate to men. Diodore, Chysostom, and Theodoret 
frequently liked to cite Paul’s statement that man qua male ‘is the image and 
glory of God but woman is the glory of man’ (I Cor 11:7). The most they 
would say is that women are ‘images of the image.’  Yet, while following the 
same literal, rational hermeneutical principles of exegesis, Theodore, and 
perhaps, Nestorius, understood image as referring to how human nature—in a 
general sense—plays a unitive, revelatory, and cultic role within creation. It is 
not clear, however, what they thought about women as images of God and, if 
so, how they regarded women as functioning as such.38 
 
 There are several important items to note in the above quotation. First, is the 
connection between the image and participation in God’s rule. Greek philosophers 
“knew” that women were not suited to rule. Christian theologians looked to Genesis 3:16 
to substantiate their cultural assumptions that women were not designed to rule. In this 
passage, after the sin of Eve and Adam, God says to the woman “I will greatly increase 
your pains in childbearing; with pain you will give birth to children. Your desire will be 
for your husband, and he will rule over you.” Early theologians believed that God, as the 
supreme Ruler, could not be properly imaged in one over whom another ruled. 
 But the subjugation of women was justified, not simply on exegetical grounds, 
nor always as a result of sin. Many early Christian theologians believed that women were 
unsuited to rule by nature (i.e., ontologically inferior). According to Cyril of Alexandria, 
“the female sex is ever weak in mind and body.”39 
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Some argued that this defectiveness was part of woman’s created nature, while 
others explained women’s weakness as result of the fall. Still it is important to recognize 
the unequal effects of the fall upon the sexes. Following Romans 5:12-20, the Fathers 
taught that the whole human race fell into sin on account of Adam’s transgression, 
resulting in the mortality of all, men and women. But women experience additional 
results of the fall on account of the sin of Eve. Reading Genesis through the lens of  
I Timothy 2:11-15, Chrysostom wrote: 
A woman once taught and overturned everything. For this reason, he said: 
“Let her not teach.” What then about the women coming after her, if she 
incurred this? By all means [it applies to them]!  For their sex is weak and 
given to levity. For it is said here of the whole nature. For he did not say that 
“Eve” was deceived, but “the woman,” which is a term for her sex in general, 
rather than a term for her. What then? Did the whole female nature come to 
be in [a state of] deviation through her? For just as he said of Adam, ‘In the 
pattern of the transgression of Adam who is a type of him who is to come,’ so 
also here the female sex has transgressed, not the male’s. What therefore? 
Does she not have salvation? Most certainly, he said. And how is that? 
Through that of [having] children. Thus he was not speaking [here only] of 
Eve.40 
 
Thus, while the sin of Adam affected men and women, the sin of Eve affects only 
women. Women are thus “doubly fallen,” a theological position which has undergirded 
the perpetual subordination of women in the Church.  
One should note the substance metaphysics (i.e., ontology) undergirding the 
theological interpretation above. Chrysostom appears to posit a human nature 
(represented by Adam) as well as women’s nature (represented by Eve); but says nothing 
of the fall of Adam as a representative of men qua male. Nevertheless, thanks to 
Chyrsostom’s belief in Platonic substance dualism, women are not fallen beyond 
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redemption. Women remain accountable to the demands of holiness despite their doubly-
fallen nature.  
In external contests, which involve corporeal labors, only men are accepted 
as suitable. But as the entire contest here is one of the soul, the race-course is 
open to each of the sexes, and the spectators sit [in judgment] of each. But it 
is not only men who are to strip [for this kind of contest], lest women raise a 
specious argument [for not doing this] by appealing to their weakly nature. 
Nor do women alone show themselves as brave, lest mankind be steeped in 
shame. But there are many from both sides who have been proclaimed by the 
herald and crowned as victors, so that from their labors you may learn that 
“in Christ Jesus there is not male nor female.” For neither nature nor bodily 
weakness, nor age nor anything else can incapacitate those running in the 
race of piety.41 
 
He expands upon this in his commentary on Galatians,  
 
“For there is neither Jew nor Greek, neither slave nor free man, neither male 
nor female; for you are all one in Christ.” Do you see that the soul is 
common? For by saying that we have become sons of God through faith, he 
is not content with this but seeks to find something more: the ability to 
submit more clearly to a closer unity to Christ. And when he says, “You have 
been clothed with him,” he is not satisfied with this statement. But in 
interpreting it, he moves to a closer [explanation] of such a connection. He 
says that “You are all one in Christ,” that is, you all have the same form, a 
unique being, that of Christ.42 
 
Chrysostom appeals to substance dualism in order to preserve the possibility of women 
being conformed to the image of Christ; for “the soul is common” and it is the soul that 
enables both women and men to be clothed with Christ, being united with the “form…of 
Christ.” Whether Chrysostom believed that women become male in their conformity to 
Christ is not clear from his commentary. What is clear is that the common humanity 
which allows for both men and women to be conformed to the image of Christ is located 
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not in the body but in the soul—a soul that is “neither Jew nor Greek, neither slave nor 
free man, neither male nor female.” 
 Rosemary Radford Ruether notes that in the Eastern tradition, especially in the 
work of Gregory of Nyssa, “the image of God was as identified with the soul, which was 
seen as spiritual and asexual.”43 According to Nyssa,  
In the original creation there was no subordination but also no gender, sex, or 
reproduction. Gendered bodies arose as a result of the Fall, which resulted in 
both sin and death and the necessity of sex and reproduction.44 
 
Like his Eastern brothers, Augustine emphasizes the soul as the seat of the 
person,45 but unlike Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine does not look to the sexlessness of the 
soul as an indication of equality in Eden. He declares both substances, soul and body, 
“good” because they are created by God; and yet, in order to secure the continuation of 
the person after death, he gives priority to the soul. “[W]e must regard the human being 
as the combination of both substances, at least prior to death.”46 It is the death of the body 
that reveals the priority of the soul. In a similar way, Augustine emphasizes the goodness 
of both sexes while, at the same time, noting a hierarchy of essence and function. Men 
rule and women obey, just as the soul rules and the body obeys. Unlike Nyssa, Augustine 
does not see this subordination as a result of sin; rather he believed the subordination of 
women was a part of original creation.  
Augustine locates this distinction in the natural propensities, ordinary attentions 
of the mind. For in book 7, chapter 7 of On the Trinity, (the same passage where he 
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argues that a woman is not the image when spoken of as a woman, as a “help-meet,” but 
only when united to her husband, who can be said to be the image even when not united 
to his wife47) he qualifies this distinction later in 7.7.12. He locates the renewing of the 
image in fallen humanity in the renewing of the mind following Ephesians 4:23-24 and 
Colossians 3:9-10. 
If, then, we are renewed in the spirit of our mind, …no one can doubt, that 
man was made after the image of Him that created him, not according to the 
body, nor indiscriminately according to any part of the mind, but according 
to the rational mind, wherein the knowledge of God can exist.48  
 
Here Augustine divides the mind into different parts. The rational mind is that which 
is directed to the knowledge of God. And it is the renewal of this part of the mind, or 
the giving of this mind, which is the image of God in men as well as in women. 
And it is according to this renewal, also, that we are made sons of God by the 
baptism of Christ; and putting on the new man, certainly put on Christ 
through faith. Who is there, then, who will hold women to be alien from this 
fellowship, whereas they are fellow-heirs of grace with us; and whereas in 
another place the same apostle says, “For ye are all the children of God by 
faith in Christ Jesus; for as many as have been baptized into Christ have put 
on Christ: there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there 
is neither male nor female; for ye are all one in Christ Jesus?”49  
 
Augustine then asks, “Pray, have faithful women then lost their bodily sex?” and 
answers himself, indicating that the renewal of the mind in the image of God 
represents “no sex.” Nevertheless,  
But because she differs from the man in bodily sex, it was possible rightly to 
represent under her bodily covering that part of the reason which is diverted 
to the government of temporal things; so that the image of God may remain 
on that side of the mind of man on which it cleaves to the beholding or the 
consulting of the eternal reasons of things; and this, it is clear, not men only, 
but also women have.50  
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Augustine appears to be trying to make sense of what he understands to be conflicting 
messages in the Scriptures. He recognizes that Genesis 1:27 includes women in the image 
of God, and yet I Cor. 11:10 speaks of males in the image of God (who therefore do not 
cover their heads) while women are the glory of men (as male) and thus, cover their 
heads.  
But Augustine is more nuanced. He divides the mind into multiple parts so as to 
be able to include women in the renewing of their minds, a renewing of the image of God 
in women, while at the same time arguing that women’s minds are not naturally directed 
to things above. He argues that women cover their heads because their minds are directed 
to earthly things, e.g., the governance of their households. This interpretation of the 
veiling of women helps explain the practice of some consecrated virgins removing the 
veil—a symbol of their subordination to men (in marriage) and also a symbol of the 
direction of their minds (toward earthly rather than heavenly things). 
Augustine is in substantial agreement with the substance metaphysics bequeathed 
to him by Plato and Plotinus. Women are lesser men in body and in mind. Nevertheless, 
there is a part of their minds which can be renewed in the sexless image of God. And in 
the life to come, though bodily differences will remain, the inequality of sexes that exists 
in this life will finally give way to equality when body and soul are reunited in the 
resurrection and women and men relate to one another not according to hierarchically 
ordered marital relations but as equals, sharing a common humanity.51   
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Augustine’s platonic emphasis on the rational soul (or, the rational portion of the 
mind) was given succinct formulation by Boethius (480-524) whose definition of the 
human person as “an individual substance of a rational nature” became the standard for 
Western theological anthropology.52 Boethius teaches that the human person is rational, 
but women are less rational; thus, women are less than human persons. While it is true 
that Thomas Aquinas’ rediscovery of Aristotle’s “psychosomatic unity of soul and body” 
attempted to offer a more holistic account of the person; he continued to teach the priority 
of the soul and the inferiority of women, based on an inferiority of mind.53 
Both Plato and Aristotle bequeathed to Christian theology a hierarchy of 
substances which paralleled a hierarchy of sex.54 It is important to recognize the 
progression from Greek ontology to Christian anthropology. The true human, the true 
image of God, must be the male whose rational soul governs his body and whose strong 
body corroborates his masculine, virtuous, rational soul. Women were misbegotten 
bodies with defective souls, lesser humans, lesser images of God. These assumptions 
would be carried into Christological writings; thus, the messiah, if he was to represent 
true humanity, must necessarily have been incarnated as a male human—the perfect 
restoration of the original human.  
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 In the Classical Period, the hierarchically ordered substance dualism undergirded 
a hierarchy of sex in home, church, and society. Substance dualism did not result in sex 
dualism because both men and women were believed to have bodies and souls, even if 
the male was more often associated with the soul/mind while the female was more often 
associated with body, and eunuchs and hermaphrodites displayed a mixed nature. Rather, 
the ancients held a view of a single sex, one true human form, the male, against which all 
other lesser, inverted, misbegotten males were measured. A true sex dualism was yet to 
come.  
 
THE MODERN PERIOD: 
SUBSTANCE AND SEX DUALISM 
 
Historical Changes: 16th to 19th Centuries 
 
The Protestant Reformation, 16th Century 
 
 The Classical identification of the true human, true image of God, as the male 
lasted well into the Middle Ages, with Thomas Aquinas recovering Aristotle’s ancient 
phrase identifying women as “misbegotten” males.55 And while the Protestant reformers 
shared many of the sexist assumptions of their predecessors, they made several 
theological changes which laid the groundwork for a revolution in theological 
constructions of human sex. 
Luther argued against the Greek and Medieval assumption that women were 
morally inferior and lesser images of God than men. Still he wrote,  
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there is a great difference between the sexes. The male is like the sun in 
heaven, the female like the moon…  therefore, let us note from this passage 
[Gen 1:27] that it was written that this sex may not be excluded from any 
glory of the human creature, although it is inferior to the male sex.56   
 
Luther had a fairly high view of female education, probably due to his marriage to 
an educated nun. Calvin, on the other hand, believed that “oral instruction in the 
catechism was enough for women”57 and that teaching was out of the question.  
[Woman] by nature (that is, by the ordinary law of God) is formed to obey; 
for… (the government of women) has always been regarded by all wise 
persons as a monstrous thing; and therefore, so to speak, it will be a mingling 
of heaven and earth, if women usurp the right to teach. Accordingly, he bids 
them be ‘quiet,’ that is, keep within their own rank.58 
 
Also in Calvin’s commentary on I Corinthians, he writes: 
 
He (Paul) establishes by two arguments the pre-eminence, which he had 
assigned to men above women. The first is, that as the woman derives her 
origin from the man, she is therefore inferior in rank. The second is, that as the 
woman was created for the sake of the man, she is therefore subject to him, as 
the work ultimately produced is to its cause. That the man is the beginning of 
the woman and the end for which she was made, is evident from the law.59 
 
Rather than seeing Eve’s creation from Adam as evidence that they are equal in 
rank, because made from the same material (“flesh of my flesh, bone of my bone”), 
Calvin interprets the sequence of creation through the lens of the Chain of Being.60 
Women are lower down on the Chain; therefore, it is “natural” that they serve those of 
the rank above them. 
While the Reformers emphasized the religious value of marriage, child-rearing, 
and secular vocations (a shift that brought new dignity to the menial labor of married 
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women and men), they continued to maintain a low view of women, even within that 
sphere. Luther wrote: “Women ought to stay at home. The way they were created 
indicates this, for they have broad hips and a wide fundament to sit upon, keep house, and 
bear and raise children.”61 Luther held the typical German view of women which 
indicated that if one take a woman from her housewifery she is good for nothing.62 
Elsewhere he is said to have quipped, “If women get tired and die of childbearing, there 
is no harm in that; let them die as long as they bear; they are made for that.”63 The 
Anabaptist Reformer, Menno Simons, shared Luther’s opinions and argued that married 
women should remain as cloistered as nuns within their houses.64 
Even though the Reformers raised the status of women’s work, giving it religious 
value, they also eliminated religious orders, the only way available for women to give 
themselves fully to the work of God and acquire a religious education. The elimination of 
monastic orders also removed a safe haven for eunuchs—a cultural and religious space 
where eunuchs could serve God apart from familial responsibilities.  
 By eliminating the monasteries and arguing for the normativity of marriage, the 
Reformers effectively kept all women at home under the rule of a husband with a strict 
division of labor and eroded the legitimate margin created by and for eunuchs during the 
Middle Ages. This theological and political move laid the groundwork for the hardening 
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of sex differentiation, the elimination of a third sex, and the doctrine of separate spheres 
which would come to full flower in the Victorian Era, but not before it passed through the 
philosophical revolution of the enlightenment. 
 
Descartes, 17th Century, the Beginning of Modern Philosophy 
 
 Though the Reformers had broken open the possibility of questioning the 
authority of the past, this kind of questioning would reach its apex in the philosophical 
work of René Descartes (1596-1650). Descartes inherited the Platonic and Aristotelian 
emphasis of the priority of the rational soul or mind, but despite his indebtedness to the 
philosophers of the past, he was frustrated that the more he learned the less certain he felt 
about his knowledge. His quest for certitude led him to question everything in order to 
discover, beneath it all, his certainty that he himself was doubting and therefore, he must 
exist. From this foundation, “I think, therefore I am,” he began to reconstruct knowledge 
—not on the basis of received tradition but on the basis of his own thoughts and his own, 
individual experiences of the world. Thus, the Modern Enlightenment project began, 
elevating individual human reason above all else.65 Colon Gunton observes that the 
classical identification of the person with the reasonable soul finds its logical conclusion 
in Descartes and the Enlightenment enthronement of human reason.66 
 Nevertheless, Descartes was not without his opponents, particularly those found 
in the Empiricist and Romantic traditions, who insisted on the significance of the body, of 
sense experience, and the passions. Though Descartes was willing to admit that the mind 
is not immune from influences from the body, he nevertheless continued the Platonic, 
Aristotelian and Augustinian emphasis on the mind as the rational ruler of the body and 
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its passions.67 The mind, for Descartes, was god-like, in its total freedom from external 
constraints.68 Like the Platonic dualism described above, Descartes’ dualism could be 
interpreted positively and negatively for those who were not male. One can either argue 
that women, eunuchs, and “effeminate” men have lesser minds and therefore are less 
god-like, or one can argue that the mind is sexless and the basis for women’s equality.69  
Romantic philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau would follow the first argument while the 
Pragmatists, the forerunners of liberalism, John Stuart Mill and Mary Wolstonecraft 
would follow the second. 
 
Romanticism and Revolutionary Liberalism, 18th to 19th Centuries 
 Calvin’s language of woman being created from and for the man (rather than by 
and for God) found its logical conclusion in the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the 
Romantic Philosopher, who wrote of the education of women in his treatise, Émile, in 
1762. Where Calvin argued that women were created to be subject to men and legally 
bound by divine law to remain such, Rousseau would advocate education as the means 
to preserve this “natural” arrangement. 
Woman and man were made for each other, but their mutual dependence 
is not the same. The men depend on the women only on account of their 
desires; the women on the men both on account of their desires and their 
necessities…   
For this reason the education of women should be always relative to the 
men. To please, to be useful to us, to make us love and esteem them, to 
educate us when young, and take care of us when grown up, to advise, to 
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console us, to render our lives easy and agreeable—these are the duties of 
women at all times, and what they should be taught in their infancy…70 
 
How is such a disposition to be taught? Rousseau explains: 
 
Girls … should also be early subjected to restraint. This misfortune, if it 
really is one, is inseparable from their sex; nor do they ever throw it off but to 
suffer more cruel evils. …that they may more readily submit to the will of 
others… 
…formed to obey a being so imperfect as man, often full of vices, and 
always full of faults, she ought to learn betimes even to suffer injustice, and 
to bear the insults of a husband without complaint; it is not for his sake but 
for her own that she should be of a mild disposition… 
Woman has everything against her, as well as our faults as her own 
timidity and weakness; she has nothing in her favour, but her subtility (sic) 
and her beauty. Is it not very reasonable, therefore, she should cultivate 
both?... 
A man speaks of what he knows, a woman of what pleases her; the one 
requires knowledge, the other taste; the principle object of a man’s discourse 
should be what is useful, that of a woman’s what is agreeable. There ought to 
be nothing in common between their different conversation but truth.71  
 
These citations of Rousseau come from Mary Wollstonecraft’s 1792 publication, A 
Vindication of the Rights of Women, in which she argues that women and men are both 
disadvantaged by the suppression of the humanity of women. While Wollstonecraft cites 
Rousseau in order to show the disastrous consequences of his project, they agree on at 
least one point, that women cannot be faulted overmuch for excessive attention to their 
looks and cultivating cunning, since they have nothing else which brings them any power 
in the world.72 Unlike Rousseau, she sees his educational project as that which has made 
women what they are today. 
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John Stuart Mill, writing some 70 years after her, made similar arguments in his 
own treatise, The Subjection of Women, 1869. 
All women are brought up from the very earliest years in the belief that their 
ideal character is the very opposite to that of men; not self-will, and 
government by self-control, but submission, and yielding to the control of 
others. All the moralities tell them that it is the duty of women, and all the 
current sentimentalities that it is their nature, to live for others; to make 
complete abnegation of themselves, and to have no life but in their 
affections. And by their affections are meant only the ones they are allowed 
to have—those to the men with whom they are connected, or to the children 
who constitute an additional and indefeasible tie between them and a man.73 
 
According to Mill, it is this “tie between them and a man” that is the cause of women’s 
“subjection.” 
[Women’s subjection] never was the result of deliberation, or forethought, or 
any social ideal, or any notion whatever of what conduced to the benefit or 
humanity or the good order of society. It arose simply from the fact that from 
the very earliest twilight of human society, every woman (owing to the value 
attached to her by men, combined with her inferiority in muscular strength) 
was found in a state of bondage to some man.74   
 
Mill argues that it is impossible to know whether women have rational capacities equal to 
that of men given their perpetual subjection. Thus, he recommends with Wollstonecraft 
that they be given equal educational opportunities in order to discover what capabilities 
and differences may truly exist.75 
 
The Industrial Revolution, 18th to 19th Centuries 
Despite Luther’s belief that women were suited to housework, “due to their large 
fundaments” and men to moving around, in practice, most men and women shared the 
tasks of providing for the needs of the family and the care of children. Men and women 
worked in the fields and/or the shop, and children worked alongside them. Except for the 
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minority in the upper class, both worked, both looked after the children, and both were at 
home. All of this changed in the Industrial Revolution when jobs moved away from 
homes into factories. No longer were men able to share in the training of their children 
and participate in all family meals. Factories kept them away from their families for long 
8-12 hour days. 
 It is essential that one recognizes the impact of economic and political influences 
on theological constructions of sex and gender. Because it was only after the Industrial 
Revolution that Christians began to redefine their concepts of the differences of the sexes. 
Once men were removed from the home, the home was left devoid of their governance, 
their moral influence, their modeling of perfect humanity. They were not there to 
supervise women and children (and servants). Women needed to do this in their place. 
But according to the classical Greek model and Medieval and Reformation theology, 
women were not capable of ruling. Their minds, bodies, and moral sensitivities were 
weak. Women were irrational and unspiritual. How could they to be left alone to raise 
children, instructing them in such important matters as right doctrine? How would 
women be able to rule the servants and manage the house without their husbands?  
 
Victorian/Romantic Gender Revolution, 19th Century 
 
The Industrial Revolution brought about the Romantic/Victorian reconstruction of 
gender ideology. It is during this period that we find the association of morality and 
spirituality with the home, the private life, the feminine. Rather than associating mothers 
with matter (that which is opposed to the soul, the spiritual, the divine), Victorians held 
up women as “angels in the home” who maintained a private sphere of virtue, a “haven” 
apart from the hostile, secular world of men. 
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 This is a far cry from women being less spiritual and more bodily. But the new 
economy demanded a change and Christian thinkers obliged. Rather than identifying 
virtue only with the vir (the male), Victorian thinkers divided up the virtues among the 
sexes. Men were given certain virtues: courage, fortitude, shrewdness. Women were 
given others: piety, peacemaking, and gentleness.  
In some ways this was an improvement for women. At least now women were 
seen as having virtue as women. They didn’t need to become men in order to be 
considered virtuous or holy. Still, this was nothing like equality and in some ways it 
excluded women from certain areas of influence that they had previously. Women’s 
particular virtues were interpreted as making them suitable only for the private sphere, 
caring for children and working in the church (though not in any sort of leadership 
capacity). This historical change has also been labeled the “feminization of the church”—
because if spirituality is a female quality then men’s masculinity is threatened when men 
are religious. This was one of the results of the Victorian gender revolution.76 
 On the other hand, this division of the sexes also opened the door to another 
interpretation. Women gained courage in their new status as “moral standard bearers” and 
argued that if they really were responsible to uphold Christian virtue then men needed 
them, not just in the home but also in the public sphere to make the wider world more 
Christian. Thus, the feminist movement of the 19th century, headed by evangelical 
women, drew upon this new ideology of gender. Here we find women becoming involved 
in suffrage and the abolition of slavery on the basis of their unique “feminine virtues.” 
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 Another result of the Victorian revolution (noted in chapter 1) was the virtual 
elimination of a third gender option. Public debates over the natures of the sexes—the 
assumptions that women and men have their own particular virtues associated with their 
separate spheres—added political pressure to clearly categorize anyone who blurred these 
important distinctions. Natural eunuchs and hermaphrodites had to be classified as either 
male or female, thus doctors coined a new phrase “pseudo-hermaphrodite” in order to 
acknowledge bodily difference while maintaining social order (even if “order” required 
people who appeared female [e.g., persons with complete androgen insensitivity 
syndrome] to forego all “homosexual” alliances with men).77 
Rather than seeing women as defective, misbegotten humans, valuable only for 
their contribution in generation (Aquinas), women begin to be seen as having human 
qualities and virtues that contribute to family (and society) in particular, unique ways, 
resulting in a complementary, binary anthropology, what Ruether has called “romantic 
dualism.”78 
 
Ontological and Theological Shifts 
 
 As we noted in our study of Classical anthropology—i.e., that there was a 
connection between ontology (human nature identified with the soul) and gender 
ideology—we can also see a connection between the gender revolution of the 19th century 
and ontological and theological assumptions. Romantic philosophers of the 19th century 
began to take the body more seriously and continued to challenge “the Enlightenment 
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delight in the power of human reason to control nature and everything bodily.”79 LeRon 
Shults explains,   
We can see the impact of this new emphasis in Schleiermacher’s desire to 
derive his dogmatic reflections from the pious self-consiousness, which is a 
modification not of knowing or doing, but of ‘feeling’… By the end of the 
nineteenth century, we find the empirically oriented William James making 
the viscera primary, reversing the traditional view so that now the bodily 
manifestations of emotions drive the mind’s noetic and volitional activities, 
rather than vice versa.80   
 
Whereas in the Classical period reason (associated with the soul and the male) had been 
seen as superior to emotion (associated with the body and the female), in the Victorian 
period, emotions were recovered as valid media for theological engagement. 
 Schleiermacher retains the idea that men display a certain type of calculating 
rationality, but rather than presenting women as less rational or irrational, he grants them 
an alternative type of rationality. In his lectures on biblical interpretation Schleiermacher 
speaks of different types of knowledge in gendered categories, both of which are needed 
for proper interpretation of biblical texts: 
From the moment it begins, technical interpretation involves two methods: a 
divinatory and a comparative. Since each method refers back to the other, the 
two should never be separated. By leading the interpreter to transform 
himself, so to speak, into the author, the divinatory method seeks to gain an 
immediate comprehension of the author as an individual. The comparative 
method proceeds by subsuming the author under a general type. It then tries 
to find his distinctive traits by comparing him with the others of the same 
general type. Divinatory knowledge is the feminine strength in knowing 
people; comparative knowledge, the masculine.81 
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Thus was the binary gender model reproduced in theological hermeneutics.  
 
From One Sex to Two 
 
Gendered politics and the practicalities of separate spheres required by the 
Industrial Revolution all contributed to the making of two incommensurable sexes. 
Thomas Laqueur again summarizes the shift and illustrates how this new ontology 
transformed scientific enquiry into the body itself. 
Sometime in the eighteenth century, sex as we know it was invented. The 
reproductive organs went from being paradigmatic sites for displaying 
hierarchy, resonant throughout the cosmos, to being the foundation of 
incommensurable difference… Here was not only an explicit repudiation of 
the old isomorphisms but also, and more important, a rejection of the idea 
that nuanced differences between organs, fluids, and physiological processes 
mirrored a transcendental order of perfection. Aristotle and Galen were 
simply mistaken in holding that female organs are a lesser form of the male’s 
and by implication that woman is a lesser man. A woman is a woman, 
proclaimed the ‘moral anthropologist’ Moreau in one of the many new efforts 
to derive culture from the body, everywhere and in all things, moral and 
physical, not just in one set of organs.82 
 
Laqueur gives two reasons for the shift from one sex to two: one epistemological and the 
other political. He identifies two parts of the epistemological shift. The first is the 
Enlightenment banishment of “superstitions:”  
lactating monks, women who never ate and exuded sweet fragrance, sex 
changes at the whim of the imagination, bodies in paradise without sexual 
difference, monstrous births [under which label hermaphrodites were 
categorized], women who bore rabbits, and so on, were the stuff of fanaticism 
and superstition even if they were not so far beyond the bounds of reason as 
to be unimaginable.83 
 
The second part of the epistemological shift was the priority of the physical over 
the cosmological.84 “There were no books written before the late seventeenth century… 
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that argued so explicitly for the biological foundations of the moral order. There were 
hundreds if not thousands of such works… in the centuries that followed.”85  
Language changed from the cosmological and theological to the biological. 
 
Indeed the term ‘generation’ itself, which suggested the quotidian repetition 
of God’s act of creation with all its attendant heat and light, gave way to the 
term ‘reproduction,’ which had less miraculous, more mechanistic 
connotations even if it did not quite capture the virtuosity of nature.86  
 
The shift from one sex to two in the Modern period did enable physicians for the first 
time to see women’s organs as women’s organs. Nevertheless, Laqueur cautions readers 
from taking these discoveries as “objective science.” “Distinct sexual anatomy was 
adduced to support or deny all manner of claims in a variety of specific social, economic, 
political, cultural, or erotic contexts. …But no one account of sexual difference 
triumphed.”87 Laqueur insists that the differences between the sexes, emphasized so 
powerfully in the Modern period were “largely unconstrained by what was actually 
known about this or that bit of anatomy, ‘this or that physiological process…” Rather, 
they arose “from the rhetorical exigencies of the moment.”88 Emphasizing the dubious 
nature of the shift from one sex to two, Laqueur is careful to emphasize the significance 
of the shift.  
While the one flesh did not die—it lives today in many guises—two fleshes, 
two new distinct opposite sexes, would increasingly be read into the body. 
                                                 
85
 Ibid., 153. 
86
 Ibid., 155. 
87
 Ibid., 152.  
88
 Ibid., 243. “But my point here is that new knowledge about sex did not in any way entail the 
claims about sexual difference made in its name. No discovery or group of discoveries dictated the rise of 
the two-sex model, for precisely the same reasons that the anatomical discoveries of the Renaissance did 
not unseat the one-sex model: the nature of sexual difference is not susceptible to empirical testing. It is 
logically independent of biological facts because already embedded in the language of science; at least 
when applied to any culturally resonant construal of sexual difference, is the language of gender…   
Despite the new epistemological status of nature as the bedrock of distinctions, and despite the 
accumulation of facts about sex, sexual difference in the centuries after the scientific revolution was no 
more stable than it had been before.” Ibid. 153, emphasis added. 
 163
No longer would those who think about such matters regard woman as a 
lesser version of man along a vertical axis of infinite gradations, but rather as 
an altogether different creature along a horizontal axis whose middle ground 
was largely empty.89 
 
 The middle ground, once occupied by hermaphrodites, natural eunuchs, castrated 
eunuchs, effeminate men, and virile women had been emptied of such ambiguous cases. 
Thus, the modern period bequeathed a legacy of two opposite and incommensurable 
sexes, unified by the belief in the possession of a sexless soul in the Christian tradition or 
a sexless mind in the tradition of Enlightenment liberalism. Substance dualism remained 
the unifying factor undergirding a belief in the common humanity of the sexes regardless 
of difference, but this common denominator would come into question in the postmodern 
period.90 
Rather than understanding the image of God as the male, corporate head of a 
family, the modern period shifted attention to individuals, male and female, yet secured 
in a common humanity by the sexless soul, made in the image of a sexless God.91 All of 
these beliefs were to come under attack in the postmodern period when the power politics 
of the naming of sex, which Laqueur has illustrated, came into the light for the first time. 
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POSTMODERN SHIFTS: 
FROM SUBSTANCE AND SEX DUALISM TO RELATIONAL ONTOLOGY 
AND THE MULTIPLICATION OF THE SEXES 
 
The Enlightenment quest for certainty, for the Rule of Reason over all of nature, 
has floundered on the shoals of postmodernity. The modern quest for unified, universal, 
objective knowledge, knowledge that renders power over all that is “other,” has been 
abandoned. Descartes’ mind was god-like, unconstrained by the body, much less by 
cultural, social, and historical factors. The postmodern mind is only too aware of the limits 
of human finitude, the situatedness of all knowing, and the impossibility of objectivity. We 
are not gods, and we know it. 
Ironically, despite the failure of his project, Descartes’ methodological skepticism 
finds its logical conclusion in postmodern deconstructive theory. Even the very language 
we use to try to formulate ideas has become subject to critique. Language is now believed 
not only to describe the world but to create worlds, enabling us to see some things and not 
others, to think some things and not others. The history of the sexes, and especially the 
history of intersex, is illustrative of this very point. 
In the ancient world, when there was language for eunuchs, hermaphrodites and 
androgynes, people were able to see them, laws governed them, and places in society 
were carved out where they could live and contribute to the life of the community. Such 
is no longer the case. As we saw in chapter one, during the Victorian Era, at the very 
time when physicians were documenting larger numbers of intersexed bodies, by 
redefining their terms, creating the new language of “pseudo-hermaphrodite” they were 
able to remake the world, virtually eliminating hermaphroditism (at least from public 
record), through a few strokes of the pen.  
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But postmodern thinkers are not only deconstructive. By recognizing the power 
of language to create worlds, many postmodern thinkers, both Christian and non-
Christian, are using it to recreate a world that is more attentive to difference than that 
which was allowed in the Modern period. James Olthuis, a postmodern Christian 
theologian, explains: 
In its heart, postmodernism is a spiritual movement that resists the totalizing 
power of reason. It is that resistance, and the concomitant celebration of 
difference and diversity, that marks a wide array of disparate discourses as 
postmodern. Ethically, postmodern discourses share an alertness to plurality 
and a vigilance on behalf of the other. Modernist rational ethics, in its 
Enlightenment dream of a world increasingly controlled by a pure rationality, 
has shown itself not only blind and indifferent to those who are other and 
different, those who fall outside the dominant discourse, but violent and 
oppressive to them.92 
 
 Olthuis explains that while Modern thinkers attempted to take “others” seriously, 
even the “other” sex (i.e., women), they failed to do so, because their attempts were 
wholly self-serving. Their versions of “others” were reflections of their own desires and 
projections of their fears, threats to the self which had to be overcome.93 In such a world, 
“One either dominates or is dominated—as Freud, Hegel, and Sartre in particular 
emphasize… 
Thus, Paul Tillich defines power as ‘the possibility a being has to actualize 
itself against the resistance of other beings.’  To be a self is to have enemies. 
Implicitly, if not explicitly, one is always at war. This apotheosis of the self 
is seen to crest in the idealism of Hegel in which everything becomes itself in 
and through its own other. In the end, since the ‘other’ has a utilitarian 
function in relation to the self, relationship to the other is, finally, self-
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relationship. When an ‘other’ resists this role, failing to mirror the self, when 
it resists being used and consumed, it must be invaded and dominated.94  
 
In the postmodern period, many “others” are finding voices to resist such 
domination. Women are pushing back against the dominating language of the “other” 
sex, being compared always and everywhere to a standard that is male and required to do 
all of the tasks which men consider objectionable. They are continuing the work begun in 
the late modern period of resisting the language of “other” by calling for the “rights of 
men” to be extended to them—rights to vote, to own property, to make legal and 
financial decisions without the authority of a husband, father, or male guardian, and equal 
pay for equal work.95 As Dorothy Sayers argued almost seventy years ago, women are 
not asking to be other, nor opposite, but simply to be recognized as human.96 
In the postmodern period, men too are finding voices to resist the hegemonic 
accounts of masculinity which have oppressed not only women, eunuchs, hermaphro-
dites, and intersex, but also any man failing to measure up to the standard of “masculine 
perfection.” Thus in the postmodern period we find shifts from masculinity, or 
“hegemonic masculinity” to masculinities in the plural.97 
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 It is in this context that the intersexed are also finding voices to resist the 
domination of language which has erased their existence from public society. They are 
crying out with similar language, not to be known as another “other” but to be recognized 
as human. As one woman with Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome put it: 
The world has tried to make us feel like freaks. We have felt like freaks. I felt 
like a freak most of my life, but look at me. I’m just a human being just like 
everybody else. …I really have a place in the world. I really am a human 
being, a very valid human being…98 
 
 But what is a human being?  How does one define human being in the post-
modern age? Is a definition of human being even possible today? Postmodern 
deconstructionist, Jacques Derrida insisted it is not.99 In the early 18th century, when 
Americans confronted intersex babies, the question of their humanity was decided on the 
assertion that “’tho [sic] their outward Shape may be deformed and monstrous; [they] 
have notwithstanding a reasonable Soul, and consequently their Bodies are capable of a 
Resurrection.’”100 The “reasonable soul,” the divine substance passed down from Plato to 
Augustine to Descartes was the security of human personhood, but this very substance 
has come under considerable attack in postmodern times. 
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Ontological Shifts 
 
Rejection of Substance Dualism 
 
The shift from cosmology to biology, which began in the late modern period, 
reaches its logical conclusion in the postmodern abandonment of substance dualism. 
Advances in scientific understandings of the brain and its functions, along with 
philosophical challenges to the subject-object dualism of the modern project, have led to 
a thoroughgoing reconfiguration of what it means to be human. Some Christian scholars 
are arguing that these scientific and philosophical theories amount to nothing less than a 
Copernican revolution in theological anthropology.101   
Theologian LeRon Shults explains how even some conservative theologians have 
been willing to move away from the idea that humans are made of both body and soul.  
The activities once ascribed to the ‘soul’ and its ‘faculties’ are now 
accounted for by consciousness as an emergence of patterns of neuronal 
functioning in the human brain, which in turn are connected to chemical 
interactions throughout the body. These give rise to ‘feeling,’ which cannot 
be separated from ‘thinking.’  Conversely, how we think affects how we feel 
and act.102   
 
Nancey Murphy, a theologian and philosopher of science at Fuller University, has shown 
how the faculties of the soul enumerated by Thomas Aquinas have brain responses that 
can be located for each. “Even in the most intense religious experience of contemplatives, 
imaging techniques have shown that during deep meditation very particular patterns of 
neural functioning are operative.”103 
                                                 
101
 Joel B. Green, “Body and Soul? Questions at the Interface of Science and Christian Faith,” 
What About the Soul? Neuroscience and Christian Anthropology, Joel B. Green, ed. (Nashville: Abingdon 
Press, 2004), 6. 
102
 Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology, 179. 
103
 Ibid., 180. Nancey Murphy, “Darwin, Social Theory and the Sociology of Scientific 
Knowledge,’ Zygon 34, no. 4 (1999): 596. See also the constructive proposals of James B. Ashbrook and 
Carol Rausch Albright, The Humanizing Brain (Cleveland: Pilgrim, 1997). 
 169
 Rather than seeing these discoveries as proofs of the impossibility of the 
supernatural or of communion with God, a number of biblical scholars and theologians 
are arguing that a rejection of substance dualism is not a rejection of Christianity but of 
Platonic metaphysics—non-Christian philosophical notions they believe have distorted 
past interpretations of the Scriptures. They insist that the Bible does not present the soul 
as a metaphysical substance opposed to the body. Rather, like Aristotle, they show how 
the term “soul” in its Hebrew and Greek variations is used to speak of the life of the 
person in holistic fashion—a task Joel B. Green takes on at length in Body, Soul and 
Human Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible.104 The new challenge for theologians 
is not the existence of the soul and its relation to the body, but the mind/brain, 
body/consciousness connection and the possibility of talking about human selves at all.105 
How does one talk about the self after abandoning the concept of the soul? 
Augustine spoke of these as one and the same, when he wrote. “I, that is, my soul…”106  
We remember Plato and Descartes and even Wollstonecraft and Sayers who appealed to 
the shared faculty of reason (which Sayers called “that great and sole true Androgyne”) 
as the basis for the co-humanity of the sexes.107 But the reduction of the soul to the brain 
disallows such a conclusion. Scientists tell us that even the brain is sexed through pre- 
and post-natal hormones as well as through shifting brain structures that develop through 
restructuring that occurs on account of experiences of living in a sexed body and a 
                                                 
104
 Joel B. Green, Body, Soul and Human Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible  (Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 2008). See also Green’s essay “’Bodies—That Is, Human Lives’: A Re-Examination of 
Human Nature in the Bible,” in Whatever Happened to the Soul? Scientific and Theological Portraits of 
Human Nature, ed. Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy, and H. Newton Malony (Minneapolis: Fortress, 
1998), 149-73. See also What About the Soul?  
105
 Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology, 181-183.  
106
 Ibid., 167, citing Augustine’s On the Doctrines of the Church, 1.27. 
107
 Sayers, “The Human-Not-Quite-Human,” 44. 
 170
gendered society.108 While “brain sex” is the least understood of all the categories of the 
science of sex differentiation, it is nevertheless a factor that complicates the possibility of 
speaking of a “sexless” human nature—something shared by male, female, and intersex 
alike. 
How does one secure the humanity of anyone—male, female, or intersex—
without the “reasonable soul” and without even the concept of a human self? Despite 
Derrida’s objections, postmodern thinkers continue to proffer alternative proposals. 
 
Bodies, Relations, and the Multiplication of the Sexes 
 
Building on the assumption that humans are mere bodies, most secular, 
postmodern thinkers fall into one of two philosophical camps as biological determinists 
or social constructionists. Neither is unproblematic.  
In the twentieth century, socio-biologists have suggested that every aspect of 
our social lives is but a sub-plot in a broader evolutionary drama scripted by 
human DNA. The true story of the self is about human genes that seek to 
survive long enough to reproduce.109 
 
Given this situation, theologian Kevin Vanhoozer asks, “Is it possible to save human 
freedom and dignity, to preserve the person, and if so, on what grounds?”110 
Other postmodern theologians have suggested that with the fall of modern 
metanarratives, humans are able to recognize the socially constructed nature of societies. 
While some might conclude from the discovery of the power of culture that humans are 
nothing but cogs in the cultural machine, without the ability for self-determination, most 
do not abandon all ground for human self-determination. Rather, they argue that if culture 
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is a human creation, it can be recreated, reconstructed, at least in modest degrees. Clifford 
Geertz concluded, “man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has 
spun.”111 These webs consist of the cultural constructions into which we are born and in 
which we participate either by cooperation or resistance, as well as our personal 
narratives—the stories we write to make sense of ourselves, to create our selves in the 
world. 112 According to theologian Elaine Storkey, this theme of self-creation, rather than 
self-mastery, is central to the postmodern spirit. 
Once we recognize that the self is in the process of being constructed, it is 
only a short step to the notion of self-creation. …There is no aspect of our 
identity therefore which we cannot create… Our sexuality is also our 
creation, so to take one example, there is nothing ‘given’ about hetero-
sexuality. It too is a product of the power concepts of modernity. There is 
nothing fixed about monogamy, either, and plurality of couplings fits much 
more comfortably into a postmodernist culture.113 
 
Given the conclusion that humans are nothing but bodies, highly diverse, with no 
grand narrative to tell us who or what we are, or how to act, it is perfectly understandable 
how some sociologists of gender are arguing for a deconstruction of the sex/gender 
system. Gilbert Herdt’s call for a third sex, Fausto-Sterling’s identification of five sexes, 
David Hester’s recognition of hundreds of sexes, and Kessler and McKenna’s insistence 
on the elimination of sex and gender categories remain perfectly reasonable suggestions 
in the postmodern context. If bodies are all that we are, if the cultures into which we are 
born can be reshaped and there is no objective vantage point for better and worse 
constructions, then the best we can hope for are less oppressive, more peaceful relations 
between bodies. But even here we have no absolute vantage point from which to argue 
for such ethical treatment of “others.” 
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The ancient Greeks recognized only one sex, the male. Many have found this to 
be oppressive to women, so it is rejected. The binary sex model of the modern period was 
an improvement, but this also proved to be oppressive to women—who are always 
constructed as the “other” sex—as well as oppressive to intersexed persons who no 
longer had a place on the chart. Both systems are oppressive. Neither lead to peaceful 
relations between persons. Both can and must be rejected. The ontological shifts allow 
for the multiplication of the sexes or their abandonment. Either option is open for those 
who would choose this path. 
 
Theological Turn to Relationality 
 
Given their vocation, theologians are considerably more interested in questions 
of ontology than non-religious thinkers. They are not satisfied to speak of the human as 
wholly biologically determined, nor as beings with the power of self-creation, no matter 
how circumscribed that power. Nevertheless, many acknowledge the validity of the 
postmodern critique of the modern self and are working to rethink theological 
anthropology in its wake. LeRon Shults identifies the most significant shift as the 
“Philosophical Turn to Relationality:”114 
Today most philosophers no longer describe human nature with the 
categories of substance ontology, as in ancient philosophy, nor in terms of 
autonomous subjectivity, as in early modern philosophy. In both of these 
models, the ‘self’ is dualistically separated from its ‘knowing.’ The human 
subject is defined prior to and over against the objects of knowledge. In late 
modernity, however, we find a new emphasis on the self as always and 
already immersed in the dynamic process of knowing and being known in 
community. The hard dichotomy between subject and object is rejected.115  
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Shults notes that despite the fact that many postmodern thinkers have concluded from these 
reflections that there can be no self, a number of postmodern theologians refuse to join in 
the lament.  
James Olthuis employs the language of psychology to explain that the 
postmodern “‘death of the self’ was not a real death but …the death of a “false self” 
which is no real loss but the beginning of healing.”116 He insists that “There is still room 
for an agent self that is not absolute, with no claims to self-authorization and full 
presence…” and returns to Christian theology to begin theological anthropology again.117 
Likewise, Shults is hopeful that the death of the modern self, tied to a non-
Christian ontology, will open up the possibility of finding more accurate descriptions of 
the self, complete with a revisioning of ontological categories. 
To conclude from this, as some radical deconstructionists do, that no 
substantial ‘self’ exists at all follows only if we completely divorce relation 
from substance. If being is essentially relational, however, we may still speak 
of the ‘self’ as substantial and real—precisely because of the intensity of its 
self-relationality. As Calvin Schrag points out, the rejection of old anthro-
pological models does not mean a jettisoning of every sense of self. One may 
argue instead for a “praxis-oriented self, defined by its communicative 
practices, oriented toward an understanding of itself in its discourse, its 
action, its being with others, and its experience of transcendence.”118   
 
Kevin Vanhoozer agrees that “personhood, not substance, comes first in the order 
of being. …persons are not autonomous individuals. …persons are what they are by virtue 
of their relations to others.”119 Nevertheless, even while he critiques the modernist version 
of individuality, Vanhoozer insists that personhood is not lost, “assimilated into some 
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collectivity… [R]ather a particular person… achieves a concrete identity in relation to 
others.”120 Similarly, Jürgen Moltmann, attempts to navigate the shoals between 
individuality and collectivism which both threaten human being. 
An individual, like an atom, is literally that ultimate element of indivisibility. An 
ultimate element of indivisibility, however, has no relationships, and also cannot 
communicate. …If an individual has no relationships, then he also has no 
characteristics and no name. He is unrecognizable, and does not even know 
himself. By contrast, a person is the individual human being in the resonance 
field of the relationships of I-you-we, I-myself, I-it. Within this network of 
relationships, the person becomes the subject of giving and taking, hearing and 
doing, experiencing and touching, perceiving and responding.121 
 
 
Theological Reconstruction 
 
Trinitarian Relationality and the Social Imago 
 
 These postmodern theologians have moved a long way from Boethius’ definition 
of the human person as an “individual substance of a rational nature,” focused as it was 
on the individual apart from society and on the rational in opposition to the body. 
Postmodern theologians want to affirm the body as a fundamental element in human 
personhood even as they avoid grounding rationality in substance metaphysics. On the 
other hand, many of these same theologians are eager to ground relationality in 
ontological categories. It is this latter shift that has led to a renewed interest in the 
Trinitarian nature of God. 
 Plato’s soul and Aristotole’s mind, their centers of human identity, were both 
grounded in their conceptions of a monistic God. Thus, their anthropology reflected their 
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attempts to escape the body (and its sex) and become united with the divine soul/mind. 
Christian thinkers who built upon their ontological speculations found themselves at 
odds with their own unique Christian heritage, belief in the goodness of the body, of 
creation, and resurrection, as well as their belief in a God who is three-in-one. 
 As we noted in the introduction to this project, the renewal of trinitarian studies 
and its significance for theological anthropology is usually traced to Karl Barth (1886-
1968), who pulled together the contributions of Martin Buber, Wilhelm Vischer, Deitrich 
Bonhoeffer, Emil Brunner, Charlotte von Kirschbaum, and Fredrich Schleiermacher to 
argue that the way in which humans image God is in their existence as relational 
beings.122 Barth concluded,  
the analogy between God and man, is simply the existence of the I and the 
Thou in confrontation. This is first constitutive for God, and then for man 
created by God. To remove it is tantamount to removing the divine from God 
as well as the human from man.123 
 
Relationality is constitutive of divinity and humanity in God’s image. Ultimately, “Jesus 
is a man for His fellows, and therefore the image of God, in a way which others cannot 
even approach, just as they cannot be for God in the sense that He is.”124 Insomuch as 
there is a proper location of the image of God in humans, following after the pattern of 
Jesus, Barth locates this in the relationality of male and female. 
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The Trinity and Sex, Gender, and Sexuality  
 
 Barth’s construction is important for our discussion because he was also the first 
to connect the imago Dei, not to an extra-bodily, sexless, divine substance, but to human 
being as sexually differentiated. Thus, he insists that male and female together are the 
“original and proper form of this fellow-humanity… This basic distinction, the 
differentiation and connexion [sic] of the I-Thou must be explained as coincident with 
that of male and female.”125  
Could anything be more obvious than to conclude from this clear indication 
that the image and likeness of being created by God signifies existence in 
confrontation, i.e., in this confrontation, in the juxtaposition and conjunction 
of man which is that of male and female…?126 
 
This interpretation has come to be known as the “social view” of the imago Dei.127 
Barth’s contribution arises directly from the biblical text of Genesis 1:26-27,  
 
Then God said, ‘Let us make human[kind]128 in our image, according to our 
likeness, and let them rule …’  So God created the human in his image, in 
the image of God he created [the human],129 male and female he created 
them.  
 
Rather than focusing on the rule of humans over the rest of creation as early Christian 
theologians have done, Barth shifts attention to verse 27 where the plurality of God (“let 
us make”) is imaged in the plurality of what is made, “male and female.” Thus, the 
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Christian who reads the Trinity back into the plural pronoun concludes that humans as 
male and female, called to “become one flesh” (Gen 2:24), somehow reflect the unity of 
the Trinity. 
 For Barth sex/gender (i.e., masculinity and femininity) represent the “center of 
humanity” and are inherently connected to sexuality. Sexuality according to Barth is not 
sinful per se but it has been deeply affected by sin since the fall. Thus,  
that awful genius of sin is nowhere more plainly revealed than in the fact that 
it shames man at the center of his humanity, his masculinity and femininity, 
before God and man, and every attempt to escape this shame, every self-
justification, or concretely every denial and suppression of sexuality can only 
confirm and increase the shame… This is the climax of this text and therefore 
of the whole biblical history of creation.130 
 
Kevin Vanhoozer summarizes Barth’s contribution to theological anthropology: 
Sexuality, and the male-female duality in particular, becomes an image for 
the difference-in-relatedness that characterizes human, and divine, being in 
general. It is therefore impossible to speak about humanity apart from 
‘cohumanity’: the human person is both irreducibly individual and 
constitutionally interrelated.131 
 
Barth’s reconfiguration moves conversations about the imago Dei away from 
disembodied attributes (e.g., rationality) or functions (e.g., dominion) toward the 
relationality found between the first man and first woman. Upon first blush, his proposal 
is good news for women. Rather than being excluded from full participation in the image 
of God, due to a supposed inferior rationality or unnatural dominion, one cannot begin to 
speak about the image of God without speaking about men and women in relation to one 
another and to God. 
Even where Barth’s proposal has been roundly critiqued, it is impossible to over-
estimate the significance of his reflections for subsequent theological work. Theologians 
                                                 
130
 Barth, CD, III/2, ¶ 45.3, p. 292. 
131
 Vanhoozer, 172. 
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now regularly assume a binary model of human sex differentiation based on the creation 
narratives found in Genesis (not the one sex model of the classical period), and most read 
equality and mutuality into sex relations, rather than hierarchy (a trend which many 
feminists find ironic).132 As the rest of this dissertation will show, recent work in 
theological anthropology continues to ground theological concepts such as the imago Dei, 
human personhood, and human relationality on the creation of humans as male and 
female in heterosexual marital relation with analogies to trinitarian relationality and 
difference-in-relation.133 
 
Postmodern Theological Anthropologies and Intersex 
 
Even while many postmodern theologians have welcomed the turn from substance 
ontology to relational ontology, most Christian thinkers continue to uphold the binary sex 
model of the modern period, emphasizing the significance of sexual differentiation (as 
male and female) and heterosexual relationality for imago Dei, human personhood, and 
human relationality. Their constructions continue to neglect the presence of intersexed 
persons within the human community and problematize not only their humanity but also 
their ability to image God. 
The binary sex model of the modern period, even when presented by postmodern 
theologians, remains subject to the postmodern critique of the way “otherness” has been 
defined and employed. Even Olthuis, who defends postmodernism as a “spiritual 
                                                 
132
 Kari Elisabeth Børresen and Rosemary Radford Ruether, in The Image of God: Gender Models 
in Judaeo-Christian Tradition, 3-4, 269-70, 284, 288. 
133
 Stanley Grenz sums up the current state of trinitarian studies, heralding the “triumph of 
relationality.” He explains, “Although contemporary theologians vary enormously in the degree to which 
they are willing to renounce their allegiance to a metaphysics of substance, they seem to agree that more 
stress should be placed on the claim that God is relational.” Stanley J. Grenz, Rediscovering the Triune 
God: The Trinity in Contemporary Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2004), 117, emphasis original. 
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movement… [alert] to plurality and vigilan[t] on behalf of the other,”134 continues to 
employ the binary sex model in his revision of theological anthropology.135 There are a 
few postmodern theologians who are extending this vigilance on behalf of those who 
diverge from heterosexual practice,136 but almost none who pay any attention to the 
theological challenge of intersex.137 
Evangelicals and Roman Catholics, perhaps because of their commitment to 
(hetero)sexual ethics, are first among those who have failed to take seriously the 
challenge of intersex to their theological constructions. While ignorance of intersex may 
account for some of this neglect, even those familiar with intersex tend to dismiss it or 
advocate “correction” through medical technology in order to uphold sex and gender 
complementarity.138 
Is it possible to incorporate postmodern vigilance on behalf of “others” while at 
the same time upholding traditional Christian sexual ethics (i.e., heterosexual 
monogamy)? I will argue that it is, but not without a serious reconsideration of the 
theological edifices that have been built on the binary sex model by Evangelicals and 
Roman Catholics alike. That is the task of the chapters which follow. 
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 Olthuis, “Face-to-Face,” 135. 
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 Olthuis, “Be(com)ing: Humankind as Gift and Call,” 161-164. 
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 Stuart, Religion is a Queer Thing. 
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PART II 
CRITIQUE AND CONSTRUCTION: 
THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE POSTMODERN PERIOD 
 
an Introduction  
In Part I of this dissertation we learned of the phenomenon of intersex, persons 
whose bodies do not fit neatly into the category of either male or female—a surprisingly 
high number despite lack of public recognition in contemporary society. We also learned 
that the ancients were not unfamiliar with intersex. Indeed, Jesus himself discussed those 
who are born eunuchs—an ancient term under which some intersex conditions would 
have been classified. Notwithstanding the checkered history of the treatment of eunuchs 
in the early Christian period, we noted that eunuchs and hermaphrodites were publicly 
recognized by early Christian societies—both East and West—and that their bodily 
ambiguity prompted theological reflection on the significance of sex, gender, and 
sexuality for theological anthropology. 
We then traced the history of the human self from Plato’s disembodied, sexless 
soul through the Western Enlightenment elevation of reason over sense perception on to 
the postmodern recovery of the body, its senses, and its sex. Along the way we also 
traced how theological reflection on the image of God followed similar shifts, from the 
centrality of reasonable rule of the (masculine) soul over the (feminine) body—a 
presupposition which undermined the affirmation that women are also made according to 
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the image of God—to the postmodern insistence that the image of God cannot be 
reflected apart from male and female in community, a social view of the imago Dei. 
This postmodern theological account of the image of God reflects both a return to 
the body as well as the philosophical turn to relationality, and for many theologians, it is 
sexuality that guides the reading of both. The return to the body is a return to the sexed 
body—male and female. The turn to relationality has been construed in sexual terms by 
more than a handful of theologians. Chapters 5 and 6 will investigate these twin themes: 
imago Dei as sexed body and imago Dei as sexual community. Exploring the challenges 
and contributions which intersex and a more careful reading of Jesus’ teaching on 
eunuchs bring to current theological anthropologies built upon the social imago, I will 
argue in chapter 4 that the binary sexed model needs to be expanded in order to include 
the intersexed while not being deconstructed of all meaning and value. In chapter 5, I will 
argue that the social imago must remain social, resisting the slide into sexual communion. 
Finally, in chapter 6, I will follow the theological trajectories laid out in chapters 4 and 5 
to ask how the eschatological goal of human identity—the identification and union of the 
ecclesial community with Christ—addresses the place of sex, gender, and sexuality as 
these impinge upon the imago Dei.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
SEX, GENDER, AND IMAGO DEI: 
FROM OTHER TO OTHERS 
 
 
 Chapter three concluded with the recognition that Barth and those who have 
followed him in the social view of the imago Dei as “male-and-female-in-community” 
have taken up the postmodern turn to relationality and the postmodern turn to the body 
while retaining a modern conception of sex and gender difference. But postmodern 
vigilance on behalf of others calls theologians to more careful attention to bodies as they 
are found in the real world rather than in the ideal world of philosophical and theological 
systems. Philosophically and theologically the male-female difference has been hailed as 
paradigmatic of the “other.” This simplistic construal has caused theologians to over-
emphasize difference between the sexes while at the same time blinding them to the 
existence of other others. I will argue that more careful attention to “real” men, women, 
and intersexed persons, in all of their particularities, diversity, and similarities, as well as 
a fresh reading of biblical narratives can help us move forward in our theological 
understanding of sex and gender differences and their place in theological discussions of 
identity and imago Dei. 
 In order to do this, I will present a brief overview to the ways in which the sex 
binary model has been construed in Roman Catholic and Evangelical theology. I will 
focus on the legacy of the late Pope John Paul II (1920-2005), in what has come to be 
known as the Theology of the Body (a collection of homilies delivered from September 
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1979 to November 1984). It is impossible to identify a similarly representative voice for 
American Evangelicalism; any such choice is suspect from the beginning. Nevertheless, I 
will risk putting forward the work of Stanley J. Grenz (1950-2005) whose work on 
theological anthropology and human sexuality has been widely received within the 
Evangelical academy.1    
 After showing the strong consensus between these two theological traditions, I 
will examine how both are being extended in ways that continue to problematize intersex 
persons, as well as many non-intersexed persons by overstating the significance of sex 
and gender difference. I will then conclude by suggesting a better way to build upon the 
good work of both of these traditions in order to build a more balanced, nuanced, and 
inclusive vision of the relation between sex, gender and imago Dei. 
 
The Common Witness of Roman Catholic and Evangelical  
Theologies of the Body 
 
There are striking similarities between Roman Catholic and Evangelical theologies of 
the body. In Part I of his Theology of the Body, Pope John Paul II builds a case for the 
nuptial meaning of the body as the foundation for sexual ethics.2 He finds several 
meanings for the sexed body and the marital sexual act in his reflections upon the 
creation accounts found in Genesis 1-4. I have summarized these as follows: 
                                                 
1
 Evangelical theologian Richard Lints attests to the influence of Stanley Grenz on contemporary 
Evangelical theological anthropology in Lints, “Introduction: Theological Anthropology in Context,” 
Personal Identity in Theological Perspective, Richard Lints, Michael S. Horton and Mark R. Talbot eds. 
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006), 7. Hollinger depends heavily on Grenz, 
employing Grenz’s definitions of sexuality as foundational for his own work in, The Meaning of Sex, 15-
16. 
2
 John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body, Michael Waldstein, 
trans. and ed. (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 2006). 
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1. The sexed body participates in the meaning of personhood: Sexual 
distinction is not mere attribute but fundamental, “constitutive” of the 
person.3 
 
2. The image of God, though present in an individual human, is also (more 
fully revealed) in the communion of persons, the union of the first man and 
first woman.4 This union is specifically related to the “conjugal act.”5  
 
3. The spousal meaning of the body relates to the ability of the spouses to 
express love through the gift of self. This gift of self “fulfills the very 
meaning of [human] being and existence.” 6 The gift of self becomes the 
paradigm of Christian love. It is the basis for celibate religious vocation,7 
the model of God’s love for the world in Christ,8 and grounded in the 
Trinitarian nature of God.9   
 
4. The body also carries a parental (paternal/maternal) meaning. The pope 
argues that masculinity and femininity reveal themselves more fully in 
paternity and maternity.10 Paternity mirrors divine Fatherhood.11 
 
                                                 
3
 Ibid., page 166-169; homily 10. 
4
 “man became the image of God not only through his own humanity, but also through the 
communion of persons, which man and woman form from the very beginning. …Man becomes an image of 
God not so much in the moment of solitude as in the moment of communion. He is, in fact, ‘from the 
beginning’ not only an image in which the solitude of one Person, who rules the world, mirrors itself, but 
also and essentially the image of an inscrutable divine communion of Persons.” Ibid., 163; 9:3. 
5
 Ibid., 167; 10:2. 
6
 “The human body, with its sex—its masculinity and femininity—seen in the very mystery of 
creation, is not only a source of fruitfulness and of procreation, as in the whole natural order, but contains 
‘from the beginning’ the ‘spousal’ attribute, that is the power to express love: precisely that love in which 
the human person becomes a gift and—through this gift—fulfills the very meaning of his being and 
existence.” Ibid., 185-186; 15:1, italics original to John Paul II. 
7
 “love as the readiness to make the exclusive gift of self for the ‘kingdom of God…’” Ibid., 435-
436; 79:8. 
8
 Ibid., 509; 97:4. 
9
 This can be clearly seen from the quote above from Man and Woman, 163; 9:3. Editor Michael 
Waldstein also emphasizes the centrality of Trinitarian thought in his introduction to Man and Woman 
where he quotes from John Paul II’s earlier work, Sources of Renewal. Here Wojtyła wrote: “Man’s 
resemblance to God finds its basis, as it were, in the mystery of the most holy Trinity. Man resembles God 
not only because of the spiritual nature of his immortal soul but also by reason of his social nature, if by 
this we understand the fact that he ‘cannot fully realize himself except in an act of pure self-giving’ 
[Gaudiam et Spes, 24:3].” Waldstein, 89; citing Sources of Renewal: The Implementation of the Second 
Vatican Council (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980), 61. 
10
 “the mystery of femininity manifests and reveals itself in its full depth through motherhood… In 
this way, what also reveals itself is the mystery of the man’s masculinity, that is, the generative and 
‘paternal’ meaning of his body.” John Paul II, Man and Woman, 210-211, 20:2; italics original to John Paul 
II. 
11
 “Fatherhood is one of the most prominent aspects of humanity in Sacred Scripture. The text of 
Genesis 5:3, ‘Adam…begot a son in his image, in his likeness,’ is explicitly connected with the account of 
the creation of man (Gen 1:27; 5:1) and seems to attribute to the earthly father the participation in the 
divine work of transmitting life…” Ibid., 211, footnote 33. Page 17 of the introduction indicates that the 
footnotes are original to John Paul II and “an integral part of the text.” 
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Though couched in different language, Stanley Grenz, in his text Sexual Ethics: 
An Evangelical Perspective, and in his theological anthropology, The Social God and the 
Relational Self, identifies the same features of human sexuality; meanings I have labeled 
combining language from both traditions as 1) Personal, 2) Sacramental, 3) Unitive and 
4) Procreative.12   
1. Personal: Sexual distinction is essential to human personhood. It is connected to but 
mysteriously deeper than chromosomes, hormones, genitalia, or social (affective 
gender) expression.13 
 
2. Sacramental: Sexual distinction is the basis for “bonding.” It is the most basic form of 
the human community, the primitive form of the imago Dei which is more fully 
revealed in Christ (the true image), the communion of the church, and the 
eschatological nuptial union between Christ with his church. The union-in-difference 
is fundamental to Grenz’s understanding of sexuality—which, while it images the 
Trinity, ultimately prefigures the union between God and creation.14 
 
3. Unitive: The sex act is an expression of mutual submission which Grenz also describes 
as “gift of self.”15 
 
4. Procreative: The sex act is an expression of openness beyond the couple to others—
particularly children. “Sexual intercourse, through its link to procreation, constitutes 
                                                 
12
 While in Roman Catholic literature the “unitive and procreative” elements stand for the full 
meaning of sex, including its sacramental meaning under the unitive, I believe it is important to maintain 
the distinction between the two. Grenz utilizes this distinction when he argues against the acceptance of 
homosexual marriages. He contends that while homosexuals may be able to give themselves to one another 
in love and mutual submission—thus fulfilling one of the meanings of sex in marriage—their unions will 
never represent the “unity in difference” that the male/female union symbolizes as a prefiguring of the 
eschatological union between God and Church. The nuance in Grenz’s argument should not be missed 
especially considering that it can be argued that homosexual unions can image (in a sacramental way) the 
Trinitarian union of persons just as well if not better than heterosexual unions—given the fact that God is 
beyond sex/gender distinctions (suggesting their irrelevance or limited value to the argument of union in 
difference), or is symbolically portrayed as a union of same sex/gender persons (Father and Son). Here, the 
eschatological union between God and humanity must be maintained as the meaning of unity in difference 
and the basis for the argument. Of course, Rosemary Radford Ruether and other feminists have wisely 
warned of the dangers of a symbolic universe which identifies God with the male and humanity with the 
female. Their arguments on the limits of analogical language and the dangers of unnecessary applications 
of such symbolism must be heeded.  
13
 Stanley J. Grenz, Sexual Ethics: An Evangelical Perspective (Louisville: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 1990), 22-30. Both Grenz and John Paul II take for granted that there is a fundamental 
connection between biological sex and “affective sexuality” (i.e., socio-cultural gender expression). 
14
 Grenz, Social God and Relational Self; summarized by Grenz in “The Social God and the 
Relational Self: Toward a Trinitarian Theology of the Imago Dei,” in Trinitarian Soundings in Systematic 
Theology, Paul Louis Metzger, ed. (London and New York: T & T Clark International, 2005), 87-100. 
15
 Grenz, Sexual Ethics, 88-89. 
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an apt human analogy to the expansive love of God, which likewise creates the other 
as its product.”16 
 
The Context of the Critique 
The significance of the overlap in these two theological visions of sex, gender, 
marriage, and spirituality should not be missed. There is a powerful common witness of 
these two major players in conservative American Christianity that many find 
compelling. The critique that follows should not be interpreted as an attempt to 
undermine this common witness. Rather, it is an effort to strengthen it by affirming some 
general principles, acknowledging their limitations, and pushing beyond these limits to a 
more comprehensive theology of human persons made in the image of God. 
 
BINARY DIFFERENCE IN ROMAN CATHOLIC AND EVANGELICAL 
THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGIES 
 
The Binary Model in John Paul II’s Theology of the Body 
 
John Paul II begins his homilies on the Theology of the Body with the same text 
examined in chapter 2 of this dissertation: Matthew chapter 19:1-12. He begins with 
Jesus’ words in verses 1-8 but interrupts a complete analysis of the passage by jumping to 
Genesis, and inserting Jesus’ statements about the indissolubility of marriage (Mt. 19:8; 
Mk. 10:6-9), lust (Mt. 5:28) and the resurrection of the body (Mt. 22:30; Mark 12:25; 
Luke 20:35-35), followed by Paul’s teaching on the resurrection in I Corinthians 15, 
before returning to attend to the last verses of the pericope, Matthew 19:9-12. After 
reading “eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom” through the Pauline language of I 
Corinthians 7, the late Pope concludes with a long exposition on the sacrament of 
marriage (Eph. 5:21-33), and its implications for the continuing authority of Humanae 
                                                 
16
 Ibid., 90-91. 
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Vitae—the prohibition of artificial contraceptives penned by Pope Paul VI in 1969. This 
is the shape of his text as he describes it.17   
Given his admission of the purposes of his work, one should not find it surprising 
that his Theology of the Body only considers certain types of bodies—those that fall into 
the binary pattern of Adam and Eve—while excluding others. He does not consider what 
the bodies of eunuchs, intersex bodies, have to say for any theology of the body. Rather, 
following the pattern of many Church fathers, he briefly acknowledges the physical 
nature of eunuchism but defines it as “the physical defects that make the procreative 
power of marriage impossible.”18 Unfortunately, this is an ambiguous phrase that could 
include everything from impotence to infertility. Avoiding the gender ambiguity of 
eunuchs altogether, he reads the eunuch through the lens of continence or virginity 
translated into spiritual marriage.19   
 John Paul II’s Theology of the Body is built upon heterosexual complementarity—
which guides not only sexual ethics but is developed to ground the meaning of human 
existence and even Christian spirituality: 
The human body, with its sex—its masculinity and femininity—seen in the 
very mystery of creation, is not only a source of fruitfulness and of 
procreation, as in the whole natural order, but contains ‘from the beginning’ 
the ‘spousal’ attribute, that is the power to express love: precisely that love in 
which the human person becomes a gift and—through this gift—fulfills the 
very meaning of his being and existence.20  
 
His proposal takes Jesus’ statement in Matthew 19:4-5 very seriously:  
 
                                                 
17
 John Paul II, Man and Woman, 659-663; homily 133. 
18
 Ibid., 416; 74:1. 
19
 John Paul II reads “eunuch for the sake of the kingdom” through I Cor. 7, Rev. 14:4, Mt. 22:30; 
Mk. 12:25; Lk. 20:35-36; see Man and Woman, 414- 462; homilies 73-86.  
20
 Ibid., 185-186; 15:1, italics original to John Paul II. 
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“Haven’t you read,” he replied, “that at the beginning the Creator ‘made them 
male and female,’ and said, ‘For this reason a man will leave his father and 
mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh’”? 
 
The nuptial meaning of the body insists that masculinity and femininity exist “for this 
reason,” i.e., to direct women and men to marriage. And marriage, according to John Paul 
II, exists as the primary metaphor for Christian love in the Scriptures. (The question of 
whether or not marriage should be seen as the primary metaphor for Christian love is the 
subject of the next chapter. For now, we focus our attention on the late Pope’s construal 
of masculinity and femininity.) 
According to John Paul II, masculinity and femininity are relational terms. 
Neither can be understood apart from the other. 
Thus, as Gen 2:23 already shows,21 femininity in some way finds itself before 
masculinity, while masculinity confirms itself through femininity. Precisely 
the function of sex [that is, being male and female], which in some way is 
‘constitutive for the person’ (not only ‘an attribute of the person’), shows 
how deeply man, with all his spiritual solitude, with the uniqueness and 
unrepeatability proper to the person, is constituted by the body as ‘he’ or 
‘she.’22 
 
Unfortunately, the late Pope does not unpack what he means by sex as “constitutive” of 
the person rather than a mere “attribute.” This is regrettable, given the weight he places 
upon it. What he does unpack is the connection he sees between femininity and 
motherhood and masculinity and fatherhood. 
According to his Theology of the Body, masculinity and femininity are ordered 
toward fatherhood and motherhood.  
[T]he mystery of femininity manifests and reveals itself in its full depth 
through motherhood… In this way, what also reveals itself is the mystery of 
                                                 
21
 “The man said, ‘This is now bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called 
“woman,” for she was taken out of man.’” 
22
 John Paul II, Man and Woman, 166, 10:1.  
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the man’s masculinity, that is, the generative and ‘paternal’ meaning of his 
body.23   
 
But while woman’s maternal femininity is read off of her body,24 the connection between 
masculinity and fatherhood can be understood as more “hidden.”25 Rather than looking to 
men’s bodies in order to understand fatherhood, the late Pope directs his hearers to the 
presentation of fatherhood in the scriptures—especially the Fatherhood of God.26 
Thus, femininity and masculinity direct women and men to marriage. Marriage is the 
paradigmatic form of the “gift of self” (which is the ultimate form of love—human and 
divine). This love is made visible in the conjugal union of husband and wife that leads 
naturally to motherhood and fatherhood. Marriage points to the sacramental, loving 
union between Christ and the Church and fatherhood points to God the Father. 
Despite the fact that there are numerous problems with such an account (not least 
of which is the obvious imbalance between fatherhood and motherhood in their 
connection to the person and work of God27), there is also much to commend in the 
                                                 
23
 “the mystery of femininity manifests and reveals itself in its full depth through motherhood… In 
this way, what also reveals itself is the mystery of the man’s masculinity, that is, the generative and 
‘paternal’ meaning of his body.” Ibid., 210-211, 20:2; italics original to John Paul II. 
24
 “The whole exterior constitution of woman’s body, its particular look, the qualities that stand, 
with the power of perennial attraction, at the beginning of the ‘knowledge’ about which Genesis 4:1-2 
speaks (‘Adam united himself with Eve’), are in strict union with motherhood. With the simplicity 
characteristic of it, the Bible (and the liturgy following it) honors and praises throughout the centuries ‘the 
womb that bore you and the breasts from which you sucked milk’ (Lk 11:27). These words are a eulogy of 
motherhood, of femininity, of the feminine body in its typical expression of creative love.” Ibid., 212, 21:5, 
emphasis original. 
25
 “masculinity contains in a hidden way the meaning of fatherhood and femininity that of 
motherhood.” Ibid., 217, 22:6. 
26
 “Fatherhood is one of the most prominent aspects of humanity in Sacred Scripture. The text of 
Genesis 5:3, ‘Adam…begot a son in his image, in his likeness,’ is explicitly connected with the account of 
the creation of man (Gen 1:27; 5:1) and seems to attribute to the earthly father the participation in the 
divine work of transmitting life…” Ibid., 211, footnote 33. Page 17 of the introduction indicates that the 
footnotes are original to John Paul II and “an integral part of the text.” 
27
 While motherhood is read off of the female body, fatherhood is read off of the work of God in 
creation, so that fatherhood is presented as participating in the divine work in a way that motherhood is not. 
Note how the following quotation falls short of acknowledging her participation in God’s work of creation: 
“The first woman to give birth has full awareness of the mystery of creation, which renews itself in human 
generation. She also has full awareness of the creative participation God has in human generation, his work 
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Theology of the Body. The first is John Paul II’s attempt to confirm the goodness of the 
body, sex differentiation, sexual desire, and marriage in the face of a long tradition of the 
devaluation of each. Additionally, despite the fact that the sacramental image of the union 
of Christ and the Church has historically led to a belief in the absolute authority of the 
husband over the wife, John Paul II insists upon a mutuality in marriage that is 
unprecedented in the Roman Catholic tradition up to his time.28 The mutuality he sees in 
marriage is also integrated into his understanding of the relationship of masculinity and 
femininity as one of “reciprocal enrichment”29 although the details of this enrichment are 
not spelled out in this series of homilies.   
The obvious omission from our perspective is that John Paul II does not take the 
time to develop a theology of the body of the eunuch. He assumes that the eunuch is one 
who cannot marry because “he” cannot father children, but he fails to take seriously the 
liminal status of the eunuch as one who is neither (fully) male/masculine nor 
female/feminine. Such recognition would call into question the very foundation of his 
project, because, according to Jesus, there are those whose bodies do not carry a nuptial 
meaning—they naturally do not marry. And there are still others who consider the 
                                                                                                                                                 
and that of her husband, because she says, ‘I acquired a man from the Lord’” Ibid., 213, 21:6. The woman 
“has full awareness” of God’s participation, of God’s work and that of her husband. Her own work is not 
acknowledged as participating in this same work. Similarly in the following, “In this new man—born from 
the woman-parent through the work of the man-parent—the same ‘image of God’ is reproduced every time, 
the image of that God who constituted the humanity of the first man… (Gen 1:27). Ibid., 213. Here again 
we find that man’s contribution is spoken of as work—representing the work of God in creation—while the 
child is simply “from the woman.” 
28
 He interprets the submission of the wife in Eph. 5:22 in light of 5:21, the command for mutual 
submission of all believers (Man and Woman, 473; 89:3). In 30:6 (p. 252) he argues that the domination of 
Genesis 3:16 (“he will rule over you”) is a result of the fall. Nevertheless, he sees it as the man’s 
responsibility to be “the guardian of the reciprocity of the gift and its true balance… as if it depended more 
on him whether the balance is kept or violated or even—if it has already been violated—reestablished” 
(261; 33:2). Cf. Lisa Sowle Cahill, “The Feminist Pope,” in Does Christianity Teach Male Headship? The 
Equal-Regard Marriage and Its Critics, David Blankenhorn, Don Browning and Mary Stewart Van 
Leeuwen, eds. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2004), 40-48. 
29
 John Paul II, Man and Woman, 165, 9:5. 
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“nuptial meaning of the body” to be of lesser importance than the priority of the 
kingdom.30 While John Paul II acknowledges the broad nature of the renunciations 
involved in the choice of making oneself a eunuch for the sake of the kingdom, he does 
not recognize the challenge of the eunuch to his binary sex/gender complementary 
model.31 
 
The Binary Model in Stanley Grenz’s Evangelical Theology 
 
In his earlier work, Sexual Ethics, Stanley Grenz’s theological reflection on the 
nature of human sexuality is similar to John Paul II’s work in that its scope is limited by 
his attention to heterosexual ethics, thus assuming the male/female binary model. In his 
later work, The Social God and the Relational Self, as well as his summary essay, “The 
Social God and the Relational Self: Toward a Trinitarian Theology of the Imago Dei” 
(published the year of his untimely death), wherein he had the opportunity to look beyond 
the sexual, he does not. Rather, he expands the heterosexual model to argue that sexuality 
(i.e., the heterosexual drive toward marital bonding) provides the basis for all human 
relationality, including human relation to God (spirituality), and the bonded ecclesial 
community. This latter emphasis, on the place of sexuality, will be explored in the next 
chapter. In this chapter we must focus our attention on his construal of male and female, 
rather than the nature of their bond. 
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It is important to understand that for Grenz, heterosexual (marital) bonding is not 
the final form of the imago Dei. It is the foundational form. Grenz reads the development 
of the imago Dei in three canonical moves: 1) From a creation-centered anthropology 
beginning with Adam and Eve made who are made “in [God’s] image and according to 
[God’s] likeness” (Gen. 1:26); 2) to a Christocentric anthropology identifying Jesus 
Christ as the “image of the invisible God” (Col. 1:15) and “the exact representation of 
[God’s] being” (Heb. 1:3). But he does not stop there. 3) From here Grenz argues that the 
Scriptures teach us that “God’s intention is that those who are in Christ participate in his 
destiny and thereby replicate his glorious image.”32 “For those God foreknew he also 
predestined to be conformed to the likeness of his Son, that he might be the firstborn 
among many brothers” (Rom. 8:29). Commenting on this verse Grenz writes, 
The climax of the verse comes in the subordinate clause that follows, ‘that he 
might be the firstborn’, which expresses the Christological intent of God’s 
foreordination, namely, the pre-eminence of Christ among those who 
participate in the eschatological resurrection. …Consequently, humankind 
created in the imago Dei is none other than the new humanity conformed to 
the imago Christi, and the telos toward which the Old Testament creation 
narrative points is the eschatological community of glorified saints.33 
 
Given his larger vision of the imago Dei as the eschatological body of Christ, it 
might appear pedantic to focus on his construal of masculinity and femininity. 
Nevertheless, I believe that the way in which Grenz extends heterosexuality as the basis 
for all human relations, even eschatological relations of the bonded, ecclesial community, 
justifies a more careful look at the basis of his project. 
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 In chapter one of his Sexual Ethics: An Evangelical Perspective, Stanley Grenz 
argues that sexuality [i.e., sex differentiation with its (assumed) corresponding gender 
distinctions] is essential to the human person. Where John Paul II used the language of 
“constitutive,” Grenz uses “essential” but both argue that sex, gender, and sexuality are 
not mere attributes.34   
Grenz rejects what he labels the “Medieval anthropology,” which located a 
common humanity in the sexless/rational soul, and more modern theological proposals of 
androgyny coming from Jungian depth-psychology.35 He insists that  
men and women are different in ways that are more fundamental than simply 
their roles in the reproductive process. The differences lie even in the basic 
ways in which we view ourselves and the world. Men and women think 
differently; they approach the world differently.36 
  
It should not go unnoticed that Grenz cites the work of John Money, the medical 
psychologist of Johns Hopkins University who became famous for his work on intersex 
and his insistence that intersex could be “fixed” through medical intervention and whose 
work has now come under considerable criticism as chapter 1 of this dissertation 
recounted.37 This is significant because it shows that Grenz was at least aware of the 
phenomena of intersex but failed even to mention that there are those whose bodies do 
not naturally fit the categories he believes are “essential.”38 
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Over-Extending the work of Stanley Grenz and John Paul II 
 
Evangelical ethicist Dennis Hollinger is indebted to Grenz in his own work, The 
Meaning of Sex: Christian Ethics and the Moral Life. Hollinger does better than Grenz in 
the fact that he at least acknowledges the reality of intersexed persons and their potential 
challenge to a heterosexual ethical program. Unfortunately, he fails to reflect 
theologically on intersexed bodies—beyond dismissing them as products of the Fall and 
suggesting that their bodies can be “rectified” (i.e., corrected through medical 
technology) “in the direction of divine givens.”39 Hollinger reads Matthew 19:4 as Jesus’ 
affirmation of “creation givens” (“Haven’t you read,” he replied, “that at the beginning 
the Creator ‘made them male and female’”). He then goes on to explain these givens in 
ontological terms. “Jesus affirms that a basic given of reality is human maleness and 
femaleness. He doesn’t define specific functions of this dual way of being, but simply 
posits this ontological reality as the paradigm for guiding humans in marriage and sex.”40 
 There are several dangers in the above proposal. First, the focus on upholding 
heterosexual ethics has led to a dismissal of the theological significance of intersexed 
bodies. Second, an emphasis on the “constitutive” or “essential” nature of masculinity or 
femininity for human personhood, identity, and imago Dei, found in the work of John 
Paul II and Stanley Grenz, naturally leads to Hollinger’s conclusion that intersex persons 
should seek medical help in order to “rectify” their bodies/identities, by conforming to 
creational norms or divine givens, i.e., bodies that are “naturally” male or female. Third, 
by emphasizing sex differentiation for (hetero)sexual ethics, Hollinger illustrates how 
Evangelical and Roman Catholic theologians are tempted to push the pendulum too far, 
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overemphasizing sex differentiation to the point of speaking of sex difference as 
“ontological difference.” Thus Hollinger writes of “this dual way of being… this 
ontological reality”41 and “the male-female ontological distinction” as the foundation for 
marriage and sexual activity.42 
Evangelicals are not the only ones to speak of ontological difference between the 
sexes. In 2004, the Vatican, under the leadership of Pope John Paul II, issued a letter to 
Roman Catholic bishops entitled, “On the Collaboration of Men and Women in the 
Church and in the World.” The letter was penned by the current Pope Benedict XVI when 
he was still known as Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger and head of the Offices of the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. This letter illustrates the same tendency as 
found in Evangelical theology. By emphasizing sex difference for heterosexual ethics and 
calling for the “collaboration of men and women” on account of essentialist gender 
differences, Roman Catholic theologians are also overemphasizing sex differentiation to 
the point of risking ontological difference. The letter describes sex differentiation as 
“belonging ontologically to creation.”43 This is an obscure phrase, which invites more 
detailed attention to other portions of the letter. 
In paragraph 8, we find an affirmation of the full dignity of men and women as 
persons made in the image of God, followed by an emphasis on difference. 
Above all, the fact that human beings are persons needs to be underscored: 
‘Man is a person, man and woman equally so, since both were created in the 
image and likeness of the personal God.’44 Their equal dignity as persons is 
realized as physical, psychological and ontological complementarity, giving 
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rise to a harmonious relationship of “uni-duality,” which only sin and “the 
structures of sin” inscribed in culture render potentially conflictual. The 
biblical vision of the human person suggests that problems related to sexual 
difference, whether on the public or private level, should be addressed by a 
relational approach and not by competition or retaliation.45 
 
This physical, psychological, and ontological complementarity is extended into the 
spiritual realm later in the same paragraph.  
Furthermore, the importance and the meaning of sexual difference, as a 
reality deeply inscribed in man and woman, needs to be noted. ‘Sexuality 
characterizes man and woman not only on the physical level, but also on the 
psychological and spiritual, making its mark on each of their expressions.’46 
It cannot be reduced to a pure and insignificant biological fact, but rather “is 
a fundamental component of personality, one of its modes of being, of 
manifestation, of communicating with others, of feeling, of expressing and of 
living human love.”47 This capacity to love—reflection and image of God 
who is Love—is disclosed in the spousal character of the body, in which the 
masculinity or femininity of the person is expressed.48   
 
Grenz and Hollinger make similar statements in their own works. Hollinger 
actually quotes Grenz in his Introduction where he writes:  
To put it another way, our sexuality is the form of our bodily or physical 
being within the world. It certainly encompasses our emotional, social, and 
spiritual selves, but it is related to the very way in which we as embodied 
beings exist in relationships to others. As Stanley Grenz puts it, “Sexuality 
comprises all aspects of the human person that are related to existence as 
male and female. Our sexuality, therefore, is a powerful, deep, and 
mysterious aspect of our being. It constitutes a fundamental distinction 
between the two ways of being human, i.e., as male or female).”49 
 
It is important to note that Hollinger also follows Grenz in reversing the normal 
definitions of sex and sexuality, saying that “sex” is “particular acts of physical intimacy” 
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while “sexuality [refers] to our maleness and femaleness as human beings.”50 
Unfortunately, both use “sexuality” so broadly that it sometimes includes sex 
differentiation, culturally formed gendered behavior/role/identities, and (genital and 
social) sexual expression. Again Grenz illustrates this overlap: 
We give expression to the fundamental sexual dimension of our being in 
many ways. The most obvious, of course, is through sexual attraction and 
sexually determined acts. Such acts include the way we speak and touch 
others especially those to whom we are sexually attracted, and ultimately in 
genital sexual relations. But there are other ways of expressing our sexuality. 
They may range from the seemingly mundane—how we dress, comb our 
hair, etc.—to the more sublime—the appreciation of beauty, as well as 
cultural and artistic preferences and activities.51 
 
Grenz finds support for this view in a similar statement “adopted by the Tenth General 
Convention of the American Lutheran Church”: 
Human sexuality includes all that we are as human beings. Sexuality at the 
very least is biological, psychological, cultural, social, and spiritual. It is as 
much of the mind as of the body, of the community as of the person. To be a 
person is to be a sexual being.52 
 
Whereas Grenz followed John Money as one of his primary sources for scientific 
study of sex differences, Hollinger refers to more recent “brain-imaging technologies” 
which “show difference in the responses of women and men to external stimulations of 
all sorts, even though brain responses upon gender lines frequently do not seem to 
represent gender differences in behavior.”53 What both fail to attend to is the fact that 
brain-imaging technology has also shown that 
few, if any, individuals correspond to the modal male pattern or the modal 
female pattern. Variation within each sex is great, with males and females 
near the top and bottom of the distributions for every characteristic. …In fact, 
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although most of us appear to be either clearly male or clearly female, we are 
each complex mosaics of male and female characteristics.54  
 
Both Evangelicals and Roman Catholics seem committed to gender essentialist 
complementarity (i.e., the belief that all men think and behave in a particular way and 
that all women think and behave in a different but complementary way) and base their 
theological anthropology on this foundation. Both use this to argue that men and women 
should work together in the home, church, and world.55 But for each, complementarity is 
a simplistic binary model. There are only two ways of being in the world—an ideal 
masculinity and an ideal femininity. But for all of its importance, none of the authors are 
able to put their finger on concrete definitions of masculinity and femininity. John Paul II 
attempts to link masculinity and femininity to the paternal and maternal. Grenz and 
Hollinger do not even attempt a description. The 2004 letter to the bishops “On the 
Collaboration of Men and Women in the Church and in the World” comes closest to a 
definition for femininity by describing it as “a capacity for the other”—a definition that 
arises out of physical maternity but is expanded into other relations and to the spiritual. 
While the document does insist that “the feminine values mentioned here are above all 
human values [because] the human condition of man and woman created in the image of 
God is one and indivisible,” it qualifies this by saying that “women are more 
immediately attuned to these values [thus] that they are the reminder and the privileged 
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sign of such values. But, in the final analysis, every human being, man or woman, is 
destined to be ‘for the other’.”56 Unfortunately, the letter does not define masculinity at 
all. It warns that “Whenever these fundamental experiences are lacking” [i.e. concern for 
the other nourished by women’s care for children in the home], “society as a whole 
suffers violence and becomes in turn the progenitor of more violence.”57 This statement 
could be construed as defining masculinity only in negative terms (i.e., violence), but the 
text is not explicit. 
It does seem strange, given the theological weight which Evangelicals and Roman 
Catholics place on gender complementarity, that they are unable to define either pole of 
the equation. While in past centuries, theologians have argued against greater female 
participation in church and society on the basis of gender differences, most contemporary 
Evangelicals and Catholics are arguing for greater female participation in these areas—
barring ordination to the priesthood by Roman Catholics and more conservative 
Evangelicals.58 This greater measure of participation and valuing of the “woman’s 
perspective” may be heralded as an improvement; nevertheless, this complementary 
model inadvertently introduces other dangers. 
 
Some Problems in Evangelical and Roman Catholic  
Theologies of the Body 
  
By overemphasizing sex and gender difference, and its essential or constitutive 
relation to human personhood, both Evangelicals and Roman Catholics are running 
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headlong into theological trouble. Their emphasis on the radical (ontological) difference 
between men and women threatens to undermine the value of the incarnation for women. 
Dennis Hollinger presents Jesus as “not an asexual being, but a male with the 
same physiological and hormonal makeup of all males, yet without sin (Heb. 4:15).”59  
Quoting Evangelical ethicist and theologian Lewis Smedes, he writes, “Christian piety 
does not have to be nervous about the sexuality of Jesus. He was a male, and his 
masculinity shaped his human life from his hormones to his soul.”60 Such statements 
present two dangers: First, it gives the mistaken impression that all men have the same 
physiological and hormonal makeup, and second, it works to drive a wedge between 
Christian women and the savior in whose image they are created and into whose likeness 
they are being transformed day by day (II Cor. 3:18). Both problems must be addressed. 
First, it is inaccurate to state that all men have the same physiological and 
hormonal makeup. This should be obvious to the common observer who notices the great 
diversity among men in society. But when such common sense arguments fail to 
convince those already committed to sex/gender essentialism, scientific study can also 
assist in proving the point. The Director of the Behavioral Neuroendocrinology Research 
Unit at City University in London explains that there are differences in hormone levels 
among men and that these differences should be seen as advantageous for the human 
species: 
One advantage of having sexual development controlled by gonadal 
hormones, rather than directly by genetic information, is that it allows for 
great variability both within and between individuals. Not only are several 
hormones involved, but the action of these hormones depends on a number of 
processes, including the amounts of each hormone produced, their conversion 
to other active products, and the numbers or sensitivity of receptors at each 
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target site. As a result, individual men and women are each complicated 
mosaics of different sex-related traits, rather than replicas of the modal man 
or modal woman. In addition… environmental sources of hormones and other 
factors that modify the actions of hormones can modify sexual 
differentiation, at least in theory. This provides more potential for flexibility 
than if sexual development depended directly on genetic information. Thus, 
the use of this secondary mechanism (i.e., hormones) allows for greater 
diversity in the species as well as potentially greater responsiveness to 
environmental changes.61 
 
What physicians have documented at the neuroendocrinological level, sociologists, 
psychologists, and cross-cultural anthropologists have also documented in their own 
fields.62 One simply cannot speak of masculinity as if it were a single unified perspective 
on self and world—or insist that this single perspective is the one that Jesus shared. 
Although some theologians are beginning to bring such studies into their accounts, 
speaking about masculinities in the plural, or of hegemonic masculinity in the singular, 
Evangelicals and Roman Catholics have been slow to bring such insights into their 
theological anthropologies.63   
It is simply inaccurate to present Jesus as a male “like every other male” as if all 
males were alike. Such statements may sound comforting to some men in the church but 
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it is imperative that we recognize the danger they present, not only to men who do not fit 
the mold but also to women who cannot and to the intersex who can only approximate 
likeness to Jesus in certain respects—depending on the specifics of their intersex 
condition. Presenting not only Jesus’ body but also his soul as radically, ontologically 
different from the bodies and souls of women puts Jesus’ humanity beyond the reach of 
over half of the human race. Elizabeth Johnson spells out the danger for women: 
The Christian story of salvation involves not only God’s compassionate will 
to save but also the method by which this will becomes effective, namely, by 
God’s plunging into sinful human history and transforming it from within. 
The early Christian aphorism: ‘What is not assumed is not redeemed, but 
what is assumed is saved by union with God’ sums up the insight that God’s 
saving solidarity with all of humanity is what is crucial for the birth of the 
new creation. Et homo factus est: thus does the Nicene creed confess the 
universal relevance of the incarnation by the use of the inclusive homo. But if 
in fact what is meant is et vir factus est, with stress on sexual manhood, if 
maleness is essential for the christic role, then women are cut out of the loop 
of salvation, for female sexuality is not taken on by the Word made flesh. If 
maleness is constitutive for the incarnation and redemption, female humanity 
is not assumed and therefore not saved.64 
 
What is being contested is not the historicity of Jesus as a male human but a theological 
emphasis placed on the masculinity of Jesus, combined with an insistence on essential 
sex/gender differences, exacerbated by a distorted presentation of the radical nature of 
those differences.  
The 2004 letter to Roman Catholic bishops does not address the masculinity or 
maleness of Jesus; nevertheless, it also places Jesus’ humanity and spirituality beyond 
the reach of his female followers when it emphasizes physical, psychological, and 
spiritual differences between men and women.65 Roman Catholic theologian, Janice 
Martin Soskice, takes comfort in the fact that when the letter speaks of sexual difference 
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as “belonging ontologically to creation” it “fortunately falls short of saying that there is 
an ‘ontological difference’ between men and women.” She argues that the language of 
ontological difference is philosophically and theologically problematic.  
That would indeed be odd, for one can see an ontological difference between 
a stone and a tiger, between a planet and a lamb, but it would be an odd 
stretch to see an ontological difference between a man and a woman, unless 
one went the whole way and said there was an ontological difference between 
any two individuals, between George Bush and Nelson Mandela, for instance. 
That would vacate the phrase of philosophical meaning. 66 
 
She insists that the language of  “ontological difference” is “too strong” because  
 
It would put the 2004 letter at odds, not only with Gaudiam et Spes,67 but 
with Scripture itself were it to suggest it is impossible for a woman to say 
that, in all significant sense, Christ is like me in every sense except sin.68 
 
Thus she concludes: 
 
We find ourselves to this very day teetering between two positions that are 
both compelling but at the same time incompatible. We must say that, 
Christologically speaking, women and men cannot be different for ‘all will 
bear the image of the man from heaven.’ But we must also say that sexual 
difference is not, or should not be, a matter of theological indifference. 
Sexual difference has something to tell us, not just about God, but also about 
the human being made in the image of God. 
The unresolved question then is—where, why and how does sexual 
difference make a difference?69 
 
 Like Grenz, Soskice looks to the triune nature of God in order to ground unity-in-
difference but she also falls into the same trap as Grenz and John Paul II when she 
assumes there are only two categories of difference. “[T]he fullness of divine life and 
creativity is reflected by humankind which is male and female, which encompasses if not 
an ontological, then a primal difference. And this difference is not for pragmatic reasons 
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but by divine plan.”70 Thus, her helpful critique of Roman Catholic theological 
anthropology also needs to be expanded by a theological reflection upon intersexed 
bodies. It is to that task that we now turn. 
 
A THEOLOGY OF INTERSEX BODIES:  
ONTOLOGICAL SAMENESS AND REAL DIFFERENCE 
 
Intersex as Illustration of Ontological Sameness 
 
 Theological reflection on intersexed bodies must extend beyond their dismissal as 
products of the Fall.71 As I argued in chapter 2, Jesus in his words about eunuchs, even in 
the context of his affirmation of the creation account of male and female, does not 
dismiss physical intersex conditions as a product of the Fall to be overcome. Rather, he 
teaches his disciples that they can learn from eunuchs. Even more, he instructs them that 
those who can should model their lives on those who do not fit neatly into either the 
category of male or female. 
 Reflecting on intersex bodies is helpful because it can also grant insight into the 
thorny question of sameness and difference among the sexes. In particular, it provides us 
with substantial support for arguing against the construal of sex difference as ontological 
difference. Intersexed bodies show, once again, how males and females are made of the 
same stuff. It is not impossible for a “male” fetus (XY chromosomes and testes) to 
develop into a female person—complete with labia, clitoris, a short vagina, breasts, 
feminine musculoskeletal structure, and a female gender identity. This is the common 
pattern for intersexed persons with Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome, an intersex 
condition occurring on the average of one out of every 13,000 births. Similarly, it is not 
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impossible for a “female” fetus (XX chromosomes and ovaries) to develop into a male—
complete with a phallus capable of vaginal penetration, male pattern hair growth, voice 
descent, musculoskeletal development, and male gender identity—as is possible in more 
severe cases of Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia. To call androgens and estrogens “male 
hormones” and “female hormones” respectively is misleading given that both androgens 
and estrogens course through the veins of men, women, and intersexed persons (albeit at 
different levels) and affect much more than reproductive and secondary sex 
characteristics.72 Even gonadal tissue is undifferentiated in the early weeks of gestation.73 
Males, females, and intersexed persons are made of the same “stuff.” We belong to the 
same order of being. We are not ontologically different. This is not to deny that there are 
no real differences between the categories but that such differences do not belong to the 
realm of ontology. 
 
Intersex as Illustration of Real Difference 
 
At the same time to say that there is no ontological difference between male, 
female, and intersex does not mean that there are no real differences between men and 
women. One could not even speak about intersex if there were not two categories of sex 
able to be “inter”-mixed in various ways. In this way, John Money’s critique of Anne 
Fausto-Sterling’s “Five Sexes” is valid. Intersex is “not a third sex” but “a mixed sex or 
an in-between sex.”74 Scientific studies on males, females, and intersexed persons 
illustrate these similarities and real differences.  
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Melissa Hines’ work as Director of the Behavioral Neuroendocrinology Research 
Unit at City University in London shows how it is possible to speak about sex/gender 
differences in a more nuanced fashion. She argues that when trying to discuss behavioral 
differences between males and females it is helpful to compare them to differences in 
height. We all know that men are “generally” taller than women, and yet, we all know 
exceptions to this “rule.”  
Comparing the average heights of males and females shows how it is possible to 
identify a typical male pattern as well as a typical female pattern while at the same time 
recognizing the significant overlap between the two norms. Hines explains that 
differences in behavior are much less noticeable than differences in height. Thus, when 
comparing typical male and female behavior on a number of categories, she shows how 
there is considerably more overlap.75 Again, it is helpful to quote her summary, that  
few, if any, individuals correspond to the modal male pattern or the modal 
female pattern. Variation within each sex is great, with males and females 
near the top and bottom of the distributions for every characteristic. …In fact, 
although most of us appear to be either clearly male or clearly female, we are 
each complex mosaics of male and female characteristics.76  
 
 Hines’ work shows that there is real difference between the sexes—physical, 
psychological, social, and behavioral differences. But not all of these differences can be 
neatly lumped into two (or three) sex/gender categories. While there are typical male 
patterns, they do not apply to every male or to males exclusively. Despite the fact that 
there are typical female patterns, these do not apply to every female or to females 
exclusively. Such studies show that there is greater sameness and more differences 
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 Hines shows that sex differences in height (standard deviation of 2) are much greater than sex 
differences in other behaviors, i.e., 3-D rotations (.9), math problems (.3), Math concepts (.1), verbal 
fluency (-.4), physical aggression (.4), toy preferences (.8), rough and tumble play (.4). Hines, 10-11. 
76
 Ibid., 18-19. 
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between and among the sexes. Given this perspective, how ought Roman Catholics and 
Evangelicals respond? How can we take into account a more nuanced vision of sex and 
gender similarities and differences in a way that makes sense of the biblical data? 
Certainly, it requires returning to Genesis with new eyes. 
 
FROM OTHER TO OTHERS: PROPERLY EXTENDING THE WORK  
OF STANLEY GRENZ AND JOHN PAUL II 
 
Interpreting the Significance of Adam and Eve 
 
The biggest theological challenge keeping Evangelicals and Roman Catholics 
from embracing a more nuanced version of sex/gender complementarity may be the 
creation account. It is here that John Paul II, Stanley Grenz, and others ground their 
accounts of the imago Dei as male-and-female-in-community as a reflection of the 
trinitarian communion of persons. It is here that woman is presented as the necessary 
“other” who calls the man outside of himself and into relationality. It is here that we find 
only two, a male and a female, in binary complementarity. But this is an incomplete 
reading of the text. It neglects the fact that Adam and Eve are only the beginning. 
John Paul II looks upon Adam and Eve as the prototypes for all human 
interaction. According to his Theology of the Body, their heterosexual union reveals the 
meaning of human existence as it teaches us the spousal meaning of the body, which is 
the gift of self, the paradigm of human and divine love. 
The human body, with its sex—its masculinity and femininity—seen in the 
very mystery of creation, is not only a source of fruitfulness and of 
procreation, as in the whole natural order, but contains ‘from the beginning’ 
the ‘spousal’ attribute, that is the power to express love: precisely that love in 
which the human person becomes a gift and – through this gift – fulfills the 
very meaning of his being and existence. 77   
 
                                                 
77
 John Paul II, Man and Woman, 185-186; 15:1, italics original to John Paul II. 
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Similarly, the 2004 letter “On the Collaboration of Men and Women in the 
Church and in the World” presents the creation of Adam and Eve as paradigmatic of 
otherness.  
Above all, the fact that human beings are persons needs to be underscored: 
‘Man is a person, man and woman equally so, since both were created in the 
image and likeness of the personal God’.78 Their equal dignity as persons is 
realized as physical, psychological and ontological complementarity, giving 
rise to a harmonious relationship of “uni-duality…79 
 
The language of “uni-duality” once again construes female-male complementarity as 
paradigmatic of unity-in-diversity. 
Grenz’s account of the imago Dei entails more components than John Paul II’s in 
that he sees canonical language about the image developing from Adam and Eve to Christ 
and culminating in the diverse eschatological community of the redeemed which is united 
to Christ as his Body. He does well to emphasize that while the marriage of Adam and 
Eve “marks the climax of the second creation story… it does not constitute the end of the 
account of the origins of human community.”80 These two bear children, begin a family, 
and “as the generations multiply, the primal human community expands, resulting in the 
building of cities (Gen. 4:17) and the advent of societies characterized by a division of 
labor (4:21-22).”81 In order to interpret the significance of Genesis chapter one for 
theological anthropology, it is helpful to learn from Grenz’s attention to the narrative and 
the canonical development of the imago.  
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 Citing John Paul II, Apostolic Letter Mulieris dignitatem (August 15, 1988), 7.   
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Adam and Eve: From Form to Fountainhead, Prototype to Parent 
 
Grenz does well to point out that other differences come from the union of male 
and female at the beginning—differences that are ultimately taken up into the 
eschatological body of Christ. On the other hand, he undermines the significance of those 
differences when he says that sex difference is essential to the person in a way that other 
differences, such as age and race, are not.82 He does not acknowledge how differences of 
race, language, culture, and age can provide other differences—also essential to the 
identity of the person—which can significantly alter the way bodily maleness, 
femaleness, and intersex are interpreted. Because he views sex difference as more 
essential to human personhood than other differences, Grenz continues to view Adam and 
Eve as the paradigmatic forms of difference, rather than the fountainheads of even greater 
differences which are then incorporated in his progressive model. 
Where Grenz focuses on sexuality, Soskice represents the center of the Roman 
Catholic tradition by emphasizing fecundity. In her account of the imago Dei, she notes 
how in the creation narratives “fecundity…comes from difference, the difference of light 
and dark, of sea and dry land. Fecundity is the interval.”83 It is the literal fecundity, 
coming from the sexual union of male and female, which continues to ground 
Evangelical and Roman Catholic commitments to heterosexual marriage—and on this 
point their work is to be praised. At the same time, affirming the goodness of fecundity in 
heterosexual marriage does not necessarily lead to affirming what Hollinger calls 
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 “Although undeniably important, racial differences and other factors do not loom as 
foundational in personal and social identity as do those distinctions which arise out of the fact that we are 
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distinctions. Rather, the races first emerge after the Flood.” Grenz, Sexual Ethics, 29. 
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 Soskice, “Imago Dei.”  
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“creational givens”—i.e., the belief that all persons must be fully, ideally, male/masculine 
or female/feminine, in order to more fully participate in or be conformed to the image of 
God. Reading Adam and Eve as prototypes for all men and all women overlooks their 
place in the history of revelation and redemption. 
Despite the fact that theologians continue to debate whether or not the statement 
“Be fruitful and multiply” should be interpreted as a command or a blessing when applied 
to modern-day couples, all should recognize the importance of a literal interpretation of 
the statement for the first couple. It was their literal fruitfulness that was necessary to the 
divine project. The differences between the bodies of Adam and Eve enabled them to be 
literally, physically fruitful/fecund. But this was only the beginning. Male and female 
need not be held up as the epitome of otherness—from which comes metaphorical 
fecundity.  Rather than identifying male and female as the paradigmatic forms of 
otherness, they can be interpreted as the fountainhead of others who may become more 
“other” than their parents could have ever conceived. 
Reading the Genesis account this way allows us to hold several truths in tension. 
The first is the value of literal fecundity in marriage—stemming from the union of one 
man and one woman. The sexual union of male and female in marriage can be fruitful, 
and this fecundity is good. Sex difference is fruitful. Soskice is right, “fecundity is the 
interval.” The affirmation of difference arising from common, ontological sameness is 
also important because it protects us from the other extreme of focusing so much on 
difference—sex, gender, culture, language, class, race, age—that we endanger the 
common humanity of men, women, and intersex. 
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Adam and Eve: From Prototype to Parent to Pedagogue 
 
At the same time, viewing Adam and Eve as providing the paradigm for marriage, 
we can also identify a pedagogical value. When we view marriage as the norm, as the 
way that most humans live and experience adulthood, we can view it as a divinely 
ordained object lesson on the value of similarity and diversity, pedagogy of love for 
others. Heterosexual marriage can teach us, if we are willing to learn, about loving those 
who are other from us. We begin to learn to love our spouse in their similarity and 
otherness, and then, as children come, we are challenged to learn to love those who are 
even more different—unable to communicate, to share our worldview, to see the 
reasonableness of our requests. Many of us have found that our children, because of their 
age difference and their generational experiences, have perspectives on themselves, their 
sex, gender, and sexuality, and on the world, which are far different from our own and 
even from our spouse despite the fact that they may share our biological sex. Learning to 
love our children, who are like us and yet different, stretches our love for others to new 
levels.  
One finds a similar pattern in the biblical narrative. In the Old Testament there is 
a focus on family, kin, clan, and nation, but in the New Testament, this love for family is 
extended to the “family” of believers. Similarly in Matthew 5:43-48, Jesus compares the 
old covenant to the new saying: 
“You have heard that it was said, ‘Love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’  
But I tell you: Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, that 
you may be sons of your Father in heaven. He causes his sun to rise on the 
evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous. If you 
love those who love you, what reward will you get? Are not even the tax 
collectors doing that? And if you greet only your brothers, what are you 
doing more than others? Do not even pagans do that? Be perfect, therefore, as 
your heavenly Father is perfect.” 
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Love for family is extended beyond kin. Love for neighbor is extended even to enemies. 
The love between two is expanded. Love grows. The binary-sex other multiplies to 
include ever more others. Ronald Rolheiser, a Roman Catholic writer on Christian 
spirituality, notes a similar pattern, arguing that sexual desire, when tied to faithfulness in 
marriage and openness to children, naturally matures and sanctifies the individual by 
expanding his or her world and desires.84 Whereas Rolheiser focuses on the progressive 
nature of sexual desire, I focus on the nature of otherness. Reading the Genesis account in 
light of the larger biblical narrative we are able to affirm the goodness of marriage as the 
fountainhead of human difference without requiring sex difference to stand always as the 
paradigmatic form of difference or otherness. 
 
Beyond the Binary 
 
 This revision of the “other” will sound familiar to those versed in feminist 
literature. As early as 1938, Dorothy Sayers was working for a larger vision of difference, 
arguing that differences of age, nationality, and class can be just as fundamental, if not 
more fundamental than differences of sex. “There is a fundamental difference between 
men and women, but it is not the only fundamental difference in the world.”85   
 Roman Catholic feminist theologian, Elizabeth Johnson develops this idea in her 
own work, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse. Her 
discussion is worth quoting at length. 
On the one hand, feminist thought resists an unrelieved binary way of 
thinking, a notion of human nature polarized on the basis of sex, which 
inevitably leads to a dominant/subordinate pattern. On the other hand, 
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 Ronald Rolheiser, The Holy Longing: A Search for a Christian Spirituality (NY: Doubleday, 
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Company, 1971), 33-34. 
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reduction to an equality of sameness by ignoring sexual difference is also 
unacceptable. … 
 A way beyond the impasse of these options is emerging: one human 
nature celebrated in an interdependence of multiple differences. Not a binary 
view of two forever predetermined male and female natures, nor abbreviation 
into a single ideal, but a diversity of ways of being human: a multipolar set of 
combinations of essential human elements, of which sexuality is but one. 
Human existence has a multidimensional character. If maleness and 
femaleness can be envisioned in a more wholistic context, their relationship 
to each other can be more rightly conceived. 
 All persons are constituted by a number of anthropological constants, 
essential elements that are intrinsic to their identity. These include bodiliness 
and hence sex and race; relation to the earth, other persons and social 
groupings; economic, political, and cultural location, and the like. The 
constants mutually condition one another, and in their endless combinations 
are constitutive of the humanity of every person. Significantly change any 
one of them, and a different person results. 
 It is shortsighted to single out sexuality as always and everywhere 
more fundamental to concrete historical existence than any of the other 
constants. Age, race, period in history, bodily handicap, social location, and 
other essential aspects of concrete historical existence are at least as 
important in determining one’s identity as sex. Focusing on sexuality to the 
exclusion of other equally constitutive elements is the equivalent of using a 
microscope on the one key factor of human life when what is needed is a 
telescope to take in the galaxies of rich human difference. In a multipolar 
modal, sexuality is integrated into a holistic vision of human persons instead 
of being made the touchstone of personal identity and thus distorted. 
 The anthropological model of one human nature instantiated in a 
multiplicity of differences moves beyond the contrasting models of sex 
dualism versus the sameness of abstract individuals toward the celebration of 
diversity as entirely normal. The goal is to reorder the two-term and one-term 
systems into a multiple-term schema, one which allows connection in 
difference rather than constantly guaranteeing identity through opposition and 
uniformity. Respect can thus be extended to all persons in their endless 
combinations of anthropological constants, boundlessly concrete. And 
difference itself, rather than a regrettable obstacle to community, can function 
as a creative community-shaping force.86 
 
 Although Johnson does not argue for such a model on the basis of intersex, her 
insistence on a multipolar model creates theoretical and theological space for intersexed 
persons in addition to other others. What is unfortunate is that these ideas have yet to 
seriously alter mainstream Evangelical and Roman Catholic theological anthropologies. 
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And yet, the seedbed for such ideas has already been laid by both traditions in a shared 
emphasis on eschatology. 
 
From Eden to Eschaton: The Priority of the Future 
 
One of the similarities between the Evangelical anthropology of Stanley Grenz 
and the Roman Catholic vision of Janice Martin Soskice is the emphasis each places on 
the eschaton as the final form of the human. They insist that as helpful as the creation 
accounts may be, these are not to be understood as the paradigm or final form for 
humanity. Rather, true humanity is a future toward which we are moving.87 
This priority on the future fits well with an expansive notion of otherness. While 
the primal or primitive form of the imago as a community of diverse persons may be 
found in the creation of Adam and Eve, these do not need to remain the paradigmatic 
form of otherness. Other others are born from these parents: other ages, other languages, 
other cultures, and even another sex: intersex. 
In chapter 2 we learned how, in the ancient world, it was not only woman but also 
the eunuch that stood as the paradigmatic other. Eunuchs were legally other, morally 
other, sexually other, socially other, religiously other, and ethnically other. They were, to 
quote Claudius Mamertinus once again, “exiles from the society of the human race.”88  
And yet it was of these exiles that the prophet Isaiah spoke, when he promised them a 
place in the kingdom of God: 
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Let no foreigner who has bound himself to the LORD say, “The LORD will 
surely exclude me from his people.” And let not any eunuch complain, “I am 
only a dry tree.” For this is what the LORD says: “To the eunuchs who keep 
my Sabbaths, who choose what pleases me and hold fast to my covenant— to 
them I will give within my temple and its walls a memorial and a name better 
than sons and daughters; I will give them an everlasting name that will not be 
cut off. And foreigners who bind themselves to the LORD to serve him, to 
love the name of the LORD, and to worship him, all who keep the Sabbath 
without desecrating it and who hold fast to my covenant—these I will bring 
to my holy mountain and give them joy in my house of prayer. Their burnt 
offerings and sacrifices will be accepted on my altar; for my house will be 
called a house of prayer for all nations.”89 
 
Isaiah predicted the future inclusion of these others. Foreigners and even eunuchs 
would be included in the temple of God, which from the perspective of the New Test-
ament can be named the Body of Christ, the Temple of the Holy Spirit, the eschatological 
community. 
In the 4th century, when Jerome wanted to argue for the essential nature of sex 
differences, he employed the logic of the resurrection. He insisted, against Origen (his 
former theological mentor), that sex difference would remain at the resurrection.90 
Similarly, Augustine insisted that sex difference would remain although it would no 
longer impair relations between the sexes.91 The Scriptures speak also of differences of 
race and culture, nation and tribe present in the eschatological community. Revelation 7:9 
describes “a great multitude that no one could count, from every nation, tribe, people, and 
language, standing before the throne and in front of the Lamb.” It can be argued that the 
differences enumerated in Revelation 7:9 are recognized as essential to the personal 
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identity of individual Christians even if they are also transformed in such a way that they 
no longer divide the people of God. 
Following a similar logic, Susannah Cornwall has argued that there is no need for 
us to believe that intersexed bodies will be “healed” or “corrected” at the resurrection, 
i.e., transformed into an ideal male or female body. She insists that new creation brings 
about not only the healing of individuals and their bodies, but also the healing of 
communities to the point that identities of difference that now divide and impair 
communal life will no longer be divisive or limiting.92   
Cornwall finds helpful resources in the work of disability theologians, particularly 
those of John M. Hull and Nancy Eiseland. In her work, The Disabled God: Toward a 
Liberation Theology of Disability, Eiseland suggests that bodily differences, which are 
now perceived as impairments, may persist even at the resurrection. She bases this belief 
on the fact that “Christ himself is portrayed in the New Testament as having a wounded 
body even after his resurrection (Eiesland 1994: 99-100).” Cornwall goes on to suggest,  
It is conceivable that other instances of physical impairment, and physical 
atypicality, will also persist in the human bodies of the general 
resurrection…. The resurrected Jesus, with his impaired hands and feet, is 
God’s revelation of a new humanity—‘underscoring the reality that full 
personhood is fully compatible with the experience of disability.’ The 
wounds of the impaired Jesus are not to be vilified, nor to be pitied; they are 
marks of life experience, and signposts to a new kind of life too.93 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 John Paul II may be correct to state that biological sex is constitutive of the 
human person. Stanley Grenz may be correct in insisting on the essential nature of sex for 
personal identity. But their proposals must be expanded through a reading of the larger 
                                                 
92
 Cornwall, “Kenosis,” 196. 
93
 Ibid., 195. 
 217
scriptural narrative of which Genesis is only the beginning. Sex identity as male or 
female may be essential. But there are more essentials than these two. Stanley Grenz’s 
progressive account of the social imago lays the groundwork for including other essential 
differences in the eschatological community of God which is the fullness of the imago, 
the telos of true humanity. 
Consequently, humankind created in the imago Dei is none other than the 
new humanity conformed to the imago Christi, and the telos toward which 
the Old Testament creation narrative points is the eschatological community 
of glorified saints.94 
 
This eschatological community is comprised of more than males and females. It 
is “a great multitude that no one could count, from every nation, tribe, people, and 
language…” (Revelation 7:9). It includes eunuchs who have held fast to the covenant and 
foreigners who have bound themselves to the LORD (Isaiah 56:3-7). It includes the 
intersexed who may be resurrected as intersexed and know, possibly more than females 
or males the truth of Galatians 3:26-29: 
You are all [male, female, and intersex] sons of God through faith in Christ 
Jesus, for all of you who were baptized into Christ have clothed yourselves 
with Christ. There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male and female, 
for you are all one in Christ Jesus. If you belong to Christ, then you are 
Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise. 
 
 Being “in Christ” does not make all believers male “sons” any more than the 
declaration of being “Abraham’s seed” makes all believers Jewish—thus eliminating 
ethnic, cultural, and racial distinctions upheld in Rev. 7:9. Rather, all of these 
distinctions, which now divide, are taken up into Christ who is revealed as the true image 
of God, the seal of our shared humanity, and the promise of its perfection. We will return 
to explore the connection between the imago, christology, and eschatology in chapter 6, 
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but before that we must attend to the connections being made between sexuality and the 
image of God. 
 219
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
SEXUALITY AND IMAGO DEI:  
THE RELATIONAL TURN 
 
 
The postmodern theological account of the social imago reflects both a return to 
the body as well as the philosophical turn to relationality. After Barth, many theologians 
insist that in order to speak of the human at all, one must speak of male and female in 
relation. Just as God exists as a community of divine love so humanity images God 
through the community of love. This social view of the imago Dei has been widely 
received because of the way in which it requires the full incorporation of women into 
theological constructions of the image. In the last chapter, I showed how this tradition 
could be improved so that the social imago creates space not only for women but for 
intersex persons as well. 
This chapter will explore the connections that have been made between the social 
view of the imago Dei and human sexuality. Both John Paul II and Stanley Grenz build 
upon the social imago in their discussions of human sexuality but they emphasize the 
place of sexuality and heterosexual marriage to such a point that they risk transforming 
the social imago into the spousal/sexual imago. Their proposals sexualize all human 
relations as well as the relationality between the members of the Trinity. In doing so, they 
are inadvertently undermining traditional Christian sexual ethics and the goodness of 
celibacy, and problematizing the sexuality of married persons. These Roman Catholic 
and the Evangelical theologians risk marginalizing not only intersexed persons but 
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anyone unable to enter into heterosexual marriage and married sexuality. Thankfully, 
these dangers can be avoided. 
In this chapter I will lay out the ways in which Stanley Grenz and John Paul II 
shift the social view of the imago to become the sexual/spousal imago. I will illuminate 
the dangers in their proposals and suggest ways in which these traditions can continue to 
uphold the goodness of sexuality and marriage without making these the primary lenses 
through which we read the social imago. I will argue that the social imago is the right 
place to begin speaking about the significance of human relationality and communities of 
love provided these relations are not sexualized. 
 
IMAGO DEI AND SPOUSAL SEXUALITY  
IN STANLEY J. GRENZ AND JOHN PAUL II 
 
Stanley Grenz: Social Imago becomes Sexual Imago 
 
Stanley Grenz acknowledges his debt to Karl Barth upon whom he builds his 
vision of the social imago, but Grenz differs from Barth in his insistence that it is not 
simply relationships that constitute human personhood but sexual relations. Grenz 
believed that Barth’s construal of the relationality between Adam and Eve as the primal I-
Thou relationship leads to a devaluation and final abandonment of human embodiment 
and sexuality.1 For Grenz this will not do. Grenz argues that the biblical narrative does 
not allow us to leave sexuality behind. According to Grenz, God did not simply make two 
humans to be in relationship, but a male and female to be in sexual relationship. Rather 
than seeing the sexual dimension of the relationship of Adam and Eve as a feature of their 
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 “…he [Barth] exchanges the dynamic of sexuality, understood as the sense of incompleteness 
that gives rise to the drive toward bonding, for the paradigm of I-Thou relationality. In spite of his concern 
to draw deeply from the creation of humankind as male and female, in the end Barth leaves human 
sexuality behind.” Grenz, “The Social God and the Relational Self,” 95. See also Grenz, The Social God 
and the Relational Self, 300-301.  
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marital relationship, Grenz sees even more significance in sexuality than that which 
draws humans into marriage. In his theological anthropology text, The Social God and 
the Relational Self, he explains his reading of Genesis thus: 
Adam’s cry of delight as the presence of the woman rescues him from his 
debilitating solitude, … suggests, however, an even deeper aspect of human 
sexuality [i.e., deeper than procreation].2 The narrative indicates that individual 
existence as an embodied creature entails a fundamental incompleteness or, stated 
positively, an innate yearning for completeness. This sensed incompleteness is 
symbolized by biological sex—that is, by existence as a particular person who is 
male or female. The incompleteness is related to existence as a sexual creature 
and therefore to human sexuality. Sexuality, in turn, is linked not only to the 
incompleteness each person senses as an embodied, sexual creature but also to the 
potential for wholeness in relationship to others that parallels this fundamental 
incompleteness. …Hence, sexuality is the dynamic that forms the basis of the 
uniquely human drive toward bonding.3  
 
Two pages later he summarizes his position, saying: 
 
The ultimate goal of sexuality, and hence of the impulse toward bonding, is 
participation in the fullness of community—namely, life together as the new 
humanity [the believing community, the bride of Christ]… in relationship with 
God and all creation. …Viewed in this light, sexuality, understood as the sense of 
incompleteness and the corresponding drive for wholeness, forms the dynamic 
that not only seeks human relationships but also motivates the quest for God.4  
 
According to Grenz, it is sexuality that illustrates or symbolizes our “sense of 
incompleteness and corresponding drive for wholeness.” It is sexuality that leads humans 
out of isolation into community. It is sexuality that motivates bonding. It is the sense of 
sexual incompleteness that motivates the quest for God.  
Rather than regarding the sexual relation of Adam and Eve as the first fruitful 
foundation for other kinds of relations, Grenz redefines sexuality as the basis for all 
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relationality. He writes, “[S]exuality is the drive toward bonding in all its forms, even in 
the bonding that characterizes singleness”—i.e., bonding in church community and in 
close friendships.5  Elsewhere in his Sexual Ethics, he writes: 
The drive toward bonding… is always based on our existence as sexual 
beings – on our fundamental incompleteness, our inner restlessness, our 
desire for love and intimacy.6 
 
In the above quotation one can see that, instead of defining incompleteness as a 
fundamental component of being a finite creature, Grenz defines finitude as sexual. 
Sexual incompleteness becomes the symbol of any incompleteness. Whereas sexual need 
could have been presented as one of the many, varied ways in which humans need others, 
Grenz presents sexuality as the paradigm for all need, even human need for God. Thus, 
the fulfillment of that need—the love of friends, neighbors, spouse, children, community, 
church, and God—are all viewed through the lens of the sexual.  
 Lest we suppose that this is simply one influential evangelical who has imbibed 
too much of the Freudian spirit of the age, let us consider the similarities we find in Pope 
John Paul II’s Theology of the Body. 
 
John Paul II: Social Imago becomes Spousal Imago 
 
In his Theology of the Body John Paul II shows his affinity for the social view of 
the imago Dei as imago Trinitas. 
Man [by which he means the human] became the image of God not only 
through his own humanity, but also through the communion of persons, 
which man and woman form from the very beginning. …Man becomes 
an image of God not so much in the moment of solitude as in the moment 
of communion. He is, in fact, ‘from the beginning’ not only an image in 
which the solitude of one Person, who rules the world, mirrors itself, but 
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also and essentially the image of an inscrutable divine communion of 
Persons.7   
 
According to John Paul II, “the authentic development of the image and likeness of 
God, in its trinitarian meaning, [is] its meaning precisely ‘of communion.’”8  
Similarly, in The Trinity’s Embrace, he proclaimed,  
Today it is more necessary than ever to present the biblical anthropology of 
relationality, which helps us genuinely understand the human being’s identity 
in his relationship to others, especially between man and woman. In the 
human person considered in his “relationality,” we find a vestige of God’s 
own mystery revealed in Christ as a substantial unity in the communion of 
three divine Persons. In light of this mystery it is easy to understand the 
statement of Gaudiam et Spes that the human being, “who is the only creature 
on earth which God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through 
a sincere gift of himself (cf. Luke 17:33).” Interpersonal communion and 
meditation on the dignity and vocation of woman strengthens the concept of 
the human being based on communion (cf. Mulieris Dignitatem, 7).9 
 
Humans image God not so much as individuals but in community, and God 
has written our need for community on our very bodies—by creating humans as male 
or female. Masculinity and femininity lead us to marriage which teaches us love and 
enables us to participate in a union with another that corresponds to the union of the 
three persons of the Trinity. This marital union, according to the Pope, is specifically 
related to the sexual act. 
The unity about which Gen. 2:24 speaks (‘and the two will become one 
flesh’) is without doubt the unity that is expressed and realized in the 
conjugal act… The fact that they become ‘one flesh’ is a powerful bond 
established by the Creator through which they discover their own 
humanity, both in its original unity and in the duality of a mysterious 
reciprocal attraction.10 
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Notice that it is sexual union which realizes and expresses marital union and that sexual 
union enables the couple to “discover their own humanity.” Elsewhere, the Pope makes an 
even bolder statement, saying that sexual union in marriage “fulfills the very meaning of 
[human] being and existence”: 
The human body, with its sex—its masculinity and femininity—…contains 
‘from the beginning’ the ‘spousal’ attribute, that is the power to express 
love: precisely that love in which the human person becomes a gift and— 
through this gift—fulfills the very meaning of his being and existence.11  
 
What is the meaning of human existence which masculinity and femininity teach 
us? According to the late Pope, it is love. This is nothing new. Christians have always 
maintained that the center of the gospel is love; however, it is the nature of Christian love 
which is now under consideration. According to John Paul II, the nature of Christian love 
is “spousal” by which he means the giving of one’s whole self, body and soul, to another, 
for the well-being of the other. Just as the Father gives Himself to the Son and the Son to 
the Father in the eternal union of the Trinity, so spouses give themselves to one another 
in marriage becoming “one flesh.” 
In his emphasis on the nature of spousal love as self-gift, John Paul II is 
developing the teaching of St. John of the Cross (1542-1591), on whom the Pope, then 
Karol Wojtyła, wrote his theological dissertation. St. John of the Cross was a sixteenth 
century mystic who meditated on the mysterious analogy between husband/wife and 
Christ/Church, found in Ephesians 5:21-32, and transposed the analogy from the Church 
as Bride, to the Bride as individual soul.  St. John of the Cross remains famous for his 
Spiritual Canticle, a poetic meditation, paraphrase, and commentary on the Song of Songs 
in Spanish, in which the individual soul is the Bride and Christ is the Bridegroom. In his 
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writings, one finds spousal longings viewed through a spiritual lens and vice versa. From 
St. John of the Cross, John Paul II learned  a “spousal theology of self-gift”12 and 
developed the saint’s “characteristic triangle of theses: love is a gift of self; spousal love 
between man and woman is the paradigmatic case of the gift of self; the origin and 
exemplar of the gift of self lies in the Trinity.”13 Michael Waldstein, one of John Paul II’s 
translators and editors, is careful to point out that the Pope never used spousal language 
of the Trinity. Nevertheless, his central text, John 17:10, is transposed from God the 
Father and God the Son onto marriage: “All that is mine is yours and yours is mine, and I 
am glorified in them.”14 
One of the difficulties in interpreting John Paul II is identifying what he means 
when he speaks of conjugal love. Whereas he uses the word “sex” (in the English 
translation) to speak of masculinity and femininity, he rarely uses the explicit language of 
sexuality or intercourse. Rather, he talks of “the conjugal act,” “uniting so as to become 
one flesh,” “reciprocal attraction,” “nuptial,” or “spousal” love as ways to express sexual 
desire and action between husband and wife.15 Unfortunately, one is left to decipher if 
sexual love is the focus of his intention or if he is speaking of a more general marital love 
in which sexuality is but one facet. It is not always clear from his writings if the image of 
God as communio personarum is related to marriage in general or married sexuality more 
specifically. 
William E. May, professor of Moral Theology at the John Paul II Institute for 
Studies on Marriage and Family at The Catholic University of America, has tried to 
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untangle John Paul II’s legacy on this point. He argues that marriage is established by 
“the act of irrevocable personal consent.” The leaving of “father and mother” and 
cleaving to the spouse are acts of personal consent. According to May’s interpretation of 
John Paul II, “[t]he act of matrimonial consent is an act of self-giving love.”16   
A man and a woman become husband and wife when they “give” themselves 
to one another in and through the act of irrevocable personal consent that 
makes them to be spouses. And in consenting to marriage, to being husband 
and wife, they consent to all that marriage implies and therefore they consent 
implicitly to the conjugal act, the act “proper and exclusive to spouses.”  In 
and through the conjugal act husband and wife literally become “one flesh,” 
“one body.” 
 
May distinguishes between matrimonial consent and the conjugal act. The former 
creates marriage while the latter creates union. One finds a similar distinction in John of 
the Cross who differentiated between marital consent and the conjugal act in his own 
writings when he separates “spiritual betrothal” (the act of promise) from “spiritual 
marriage” (the act of union).17 According to St. John of the Cross, 
spiritual marriage is incomparably greater than the spiritual betrothal, for 
it is a total transformation in the Beloved, in which each surrenders the 
entire possession of self to the other with a certain consummation of the 
union of love. The soul thereby becomes divine, God through 
participation, insofar as is possible in this life. …Just as in the 
consummation of carnal marriage there are two in one flesh, as Sacred 
Scripture points out (Gen 2:24), so also when the spiritual marriage 
between God and the soul is consummated, there are two natures in one 
spirit and love…18 
 
For St. John of the Cross’s spiritual analogy, there is certainly a progression in 
which marital sexual union is valued above marital promise.  It is difficult to know 
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whether John Paul II reflects the same hierarchy. The language he uses could certainly be 
read as indicating this same elevation of sexual union given that he speaks of the sexual 
union of spouses as “the conjugal act” rather than naming personal consent as the 
“conjugal act,” i.e., the act which creates or defines marriage. But his avoidance of the 
common language of sexuality is better understood as his attempt to differentiate what he 
would see as base sexual activity from the ideal he proposes in his Theology of the 
Body—sexual activity which is attentive to the irreplaceable personal identity of the 
spouse, loving, self-giving, and open to the creation of life (i.e., unhindered by artificial 
contraception). The unloving use of the spouse’s body for personal sexual satisfaction is 
not “the conjugal act.” He also wants to distinguish married sexual union from unmarried 
sexual union. Thus, spouses may engage in sexual acts but these can only be labeled “the 
conjugal act” if they meet the criteria defined above.19 
In May’s own account, when he takes the time to unpack the ways in which 
heterosexual marriage images God, he focuses on the sexual act—not the interpersonal 
dynamics of emotional union, joy, or common labor, but the ways in which male and 
female reproductive processes image the divine.  
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[Male sperm] symbolizes the superabundance and differentiation of being, 
…whereas the woman in her way symbolizes the unity of being insofar as 
ordinarily she produces only one ovum; she symbolizes what can be called the 
interiority and sameness of being. 
…As we have seen, man and woman are two different and complementary 
ways of being the image of God. He is both the superabundant Giver of good 
gifts and the One who is always with us and for us, and who greatly longs to 
welcome us and to give our hearts refreshment and peace. 
…the man, in imaging God, is called above all to bear witness to his 
transcendence and superabundant goodness, his Glory as the “Wellspring of 
the Joy of Living,” while the woman, in her imaging of God, is called upon to 
bear witness to his immanence, his “interiority” or withinness, his Glory as the 
“Ocean Depth of Happy Rest.”20 
 
We see in the above that it is spousal sexuality, “the conjugal act,” which images God in 
the world in discrete masculine and feminine forms. Thus does the Roman Catholic 
tradition insist that it is only marital sexuality that is open to new life that can aptly be 
described as “conjugal,” and that the conjugal act “expresses and actualizes in a fitting 
way the communion of persons” which is the image of God.21 
 Roman Catholic theologian David Matzko McCarthy summarizes this shift in 
contemporary Roman Catholic accounts of the image of God and sexuality, saying,  
…[this] account follows modern trends by highlighting sex and sexual desire 
as ideal expressions of love. Sex is considered representative of conjugal love, 
and conjugal intercourse is considered a good and sacramental experience. 
Through a sexual relationship, we discover our humanity in intimate 
communion with each other as “Other,” and, in the process, encounter God’s 
grace.22 
 
McCarthy explains that this account arose in order to correct earlier Roman Catholic 
views on marriage which saw little to no value in marital sexuality beyond procreation.  
In the mid-twentieth century, theological personalism emerged, in Catholic 
circles, as a challenge to instrumental and juridical understandings of 
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marriage. Personalism offered a challenge to the idea that marriage is not 
good in itself but produces only external goods like children and social  
stability.23 
 
But the new personalist account elevates sexuality to such an extent that sexual love is 
now seen as the basis for all Christian love.  
 Both the Evangelical and Roman Catholic traditions are connecting the image of 
God to married sexuality—male and female in heterosexual union. For both traditions 
heterosexual marital union is reflective of Trinitarian love. Now, there is much in these 
proposals to recommend them. The assertion that the meaning of human existence is love 
and that this love is grounded in God who is a community of love is central to the 
Christian faith. What is problematic is that human love, and the divine love after which it 
has become an image, is being labeled as sexual. This is what John Paul II and Stanley 
Grenz have done. John Paul II has made spousal/sexual love the paradigmatic form of 
Christian love while Grenz has presented sexuality the basis for all relationality. The 
social imago is shifting to become the spousal/sexual imago. These shifts have dangerous 
consequences. 
 
UNCOVERING HIDDEN DANGERS 
 
 One of the first dangers inherent in these shifts is the sexualization of divine love. 
When Trinitarian love is sexualized it can lead to several problematic applications. It 
weakens theological arguments for traditional Christian sexual ethics. It undermines the 
goodness of celibacy. It adds the weight of spiritual failure to sexual difficulties. 
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Sexualizing Trinitarian Love 
 
 Whereas John Paul II is careful not to speak of divine love as sexual or spousal, his 
successor, Pope Benedict XVI, in his first encyclical defended the claim that while God’s 
love is “totally agape,” it is not inappropriate to speak of God’s love as eros. He admits 
that eros and agape have been pitted against one another in the history of Christianity 
where eros has been understood as “ascending” love while agape is presented as 
“descending” love.24 While acknowledging that the Biblical authors (and Septuagint 
translators) do not use the term eros explicitly, he finds it in Pseudo-Dyonysius25 and 
defends it on the basis of the Old Testament prophets,  
particularly Hosea and Ezekiel, [who] described God’s passion for his people 
using boldly erotic images. God’s relationship with Israel is described using 
the metaphors of betrothal and marriage; idolatry is thus adultery and 
prostitution.26 
 
It is the idea of passion that drives the Pope’s desire to include eros in the description of 
divine love. 
The philosophical dimension to be noted in this biblical vision, and its 
importance from the standpoint of the history of religions, lies in the fact that 
on the one hand we find ourselves before a strictly metaphysical image of 
God: God is the absolute and ultimate source of all being; but this universal 
principle of creation—the Logos, primordial reason—is at the same time a 
lover with all the passion of a true love. Eros is thus supremely ennobled, yet 
at the same time it is so purified as to become one with agape.27   
 
 Like Benedict XVI, Stanley Grenz also defends speaking of God’s love through 
the lens of eros on the basis of biblical metaphors of marriage—God’s marriage to the 
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ancient Israelites and Christ’s marriage to the Church.28 And, like Benedict XVI, Grenz 
wants to defend divine passion.  
These considerations suggest that while retaining the primacy of agapē, our 
understanding of divine love must incorporate aspects of the other concepts 
too. In fact, when stripped of the dimensions of love expressed in philia 
[friendship], storgē [familial affection/compassion], and to some extent even 
eros, our conception of God who is agapē can easily degenerate into a distant, 
austere, “Stoic,” deity.29   
 
 The relationship of eros to sexuality is a difficult one. Depending on their 
concerns, authors employ varying definitions of eros to suit their needs. Benedict XVI 
emphasizes eros as passion but includes the “erotic” imagery of the Prophets. Grenz adds 
that eros within the godhead should be understood as “desire for communion with the 
beloved.”30 When he considers the human condition, Grenz, like others, draws a 
distinction between venus—“the drive the propagate the species through procreation—
and eros—“the communion which the sex act nurtures between sex partners, which sets 
humans above the world of nature.”31 
‘Sexual desire’ refers to the need we all have to experience wholeness and 
intimacy through relationships with others. It relates to the dimension often 
called eros, the human longing to possess and be possessed by the object of 
one’s desire. Understood in this way, eros ought not be limited to genital 
sexual acts, but encompasses a broad range of human actions and desires, and 
it participates even in the religious dimension of life in the form of the desire 
to know and be known by God. For many people, the desire for sex, the 
longing to express one’s sexuality through genital acts (venus), is 
psychologically inseparable from sexual desire. Nevertheless, for the 
development of true sexual maturity, a person must come to terms with the 
difference between these two dimensions and learn to separate them both in 
one’s own psychological state and in overt action.32 
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 Given these distinctions, Grenz is willing to include eros as present within the 
immanent Trinity, and does not shy away from calling God “sexual.”  According to Grenz, 
God is sexual, but not because God engages in genital sexual relations with Godself or 
with humans; these are some of the ways in which the Hebrew God differed from other 
gods of the ancient Near East. Nevertheless, Grenz is willing to speak of God as sexual for 
two reasons: 1) because God as Trinity is relational, and 2) because God has employed 
gendered language (both masculine and feminine) in order to reveal Godself in the 
Scriptures.33   
 Just as John Paul II’s work is difficult to interpret because he avoids using the 
explicit language of sexuality, Grenz’s work poses difficulties for the opposite reason. As 
was noted in the last chapter, one can see that Grenz conflates the categories of sex 
differentiation, gender, and sexual desire and sexual action by speaking of them all as 
“sexuality.” He insists that sexuality pervades every human relationship because every 
human relationship happens between persons who have sexed bodies—either male or 
female. Thus, all human relations are sexual. Although God does not have a body, Grenz 
still insists that God is sexual because God is relational and willing to employ gendered 
language. 
Despite his willingness to use the language of sexuality for relationality, bonding, 
sex, gender, and the erotic, Grenz does draw a distinction by differentiating between 
genital sexuality and what he has called “social sexuality.” Social sexuality is the 
language he uses to describe any relationship between humans because it recognizes that 
all relationships are between persons with embodied biological sex, gendered 
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perspectives, and gendered behaviors. All human relations are sexual; some are 
genitally-sexual while others are merely socially-sexual. Thus, within his system of 
thought, a nursing mother’s relationship to her child is “sexual” because it is a 
relationship rooted in the sexed body and a form of intimate bonding.34   
 Grenz teaches that genital sexuality is to be reserved for marriage while social 
sexuality extends to all human interactions in this life and the life to come. Commenting 
on Jesus’ teaching in Matthew 22:30 (“At the resurrection people will neither marry nor 
be given in marriage; they will be like the angels in heaven”), Grenz writes,   
Although genital sexual activity has no place in the eschatological reign 
of God, sexuality will be present in various forms. 
     Sensuality, for example will remain… a heightened appreciation for 
sensual joy as is indicated by the use of sensuous imagery in the biblical 
vision of the reign of God. Sexuality is present in the form of the aesthetic 
sense, as is evidenced by the biblical vision of the beauty of the place of 
God’s eschatological reign. But of highest importance, sexuality remains 
present in the form of mutuality. According to the biblical vision, the 
eschatological community is a bonded society…  It is a society of 
transformed yet embodied human beings, the perfect community of male 
and female, in which all experience the fullness of interpersonal 
relationships.35 
 
For Grenz, sensuality, aesthetics, and mutuality are all aspects of sexuality. Sexuality is 
the broad category under which sensuality, relations, and aesthetics fall as subsets.  
 Grenz’s conflation of sex, gender, and sexuality, and his insistence that 
relationality arises from sexuality, leaves him no choice but to conclude that God is 
sexual, even if he wants to limit the discussion to social, rather than genital sexuality—an 
eros that does not arise from bodily need or incompleteness within God but a desire for 
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communion with the beloved.36 Nevertheless, despite his attempt to draw careful 
boundaries, this language opens the door to conclusions to which Grenz would object. 
 
Weakening Traditional Christian Sexual Ethics 
 While Grenz wants to ground heterosexual sexuality in the social Trinity and 
limits genital sexuality to this side of the eschaton, other theologians do not see the need 
for such limitations.37 Thomas Breidenthal and Ronald Rolheiser expand Grenz’s vision 
of sexuality in heaven. Breidenthal writes, “I have no doubt that in heaven we will enjoy 
a measure of delight and fulfillment in every other praiser of God which we should not 
shrink from calling sexual delight and sexual fulfillment.”38 Rolheiser is more specific. 
Commenting on Jesus’ statement in Matthew 22:30 (that there would be no marriage in 
heaven) Rolheiser insists that this does not mean there will be no genital sexuality. 
What Jesus is saying is not that we will be celibate in heaven, but rather that, 
in heaven, all will be married to all. In heaven, unlike life here on earth where 
that is not possible, our sexuality will finally be able to embrace everyone. In 
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heaven, everyone will make love to everyone else and, already now, we 
hunger for that within every cell of our being. Sexually our hungers are very 
wide. We are built to ultimately embrace the universe and everything in it.39 
 
While Rolheiser and Breidenthal expand Grenz’s vision to include communal genital 
sexuality in heaven while attempting to uphold traditional Christian sexual ethics this side 
of the eschaton, other theologians see the need for no such distinctions.  
Marilyn McCord Adams of Duke University argues that Trinitarian relations give 
us the theological foundation not only for heterosexual marriage but for a human ménage 
à trios, for incest, and for homosexual unions. She writes, “Whether or not, in which 
personal dimensions and to what extent, human ménage à trios can be an icon of godly 
love, depends in part on our varying assessments of human capacity for intimacy and 
functional household organization.”40 She notes the endurance of polygamy among 
African households even after their conversion to Christianity and identifies Jacob, Leah, 
and Rachel as a possible biblical example of holy marriage of three.41 McCord Adams 
explores the issue of incest, arguing that the problem with incest in human relations is 
inequality—the imposition on a minor who is unable to grant consent. But, given the full 
equality of the co-eternal Father and Son, incest in the Trinity does not suffer from the 
same weakness.42 Like many other theologians, she makes the connection between 
Trinitarian love and homosexual love following the traditional gendered names for first 
and second person of the Trinity.  
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Kathy Rudy takes the argument further when she suggests that the communal sex 
that takes place in many gay bars can provide a model for Christian community:  
Each sexual encounter after that [in a bathroom or bar] shores up his 
membership in the community he finds there; and his participation and 
contribution subsequently makes the community he finds stronger for others. 
His identity begins to be defined by the people he meets in those spaces. 
Although he may not know the names of each of his sex partners, each 
encounter resignifies his belonging. And although no two members of the 
community make steadfast promises to any one person in the community, 
each in his own way promises himself as part of this world. Intimacy and 
faithfulness in sex are played out on the community rather than individual 
level.43 
 
A number of theologians (both conservative and liberal) have concluded that if 
the ground of all being is Trinitarian love and if Trinitarian love can be understood as 
sexual, then genital sexual activity gives humans privileged experience of God. While 
conservative theologians limit such divine experience to heterosexual married couples,44    
Carter Heyward argues that this access to the divine is possible apart from Christian 
marriage, “regardless of who may be the lovers.” Heyward summarizes the conclusions 
of many when she writes, 
The erotic is our most fully embodied experience of the love of God. As such, 
it is the source of our capacity for transcendence, the ‘crossing over’ among 
ourselves, making connections between ourselves in relation. The erotic is the 
divine Spirit’s yearning, through our bodyselves, toward mutually empower-
ing relation, which is our most fully embodied experience of God as love. 
Regardless of who may be the lovers, the root of the love is sacred movement 
between and among us.45 
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 Kathy Rudy, “Where Two or More Are Gathered: Using Gay Communities as a Model for 
Christian Sexual Ethics,” Theology and Sexuality 2 (March 1996): 89-90; cited in Stuart, 49. 
44
 Gary Thomas, Sacred Marriage: What If God Designed Marriage to Make Us Holy More Than 
to Make Us Happy (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2000), 206; cited in Christine A. Colón and Bonnie E. Field, 
Singled Out: Why Celibacy Must Be Reinvented in Today’s Church (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2009), 
128. 
45
 Stuart, 49l; quoting Carter Heyward, Touching our Strength: The Erotic as Power and the Love 
of God. In Carter’s (pseudonymous) conversation with her co-authors of God’s Fierce Whimsy, we find 
similar assertions: “Sexual pleasure, or orgasm, is really about ecstasy—at least that’s what it is for me. 
And ecstasy is a central religious theme, even a mark of revelation. It’s led me to suspect that controlling 
women’s sexuality is also about controlling alternative sources of religious knowledge.  …I am convinced 
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James Nelson and Sandra Longfellow summarize the conclusions of a number of 
theologians when they insist:  
To the degree that it is free from the distortions of unjust and abusive power 
relations, we experience our sexuality as the basic eros of our humanness that 
urges, invites, and lures us out of our loneliness into intimate communication 
and communion with God and the world. …Sexuality, in sum, is the 
physiological and emotional grounding of our capacities to love.46 
 
Grenz draws heavily on the work of Nelson and Longfellow, including part of their 
summary into his own work. 
As James Nelson and Sandra Longfellow declare, “The word ‘sexuality’ itself 
comes from the Latin sexus, probably akin to the Latin secare, meaning to cut 
or divide—suggesting incompleteness seeking wholeness and connection that 
reaches through and beyond our differences and divisions.”  Hence, sexuality 
is the dynamic that forms the basis of the uniquely human drive toward 
bonding.47   
 
And while Grenz may disagree with Nelson, Longfellow, Heyward, and others over how 
genital sexuality may be expressed, their theological foundation remains the same. 
When the social becomes the sexual, when sexuality is seen as the basis for all 
relations—the basic form of bonding, the ground of all human loves—it becomes 
difficult to uphold traditional Christian sexual ethics. When God’s relationality is 
sexualized it can be used as justification for sexualities of many stripes.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
that, to the extent that we are afraid of our sexual being, we’re afraid of God, because what is God if not the 
wellspring of our creativity, our relationality, our ecstasy, our capacity to touch and be touched at the core 
of our being?” Katie G. Cannon, Beverly W. Harrison, Carter Heyward, Ada Maria Isasi-Diaz, Bess B. 
Johnson, Mary D. Pellauer, Nancy D. Richarson, God’s Fierce Whimsy: Christian Feminism and 
Theological Education (New York: The Pilgrim Press, 1985), 194-195. 
46
 James B. Nelson and Sandra P. Longfellow, Sexuality and the Sacred: Sources for 
Theological Reflection (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1994), xiv. 
47
 Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self, 278; citing Nelson and Longfellow, xiv. 
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Undermining the Goodness of Celibacy: 
Reconsidering Matthew 19:12, Eunuchs, Intersex,  
Unmarried, and the Sexually Inactive 
 
Another danger lurking in the connection between Trinitarian love and human 
sexuality, and one that returns us to the question of intersex, is the risk of undermining 
the goodness of celibacy—whether willed celibacy as a religious vocation, or unwilled 
celibacy as a disappointment and lifelong struggle for virtue outside the bonds of 
marriage, or on account of the death of a spouse, or the sexual unavailability of a spouse.  
If married sexuality is the most accurate way in which humans image divine love, if 
sexual union gives humans a privileged experience of Trinitarian union, then it becomes 
difficult to insist on celibacy as an equally valid Christian lifestyle.48   
John Paul II tries to argue against the above conclusion by insisting that the 
celibate life is not a rejection of the “spousal meaning of the body” but its fulfillment. 
Still, the late pope sees only two paths for human fulfillment thus defined: human 
marriage (the total gift of self to another human) or spiritual marriage (religious celibacy, 
the gift of self “totally to Christ”).49 Both paths are viewed through the spousal/sexual 
lens, a lens the late Pope attempts to ground in his interpretation of Matthew 19:11-12, 
Jesus’ words about eunuchs.50 
                                                 
48
 Colón and Field, 126-132. 
49
 “…man is able to choose the personal gift of self to another person in the conjugal covenant, in 
which they become ‘one flesh,’ and he is also able to renounce freely such a gift of self to another person, 
in order that by choosing continence ‘for the kingdom of heaven’ he may give himself totally to Christ.” 
John Paul II, Man and Woman, 439; 80:6. Unfortunately, John Paul II neglects the many Christians who do 
not fall into either camp as married or celibate religious. His neglect of this third category only adds 
theological insult to personal frustration—the frustration many unmarried lay Christians experience at 
being treated like “second-class citizens” in the church. Colón and Field want to add another type of 
celibacy to that typically recognized by Christian theologians, a celibacy that bridges those actively waiting 
for a spouse and those committed to a lifetime of Christian singleness for service to God. This celibacy is 
“being called by God to live chaste lives as strong, single Christians for as long as he desires us to fulfill 
this role,” Colón and Field, 206, 209.  
50
 “But [Jesus] said to them, ‘Not all men can accept this statement, but only those to whom it has 
been given. For there are eunuchs who were born that way from their mother's womb; and there are 
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According to John Paul II, “This term [eunuch] refers to the physical defects that 
make the procreative power of marriage impossible.”51 He does not consider the 
possibility that eunuchs from birth—such as an intersex man with Klinefelter’s Syndrome 
—may very well be able to procreate but may not be able to self-identify as either 
masculine or feminine. John Paul II insists that the choice of continence arises from the 
awareness of the spousal meaning of the body as masculine or feminine.52 On the 
contrary, more careful attention to the meaning of eunuch in the ancient world actually 
turns the late Pope’s argument on its head.   
At the beginning of this passage (Matthew 19:4-5), Jesus does indeed connect 
male and female with marriage. He responds to the Pharisees’ question about divorce by 
asking them,  
Have you not read that the one who made them at the beginning “made them 
male and female,” and said, “For this reason a man shall leave his father and 
mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh”? 
 
Here Jesus does seem to affirm the spousal meaning of masculinity and femininity, i.e., 
that humans enter into marriage because of their differentiation as male and female. On 
the other hand, Jesus speaks of eunuchs to affirm another way of life. When his disciples 
suggest that it is better not to marry than to be denied the possibility of divorce, Jesus 
responds by saying, 
                                                                                                                                                 
eunuchs who were made eunuchs by men; and there are also eunuchs who made themselves eunuchs for the 
sake of the kingdom of heaven. He who is able to accept this, let him accept it.’” John Paul II comments on 
this passage, saying: “Christ’s words (Mt. 19:11-12) begin with the whole realism of man’s situation and 
with the same realism they lead him out, toward the call in which, in a new way, though he remains by his 
nature a ‘dual’ being (that is, directed as a man toward woman, and as a woman toward man), he is able to 
discover in this solitude of his, which never ceases to be a personal dimension of everyone’s dual nature, a 
new and even fuller form of intersubjective communion with others.” John Paul II, Man and Woman, 426-
427, 77:2. 
51
 Ibid., 416, 74:1. 
52
 “In light of the words of Christ, we must admit that this second kind of choice, namely, 
continence for the kingdom of God, is made also in relation to the masculinity and femininity proper to the 
person who makes this choice; it is made on the basis of the full consciousness of the spousal meaning, 
which masculinity and femininity contain in themselves.” Ibid., 440; 80:7. 
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Not everyone can accept this teaching, but only those to whom it is given. For 
there are eunuchs who have been so from birth, and there are eunuchs who 
have been made eunuchs by others, and there are eunuchs who have made 
themselves eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven. Let anyone accept 
this who can.53 
 
Jesus does not base the choice of religious celibacy on the “spousal meaning of the body” 
as masculine or feminine. Rather, he lists several reasons for not marrying. First, one may 
turn away from marriage because of a physical impairment that would make marriage 
difficult or impossible. This impairment may be a natural condition “from birth” or a 
result of violence accomplished by another. Or one may choose to renounce marriage by 
making oneself a eunuch—literally (through castration) or metaphorically (through the 
rejection of gendered expectations)—for “the sake of the kingdom of heaven.”54 
A more careful reading of Matthew 19:12 suggests that some bodies do not carry 
a spousal meaning. Rather, the bodies of naturally born and castrated eunuchs point away 
from marriage toward celibacy. The bodies of those that do not fall into the categories of 
male or female teach another way of being in the world: unmarried.  
                                                 
53
 Matthew 19:11-12 
54
 The context of Matthew 19:1-12 suggests that Jesus views the eunuch as one who would not 
marry even though we have records of non-Jewish eunuchs marrying (e.g., Nero’s marriage to Sporus). 
There is also the question of the modern-day application of the assumption that eunuchs did not marry. 
Most Protestants would not prohibit a castrated male (or one who had a vasectomy—another condition that 
would have fallen under the title eunuch in the ancient world) from marrying a woman.  
Whether naturally-born eunuchs should be permitted to marry is outside the scope of this chapter. 
Yet, one could propose an analogy from the same passage, suggesting that just as men and women can 
make themselves eunuchs so as not to marry, it is possible that eunuchs, or intersex persons, could make 
themselves like men or women in order to enter into heterosexual marital arrangements. Thus an intersex 
man would choose to identify as a male while an intersex woman could choose to identify as a female. 
Such were the laws regarding the marriage of hermaphrodites in the early modern period in many parts of 
Europe (Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body, 36. An expanded treatment of marital law is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. What I am trying to do is lay the groundwork for such discussions so that Christian 
theologians and ethicists can understand the realities of intersex persons (their various conditions and 
identities) thus entering into such ethical debate in a more nuanced fashion. 
It should also be noted that queer theologians have claimed the eunuch as “our queer antecedents,” 
suggesting that whatever Matthew 19:12 means, “is unclear but it evidently has something to do with 
people who do not follow the paths of marriage and family life. …Jesus seems to have sought to bring in 
the reign of god by calling people out of the hierarchically-based structures of marriage and family into a 
new type of kinship based on friendship which is inclusive of all.” Stuart, 44-45. The question remains as to 
whether these friendships should include a sexual component. 
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This does not mean that every eunuch must remain unmarried while every non-
eunuch must marry. Each can learn from the other. Women and men can learn from 
eunuchs. Men (and presumably women) may choose to “cut off” their masculinity (or 
femininity), in order to make themselves “eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven.” In other 
words, those whose bodies do carry a spousal meaning may choose to follow the example 
of the eunuch. Some early Christian men literally castrated themselves, others 
transgressed gendered hairstyles, dress or comportment because they recognized that the 
language of the eunuch suggested more than a simple renunciation of marriage, but also a 
renunciation of gender identity and privilege in the ancient world. The choice not to 
marry was a choice not to fulfill the requirements on manhood in ancient Jewish and 
Greco-Roman culture or lay claim to the privileges of masculinity in a patriarchal culture. 
Similarly, some early Christian women rejected not only marriage but feminine identity. 
They removed their veils, the symbol of their femininity in its shame and subordination 
to all things masculine. They saw themselves as relinquishing their feminine identity for a 
new identity “in Christ.” 
At the same time that Jesus does not base religious celibacy on the body as 
masculine and feminine, neither does he present celibacy as “spiritual marriage” or the 
avenue through which unmarried persons are to channel their sexuality.55 In other words, 
those who are unable to experience the analogous union of the Trinity in heterosexual 
marital sexual relations are not then given married sexuality with God as their 
consolation prize. The metaphor of marriage presented by Paul in Ephesians 5 is not 
presented to celibate religious individuals but to the whole church—married and 
unmarried, a collective whole. 
                                                 
55
 Cf. Rolheiser; and Colón and Field, 214-217. 
 242
John Paul II’s account of the spousal meaning of the body fails to take account of 
the bodies of eunuchs and intersex persons. His proposal, which bases Christian love on 
the spousal meaning of the body, places the intersexed outside of the possibility of love. 
For if, as the late Pope suggests, humans come to know love on the basis of the spousal 
meaning of the body (i.e., its masculinity and femininity), those bodies without a spousal 
meaning, without a clear masculinity or femininity, would at best know only a distorted 
view of love and at worst be placed outside the possibility of the knowledge of love.56  
This could not have been Jesus’ intention when he elevated the eunuch from a symbol of 
shame to become an icon of radical discipleship. The love for God that leads one to 
become a “eunuch for the sake of the Kingdom” must be a love that is distinct from love 
that arises from knowledge of the body as masculine or feminine. 
John Paul II’s account of spousal love risks not only marginalizing the intersexed 
but anyone unable to enter into heterosexual marriage and married sexuality. His 
proposal actually undermines, rather than upholds, the goodness of celibacy—especially 
non-religious celibacy (i.e., celibacy that is not read through a “spousal” lens of marriage 
to Christ). The result is that, for those who would like to be married, spiritual second-
class citizenship is added to the burden of the virtuous life.57 The spiritualization of 
spousal sexuality can undermine the goodness of celibacy, and it can also present 
problems for the married. 
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 “The human body, with its sex—its masculinity and femininity—…contains ‘from the 
beginning’ the ‘spousal’ attribute, that is the power to express love: precisely that love in which the human 
person becomes a gift and—through this gift—fulfills the very meaning of his being and existence.” John 
Paul II, Man and Woman, 185-186, 15:1, italics original to John Paul II. 
57
 Colón and Field, 127. 
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Spiritualizing Sexuality:  
Sexual Dysfunction becomes Spiritual Dysfunction 
 
Sexual/spousal spirituality presents problems not just for the unmarried but also 
for the married. John Paul II presents a beautiful ideal that can feel far removed from the 
sexual experiences of many married persons. Eugene Rogers Jr. cites the frustration that 
some have expressed as a result of the spiritualization of sexuality.  
Worried about the sort of idolatry that comes from too high a view of sex and 
marriage, a friend has complained that ‘all married couples need is to have a 
theologian telling them that they should not only expect great sex but 
spiritually significant sex, God help us.’  A contrary view is that of the 
celibate Sebastian Moore: ‘The most dramatic, indeed comic, instance of 
cross-purposes between the Vatican and the married, is that the Vatican sees 
the problem as one of curbing desire, whereas the married know that the 
problem is to keep desire going, which means to keep it growing, which 
means deepening.’ Both remarks are true.58   
 
Both remarks arise from the knowledge that sexuality, even sexuality within 
Christian marriage, even married sexuality that satisfies the late Pope’s standards for “the 
conjugal act” (i.e., self-giving, conscious of the irreplaceable identity of the spouse, and 
open to procreation), can feel at times more like a burden than an icon of Trinitarian 
union. Spiritualizing the goodness of married sexuality can add spiritual frustration to 
sexual frustration—adding to the burdens of married Christians. 
Christine Colón and Bonnie Field have documented how the spiritualization of 
sexuality has infiltrated Evangelical teaching. They cite Gary Thomas, a regular 
contributor to Christianity Today and Focus on the Family, who “goes so far as to equate 
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 Rogers, “Sanctification, Homosexuality, and God’s Triune Life,” 223; citing Sebastian Moore, 
“The Crisis of an Ethic Without Desire” in Jesus the Liberator of Desire (New York: Crossroad, 1989), 
104; reprinted in Theology and Sexuality, 17.  
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sex and orgasm with experiencing God’s presence through the shekinah glory.”59 Colón 
and Field add, 
Then there is the added pressure to have children, for ‘creating a family is the 
closest we get to sharing the image of God.’  Many married couples without 
children will attest that they, like single adults, often feel excluded from many 
of the messages coming from the evangelical church, and Thomas’s assertion 
clearly demonstrates why.60 
 
For those 43% of women and 31% of men whose bodies make sexual intimacy 
difficult, painful, or impossible, spiritual disappointment can be added to physical 
frustration.61 Not only must these persons struggle with unresponsive bodies or spouses, 
but they have the added layer of failing to experience the mystical union which sexuality 
is supposed to grant. For married couples with unequal sexual desire, spiritual guilt can 
be added to personal guilt and frustration. For infertile couples, spiritual failing is added 
to personal and family disappointment in their inability to image God through 
procreation. For those 10-40% of girls and 5-13% of boys who have been sexually 
abused and for the subgroup who are psychologically or physically prevented from 
                                                 
59
 “The ancient Jewish text The Holy Letter (written by Nahmanides in the thirteenth century) sees 
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281, no. 6 (Feb 10, 1999): 537-44. Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder or low libido is reported by 33.4% 
of women; 14.4% report pain during intercourse. Tracee Cornforth, “Female Sexual Dysfunction: Common 
Sexual Disorders and Causes of Decreased Libido,” About.com (December 10, 2009) 
http://womenshealth.about.com/cs/sexualdysfunction/a/femalesexdysfun.htm. “In fact, as many as one third 
to two thirds of women experience some type of sexual problem at some time in their lives.” Elizabeth G. 
Stewart and Paula Spencer. The V Book: A Doctor’s Guide to Complete Vulvovaginal Health (New York: 
Bantam Books, 2002), 329. 
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entering into healthy sexual relations because of the trauma they have suffered, spiritual 
disappointment is added to disappointment with God for what feels like a failure to 
protect them when they were most vulnerable.62 
To his credit, Grenz acknowledges some of these difficulties (specifically 
“debilitating physical problems… due to illness, accident, or the aging process” which 
interrupt sexual relations in marriage) and cautions against overvaluing the sexual act 
within marriage. He insists that “sexual intercourse is not the ‘end all’ of marriage.”63  
Nevertheless, the overall value which he places on sexuality as the basis for human 
relationality and Christian spirituality and his description of sex as “the most intimate and 
meaningful act embodying the deep union of husband and wife that lies at the basis of 
marriage” tends to obscure his cautionary statement.64 
Sexuality is a good gift of the Creator. Marriage is a good gift of God. But the 
connection of marriage and sexuality to the image of God risks sexualizing Trinitarian 
relationality, weakens traditional Christian sexual ethics, undermines the goodness of 
celibacy, and risks adding spiritual failings to sexual frustrations.  
These dangers are avoidable. It is possible to hold to the goodness of the social 
imago without allowing it to slide into the sexual or spousal image. This can be done first 
by clarifying several unnecessary conflations in Evangelical and Roman Catholic 
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 The World Health Organization reports that 10-25% of girls are victims of child sexual abuse 
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 Grenz, Sexual Ethics, 92.  
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traditions, reconsidering the usefulness of the marriage analogy, and returning to the 
social Trinity as the paradigm for the social imago. 
 
CLARIFYING CONFLATIONS 
 
The Social is not the Sexual 
Stanley Grenz conflates the social with the sexual in his construction of the image 
of God by reading all human relationality through the language of sexuality. He justifies 
this interpretation on his reading of Genesis but his is not the only interpretation possible.  
In the previous chapter I suggested that rather than reading the characters of 
Adam and Eve as divinely given prototypes of human sex differentiation, one could 
interpret them as progenitors of human sex differentiation instead. In a similar way, it is 
possible to affirm with Grenz the sexual nature of the relationship between Adam and 
Eve while at the same time arguing that their sexual relationality not be read as 
paradigmatic of all human relationality. Adam and Eve can be interpreted as the 
progenitors rather than the paradigm of other kinds of relations. Sexual differentiation, 
need, and desire may have been what led Adam and Eve to bond with one another, but 
the filling of the earth brought other relations—parents to children, siblings, cousins, 
uncles, grandparents, friends, strangers, and even enemies. Sexual differentiation and 
sexual desire provided the fruitful foundation for human relationality but not its 
paradigmatic form.  
A second way to correct this reading of Genesis is to argue that even if one views 
the relationship between Adam and Eve as primarily sexual, it is important to see that 
male and female partnership is narrowed and distorted when viewed exclusively or 
primarily as sexual. Men and women cooperate in the world in many complementary 
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ways far beyond the sexual. The partnership of men and women is needed not only in 
marriage and parenting but in the church and at every level of society. Labeling these 
relations “social sexuality” as Grenz has done may actually undermine the ability of men 
and women to build healthy relationships that are holy and life-giving precisely because 
they are non-sexual.65   
Sex, gender, and sexuality must be differentiated. With Grenz, we must affirm 
that all human relations take place between persons with embodied sex and culturally-
influenced gendered identities; nevertheless, not all of these relations are sexual, i.e., they 
do not arise from sexual need, desire, or action. A mother’s relationship with her child is 
influenced by her biological sex as well as her culturally-influenced and experientially-
formed gender identity but it is not, nor should it be, sexual, i.e., based on erotic desire, 
need, or activity.66 It is only by separating sexuality from sex differentiation and gender 
that sexual abuse and other sexual sins can be identified. 
Grenz’s definition of sexuality requires a second clarification. He posits the 
primary meaning of sexuality as “the sense of incompleteness and the corresponding 
drive for wholeness, [forming] the dynamic that not only seeks human relationships but 
also motivates the quest for God.”67 According to Grenz, sexuality symbolizes and 
teaches our need for others, thus leading us out of isolation:   
To be sexual—to be male or female—means to be incomplete as an 
isolated individual. For as isolated individuals we are unable to reflect the 
fullness of humanity and thus the fullness of the divine image. We see the 
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 Christine A. Colón and Bonnie E. Field document the difficulties faced especially by single 
women who are marginalized and neglected (in one example a man refused to offer a woman in his church 
a ride home when her car had broken down) due to the inability of others to see them as anything other than 
sexual temptresses, in Singled Out, 100-109. 
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 Lisa Graham McMinn follows Grenz and Rolheiser in speaking about a mother’s relationship to 
her child as sexual in Sexuality and Holy Longing, 101. See also Rolheiser, 198. 
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 Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self, 280. 
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other who is sexually different from us, and as this occurs we are 
reminded of our own incompleteness. 
 The fullness of humanness, therefore, is reflected only in community. 
As a result, our existence as sexual beings gives rise to the desire to enter 
into community, and thereby to actualize our design as human 
individuals. Sexuality, then, is an expression of our nature as social 
beings. We are not isolated entities existing to ourselves; nor are we the 
source of our fulfillment. On the contrary, we derive fulfillment beyond 
ourselves. This need to find fulfillment beyond ourselves is the dynamic 
that leads to the desire to develop relationships with others and ultimately 
with God.68 
 
Grenz should be praised for his communitarian reworking of the imago Dei, for 
the way in which it challenges the modernist illusion of an independent, self-sufficient 
self. Nevertheless, the paragraph above reveals how much Grenz is still battling the 
residual hold of modernist individualism. Rather than beginning with the presupposition 
that all humans (after Adam and Eve) come into this world already bonded by particular 
relations, already embedded within communities, Grenz begins with the modernist 
(Western, upper-class, masculine) illusion of the individual. Elsewhere, he wrote, “our 
fundamental sexuality gives rise to the desire to come out of our isolation and enter into 
relationship with others.”69 Who is this individual living in so-called isolation? Such a 
description calls to mind the lone ranger who only discovers his need for community 
through his sexuality. Dennis Hollinger illustrates how the stereotype of the lone ranger 
certainly has been taken to extremes by some in contemporary American culture when he 
quotes a teenager who quipped: “Now that it’s easy to get sex outside of relationships, 
guys don’t need relationships.”70 The assumption beneath such a statement is that men do 
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 Grenz, Sexual Ethics, 193; my emphasis. 
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 Grenz, “Theological Foundations for Male-Female Relationships,” 621; my emphasis. 
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 Hollinger, 23; citing Benoit Denizet-Lewis, “Friends, Friends Without Benefits, and the The 
Benefits of the Local Mall,” New York Times Magazine (May 30, 2004), 34. 
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not need relationships, or do not realize they need relationships, unless their sexuality 
tells them otherwise. 
Wendell Berry blames such an attitude on Western attempts to escape from the 
body, from physical labor, from the earth.71 He insists, “There is, in practice, no such 
thing as autonomy. Practically, there is only a distinction between responsible and 
irresponsible dependence.”72 That Western theologians can even posit the possibility of 
existing in isolation, outside of communities of dependence, until sexuality reminds them 
of their need for others only shows how some have been deluded by the partial success of 
the industrial revolution, becoming forgetful of all of the relations which enabled their 
existence prior to their discovery of their sexed body and sexual needs.73    
Berry insists that, historically, marriage was based on a number of needs well 
beyond the sexual. Marriage was a covenant providing for economic needs and physical 
security which extended the network of mutually dependent relations based on need, 
cooperation, and provision. However, after the disintegration of the household as an 
economic unit, Berry observes that the reasons for marriage have become too thin to 
sustain the conjugal relation. 
Without the household—not just as a unifying ideal, but as a practical 
circumstance of mutual dependence and obligation, requiring skill, moral 
discipline, and work—husband and wife find it less and less possible to 
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 Wendell Berry, “The Body and the Earth,” in The Art of the Commonplace: The Agrarian 
Essays of Wendell Berry, Norman Wirzba, ed. (Berkeley: Counterpoint, 2002), 93-134. 
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 Ibid., 107. 
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 In his defense, Grenz does well to note that the help that Eve brings to Adam is not the relief of 
(genital) sexual need. Quoting Old Testament scholar Claus Westermann, he explains: “The words ‘a 
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(not just Adam and Eve) out of isolation into community, he risks deforming the very community he is 
working so hard to recover.  
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imagine and enact their marriage. Without much in particular that they can do 
for each other, they have a scarcity of practical reasons to be together. They 
may “like each other’s company,” but that is a reason for friendship, not for 
marriage. Aside from affection for any children they may have and their 
abstract legal and economic obligations to each other, their union has to be 
empowered by sexual energy alone.74 
 
This, Berry believes, should not be misunderstood as the distillation of marriage, 
revealing its lowest common denominator. Rather, the reduction of marriage to sexuality 
is the undoing of marriage.  
…[Sexuality] becomes ‘autonomous,’ to be valued only for its own sake, 
therefore frivolous, therefore destructive—even of itself.75 
 
Grenz’s vision of sexuality as that which forms the basis of human bonding—the 
bonding of marriage and every other bonding which employs marriage as an analogy— 
provides theological justification for a warped vision of sexuality and marriage that has 
arisen in the modern age. Envisioning sexuality as that which enables bonding is not a 
remedy for a society that knows much of sexuality and very little of bonded faithful 
relations of any stripe. While sexuality may motivate some people to make promises of 
fidelity, the fulfillment of those promises has little to do with sexuality or eros and 
everything to do with agape. As C. S. Lewis quipped, “Eros is driven to promise what 
Eros of himself cannot perform.”76 
Grenz may be right to insist that incompleteness is the dynamic which grounds 
community, but his analysis misses the mark when he identifies incompleteness as 
sexual. Even when his proposal is nuanced so that Adam and Eve are properly 
understood as the primal form of the imago of God, with Christ and the Church as the 
telos, the eschatological imago, his insistence that Christ’s relationship to the Father can 
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be understood as sexual, and that sexuality provides the basis for the eschatological 
community, shows that his progressive-canonical vision of the imago never outstrips his 
initial definition of sexuality. 
The ultimate goal of sexuality, and hence of the impulse toward bonding, is 
participation in the fullness of community—namely, life together as the new 
humanity [the believing community, the bride of Christ]… in relationship 
with God and all creation. …Viewed in this light, sexuality, understood as the 
sense of incompleteness and the corresponding drive for wholeness, forms the 
dynamic that not only seeks human relationships but also motivates the quest 
for God.77  
 
Jason Sexton, in his analysis of Grenz’s use of the imago Dei, writes, “Grenz 
finds it preposterous to relegate sexual embodiment to this age alone, because it would 
both undercut the significance of Jesus’ resurrection and undermine the basis for 
community in heaven.”78 Once again we find that Grenz’s conflation of sexuality with 
bodily sex differentiation leads him to confuse the significance of the resurrection for sex 
differentiation—being resurrected with personal, bodily identity, inclusive of sex 
differentiation (and other bodily markers of identity such as race, etc.)—and the impact 
of the resurrection for sexual relations.  
Although Ephesians 5 employs the marital lens for the relation of Christ and the 
church, there are no Biblical passages which suggest that the bonding of individual 
Christians into the collective body of the church should be viewed through the lens of the 
sexual. The primary analogy used for ecclesial bonding is that of sibling relations. The 
church is to learn from familial love but not the love of spouses. Brotherly (and sisterly) 
love characterizes the relationality of the church, apage, philia, and philostorgia, not 
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eros.
79
 The analogy of sibling relations should protect against the sexualization of 
ecclesial love and keep us from concluding with Rolheiser that in heaven all will be 
married to all, enjoying sexual relations with “brothers and sisters” in Christ.80 Reading 
ecclesial bonding through the lens of the sexual is counterproductive to healthy church 
life.  
It is imperative that we untangle Grenz’s conflation of the social with the sexual. 
Sex, gender, and sexuality are related yet distinct. In order to do this, I have suggested 
several revisions: First, Adam and Eve should be understood as the progenitors of human 
relations, rather than those who provide the paradigmatic form. Second, sexuality is a 
type of incompleteness which reveals human need for others, but it is one of many needs 
which can build community. Finally, even when Grenz’s vision of sexuality is viewed as 
the primal form of the imago, with the ecclesial community standing as the eschatological 
telos, Grenz’s unwillingness to give up the language of sexuality undermines the promise 
of his proposal. Grenz’s conflation of sex, gender, sexuality and relationality can be 
corrected. 
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The Spousal is not the Sexual 
 
 John Paul II introduced a different problem into his theological anthropology by 
his conflation of spousal with sexual. John Paul II avoids the language of sexuality 
because he wants to raise the bar of what good marital sexuality must entail. Thus he 
speaks not of spousal sexuality but “the conjugal act”—i.e., sexual activity in marriage 
that is loving, attentive to the particularity of the person, self-giving, and uninhibited by 
contraceptive devices. Unfortunately, by calling married sexuality “the conjugal act” he 
allows married sexuality to be seen as the pinnacle of marriage, the central way that love 
as self-gift is expressed. While it is clear that when St. John of the Cross speaks of 
sexuality as a metaphor for spiritual things (the 16th century saint certainly does indeed 
elevate sexual union as the pinnacle of marital self-giving), John Paul II’s Theology of the 
Body is less explicit on this point. Nevertheless, the late pope opens the door to the 
elevation of married sexuality as central to human identity in the image of God. 
As was noted above, this elevation of sexuality as a good unto itself arose in 
reaction to earlier Roman Catholic accounts which downplayed the value of marital 
sexuality beyond procreation.81 While the personalist account is an improvement in 
that it finds value in marital sexuality, it presents an imbalanced account by swinging 
the pendulum too far.  
The chief problem in this personalist account is, not that it goes wrong, but 
that it says too much to be right. Every sexual act is defined as full and total, 
so that sex has no room to be ordinary. The act of sexual intercourse, in this 
theological framework, transcends its particular meaning in time, in order to 
reveal the complete contours of our two-in-one-flesh humanity. With this total 
union of body and spirit, sexual relationships are lifted out of the everyday 
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activities of marriage. …Every act is understood to ritualize “a fully shared 
life” and the “total self-giving” of spouses. This ritual context suits a 
honeymoon or anniversary day consummation, but I dare to say that our 
everyday bodily presence is far more subtle and patient. Those who believe 
sex is earth shattering will put it out of marriage.82  
 
In contrast to this personalist account McCarthy wants to present sexuality in such a 
way as to keep it within the everyday realities of married life.  
The everyday meaning of sex, in contrast, is extended through the day-to-day 
ebb and flow of common endeavors, joys, and struggles of love in the home. 
Not in an instant, but over time, we come to belong. In this regard, no sexual 
act represents a total self or full relationship. Rather, what we do today gains 
its meaning in relation to yesterday and what we will do tomorrow. For sex to 
have depth, it needs extended bodily communication over time.83 
 
McCarthy is working to restore balance to his Roman Catholic tradition by 
putting the goodness of marriage and sexuality back into their proper places. He argues 
that the Scriptures give a different picture of marriage and sexuality than that found in 
John Paul II and Roman Catholic personalist accounts. 
The Christian tradition has emphasized communal love outside of the 
practices of marriage, particularly love within troublesome contexts, not 
exotic or heavenly places, but among the poor and amid disagreements and 
sin. Modern romantics set the meaning of love in the face-to-face wonder of 
wedding vows, but the Gospels use the image of the wedding banquet, as a 
place to deal with themes of hospitality and hope for the downtrodden. Love is 
characterized as a turning around for the unfortunate, as healing, generosity, 
and most of all, as forgiveness and reconciliation. Grace and forgiveness are 
basic to the theological drama of love. The stage is not the discrete context of 
interpersonal love but relationships of the human family and the practical 
matters of living well in community. The household, in this setting, is where 
love and sexual union are ordered to common goods and to God. Christian 
love, from the start, begins outside of me and you, but when contemporary 
theology conceives of the “Me and You” as the original context of love, it has 
difficulty bringing love and sexual desire back from the impractical and other 
worldly sphere of modern romance.84 
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McCarthy insists that sexuality can only find its proper place within the wider love that is 
marriage and that marriage can only find its proper place within the wider love that is 
God’s love in the community—the church. It is marriage that means the total gift of self, 
not sexuality. Within the context of marriage, sexuality can mean many things. Within 
the wholeness of marriage, sexuality is liberated from the daunting task of having to 
mean “the gift of the whole self” in every sexual encounter. 
Through any given sexual act, spouses might express love, desire, generosity, 
frustration, fatigue, or manipulative intent, but they will do so in the semantic 
context of a day, week, a stage of life, and a series of specific events, and all 
set within the broader context of a shared life. Any particular sexual encounter 
need not say anything earth shattering; it need not point to the fullness or full 
meaning of a sexual relationship. We need not be completed by our sexual 
complement. Most sex within marriage is just ordinary, a minor episode in a 
larger story. One set of sexual expressions may need to be redeemed by 
another, and can be. One-night stands and passionate affairs, in contrast, need 
to be earthshaking and splendid because they are the whole story. They are 
manic attempts to overcome the fact that there is nothing else. The true 
superiority of sexual intercourse in marriage is that it does not have to mean 
very much. Expressed sexually or otherwise, our ‘humanity’ is something that 
accumulates quietly through small steps and comes to us as a whole only 
when we step back, in order to look back and to imagine the future.85 
 
Marital love is distorted and diminished when it is viewed primarily through the 
lens of the sexual. Indeed, Ephesians 5 (the biblical passage cited so often to justify the 
analogy of marriage to the spiritual life) speaks of marital love not in terms of eros but 
agape, giving the example of a man caring for his own body, not through erotic self-
stimulation, but by feeding himself.86 This is not to say that eros or sexuality has no place 
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in marital life but that healthy marriages require more than eros or sexual love in order to 
embrace the entire person.  
 
Differentiating Eros from Marital Love and Divine Love 
 
 The conflation of eros with married love is evident in both Roman Catholic and 
Evangelical accounts. As outlined above, we find both Pope Benedict XVI and Stanley 
Grenz suggesting that biblical metaphors for marriage should be interpreted as justifying 
eros as a revelation of divine love. The question remains whether the kind of love that 
God displays in these actions are best illustrated by eros or agape. Both Benedict XVI 
and Stanley Grenz insist that marriage requires agape as well as eros; nevertheless, their 
arguments which justify eros on the basis of marriage tend to obscure this nuance. 
Benedict XVI insists that eros without agape “is impoverished and even loses its own 
nature.”87 Grenz writes, 
Marriage as a covenantal bond brings together the two aspects of love, agape 
and eros. Within the context of marriage the sex act declares that the desire 
for the other, the physical attraction that two persons may sense toward each 
other (so central to eros), can truly be fulfilled only in the total giving of one 
to the other and the unconditional acceptance of the other (agape). As the love 
of the other characterized by desire for the other (eros) merges with the love 
of the other characterized by self-giving (agape), love in its highest form 
emerges. Sexual intercourse constitutes a visible object lesson of this reality.88 
 
Grenz also writes that adultery is “the triumph of eros over agape.”89 Given their more 
balanced accounts of marital love elsewhere, it remains to be proved whether the marital 
love which illustrates God’s faithful love of God’s people is best to be described as eros 
                                                 
87
 Benedict XVI, Deus caritas est, I.7.  
88
 Grenz, Sexual Ethics, 87. 
89
 Ibid., 111. 
 257
or agape. Following Grenz’s comparison above, it seems that “the total giving of one to 
the other and the unconditional acceptance of the other” is best described by agape.90 
When Grenz speaks of eros within the Trinity, he defines eros as “desire for 
communion with the beloved.”91 But desire for communion expands well beyond the 
sexual or marital. The father depicted in Jesus’ parable of the prodigal son could also be 
described with “desire” for reunion, reconciling communion, with his son. His desire 
leads him not to walk but to run to his son even while his son is “still a long way off.”92  
Similarly, two chapters earlier in Luke’s gospel, Jesus says to Jerusalem, “how often have 
I longed to gather your children together, as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, but 
you were not willing!”93 Jesus is certainly articulating desire for communion with his 
estranged children, his loved ones. Yet, few would label the desire expressed in these 
passages as eros, given that they occur between Father and Son, Jesus and Jerusalem, hen 
and chicks, rather than husband and wife. If eros means “desire for communion with the 
beloved,” it must be unhinged from the close connection to sexuality and marriage it 
retains in current parlance. 
 C. S. Lewis has quipped, “The times and places in which marriage depends on 
Eros are in a small minority.”94 Lewis named eros, along with storge (affection) and 
philia (friendship), natural loves which can be elevated by divine agape to become 
revelations of divine love while, nevertheless, remaining human loves. They can illustrate 
the love of God and create desire for the love of God but they remain distinct. Grenz is 
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dissatisfied with such an answer.95 He believes that proposals such as Lewis’ “ultimately 
deny that the natural loves enjoy any transcendent grounding; they all lack any basis in 
the divine life.”96 Grenz seems worried that unless eros is found within God, it cannot be 
declared to be good. He shows the same concern when he attempts to argue that God is 
sexual: 
God created humans to resemble in some sense their Creator. The imago Dei 
suggests that there is a connection between our essential human nature and the 
divine reality. As Karl Barth explains, “in God’s own sphere and being, there 
exists a divine and therefore self-grounded prototype to which this being can 
correspond.” But if God and sexuality are disjunctive, how can God be the 
transcendent ground for our human embodiment as sexual creatures? How can 
sexuality be “good,” if it is an aspect of human existence that makes us unlike, 
rather than like God?97   
  
Unfortunately, the logic in the last sentence falters because it suggests that nothing can be 
good that does not find a correspondence in God—e.g., physical creation. And yet, God 
declared creation good even though distinct from and unlike God. It is possible that just 
as the creation is distinct from God and yet can “declare God’s glory” and make visible 
“God’s invisible qualities—his eternal power and divine nature—” so human loves can 
reveal divine love, even while remaining distinct.98 
The fact that biblical authors had the term eros at their disposal but consistently 
rejected it in favor of agape—an obscure alternative—should not be dismissed as 
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irrelevant to the conversation. They knew of the association of eros with religious 
devotion but, probably because of the rampant association of eros with sexuality and 
fertility religions, they avoided its use. In our present society, when sexuality is replacing 
the religion of many, or being confused as the high-point religious experience—even 
Christian religious experience—contemporary theologians would do well to heed the 
example of the biblical authors and differentiate between eros, marital love, and divine 
love. 
 
Reconsidering the Marriage Analogy in St. John of the Cross 
 
Although the poetry of St. John of the Cross provided the theological fodder for 
envisioning spirituality through the lens of romantic sexuality, elevating marital sexuality 
above marital promise, the saint is also a helpful source for correcting this very trend. 
The 16th century monastic certainly bequeathed a legacy of spousal/sexual mysticism but 
he also remains famous for another treatise on the nature of Christian spirituality, a 
spirituality which sounds less like the ecstasy of a honeymoon and more like the daily 
realities of marriage which McCarthy is working to recover. St. John of the Cross gave us 
not only the Spiritual Canticle but also The Dark Night. 
The Dark Night is an essential counterpoint to the Spiritual Canticle. The 
Spiritual Canticle uses romantic language to speak of longing, frustration at not being 
with God, desire for God’s presence in anticipation of union with God. In this way it 
draws upon the experience of lovers, newly espoused, longing for their wedding day, for 
the day when none shall separate them. Such an analogy is fitting for the experience of 
the believer longing after God in this life, when the fullness of communion with God, the 
union so often associated with sexual union, is presented as a future reality—one hoped 
 260
for but not yet experienced. This is the metaphor which ends the biblical narrative, with 
the Spirit and the Bride saying “Come”—longing for the return of Jesus, the 
Bridegroom.99 
The poem continues the theme of lovers long estranged who now find themselves 
in ecstatic embrace, but the commentary which the saint adds to the poem is essential for 
keeping readers from misunderstanding.100 St. John of the Cross explains: 
Before embarking on an explanation of these stanzas, we should remember 
that the soul recites them when it has already reached the state of perfection—
that is, union with God through love—and has now passed through severe 
trials and conflicts by means of the spiritual exercise that leads one along the 
constricted way to eternal life, of which our Savior speaks in the Gospel [Mt. 
7:14]. The soul must ordinarily walk this path to reach that sublime and 
joyous union with God. Recognizing the narrowness of the path and the fact 
that so very few tread it—as the Lord himself says [Mt. 7:14]—the soul's song 
in this first stanza is one of happiness in having advanced along it to this 
perfection of love. Appropriately, this constricted road is called a dark night, 
as we shall explain in later verses of this stanza.101 
 
 In his commentary on the poem, St. John of the Cross presents Christian 
spirituality as a journey which may begin with ecstasies able to be likened to mystical 
moments of union with God, but a journey which passes through other phases of 
relationship along the way.102 In this way, his narrative is a fitting analogy to human 
marriage, one that begins in hope and the excitement of the wedding but changes as the 
couple learns to navigate the many responsibilities of household management, financial 
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concerns, the demands of children, etc. His commentary teaches Christians not to trust 
moments of ecstasy, nor to despair during times of doubt and difficulty for these are all 
part of a Christian’s relationship with God. Indeed, faithfulness in the absence of spiritual 
comfort is more a mark of intimacy with God than experiences of mystical 
communion.103   
 When spirituality is likened to sexual desire, then lack of sexual desire can be 
seen as a spiritual problem. But John of the Cross speaks about times in our spiritual life 
when a Christian will lose her or his desire for God. He counsels them not to fear. “They 
must be content simply with a loving and peaceful attentiveness to God, and live without 
the concern, without the effort, and without the desire to taste or feel him.”104 Just as 
married persons go through seasons of desire and seasons of apathy in their relationship 
to their spouse and yet can remain faithfully married, so Christians go through times of 
desire and apathy and yet can remain faithful in their love of God. 
 The poem speaks of the joys of ecstatic union with God but the commentary 
warns the reader that these joys come after years of trials and faithfulness. In this way the 
analogy between sexual ecstasy and spiritual union is better likened to the joy of spouses 
celebrating their golden anniversary, rather than the excitement of newlyweds.  
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 John of the Cross and John Paul II may be correct in insisting that “love is a gift 
of self; spousal love between man and woman is the paradigmatic case of the gift of self; 
the origin and exemplar of the gift of self lies in the Trinity,” but their analogy only holds 
when marital love is separated from sexual love.105 Still, it is good to remember that 
when Jesus spoke of love as the gift of self, he spoke not of marriage but of martyrdom: 
“Greater love has no one than this that they lay down their life for their friends.”106   
 Heterosexual marriage is an important illustration of God’s love and the calling 
God has placed upon us to live in love: “God is love and those who live in love live in 
God and God in them” (I John 4:16). But heterosexual marital love is not entirely sexual, 
nor is it the only kind of love, or always the best kind of love, able to illustrate the love of 
God. One must not forget all of the other ways that love is revealed in the Bible, 
especially the Fatherly (and motherly) love of God and, ultimately, the sacrificial love 
shown in Jesus on the Cross. While some Roman Catholic authors have tried to show 
how Christ’s cross can be understood as “nuptials… the marriage bed mounted not in 
pleasure but in pain,” 107 a more careful reading of Ephesians 5:25108 will show that it is 
marriage that is redeemed through martyrdom, not martyrdom that is redeemed through 
marriage.109 
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 Returning to St. John of the Cross, one last observation is needed. It is important 
to note that when the saint speaks about the individual believer seeking communion with 
God, it is assumed that the reader is already embedded in the wider community of faith. 
John of the Cross speaks of the community, of spiritual directors and confessors as 
essential coaches who encourage the believer not to give up or misinterpret spiritual 
dryness for lack of love. Indeed, the wider monastic community is an essential backdrop 
for understanding the intimate communion of the soul with God. This vision of intimacy 
as already embedded in wider social communities leads us to the final point of correction 
for the connection between sexuality and the imago Dei. 
 
RESTORING THE SOCIAL TRINITY AND THE SOCIAL IMAGO 
 
Relocating Love in the Wider Community 
David Matzko McCarthy, in his critique of contemporary theological accounts, 
argues that Roman Catholic and Evangelical constructions misplace the “location” of 
love. Romantic and theological personalists locate love between two partners who mirror 
the I-Thou relation. This was the model passed down from Martin Buber to Karl Barth to 
Stanley Grenz and John Paul II. It is the model upon which the social Trinity was first 
constructed. But McCarthy insists that the I-Thou actually distorts the nature of love, 
reducing it to the romantic two abstracted from the world, from family, neighborhood, 
finances, church, and world. 
Christian love, from the start, begins outside of me and you, but when 
contemporary theology conceives of the “Me and You” as the original context 
                                                                                                                                                 
when he argues that eros (self-seeking, need-love) must be purified by agape (love as self-gift). 
Nevertheless, his justification of eros on the basis of marital metaphors in the scriptures shows how he, too, 
reduces marital love to eros rather than identifying eros as one dimension of the rich love shared between 
husband and wife. 
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of love, it has difficulty bringing love and sexual desire back from the 
impractical and other worldly sphere of modern romance. 110   
 
Instead of Me and You (I and Thou) as the location of love, McCarthy presents the 
home as the proper place of Christian love—not the isolated suburban nuclear home 
but the open home in a network of interdependent relationships within a 
neighborhood. 
The romantic ideal of mutual absorption threatens to make friendships and 
other social relations appear as optional or as intrusions. John Paul II’s 
personalism, while not quite romantic, risks the same kind of isolation. [In 
contrast, McCarthy suggests:] …Our friends [neighbors and kin] enrich our 
marriages and home in important and practical ways.111 
 
More than “enriching,” McCarthy insists that marriages need other relations in order to 
survive and thrive. 
 He blames this “impossible ideal” on “the idea that marriage is a complete 
communion,” a bringing together of two halves into a complete whole.112   
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It is impractical to hope that one person can be completed by another, or that 
one’s spouse would be able to receive the ‘total’ personality and texture of the 
other. We should hope that friends and co-workers will tease out and cultivate 
personal qualities and make demands that our husbands and wives cannot. 
Even if marriage is a primary source of one’s identity, it is quite a different 
matter to assume that we can exhaust one another’s ‘total’ self.113 
 
McCarthy insists that spousal communion is upheld and enriched by wider social, non-
sexual relations. “I will discover who you really are as I come to know you in the 
company of others.”114   
 Evangelical theologians Margaret Kim Peterson and her husband Dwight N. 
Peterson agree. Like McCarthy they blame romantic interpretations of divine love as 
undermining the ability of Christians (especially young Evangelicals) of entering into 
healthy relationships. 
It is thus profoundly ironic that the lens through which many modern 
Christians have come to interpret marriage, the fantasy of romance, turns out 
to be so splintering and isolating a phenomenon. Romance, through its 
exclusive focus on the one true love, ends up separating people two by two 
from any other substantive human relationship. And as the sociologists tell us, 
it is in part that very separation from supportive networks of friends and 
family that makes many modern marriages as brittle and prone to collapse as 
they are. 
It might be that what contemporary Christians need is less romance and 
more love.115   
 
But how do Christians find “more love” to support their marriages when marital love 
(romantic/sexual/spousal love) is presented as the paradigmatic form of Christian love? 
Clearly, eros or sexual/spousal love is not enough. Again, the Petersons write, 
Intimacy is not identical with romance, and marital love is not so different 
from other human loves that one cannot practice on one’s parents, siblings, 
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neighbors, and friends. On the contrary: one learns to love precisely by loving 
and being loved.116  
 
Rather than beginning with spousal love for an understanding of the nature of love as 
self-gift, the Petersons suggest that the Christian love upon which marriages should be 
built can be learned outside of marriage—as children growing up in families, in 
friendships, in relations in the church. It is the wider community of love which teaches 
and enables the particular forms of love which marriage requires/entails. 
…Christian love is unitive and community forming; it weaves people together 
into familial and churchly networks of mutual care and dependence on one 
another and on God. Husbands and wives, neighbors and friends, children and 
grandchildren, widows and orphans, all are adopted by God into the 
household of the church and invited to love and care for one another in ways 
that certainly include the bond of marriage but also include a range of other 
human relationships, all of which involve real connection, real intimacy, real 
enjoyment of other people, a real participation in the redemptive work of God 
in the world.117 
 
Like McCarthy, the Petersons are working to place marriage within a broader community 
of love. At the same time, they warn their readers, “Many of us are unaccustomed to 
either the demands or the rewards of the cultivation of community, but this is a 
fundamental Christian virtue, one that is essential to the practice of Christian 
marriage.”118 The Petersons and McCarthy are correct to relocate love within the wider 
community. Their analyses invite further theological reflection.  
 
Relocating Love in the Social Trinity 
 
 McCarthy’s critique of the theological foundations of romantic personalism points 
the way to the necessary correction of these traditions.  
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Christian love, from the start, begins outside of me and you, but when 
contemporary theology conceives of the “Me and You” as the original context 
of love, it has difficulty bringing love and sexual desire back from the 
impractical and other worldly sphere of modern romance. 119   
 
McCarthy highlights the Me and You, the I-Thou as the fundamental problem. While 
Barth and others were right to highlight the significance of relationality for humanity 
made in the image of the Trinity, the I-Thou model has nevertheless come to distort the 
social model. Others have noted that Barth’s projection of I-Thou onto the Trinity tends 
to “privilege Father and Son,” obscuring or marginalizing the Spirit.120 
 Although Stanley Grenz leaves behind the language of the I-Thou, he nevertheless 
employs a model of the Trinity which also privileges the relationality between the Father 
and the Son. Despite his willingness to use the term “social Trinity,”121 Grenz never 
strays from Augustine’s model which depicts the Father and Son in loving relation and 
the Spirit as the bond of love which unites them. 
The narrator [of Genesis 2] presents marriage as the joining of two persons 
who share a fundamental sameness as “flesh of one flesh” and yet differ from 
each other as male and female. This human dynamic reminds us of the 
dynamic within the Triune God. …the divine life entails the relationship 
between the first and second persons who share the same divine essence but 
are nevertheless differentiated from each other. The bond uniting them is the 
divine love, the third Trinitarian person, the Holy Spirit. As marriage 
incorporates its divinely-given design to be the intimate, permanent bond 
arising out of the interplay of sameness and difference, this human 
relationship reflects the exclusive relationship of love found within the 
Trinity, the unique relationship between the Father and the Son concretized in 
the Holy Spirit.122 
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 While friendship (philia) and familial affection/compassion (storge) can be 
understood as including more than two persons, most theologians speak of eros as the 
love of two.  Grenz locates eros in “The desire for communion [which] is especially 
evident in the relationship of the Son to the Father.”123   
Moreover, the theological assertion that God is love indicates that the bonding 
that characterizes the divine life stands as the transcendent archetype for the 
dialectic of differentiation and commonality present in the dynamic of human 
sexuality. As was noted previously, the eternal generation of the Son constitutes 
the first trinitarian person as the Father of the Son and the second person as the 
Son of the Father, yet the two are bound together by the love they share, a bond 
that characterizes the divine nature as a whole but also emerges as a separate 
hypostasis in the third person, the Holy Spirit. In this way, the love that 
characterizes the relationship of the Father and the Son in the differentiation of 
each from the other means that they likewise share the sameness of the divine 
nature—that is, love. 
 
Similarly, when John Paul II draws the comparison between Trinitarian love and 
spousal love, he highlights the relation between Father and Son, recalling Jesus’ words in 
John 17:10, “All that is mine is yours and yours is mine, and I am glorified in them.”124 
Grenz sees a similarity between his understanding of the Holy Spirit as the love (self-gift) 
of Father and Son, and the trinitarian thought of John Paul II.125 Both theologians employ 
Augustine’s understanding of the Trinity which identifies only the Father and the Son as 
persons who love while the Spirit is presented as the love or the gift exchanged/shared 
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between these two.  While neither denies the personality of the Spirit, the emphasis 
placed on the first two persons within this model tends to downplay the reciprocity of the 
Spirit within the Trinity. As John Paul II wrote in his Letter to Families, “The divine 
‘We’ is the eternal pattern of the human ‘we,’ formed by the man and the woman created 
in the divine image and likeness.”126 
It is possible that the Augustinian model of the Trinity allows for the projection of 
eros onto the Godhead in a way that newer presentations of the social Trinity would 
not.127 More recent “social” models emphasize not only the relationality of the Father and 
Son but also speak of the Spirit as “I” and a “Thou,” one who loves and is loved by 
Father and Son.128 Reflections on divine love which begin with the relationality of three 
do not lead as quickly to analogies of human marriage, eros, or sexuality. A social model 
of the Trinity encourages the primacy of loves which are not restricted to a community of 
two. Emphasizing the difference between human marriage as a union of two and the 
Trinity as a union of three will highlight the difference between the type of union created 
by marriage and that which exists in the Godhead. Recovering the transcendent ground of 
love as the social Trinity places marriage and the conjugal sexual union in its proper 
place. It can stand as a subset, as one of the ways in which God’s love can be worked out 
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in human community, without elevating marital union as closer to divine union than the 
communion enjoyed by close friends or loving family members. Marriage is the union of 
two who do not complete one another but who complement and help the other all the 
while embedded in other interdependent relationships which uphold and enrich marital 
union. Marriage is not the icon of the social Trinity but an image of divine love. Marital 
love is upheld and embedded in the love of God that is higher, wider, deeper and broader 
than the love which marriage reflects. 
Grenz’s progressive account of the imago, which views the male-female relation 
as the primal image rather than the telos of the imago Dei offers a way forward but only 
when it is delivered from his insistence that ecclesial bonding is based upon human 
sexuality. While the human family grows through sexual union, the family of God grows 
through adoption—as humans respond out of (non-sexual) need to the redeeming love of 
God. The social imago as the ecclesial/eschatological community is the proper image of 
the social Trinity. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Gillbert Herdt, in his preface to the anthology, Third Sex, Third Gender: Beyond 
Sexual Dimorphism in Culture and History, explains that he employs the category “third” 
not to limit the options to one more than two but to deconstruct the contrasts and 
comparisons which arise within a binary system.129 A fully social trinitarianism will take 
seriously the presence of a third who does not undermine duality but opens up the kinds 
of relations possible by moving beyond two subjects in relation. Reading divine 
relationality through the lens of the I-Thou or male-female leads more readily to the 
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ontological duality of Yin and Yang, rather than the fruitful community of the Trinity. It 
is the Spirit who enlarges the relationship of Father and Son, beyond two and ultimately 
beyond three, folding the multitude of believers into the perichoretic union of the 
Godhead.130 It is the Spirit who guards against misreading the Trinity through an I-Thou 
which leaves us with little more than “the self-absorbed life of the Father and the Son, the 
One and the Other, exhausted in their dualism.”131   
By recovering the canonical place of Adam and Eve, theologians can affirm their 
position as the progenitors of human relationality without holding them up as the 
paradigmatic form of human relationality in the image of the relational God. Relocating 
love from the binary model of spousal sexuality into the wider community of extended 
family, neighborhood, and ecclesia retains the social imago while delivering it from 
sexual distortions. It is the recovery of the social Trinity that can protect theologians 
from sexualizing Trinitarian love and from asking more of human sexuality than it can 
possibly bear. Such a shift should help retain the goodness of human sexuality without 
elevating it in such a way that Christian sexual ethics are undermined, celibacy is 
devalued, and sexual dysfunction is misread as spiritual dysfunction. Such a vision 
makes space for the unmarried, the non-sexually active, for eunuchs, and for intersexed 
persons to be recognized as fully made in the image of God—for these, too, are called 
into the community of faith as members of the social imago. 
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The social Trinity does provide the transcendent ground for the social imago—the 
understanding that humankind is called into being by a God who is a community of love 
and called to reflect that God through relations of love that restore, build, and heal 
community. In such a community, sex difference—male, female, and intersex—is but 
one difference among many and sexuality is kept in its proper place so that genuine 
communion can exist between men, women, and intersex persons in ways that bring 
wholeness to all.  
 This is the community which John Paul II and Stanley Grenz want to ground 
in the social Trinity even while both understand that the fulfillment of this vision 
awaits the coming of God’s reign. Thus, it is to the tension of the already/not yet in 
the postmodern present that we turn to conclude our study. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
JESUS THE TRUE IMAGO: 
SEX, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY  
IN THE POSTMODERN ALREADY/NOT YET 
 
 
Chapters four and five demonstrated that while Evangelical and Roman Catholic 
theologians begin their theological anthropologies with the narratives of Adam and Eve 
in the Garden of Eden, both traditions are looking to Jesus as the true image of God and 
to the eschaton for the final form of humanity made in the image of God. They insist that 
as helpful as the creation accounts may be, these are not to be understood as the paradigm 
for humanity. Rather, true humanity is found in Christ as a future toward which we are 
moving. 
 
JESUS AS THE TRUE IMAGE:   
CHRISTOLOGICAL AND ESCHATOLOGICAL TENSIONS 
 
Jesus the Eschatological Imago  
in John Paul II and Stanley Grenz 
 
Although he does not make this distinction in his Theology of the Body, in The 
Trinity’s Embrace, John Paul II teaches that there are two dimensions of life offered to 
the human creature. The first is “physical and historical” and speaks to the divine image 
present in every human person—especially to human relationality and “the human 
couple’s procreative capacity.”1 The second is “spiritual”:  
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[It] expresses our communion of love with the Father, through Christ in the 
power of the Holy Spirit:  ‘The proof that you are sons is the fact that God has 
sent forth into our hearts the Spirit of his Son which cries out “Abba!” 
(“Father!”). You are no longer a slave but a son!  And the fact that you are a 
son makes you an heir by God’s design’ (Gal 4:6-7). 
Through grace this transcendent life instilled in us opens us to the future, 
beyond the limits of our frailty as creatures…2 
 
Quoting Evangelium Vitae (The Gospel of Life) he concludes: 
 
The dignity of this life is linked not only to its beginning, to the fact that it 
comes from God, but also to its final end, to its destiny of fellowship with 
God, in knowledge of love of him.3 
 
Still, it is not clear in John Paul II’s work whether this eschatological trajectory 
introduces anything new to his theological anthropology. The eschatological imago as 
“communio personarum” is presented as a return to the relationality found in the Garden.4 
Similarly, he writes that “the world itself, restored to its original state, facing no further 
obstacles, should be at the service of the just, ‘sharing their glorification in the risen Jesus 
Christ’.” 5    
Stanley Grenz introduces his exploration of the eschatological imago toward the 
end of his theological anthropology by means of the following paragraph: 
[T]he claim that by means of the imago dei the dialectic of difference and 
commonality characteristic of human bonding offers an analogy to the 
dynamic within the eternal triune life does not mean that the true reflection of 
the image of God lies in the marital union of male and female. On the 
contrary, the New Testament reserves this place for the new humanity and, 
consequently, for the church as its prolepsis and sign. What John Knox 
concludes regarding Pauline thought, therefore, represents well the tenor of 
the New Testament as a whole: love ‘belongs essentially within the Christian 
community and has meaning there which it cannot have outside.’ In this 
manner, the ecclesial self becomes the self constituted by love; yet love 
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constitutes the ecclesial self in a particular manner. Paul describes the mystery 
of the Christian life by means of the simple designation ‘in Christ.’   
According to this metaphor, believers are constituted by their 
participation in Christ’s own life, and their identity emerges from union with 
Christ. Because Jesus Christ is the eternal Son, those who are united with him 
share in the Son’s relationship to God. Although this is the case already in the 
here and now, the participation in the divine life that constitutes the ecclesial 
self remains ultimately future, and hence it is present in this age only in a 
proleptic manner. The ecclesial self, therefore, is ultimately, eschatological.6   
 
 As this project has shown, Grenz’s progressive account of the imago begins with 
the sexual differentiation of Adam and Eve, moves from their sexual bond to Christ—the 
“true image”—who relates to the Father, not only through philia and agape but also eros 
(the desire for communion with the beloved characteristic of the love between God the 
Son and God the Father). But the telos of the imago resides in the incorporation of 
believers into Christ, an incorporation that draws upon the metaphor of sexual bonding in 
marriage. Grenz believes that his project thus avoids the error he ascribed to Barth, whose 
use of I-Thou relations ultimately left sexuality behind.  
In a similar manner, John Paul II also attempts to preserve the value of sex 
differentiation through his understanding of the “spousal meaning of the body,” a 
meaning preserved in the eschaton despite the fact that marital relations are left behind.    
the ‘spousal’ meaning of the body in the resurrection to the future life will 
perfectly correspond both to the fact that man as male-female is a person, 
created in the ‘image and likeness of God,’ and to the fact that this image is 
realized in the communion of persons. That ‘spousal’ meaning of being a 
body will, therefore, be realized as a meaning that is perfectly personal and 
communitarian at the same time.7 
 
 Both Grenz and John Paul II attempt to preserve the significance of sex, gender, 
and sexuality for human personhood by reading the relation of the believer to God and 
others in the ecclesial community through the lens of spousal sexuality. However, by 
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conflating sex, gender, and sexuality they fail to recognize that sex and gender are not 
necessarily preserved by a vision of sexuality that can be divorced from sex and gender 
differentiation. If sexuality can be ascribed of God, if eros can properly be spoken of as 
one of the loves which is shared by Father and Son, then the preservation of sexuality, 
while it might preserve the differentiation of personhood does not necessarily ensure the 
significance of sex and/or gender differentiation (given the traditional gendered names 
for the first and second person of the Trinity). In addition, Christological and 
Eschatological visions of humanity as imago Dei can be employed to challenge the place 
of sex/gender differentiation for human personhood as much as it can be used to preserve 
them. These tensions must be addressed if we are to present a balanced vision of the 
place of sex, gender, and sexuality in theological anthropology in the postmodern present. 
 
Christological and Eschatological Tensions 
 
Jesus the Man 
 
 The Vatican II document, Gaudium et Spes, lays out Roman Catholic theological 
anthropology as it relates to the doctrine of Christ. The authors of this document declare: 
The most perfect answer to these questions [of the meaning of human 
existence] is found in God alone, who created women and men in his own 
image and redeemed them from sin; and this answer is given in the revelation 
in Christ his Son who became man. To follow Christ the perfect human is to 
become more human oneself.8 
 
Earlier in this same document one finds a similar affirmation: 
 
The mystery of man becomes clear only in the mystery of the incarnate Word. 
Adam, the first man (primus homo), was a type of the future, which is of Christ 
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our Lord. Christ, the new Adam, in revealing the mystery of the Father and his 
love, makes man fully clear to himself, makes clear his high vocation.9  
 
Commenting on both of the above quotations, Janet Martin Soskice identifies, “The 
unanswered question,” i.e., “does Christ make woman fully clear to herself?” She 
continues, 
The Latin of the instruction uses the more inclusive homo/homine, but the 
patterning is upon Adam and Christ, both male. What can it mean for women 
to say that ‘Whoever follows Christ, the perfect man, himself becomes more 
of a man’ (§41: Quicumque Christum sequitur, Hominem perfectum, et ipse 
magis homo fit)?  Do those aspects in which a woman is to become perfected 
or “more of a man” include only those aspects she shares with males, like her 
intellect and her life of virtue, or do they also include her mothering, her 
loving, her sense of her own embodiment which must be different from that of 
a man?  Is Christ the fulfillment of female “men”, as well as male “men”, and 
if so, how?10 
 
Recognizing the same problem that Soskice identifies, Liberation theologian Leonardo 
Boff feared “that the incarnation divinized maleness explicitly but femaleness only 
implicitly.”11 Boff attempted to rectify the situation by suggesting that just as the Logos 
became incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth, so the Holy Spirit also became incarnate in the 
female flesh of Mary. “Consequently, Boff elevates Jesus and Mary together as 
representing the whole of humanity as well as ‘the eschatological event of the full 
divinization of men and women in the Kingdom of God.’”12 Even though Boff’s solution 
will appear unacceptable to most Protestants, and even goes beyond the Mariology of the 
Vatican, nevertheless, he has identified one problem inherent in Roman Catholic and 
Evangelical Christological anthropologies—the problem of Jesus the man. 
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 Some early Christians believed that redemption for women included their 
transformation into men, so that they could be fully conformed to the image of God, sons 
and heirs of God’s promised redemption.13 Certainly, as Chapters 2 and 3 of this 
dissertation revealed, most ancient commentators at least presented the redemption of 
women as their development of virtue—an ideal never (fully) separated from manliness 
until the 19th and 20th centuries. And within the one-sex model of the ancient world, the 
attainment of full humanity and virtue could only be gained by moving up the ladder 
toward masculine perfection. 
Contrastively, other early Christians, along with Origen, believed that humans 
looked forward to a sexless existence in the eschaton. Ironically, both traditions—the 
tradition of masculine perfection and that of sexless or androgynous humanity—draw 
from the same section of Paul’s letter to the Galatians. 
For you are all sons of God through faith in Christ Jesus. For all of you who 
were baptized into Christ have clothed yourselves with Christ. There is neither 
Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free man, there is neither male nor 
female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus. And if you belong to Christ, then 
you are Abraham's offspring, heirs according to promise… 
 …But when the fullness of the time came, God sent forth His Son, born of 
a woman, born under the Law, in order that He might redeem those who were 
under the Law, that we might receive the adoption as sons. And because you 
are sons, God has sent forth the Spirit of His Son into our hearts, crying, 
“Abba! Father!” Therefore you are no longer a slave, but a son; and if a son, 
then an heir through God.14 
 
The tradition of masculine perfection follows the language of sonship. Jesus as 
Son brings about the redemption of every human, each becoming a son through 
incorporation into the Son. Jesus grants sonship to those who have clothed themselves 
with Christ. The tradition of sonship hearkens back to the last association of the image 
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 Gal. 3:26-29; 4:4-7 
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with Adam and Eve in the Old Testament, found in Genesis 5:1-3 (“…he became the 
father of a son in his own likeness, according to his image, and named him Seth”),15 and 
emphasizes the similarity between Father and Son recalled in Hebrews 1:3 (“The Son is 
the radiance of God's glory and the exact representation of his being”). In this tradition, 
the figure of a daughter would highlight dissimilarity, rather than similarity. Grenz argues 
that the language of sonship emphasizes love: “this is the theological meaning of the 
language ‘Father’ and ‘Son,’ for in ancient cultures, the son was the heir, the one upon 
whom the father lavishes all his wealth.”16 But his interpretation may not reflect the 
genuine love which fathers had for daughters in the ancient world. It was not love which 
required the inheritance to be passed from father to son, rather than father to daughter; it 
was the expectation that the son would grow up to be like the father—becoming a father 
himself, in need of an estate to support his own family. The emphasis on the similarity of 
father and son, or the preferential love of father to son, displays the challenge that 
emphasis on sonship introduces for women, intersex persons, eunuchs or other 
“unmanly” men who did not or could not aspire to become paterfamilias. 
I Corinthians 11:7 and 15:47-49 were read in such a way as to support this 
exegetical tradition:   
For a man ought not to have his head veiled, since he is the image and 
reflection of God; but woman is the reflection of man. 
 
The First man (anthropos) was from the earth, a man of dust: the second man 
is from heaven. As was the man of dust, so are those who are of the dust; and 
as is the man of heaven, so are those who are of heaven. Just as we have borne 
                                                 
15
 “This is the book of the generations of Adam. In the day when God created [the adam], He 
made him [the adam] in the likeness of God. He created them male and female, and He blessed them 
and named them Man [adam] in the day when they were created. When Adam had lived one hundred 
and thirty years, he became the father of a son in his own likeness, according to his image, and named 
him Seth.” Gen. 5:1-3 
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 Stanley J. Grenz, “Belonging to God: The Quest for Communal Spirituality in the Postmodern 
World,” Asbury Theological Journal 54 no. 2 (Fall 1999): 47. 
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the image of the man of dust, we will also bear the image of the man of 
heaven. 
 
Janet Martin Soskice explains:   
If Jesus Christ, unquestionably male, is the image of the invisible God, and we 
will all bear the image of the “man of heaven,” then it seemed reasonable to 
some to conclude that women will be resurrected as men. Augustine to his 
lasting credit said ‘no’ to this and rejected at the same time the more orthodox 
view, that the resurrected body will be “sexless.”17   
 
Although Soskice praises Augustine for rejecting such views, Augustine certainly 
wrestled with the tensions of these texts so that in the same section of his De Trinitate he 
can argue that women can be renewed in the image of God as they direct their minds 
away from “the government of temporal things” (7.7.12) while only a few sentences 
earlier he stated that woman is not the image of God alone, but only when united to her 
husband (7.7.10). Augustine’s argument that a woman can only be the image of God 
when united to her husband is not the same position as that held by Barth, Grenz, and 
John Paul II (who emphasize the need for both sexes to adequately image God) for 
Augustine insisted that a man can be said to be the image even when not united to his 
wife (7.7.10).   
By extension of Augustine’s logic, it is only through marriage to Christ, the true 
husband/man/image of God, that any human (male, female, intersexed, eunuch) is 
renewed in the image of God. As Tryon Inbody summarizes, “Jesus himself, who is 
called the Christ, is unique, definitive, archetypal, and normative for both the Christian 
understanding of the nature of God and of human beings.”18 As feminists have insisted, 
Jesus the God/Man has transformed both God and Man into male categories. These can 
function as emasculating all humans as they relate to the true “Man” or as a way to 
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 Soskice, The Kindness of God, 44. 
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 Tyron L. Inbody, The Many Faces of Christology (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2002), 117. 
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exclude and/or oppress anyone who is not a “man”—women, eunuchs, intersexed, and 
unmanly men.  
Christ’s unique place as True God, True Man, True Image bequeaths a 
complicated legacy for theological anthropology. And yet, other commentators look to 
this same section of Galatians, especially 3:28, as a way to counter the tradition of 
masculine perfection.  
 
“In Christ there is no longer… male and female” 
 
As Chapter 2 documented, those interpreters who emphasized the transformation 
of sex differentiation in the eschaton connected Galatians 3:28 with the eunuchs of 
Matthew 19:12 and the angels who do not marry in Matthew 22:30. Eunuchs came to be 
associated with angels on account of their (supposed) sexual continence, their freedom 
from the obligations of marriage (especially its ties to the economic structures of the 
day), their alternative gender, and their function as “perfect servants,” loyal to their 
masters over natural family ties, and able to mediate divided realms (heaven/earth, 
male/female, sacred/secular, royalty/commoners). Eunuchs and angels represented an 
alternative sex, an alternative gender, and an alternative sexuality. By connecting eunuchs 
and angels, the Church fathers were forced to consider the significance of sex, gender, 
and sexuality in the “already” and the “not yet”.  
 Many New Testament scholars have also noted that Jesus’ failure to live up to 
ancient ideals of masculinity, particularly his abstention from marriage and the fathering 
of children, may stand behind his defense of the eunuch in Matthew 19:12. Davies and 
Allison write, 
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Jesus frequently picked upon the names he was called—glutton, drunkard, 
blasphemer, friend of toll-collectors and sinners—to turn them around for 
some good end, it seems possible enough that Mt 19.12 was originally an 
apologetical encounter, a response to the jeer that Jesus was a eunuch.19   
 
Despite their willingness to suggest that Jesus was harassed as a eunuch, all of 
these commentators seem to suggest that this was only a jeer, an insult thrown at Jesus 
because of his unwillingness to marry. None of them consider whether Jesus could have 
accomplished salvation for the world as a literal eunuch. While many liberation feminists 
have argued that the Messiah may not have been recognized as such had the second 
person of the Trinity become incarnate as a woman—nor would a female “Christa” have 
been able to challenge the patriarchal order of the ancient world—none have considered 
what Jesus’ incarnation as a eunuch, perhaps as a man with Klinefelter’s Syndrome, one 
naturally “caught-between” the sexes, would mean for Christology and anthropology.20 
While I am not making the case for an intersex Christ, I do want to challenge Christo-
logical constructions that assume the necessity of Christ’s maleness as well as his 
incarnation as “a male with the same physiological and hormonal makeup of all males.”21 
 Queer theologians have seized upon the declaration of Galatians 3:28 and 
proclaimed a queer Christ “whose own life and teaching runs against the grain of modern 
heterosexuality, a Jesus like us.”22 Virginia Ramey Mollenkott, in her book, Omnigender, 
argues that the baptismal formula in Galatians 3:28 should imply not only “that the social 
and political advantages of being male in patriarchal cultures were to be shared equitably 
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with females” but that it can and should be read literally—erasing the distinction between 
men and women so that others are included not only in the eschatological community but 
in the present inauguration of that vision.23 She looks for a literal fulfillment of omni-
gender in Jesus himself, seizing upon a parthenogenetic account of the Virgin birth, given 
by Edward L. Kessel (emeritus professor of biology at the University of San Francisco). 
Kessel suggested that a parthenogenetic conception (the development of an unfertilized 
ovum) would have rendered Jesus chromosomally female (XX since he took his flesh 
entirely from Mary his mother).24 His phenotypic presentation as male may have come 
about through natural sex reversal.25 While Mollenkott’s recital of Kessel’s proposal does 
not list a specific intersex condition as a possible reason for “sex reversal,” I would 
suggest that a severe case of Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia in an XX fetus could have 
produced a substantial enough phallus for sex assignment as male and the development of 
male secondary sex development. Mollenkott ponders, 
I cannot help making a connection to the Genesis depiction of a God who is 
imaged as both male and female and yet is literally neither one nor the other. 
A chromosomally female, phenotypically male Jesus would come as close as a 
human body could come to a perfect image of such a God. And since I do not 
share Kessel’s view that hermaphrodites or intersexual people are necessarily 
pathological or defective, it seems to me that from the perspective of his 
findings, intersexuals come closer than anybody to a physical resemblance of 
Jesus.26 
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 Mollenkott, viii. 
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 Ironically, ancient embryology led to the opposite conclusion:  “God as source of generation, 
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Mollenkott does not move from here to privileging intersex persons as the only adequate 
representatives of Jesus, as if only intersex persons should be ordained, etc. Rather, she 
employs this account to deconstruct the privileges conferred upon men as the only 
adequate representatives of a male Christ and masculine God. Her vision begins with an 
omnigender God, who creates humans in this image (“male and female”), who is 
embodied by Jesus (the parthenogenetic female-male Christ), and ultimately 
consummated in the male or female, male and female, transgendered community that 
makes up the Body of Christ, the Church. 
We have already seen that Jesus of Nazareth is not exclusively a male Savior 
after all, judging from his/her parthenogenic [sic] birth. Now we see that Holy 
Scripture depicts Christian men as his/her brides and Christian women as 
his/her brothers. At the very least, such biblical gender blending ought to 
encourage those who take scripture seriously to become less rigid about 
gender identities, roles, and presentations.27  
 
Where other scholars use the multiplicity and overlap of gendered descriptions to argue 
for metaphor against literality,28 Mollenkott, and other queer theologians, argue for a 
literal reading of transgendered or omnigendered language in the Scriptures.  
 Cornwall highlights the fluidity of gendered imagery especially in medieval 
devotion and mysticism.  
Although it is anachronistic to project contemporary constructions of sexuality 
and gender identity back onto communities which understood them very 
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differently, it is important to recognize that even Christians have not always 
understood maleness and femaleness, masculinity and femininity as either-or, 
mutually-exclusive categories in exactly the ways that one might suppose. 
Caroline Walker Bynum, Sarah Coakley, Michael Nausner and others have 
usefully reflected on unusual or even overtly “gender-bending” figurings of 
gender in the medieval mystics, in Gregory of Nyssa and elsewhere…29  What 
this means is that “queer,” transgressive and “crossing” bodies are always 
already present to theology in its own past, and that “atypical” intersexed or 
transsexual bodies therefore already map onto the mixed-up, much-inscribed 
Body of Christ.30 
 
Reflecting on the same material, Janet Soskice remarks: 
A striking medieval example… can be found in Julian of Norwich. So much 
has been made of Julian’s dramatic styling of Christ as mother that we almost 
fail to notice the splendour of Revelations of Divine Love as a piece of 
Trinitarian theology. …in placing great emphasis on Christ as our Mother, she 
is at once provocative and altogether orthodox: Jesus was indubitably male, 
yet, if he is to be the perfection of our humanity, he must also be the 
perfection of female humanity.31 
 
All of these theologians are attempting to break open the maleness of Jesus, in order to 
open up space for women and others. Soskice looks to the gender-blending imagery of 
the mystics as helpful yet metaphorical (“Jesus was indubitably male”). Cornwall focuses 
on the ecclesial Body of Christ in its plurality of human bodies—male, female, 
intersexed, transgendered, etc. Mollenkott looks to the gender-blending of both Church 
and Christ “him/herself.” 
Like Mollenkott, J. David Hester takes the sex/gender-blending of eunuchs 
literally, connecting the “transgressive body of the eunuch that symbolizes the kingdom” 
to the “baptismal formula of Gal. 3:28” in celebration of “the Postgender Jesus” and 
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“transgressive sexualities.”32 Cornwall concurs that the maleness of Jesus is “already a 
complicated picture” being that Jesus stands for both masculinity and femininity. Jesus is 
the husband/head of the church/bride before whom men must become as submissive 
wives. But Jesus also stands as the (feminine) receiver, the other to whom God the Father 
relates as (masculine) initiator—the super-masculine.33   
Given the sex/gender-blending of Jesus’ person—either in his gender role 
performance or his very body—combined with the eschatological proclamation that in 
“Christ there is no longer… male and female” it is no wonder that intersex and 
transgender theologians are questioning the binary model of societal organization. The 
central question which frames the contemporary debate is the question of “When?”:  
“when the overturning of these sex-gender differences is supposed to take place.”34  
Chapter 2 illustrated that many early Christians recognized the challenge of 
eschatology for sex and gender distinctions; nevertheless, most relegated sexual activity 
to the present life—connected as it was to birth and death. The eschatological end of 
marriage, which Jesus declared in Matthew 22:30, was believed to indicate the end of 
sexual activity. After the condemnation of Origen, on account of their desire to uphold 
the resurrection of the body, a consensus began to form that while sex identity would 
remain at the resurrection, gender and sexuality would be altered in the coming kingdom. 
Early Christian commentators rejected the idea that sexual relations would continue after 
the resurrection and most envisioned a transformation of gender, particularly the 
transformation of female subordination brought about on account of the sin of Eve or the 
supposed natural inferiority of the female sex confirmed through the institution of 
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marriage (which required obedience to husbands) and the hierarchical ordering of church 
and state.35 Although some church fathers were willing to speak of a sexless soul, and the 
reworking of sex/gender relations in the eschaton, they continued to draw a sharp divide 
between this life and the next. As Matthew Kuefler observed, their theological anthro-
pologies protected the power structures of the present age, “rendering the genderless ideal 
of earliest Christianity quaint but harmless.”36   
Given the renewed emphasis on the place of eschatology for theological anthro-
pology, contemporary commentators are reconsidering that interpretive move. Some 
contemporary theologians believe that by putting off the reordering of sex and gender to 
an eschatological future, significant harm will continue to be perpetrated in the present. It 
is the power of the eschatological vision to transform injustices in this life, inaugurating 
the justice of the coming kingdom, which has led theologians to reconsider the signify-
cance of Galatians 3:28 for life in the “already.” Cornwall wrestles with these complex-
ities, noting that the inauguration of sex/gender transformation in the “realized temporal 
world… seems too unrealistic or utopian for most theologians to take seriously.”37 
I am not proposing that intersexed individuals are harbingers of the Gal. 3.28-
order, liminal or united firstfruits of the coming age. It would be highly 
problematic to use them in this way. But even if it would be naïve to read Gal. 
3.28 as a simple prophesy of sexual androgyny in this present realm, it must 
be read as questioning something about the way in which females and males 
relate to one another in God’s economy. The Galatians text implies that there 
is something about participation in Christ, about perichoresis between Christ 
and the church and between humans, which means that even such apparently 
self-evident concepts as sexed nature are not to be taken as read in the nascent 
new order.38 
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In her exegesis of Galatians 3:28, Cornwall focuses on the conjunction male and female 
as opposed to the comparison found in the first two couplings (Jew or Greek, slave or 
free). She argues,  
The assertion that there is no male and female in Christ does not necessarily 
mean that there is no male or female; biological reproduction in its present 
form is therefore still possible. However, what no longer exists in Christ is the 
all-encompassing cipher “male-and-female” for humanity. Humanity does not 
exist in Christ only as male-and-female as they relate to each other. … 
wherein humans are completed as humans only by so-called sexual 
complementarity.39 
 
Like Mollenkott, Cornwall wants to open up space for others, envisioning “a 
society where sex and gender do not work as a binary but rather as a continuum or a 
multiplicity, and where anatomy (particularly genital anatomy) is not unproblematically 
used as a cipher for identity.”40 She continues, 
If male-and-female is passing away, then it need not stand for or encompass 
everyone; human bodies need not be altered to ‘fit’ it, particularly before 
those who live in them (like neonates with intersex/DSD conditions) can 
express an opinion… The “no more male-and-female in Christ” then, means 
no more taxonomies of goodness or perfection attached to the success or 
otherwise of how a given body meets certain criteria for maleness or 
femalesness. …The end—the cessation—of male-and-female is the end—the 
telos—for humanity. This is the crux of reading Gal. 3.28 in a more than 
future sense, for a realized eschatology is rooted in the already, the possibility 
for the redemption of this present realm.41 
 
 
Inaugurating Christ’s Eschatological Justice 
 
 While eschatology and christology do provide fruitful ground for theological 
anthropology, their answers to the significance of sex, gender, and sexuality are 
ambivalent—at times raising more questions than they answer. What can be clearly 
observed, however, is that those who have shifted away from the “Jesus the Man” 
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paradigm to “In Christ there is no longer… male and female” do so on account of a 
concern to address injustices in the human community in light of the righteousness of 
God to be revealed in the coming kingdom, inaugurated already but not yet fulfilled. 
 Cornwall notes how eschatology can be used either as an escape from 
responsibility to pursue justice in the present or as motivation to work with God in 
inaugurating the kingdom.42 Reflecting on the implications for the debates surrounding 
intersex surgery, she writes, 
A belief that bodies will be ‘fixed’ after death sometimes makes it too easy to 
dismiss the struggles faced currently, but an attitude that human beings might 
be co-redeemers with Christ encourages endeavouring to do everything 
possible to eradicate enforced discommodity and promote inclusion.43  
 
She insists,  
Healing is not simply about individuals, but about communities—overcoming 
fears about a subsuming of identity which then provoke a desperate clinging 
to arbitrary categories. It is this which then leads to an unwillingness to accept 
those who are ‘other’—the impaired, the intersexed, the liminal—perhaps out 
of a fear that to speak with someone necessitates losing one’s own voice.44  
 
 The question to be answered is how best to work toward the eschatological justice 
which God’s kingdom is already bringing but which is far from complete. Among those 
thinking theologically about intersex, three solutions have been proffered: Omnigender 
proposed by Virginia Ramey Mollenkott, the End of Gender proposal of J. David Hester 
and the Kenosis of Sex Identity posited by Susannah Cornwall. All three begin with an 
earnest desire to bring freedom to the oppressed: to intersex persons, LGBTQ persons, 
and anyone else oppressed by the binary gender model and the heteronormativity upon 
which it is based. 
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Omnigender  
 
Mollenkott argues that opening up the binary model to include more gender 
options and the blurring/queering of these categories are the ways to correct gender 
injustice in society. She laments,  
the traditional assignment of males to the more powerful roles of the public 
sphere and females to the more supportive roles of the private sphere has 
brought with it a host of inequities. Money, prestige, influence, and honor are 
accorded to those who function publicly but domestic work is hardly 
respected as work, let alone financially rewarded. …such injustice renders 
urgent the need for a new gender pluralism, a nonhierarchical omnigender 
paradigm.45 
 
Following the recommendations of Martine Rothblatt, transman (a male-to-female 
transsexual) and author of The Apartheid of Sex, Mollenkott suggests the following 
changes to societal organization:46 
Children would be brought up as males, or females, or simply as persons, 
according to the option of their parents—at least until the child is old enough 
to decide and express their own gender identity… In such a society intersexual 
babies could comfortably be brought up that way until they could express their 
own preference about sex assignment, hormones, and surgery. 
There would be no sex/gender typing on governmental records such as 
birth, marriage or death certificates, passports, and motor vehicle licenses … 
Bathrooms in a gender-fluid society would be unisexual. Inside they 
would look like women’s restrooms today: no urinals, only sit-down toilets 
enclosed in privacy stalls. (As I write, a marine troop carrier, the USS San 
Antonio, is being built without urinals in any of the heads, as precursor of the 
society to come.)  Children would be taught to sit down to urinate, regardless 
of their genitals. To discourage sexual predators, public lavatory space would 
be under automatic video surveillance; but simply the fact that any person of 
any gender, age, strength, and sexuality might enter the rest room at any time 
should in itself be an important deterrent to rape or other unwanted 
attentions.47 
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Sports and prisons would no longer be sex segregated, a proposal she believes will be 
more equitable for all.48   
Since separate is never equal, athletes with vaginas would at last have equal 
access to sports arenas, practice times and areas, top athletic scholarships and 
salaries, and first-rate coaching. And people with atypical chromosomal 
makeup would no longer be humiliated by exclusion from competition.49  
 
In many ways their proposal suggest something like a return to the one-sex 
paradigm of the Classical Greco-Roman period except that in this model the differences 
inhering in the one sex are not organized hierarchically. In this, Mollenkott parts ways 
with other trans-gender theorists, such as Holly Devor, who suggests that masculinity and 
femininity are immature stages in human development while transgender is presented as 
the new model of gender perfection.  
I hope and trust that in an omnigender culture, “masculine” men and 
“feminine” women would not necessarily be judged as immature but would be 
acceptable as anyone else as long as they were truly comfortable and fulfilled 
by that gendering. Our goal is not to produce a different gender underclass, 
but to do away with gender hierarchies altogether.50 
 
Mollenkott should certainly be applauded for her genuine concern for equality but 
her proposal overlooks the fact that justice often requires treating people differently 
rather than the same. Justice requires special attention to the vulnerable, and global 
statistics continue to show that women and children make up the largest percentage of the 
most vulnerable. When “[w]omen aged fifteen through forty-four are more likely to be 
maimed or die from male violence than from cancer, malaria, traffic accidents, and war 
combined” eliminating gender segregated bathrooms and prisons hardly sounds like the 
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most compassionate response.51 It is true that intersex and transgendered persons are also 
targets of (typically male) violence. It would seem that working toward equal safety for 
all might require paying more attention to difference (e.g., family, unisex, handicapped 
bathrooms) rather than eliding difference in the name of equality. 
 
The End of Gender  
 
J. David Hester’s scheme is slightly different. Hester is dissatisfied with proposals 
such as those by Kessler and McKenna who employ intersex to argue that there is no 
such thing as sex, only gender. He reverses the constructivists’ perspective by arguing 
that the recognition of multiple sexes eradicates the gender paradigm altogether.  
“Having” a sex is different than “being” a gender, because even with the 
fluidity of “gender” (and therefore the implicit freedom to deviate) it 
presumes a stable body through which gender can be performed, or upon 
which gender can be carved out. But while people ponder the possibility of 
multiplying genders, asking what does it mean to “enact” feminine/masculine/ 
queer/straight/bi-/trans identities, very rarely do people ponder the possibility 
of having no clearly identifiable sex.52 
 
Hester asks “why must we have a sex? …The question to occupy us is no longer how do 
we shape the body, but how does the body also shape us?”53 
I am suggesting a fundamental alternative for gender theorists and gender 
ethicists to ponder: sex is far more important than gender. So important, in 
fact, that when sex does not fit, gender concepts will come and make a sex. 
The body is required to have a sex before subjectivity and agency can be 
ascribed and recognized (cf. AAP RE9958, The delay in naming and 
registering the child.)  Indeed, I would suggest that the lesson from intersexed 
people is that the obligation of a body to have an identifiable sex is the most 
fundamental ethical obligation of our culture. It is only on this basis that 
medical intervention in non-emergent cases of intersexuality can be justified. 
                                                 
51
 Nicholas D. Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn, Half the Sky: Turning Oppression into Opportunity 
for Women Worldwide (New York:  Vintage, 2009), 61. 
52
 Hester, “End of Gender,” 222. 
53
 Ibid., 223; italics original. 
 293
It is only on this basis that legal requirements for sexed identity can be 
explained.54 
 
Whereas social constructionists assume a passive body that is given meaning through 
culture, Hester argues that “intersexed bodies show just the opposite as well: there is no 
such thing as gender, it is all sex.”55 
Responding to Hester’s assertion that intersex brings about the end of gender, 
Cornwall counters by recalling that some intersexed persons are content with the two 
gender model.  
ISNA, for example, insisted that claiming an intersexed identity does not 
necessarily entail situating oneself within a liminal or third gender (Herndon 
2006), although some people with intersex/DSD conditions do identify as 
androgynous. What Hester’s argument actually implies is that intersex/DSD 
bodies are postsex, not postgender. ISNA’s point was that it is possible to 
have a clear gender (which is not necessarily the same as a permanent gender) 
without having an “unambiguous” binary sex.56 
 
Rather than arguing for omnigender or the end of gender, Cornwall suggests an 
alternative proposal. 
 
Kenosis of Sex Identity 
 
 Although she is willing to draw parallels between intersex and gender-queer 
theorists/theologians, Cornwall also reminds these same authors to consider those 
intersex persons who are not asking for a remaking of the world of gender. She warns,  
Making a person “mean” concepts with which they may not wish to be 
associated—as when an intersexed individual is held up as necessarily 
queering heterosexual gender-mapping even if they themselves would not 
wish to be aligned with such a project—risks distorting and misrepresenting 
them. This might be interpreted as doing violence to their personhood.57 
 
                                                 
54
 Ibid., 222; italics original. 
55
 Ibid., 220; italics original. 
56
 Cornwall, Sex and Uncertainty, 206; italics original. 
57
 Cornwall, “Kenosis,” 186. 
 294
Following Iain Morland, she suggests that concern for “weaker members” of Christ’s 
body (I Cor. 12) might lead to an alternative application, namely, that it is “those whose 
bodies are considered unremarkable in terms of a sex-gender harmony who must be 
prepared to relinquish the (unsolicited) power and status which currently comes with such 
a state of affairs.”58 Following the language of Philippians 2:7 used to describe the 
example of Jesus who did not cling to the privileges associated with his divinity but 
“emptied himself” (ekenōsen), Cornwall asks, How would such a kenosis be enacted?  
Cornwall suggests opting out of declaring one’s sex on questionnaires where such 
information is not pertinent and rejecting gender stereotypes in our own language or 
others’. She continues: 
Within churches, it could be refusing to participate in disseminating teaching 
or liturgy grounded in essentialist, complementarist norms of maleness and 
femaleness on which masculinity and femininity are supposed 
unproblematically to supervene. Crucially, however, rather than eliding bodily 
differences (as Mollenkott’s “omnigender” society threatens to do), a 
multiplicity and immense range of variation should be acknowledged and 
celebrated.59 
 
Moreland goes even further, suggesting “Non-intersexed people who seek justice for the 
intersexed should refuse the identities ‘male’ or ‘female.’”60 J. David Hester heeds 
Moreland’s example by listing his gender as “whatever” on his webpage.61 Still, there is 
arguably more fluidity for the category of gender—especially given Hester’s call for the 
“end of gender.” However, refusing to identify as male or female when the category fits 
does not aid in personal identification. It might be more helpful to allow other markers 
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into the category of sex, such as intersex, male-to-female transsexual (transwoman), 
female-to-male transsexual (transman), etc. for identification purposes on governmental 
and medical records.  
 Still, Cornwall’s more modest suggestions do merit consideration, especially as 
one recognizes the privilege—“the (unsolicited) power and status”—attending 
unambiguous bodies.62 “Kenosis for non-intersexed people necessitates thinking 
ourselves into the margins—not in order to colonize experience which is not ours” but in 
order to learn from and work with the intersexed for justice and inclusion.63 She agrees 
with Hester who has argued that “one strategy for overcoming the marginalization of 
people with intersex/DSD conditions might be one which recognizes that ‘healing’ is not 
‘healing from’, but living comfortably and healthily with oneself as intersex.’”64 
 Certainly communities of care, educated about intersex and willing to learn from 
the experiences of others, can aid in this kind of healing but only as they learn to over-
come their own fears which intersex can raise. Cornwall highlights these fears by 
comparing intersex with disability. She names what Frances Young, Jean Vanier, and 
others have noted, that “the able bodied fear the disabled not because disability is so far 
away from the ‘good’ body but because it is so close.”65 Just as Peter Brown’s study 
revealed that ancient eunuchs were feared because they were reminders of what men 
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could become, so Cornwall suggests that the non-intersexed fear the intersexed for 
similar reasons.66 
There are those of us whose bodies match the current criteria for accepted 
maleness or femaleness, but this does not necessarily mean that this will be so 
forever. Perhaps intersexed bodies threaten non-intersexed people because, as 
historian and activist for intersex issues Alice Dreger says, ‘The questioned 
body forces us to ask exactly what it is—if anything—that makes the rest of 
us unquestionable.’67  
 
Returning to the question of eschatology, Cornwall suggests that “rather than assuming 
intersexed bodies will be perfected to unambiguity, we ought to ask what eschatologies of 
perfection suggest about our own body anxieties.”68 Working from the question of the 
resurrection of non-intersexed bodies to those of the intersexed, she ponders: 
Both male and female bodies have already undergone enormous changes, 
particularly at puberty, before reaching adulthood. The bodies of women who 
have borne children also appear different afterwards:  is it the pre- or post-
motherhood body that is more perfect and will be retained in the general 
resurrection?  What body might we expect for someone shorn of an 
undersized penis and brought up as a girl, who has decided to make the best of 
a bad gender-assignment despite experiencing gender dysphoria?  Quite 
simply, it is neither possible nor desirable to specify what resurrection bodies 
will be like; but the one thing they will all share will be a redeemed body story 
rather than an unproblematically ‘perfected’ body by human standards. 
…Conceivably, the pain and prejudice attached to a particular physical 
configuration will melt away without thereby erasing either the beauty of that 
specific configuration, or the geneaological importance of the life lived in this 
body in its joy and woundedness.69  
 
Cornwall believes that an eschatological vision of inclusion is a powerful motivator to aid 
Christians seeking justice for the intersexed in the present. Such communities of care 
bring healing not only to those intersexed persons who have experienced exclusion and 
shame but can also work to heal the non-intersexed of their own bodily anxieties. 
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Evaluating the Contributions of Mollenkott, Hester, and Cornwall 
 Mollenkott, Hester, and Cornwall have provided important and thoughtful 
contributions to the challenges which intersex raises for Christian theology and ecclesial 
communities. They are right to point out the injustices that have been and continue to be 
perpetrated in societies which privilege unambiguous bodies, one sex over another, and 
certain gendered behaviors over others. They raise prophetic voices, calling Christians to 
account for our failings in these areas, preaching repentance, and culling the scriptures 
and the history of Christianity for resources in order to stem the tide of injustice and work 
for the inbreaking of God’s eschatological justice. Evaluating the devastating effects of 
sex/gender abuse around the world, New York Times correspondents Nicholas Kristof and 
Sheryl WuDunn have surmised: 
In the nineteenth century, the central moral challenge was slavery. In the 
twentieth century, it was the battle against totalitarianism. We believe that in 
this century the paramount moral challenge will be the struggle for gender 
equality around the world.70 
 
Certainly Mollenkott, Hester, and Cornwall are right that working with God to bring 
about Christ’s eschatological justice should include not just equality for women but also 
justice and equality for the intersexed whose contributions and abuses have yet to be 
recorded in most histories. And yet, questions remain how best to accomplish this.  
 Despite their careful attention to the voices of some intersexed persons and a 
number of insightful contributions for bringing about greater measures of justice, the 
proposals of Mollenkott, Hester, and Cornwall come with baggage likely to prejudice 
more conservative Christians against even their more modest contributions. The 
structural changes they recommend, namely, the dismantling of “heteronormativity,” go 
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well beyond opening up space for the intersexed in our communities. While they disagree 
in their proposed solutions, Mollenkott and Cornwall both work from the premise that, 
because intersex challenges the binary framework, that framework should be 
eliminated.71 Cornwall writes,  
intersex does not only exist as an example of something which stands between 
two distinct things; actually, it problematizes the model of their being two 
distinct things in the first place. Intersex shows that human sex is not a simple 
binary; and, since any exception to a dualistic model necessarily undermines 
the model in its entirety, this makes essentialist assumptions about what 
constitutes ‘concrete facts’ even more precarious.72 
 
Because they view “heteronormativity” as the central problem, they are working 
not only to open up space for the intersexed but also to dismantle entirely the system 
upon which Christian marriage has been established. They supply no rationale for 
heterosexual coupling beyond procreation and no reason for marriage—the permanence 
of the sexual bond—beyond personal preference. Following Kathy Rudy’s work, in Sex 
and the Church: Gender, Homosexuality, and the Transformation of Christian Ethics 
Mollenkott writes,73 
the pertinent question is not whether we are living monogamously or in 
communities where loving support exists in a different pattern, but whether 
our acts unite us into one body and whether our contexts enable our lives to 
transcend meaninglessness.74  
 
And again,  
 
To expand on one of Kathy Rudy’s statements, ‘When sex acts [or identities 
or even performances], whether gay or straight [or otherwise], monogamous 
or communal, function in a way that leads us to God, they ought to be 
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considered moral. The family does not guarantee such moral status, and 
indeed sometimes prevents us from fully participating in community…’75 
   
How to discern which acts lead us to God is a question Mollenkott neither raises nor 
answers. While it is true that the family does not guarantee the moral status of sexual 
acts—abuse within the family is of grave concern for all Christian theologians—it is not 
evident that dismantling the family is the best solution.  
Cornwall, also following Rudy, makes a case for polyamory and communal 
sexual activity. She qualifies her ethic by saying,  
There might still, and always, be aspects of some behaviors held to be 
incompatible with certain tenets of Christianity:  it would be difficult to argue 
that any kind of non-consensual sex, such as rape or sex with children, could 
be deemed just or pleasurable for everyone concerned.76 
 
Like Kessler and McKenna, they are quick to look to technological interventions 
in matters of procreation as a reason to dismiss the good of heterosexual marriage. 
McKenna and Kessler write, 
Some people, at some points in their lives, might wish to be identified as 
sperm or egg cell carriers. Except for those times, there need be no 
differentiation among people on any of the dichotomies which gender implies. 
Because the reproductive dichotomy would not be constituted as a lifetime 
dichotomy, it would not be an essential characteristic of people. Even the 
reproductive dichotomy might someday be eliminated through technology.77 
 
Georgia Warnke makes a similar jump from intersex to the infertility of some, the non-
reproductive choices of others, to reproductive technologies: 
Finally, with the present and future birth technologies of sperm banks, 
artificial insemination, artificial wombs, and cloning, and with the availability 
of these to ‘men’ as well as ‘women’ our current identities as male or female, 
as well as heterosexual or homosexual, seem at the very least unnecessary.78  
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While some point out the theological good of adoption, they fail to address the reality 
which Dennis Hollinger accurately describes:  
In adoption we are responding to a tragic or unfortunate situation with a 
loving acceptance of a child in our midst…  we are not giving moral sanction 
to the situation in which the child was conceived. Often adoption is necessary 
because procreation has been pulled apart from the other dimensions of sex…  
To agree to surrogacy [and a number of other reproductive technologies], 
however, is generally to put our ethical approval upon the severing of 
procreation from the other dimensions of sex.79 
 
For Hollinger, sex is not exclusively tied to procreation, but also is intended by God to 
mean marriage, love, pleasure, and the complementarity of male and female.80 Raising 
children within their own loving biological family is the ideal with which we tamper only 
at our peril. Loving adoptive families provide a necessary and salutary service in 
response to the breakdown of the original ideal. Discarding the family in order to correct 
gender injustice may inadvertently introduce other social problems. Bringing justice to 
the family seems, to me, to be the wiser course of action. 
 
“Compulsory” Heterosexuality and Binary Gender Model 
 
 Cornwall, Mollenkott, and Warnke follow Judith Butler in her assessment that 
“gender identity” is a “regulatory ideal” resulting from “compulsory heterosexuality.”81 
Butler’s is a strong critique. While I do believe that the Christian Scriptures reveal 
heterosexuality as a God-given good, and while I concede that heterosexuality was 
virtually compulsory in ancient Israel, Jesus’ statement in Matthew 19:12 opened up 
space not only for the alternative gender identities of eunuchs but made heterosexuality 
no longer compulsory, for naturally born eunuchs, eunuchs made so by others, and those 
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who make themselves eunuchs. Some scholars have attempted to connect the figure of 
the eunuch to homosexual, bisexual, and queer sexualities.82 They are certainly correct in 
noting that many non-Jewish eunuchs were sexually active in these ways. Still, their 
arguments suggesting that Jesus was overturning the goodness of heterosexuality must be 
recognized as arguments from silence, especially in the face of the weight of biblical 
evidence for heterosexual marriage and against alternative sexual activity.83 
Although it may sound medieval to many postmodern theorists and theologians, I 
am still ready to defend the goodness of heterosexual marriage, not entirely on account of 
its procreative potential but certainly viewing procreative complementarity as a major 
part of the divine design for sexuality. Like Grenz and Hollinger, I value the Roman 
Catholic position which emphasizes both the “unitive and procreative” meanings of 
marriage, while demurring with these same Evangelicals (and some Roman Catholics) 
that the meanings of marriage do not need to be united in every sex act in order to be 
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valid.84 Still, it is important to state that my defense of heterosexual marriage is not the 
basis for my retaining the usefulness of the categories of male and female even if these 
are related.  
I agree with Warnke, Mollenkott, Hester, and Cornwall that Christians stand 
under a moral imperative to address gender injustice, injustices which include the 
marginalization, oppression, and unnecessary medicalization of intersex persons. I do not 
agree that “intersex… undermines the model in its entirety.”85 Simply because sex/gender 
categories do not neatly fit all human persons and have been used to oppress valid 
variations from the norm, I am unconvinced that they are therefore useless categories for 
societal, ethical, and theological discussions. Warnke dismisses the usefulness of sex 
categories even for medical research and care.86 Although it is true that some men, such 
as those with Klinefelter’s syndrome, might need mammograms in order to screen for 
breast cancer, such recognition does not require testing all men or rejecting evidence that 
most women require such exams. Rather, it requires careful attention to the needs of each 
individual. Statistically significant differences remain useful for medicine, politics, 
psychology, and sociology so long as they are not employed in oppressive ways. Intersex 
certainly requires an alternation of the binary model. It necessitates opening up space in 
between the categories of male and female. Instead of two discrete categories, intersex 
shows how these overlap in various ways.  
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Intersex research adds weight to critiques of essentialist understandings of 
sex/gender differences without making the categories of male/masculinity or 
female/femininity meaningless. Dr. Melissa Hines, Director of the Behavioural 
Neuroendocrinology Research Unit at City University in London, England, shows how 
discussions of sex/gender differences remain useful so long as they are understood as 
“two overlapping distributions for males and females, with average differences between 
the two groups.”87 Hines is well aware of intersex and its challenge to the gender 
construct (including an entire chapter on intersex conditions in her text) and yet she 
continues to view statistical research on sex/gender difference as valuable. Her example 
shows how statistical averages for physiology and behavior in men and women can be 
helpful for understanding humankind so long as we balance such observations with the 
recognition that 
few, if any, individuals correspond to the modal male pattern or the modal 
[sic] female pattern. Variation within each sex is great, with both males and 
females near the top and bottom of the distributions for every characteristic. In 
fact, although most of us appear to be either clearly male or clearly female, we 
are each complex mosaics of male and female characteristics.88 
 
Recognizing that “few, if any, individuals correspond to the modal” (the statistical 
average) can help liberate everyone from oppressive gender stereotypes so long as we are 
willing to differentiate between statistical norms and ethical or aesthetic ideals. Statistical 
research on gender can be helpful for self-understanding or the understanding of others, 
provided the proverbial shoe fits. Of course, when it doesn’t, but we insist that it should 
or it must, we become like the “ugly stepsisters” in the Brothers Grimm’s original 
Cinderella—cutting off our toes and heels (or the toes and heels of others) in order to fit 
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into the glass slipper, in our attempts to find love, friendship, get the job or the 
promotion. Mollenkott describes the pain: 
What I have learned in my most recent studies is that gender normality is a 
myth as long as it is forced to locate itself within a binary paradigm that fits 
very few members of the human race. I am not the only person who limited, 
shrank, and truncated aspects of myself in an attempt to fit that paradigm. 
Millions have done the same; and some have killed themselves or been 
murdered because of their inability to pass gender muster. Many transgender 
youngsters have run away from home or been evicted by their parents, have 
lived on the streets and been used by predatory adults, and have become HIV 
positive. Others have been institutionalized for no other reason than their 
inability to satisfy society’s gender expectations. 
So much pain. So much waste of human potential. It cannot continue.89 
 
Even while debates continue to rage over the most effective and moral means to address 
Gender Identity Disorders and non-heterosexual orientations, those holding to traditional 
Christian sexual ethics still have a responsibility to address the oppressive ways in which 
sex/gender ideals (e.g., strong male rational-initiator-leaders, beautiful female intuitive-
receiver-followers) are held up as moral or biblical imperatives.90 
 
Resisting Sex/Gender Perfection  
 
 I believe Cornwall raises some particularly helpful insights in questioning how 
visions of “perfection” (whether of unambiguously sexed bodies or gendered visions of 
health and beauty) can work against the healing and wholeness which all individuals 
require. At the same time, it is her acknowledgement of the fears of the non-intersexed 
which leads me to question her model of kenosis of sex identity as the best possible 
solution for promoting equality within the church and society at large. For many, an 
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unambiguously sexed body, while it may be the cause of some unsolicited privileges, can 
nevertheless remain a source of personal insecurity. Certainly, many women have been 
willing to “give up” their sex identity in favor of a masculine or androgynous ideal.91 The 
intersexed are not alone in needing to come to terms with their own embodiment—the 
possibilities and limitations, abilities and disabilities, temptations and strengths, trials and 
joys which vary according to each individual. As Kessler noted in her study of intersex, 
there is a connection between the medicalization of intersex and the medicalization of 
beauty/perfection in contemporary American society: in everything from orthodontics to 
nose jobs to silicone implants.92 There are myriad anxieties arising from human 
embodiment, particularly attending sex, gender, and sexuality. Calling for the kenosis of 
the privileges of the non-intersexed may begin to move us in the right direction but more 
is needed for the healing of the human community.  
 
CHRISTOLOGY, IDENTITY, AND IMAGO 
 
De-centering and Reconciling Identities “in Christ” 
 
Christology and Reconciliation in the Conflicts of Identities 
 
Evangelical theologian Miroslav Volf, in his study Exclusion and Embrace:  A 
Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation, looks to christology 
to cut through the Gordian knot of conflicts surrounding personal identity in the 
postmodern world. He insists that while revisioning social arrangements is an important 
piece of working toward justice, theologians must also attend carefully to “fostering the 
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kind of social agents capable of envisioning and creating just, truthful, and peaceful 
societies, and on shaping a cultural climate in which such agents will thrive.”93 His 
reflections stem from the battles which rage on the basis of ethnic identities but many of 
his insights apply to some of the conflicts which sex and gender identities bring to 
communities. He is conscious of the connection. 
I will explore what kind of selves we need to be in order to live in harmony 
with others. My assumption is that selves are situated; they are female or 
male, Jew or Greek, rich or poor—as a rule, more than one of these things at 
the same time (‘rich Greek female’), often having hybrid identities (‘Jew-
Greek’ and ‘male-female’), and sometimes migrating from one identity to 
another. The questions I will be pursuing about such situated selves are: How 
should they think of their identity?  How should they relate to the other? How 
should they go about making peace with the other?94 
 
I would add the query, How do we go about making peace with ourselves—with our 
hybrid identities or anxieties attending our sex, gender, and sexuality whether we are 
intersexed or non-intersexed or other?  
 Volf notes how in times of peace, diverse groups can and have lived together, 
sometimes merely coexisting, sometimes helping, sometimes even mixing and marrying. 
But in times of conflict identities become hardened, loyalties are demanded.95 While 
theological/ethical “culture wars” are not identical to ethno-religious conflicts, it is still 
true that in contemporary battles of sex, gender, and sexuality there is little room for 
middle positions.96 Certainly intersex persons have found themselves as both players and 
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pawns, casualties and crusaders in the culture wars at hand. Reflecting on the effects of 
war on personal identity, Volf writes: 
…I have Czech, German, and Croatian ‘blood’ in my veins; I grew up in a 
city which the old Hapsburg Empire had made into a meeting place of many 
ethnic groups … But the new Croatia, like some jealous goddess, wanted all 
my love and loyalty. I must be Croat through and through, or I was not a good 
Croat. 
It was easy to explain this excessive demand of loyalty. After forced 
assimilation under communist rule, the sense of ethnic belonging and cultural 
distinctness was bound to reassert itself. Moreover, the need to stand firm 
against a powerful and destructive enemy who had captured one-third of 
Croatian territory, swept it clean of its Croatian population, and almost 
completely destroyed some of its cities, left little room for the luxury of 
divided loyalties. The explanations made sense and they gave reasons to 
believe that the disturbing preoccupation with the natural self was a 
temporary phase, a defense mechanism whose services would no longer be 
needed once the danger was past. Yet the unsettling questions remained: did I 
not discover in oppressed Croatia’s face some despised Serbian features?  
Might not the enemy have captured some of Croatia’s soul along with a good 
deal of Croatia’s soil?97 
 
 Volf’s analysis illuminates the experiences of some intersex persons who claim 
that “intersex” as an identity category has arisen from negative experiences of medical 
intervention in order to address the medical establishment and promote better care.  
Kessler identifies a correspondence between medicalization and identity. She quotes 
Morgan Holmes, an intersexed member of ISNA Canada: 
“Was I intersexed before I was medicalized?” [Holmes] compares herself to a 
woman friend with a three-and-a-half-inch clitoris that escaped “correction.” 
Holmes’s friend refuses the intersex label for herself, claiming that this would 
be an additional burden, making her even more of an outsider than her 
lesbianism already does. I suspect that her rejection of the label has more to 
do with an identity fit. She was not diagnosed; she was not “surgicalized”; she 
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does not feel like an intersexual. Holmes’s own argument confirms this: “It is 
partly in the naming that bodies become intersexed.”98 
 
For some intersexed, the invading army represents the medical establishment and/or 
parents who consented to surgicalization and suppression of the truth. Others look to the 
oppression of the binary sex system or heteronormativity and those who uphold them. 
Whatever is the case, their experience supports recent developments in philosophical 
notions of identity which suggest that personal identity is not simply an essence which 
resides within individuals; rather, identity comes into being through relations.99 Heeding 
the insight that identity formation arises in relation to others as well as Hester’s and 
Cornwall’s contentions that healing for the intersex is less about medical intervention and 
more about the healing of communities (i.e., small support groups of other intersexed 
persons as well as larger communities which include the non-intersexed) we must work 
simultaneously on structural changes to address the injustices perpetrated upon the 
intersexed as well as education and reconciliation among intersexed and non-intersexed 
alike if we are to work toward building just, equitable, healing communities. 
 Just as some intersexed persons have had their personhood, identity, and even 
lives threatened by the binary sex system; it is also true that some non-intersexed 
persons—especially those comfortable with the binary sex system—may feel threatened 
by the presence of the intersexed. Identities which were once secure feel secure no 
longer. Given such a situation how is reconciliation to take place? How do we reconcile 
personal identities and anxieties, as well as the reconciliation of relations between 
persons? Volf argues that this kind of radical reconciliation is only possible through the 
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cross of Christ—the cross understood as providing solidarity with the oppressed, 
atonement for the oppressors, and the embrace embodied in Christ’s outstretched arms. 
…the most basic thought that [the metaphor of embrace] seeks to express is 
important: the will to give ourselves to others and ‘welcome’ them, to readjust 
our identities to make space for them, is prior to any judgment about others, 
except that of identifying them in their humanity. The will to embrace  
precedes any ‘truth’ about others and any construction of their ‘justice.’ This 
will is absolutely indiscriminate and strictly immutable; it transcends the 
moral mapping of the social world into ‘good’ and ‘evil.’100 
 
Volf does not deny the need to struggle to identify good and evil, truth and justice, but 
insists that the way we proceed is essential. We must follow 
...the ‘wisdom of the cross’: within social contexts, truth and justice are 
unavailable outside of the will to embrace the other. I immediately continue to 
argue, however, that the embrace itself—full reconciliation—cannot take 
place until the truth has been said and justice done.  
…The practice of ‘embrace,’ with its concomitant struggle against 
deception, injustice, and violence, is intelligible only against the backdrop of a 
powerful, contagious, and destructive evil I call ‘exclusion’ … and is for 
Christians possible only if, in the name of God’s crucified Messiah, we 
distance ourselves from ourselves and our cultures in order to create space for 
the other.101 
 
How, then, do we distance ourselves from ourselves in order to draw near to 
ourselves and near to others in the embrace of healthy reconciliation? How do we 
distance ourselves from identities as personal and “constitutive” as sex, gender, and 
sexuality in order to reconcile ourselves to ourselves and others? Once again, christology 
provides the way forward. 
 
Putting to Death Identities in Christ 
 
Christology does not provide a facile answer to questions of personal identity. 
Nevertheless, it does offer wisdom for the wrestling. On the one side, christology calls 
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for a death to self which seems to challenge any notion of personal identity. Returning 
again to Galatians, we find Paul declaring, “I am crucified with Christ and I no longer 
live, but Christ lives in me. The life I live in the body I live by faith in the Son of God 
who loved me and gave himself for me.”102 Volf recounts Jewish scholar, Daniel 
Boyarin’s concerns as to how a particular reading of Galatians 3:28 (“no more Jew or 
Greek, slave or free, male and female”) can be understood as calling for the death of 
personal identities. Despite granting the possibility of a positive intention, i.e., an 
“equality at the expense of difference,” Boyarin argues that this vision nevertheless 
contained the seeds of an imperialist and colonizing’ practice; Paul’s 
“universalism even at its most liberal and benevolent has been a powerful 
force for coercive discourses of sameness, denying… the rights of Jews, 
women, and others to retain their difference.”103 
 
Volf responds that the cross and life “in Christ” can be read differently.  
Far from being the assertion of the one against many, the cross is the self-
giving of the one for many. …From a Pauline perspective, the wall that 
divides is not so much “the difference” as enmity (cf. Ephesians 2:14).104 
 
Spiritual writer Beldan Lane insists that in the Christian life “nothing is more 
important or more difficult” as discerning what to “put to death” and what to cultivate.105 
Finding one’s identity in Christ may require the death of certain identities, even “good” 
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identities, especially those which have become idols or false selves—identities in which 
we put our confidence when our security should rest in God alone.106  
In her book Men and Women in the Church, Sarah Sumner illustrates how even a 
secure sex/gender identity, such as male or female, can prove to be a stumbling block 
when it comes to transformation into the image of Christ.  
When Jim and I were first married, I wanted him to be my Superman. I didn’t 
like it when he felt afraid. I wanted him to rescue me from my fears and not 
have any fears of his own. My picture of marriage called for me to human and 
for him to be superhuman. For me to be vulnerable, and for him to invulner-
able. I expected our marriage to be a comforting refuge where I would be held 
safe in the arms of my hero and where he would be admired by me. Jim would 
be Zorro, and I’d be Cinderella. And we would serve Christ in our home. 
I am on a journey of repenting from my worldly view of marriage. I am 
letting go of my selfish expectations. I surrendering my selfish desire to feel 
sorry my husband doesn’t save me from my fears. I am in the process of 
learning to accept the full responsibility for my stuff. And through it all, I am 
discovering a new vision of marriage, one that’s based on love instead of 
fantasy. 
…From the time they are boys, men are challenged to attain manhood.  
Their consciences are trained by society and church and also by women such 
as myself. Every time I long for my husband to sweep me off my feet so that I 
don’t have to walk on the difficult path of Christlike suffering, in essence I 
asking him to prove that he is a man so that I won’t have to prove that I’m a 
Christian.107 
 
A secure sex/gender identity can be just as much a stumbling block to transformation in 
the image of Christ as an unclear sex/gender identity. Whatever the identity, it must be 
placed under the scrutiny of the Scriptures by the help of the Spirit in order to discern 
what must be put to death and what must be cultivated. 
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De-centering and Re-centering Identities in Christ 
 
Rather than insisting on the death of personal identities, Volf argues that while 
ethnic, racial, national, sex/gender and other identities remain; they must nevertheless be 
de-centered in the life of the believer.108  
What happened to the self in the process of re-centering?  Has the self been 
simply erased?  Has its own proper center been simply replaced by an alien 
center?... Not exactly. For if ‘Christ lives in me,’ as Paul says, then I must 
have a center that is distinct from ‘Christ, the center.’109 
 
Re-centering entails no self-obliterating denial of the self that dissolves the 
self in Christ… To the contrary, re-centering establishes the most proper and 
unassailable center that allows the self to stand over against persons and 
institutions which may threaten to smother it.110 
 
It may be that certain identities must be recovered before they can be de-centered. 
Such was the critique which Daphne Hampson lodged against the imitation of Christ’s 
kenosis when she argued that asking women to empty themselves or die to themselves, 
when they have never been permitted to develop as genuine selves, is destructive rather 
than life-giving. As Susannah Cornwall has noted, Sarah Coakley has countered that 
Hampson’s vision of kenosis is misconstrued. In contrast, Coakley insists that kenosis 
“can be an important element of holding vulnerability and personal empowerment 
together, precisely by creating the ‘space’ in which non-coercive divine power manifests 
itself.”111 Volf’s analysis of “preoccupation” with identity as a temporal phase, no 
“longer needed once the danger was past,” may also provide a way forward.112  
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Heeding the voices of Hampson, Volf, and Coakley, we may surmise that the 
affirmation and acceptance of an “intersex identity” and even the construction of an 
“intersexed Christ” (such as that proffered by Virginia Mollenkott) may be the first step 
along the path of healing and reconciliation for some Christian intersex persons. It is an 
affirmation of the full humanity of intersex persons, their place in society and in the 
community of faith. I believe that reflection on the possibility of an intersex Christ 
reveals a confidence that Christ stands with the intersexed, that “his” humanity does not 
stand over against them, that Jesus is with them in their struggles for identity, for love, 
for acceptance, for wholeness. The vision of an intersexed Christ (as also the vision of a 
Black Christ and female Christa) is useful for challenging the orthodoxy and hegemony 
of a male/masculine Christ to whom many cannot relate—either via similarity (as a male 
in the image of a male Christ) or via complementarity (as the female bride). It enables 
those who put too much stock in maleness and masculinity to put these idols, and the 
“false selves” constructed upon them, to death. At the same time, new theological 
constructions must also be held with care. Each must heed the warning which Elaine 
Storkey raised against feminist christologies—that just as Christ became incarnate to 
become like us, Christ is at the same time unlike any of us. 
It may be that liberation feminism has been bewitched by the very 
anthropomorphism which it warns against. For it needs to recognize that, 
though Christ is God-with-us in our humanity, pain, new life and joy, God in 
Christ is not ultimately like us, any of us. There is no need to hold against the 
features of Christ’s particularity some checklist, so that we can be assured of 
our inclusion in the mystery of divine love. For God does not incorporate into 
Godself our gender, time, language, ethnicity, religion, skin-color, lifestyle—
nor confront us with any other which undermines our own. God does not need 
to be re-imagined in our image.113 
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 Holding these poles in tension allows us to find the security of recognition that 
Christ stands with us in our humanity while preserving the distinction which allows 
Christ to stand over against us as God and Messiah—able to judge our just and unjust 
actions, things spoken and unspoken, done and undone. Holding these poles in tension 
can liberate us from old oppressions all the while protecting us from erecting new 
systems of tyranny. Holding these poles in tension creates space for a new self, with a 
new center, what Volf calls “a de-centered center.” 
Through faith and baptism the self has been re-made in the image of “the Son 
of God who loved me and gave himself for me,” Paul writes. At the center of 
the self lies self-giving love. No “hegemonic centrality” closes the self off, 
guarding its self-same identity and driving out and away whatever threatens 
its purity. To the contrary, the new center opens the self up, makes it capable 
and willing to give itself for others and to receive others in itself.114 
 
This openness of the self to others recalls the relationality of the Trinity, whose 
relationality is imaged in the eschatological-ecclesial self to which Grenz has been 
pointing. Volf describes it with different language as a “catholic personality”:  
Spirit re-creates us and sets us on the road toward becoming what I like to call 
a ‘catholic personality,’ a personal microcosm of the eschatological new 
creation... A catholic personality is a personality enriched by otherness, a 
personality which is what it is only because multiple others have been 
reflected in it in a particular way. The distance from my own culture that 
results from being born of the Spirit creates a fissure in me through which 
others can come in. The Spirit unlatches the doors of my heart saying: “You—
are not only you; others belong to you too.”115 
 
Drawing again on the language of trinitarian studies, Volf writes, “Everything in the idea 
of perichoresis—or ‘mutual interiority,’ as I prefer to put it—depends on success in 
resisting the slide into pure identity.”116  
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While we need not put to death our sex/gender/sexual identities, all of us—male, 
female, and intersex—must place the privileges and pain associated with these identities 
under the cross of Christ—dying to pride and privilege in the kenosis which Cornwall has 
recommended but also dying to the need for revenge, to insecurities, to self-hatred, and 
despair. One Christian intersex woman describes how this process has enabled her to 
come to terms with her own intersexuality. 
I too am intersexual. I lived in anonymity for years, sincerely committed 
to a scripturally conforming role, while denying my own existence. You see, I 
was the leader of the Baptist Women’s Bible study who experienced the utter 
hate and repulsion shown me by those who should have drawn nearest me. 
God’s grace alone has compelled me to step into the light, in accountability, 
and declare who I was, who I am, and who I am in Christ. The genetic puree’ 
of my life is simply the way God has formed the “clay pot” (Isaiah 64:8), only 
now with the “broken handle” removed. My heart's desire as a woman of God, 
a spiritual being, (not merely physical), is that the work of God might be 
displayed in my life. By eternal perspectives the whole jumbled genetic stew 
just doesn't matter. 
God created the eunuch (intersexual) unique. Join me to stop destroying 
unique lives while demanding conformity to a standard that is genetically 
impossible. 
We must conform only to Christ’s Image.117 
 
The cross de-centers as well as re-centers the self.  It is a de-centering and re-
centering available and necessary to all—male, female, and intersex—in order that we 
may be renewed in the image of God in Christ. 
 
Imago Christi:  Love, Purity, and Mystery 
 
Being remade into the image of Christ entails not only a death to (certain parts of, 
certain identities of) self, but a de-centering of personal identity which makes space for 
rebirth, the re-centering of a healthy identity, an identity rooted in Christ—more 
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specifically, an identity rooted in the love God lavishes upon Christ and those in Christ. 
As the apostle John wrote, 
See what love the Father has given us that we should be called children of 
God; and that is what we are. The reason the world does not know us is that it 
did not know him. Beloved, we are God's children now; what we will be has 
not yet been revealed. What we do know is this: when he is revealed, we will 
be like him, for we will see him as he is. And all who have this hope in him 
purify themselves, just as he is pure.118 
 
John’s words highlight three features of life in Christ: the centrality of love, the 
necessity of purity, and the continuing mystery of human identity. Although each of 
these deserves lengthy exploration, a few terse comments must suffice to conclude. 
The love of which John speaks is the love of God for us—the love that provides 
the proper ground for our love of self, death to self, de-centering and re-centering of self, 
and loving (i.e., relating in mutual-interiority to) others. This is the kind of love which 
Mollenkott, Hester, and Cornwall have also heralded, the love of God which enables us 
to work in love for justice in the world. 
At the same time, being remade into the image of Christ—growing in the 
imitation of Christ—entails more than love, more than working for social justice.  As 
John wrote, “all who have this hope in him purify themselves, just as he is pure.” Being 
remade in the image of Christ entails not only faith in the love of God and the 
forgiveness offered to sinners on the basis of Christ’s life, death, and resurrection, it 
includes offering this love to others as well as the choice to grow in purity, in holiness.  
This is where my own proposal parts ways with Mollenkott, Hester, and Cornwall, for I 
believe that being remade in the image of Christ requires not only just dealings and the 
reordering of societal oppressions but also the cultivation of personal holiness—a life of 
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worship,119 prayer, humility, kindness, generosity, and sexual chastity—monogamous 
chastity within marriage and celibate chastity outside of marriage. This kind of holiness 
has value for the community and the individual. 
The Christian call to virtue is as old as the Gospel, but in light of the present study 
it is imperative to recognize that, whatever it’s etymological root, virtue does not arise 
from vir.120 Although the hierarchical scale upon which masculinity was modeled in the 
classical period imposed an oppressive system which devalued women, intersex, and 
unmanly men; nevertheless, the classical model did recognize an important truth about 
humankind: We are not as we should be. Mark R. Talbot explains that every culture—no 
matter its religion—operates under this assumption. It is the basis upon which child-
rearing and education are founded. “[H]uman beings, as we arrive in this world, are 
probably less what we can and indeed must become than any other creaturely being.”121  
Yet what all societies want done with their young makes clear what kind of 
creatures we should be. In this sense, we can say that human societies view 
their members as ‘meant’ to function in particular self-regulating ways.122 
 
Talbot explains that even non-Christian thinkers, such as Richard Rorty, grant that in 
order to reach our potential as human beings, we must be guided by what Rorty names, a 
“final vocabulary.”  
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A “final vocabulary,” he tells us, consists in some “set of words which [we] 
employ to justify [our] actions, [our] beliefs, and [our] lives”; these are the 
words “in which we formulate praise of our friends and contempt for our 
enemies, our long-term projects, our deepest self-doubts, our highest hopes”; 
these are the words “in which we tell, sometimes prospectively and sometimes 
retrospectively, the story of our lives.”123 The fact that Christians, then, are 
committed to a particular ‘word’ on life does not distinguish them from 
anyone else; the need to be committed to some such word is a feature of 
distinctively human being that we share with everyone.124 
 
For Christians, this final vocabulary is be found in the Word made flesh—in the person 
and story of Jesus Christ, in God who took up human nature in order to redeem and 
perfect all of us, men, women, and intersex. 
 It may be that virtue was conflated with vir in the ancient world observing that 
one of the most powerful rhetorical devices effective for motivating men to change their 
behavior is shaming them with accusations of being or becoming effeminate.125 
Unfortunately, it is a rhetorical device still employed by preachers today. Although 
arguably effectual, the conflation of virtue with manliness replaces the gospel of holiness 
and maturity with a hierarchically-gendered system of oppression—shaming men into 
virtue instead of calling men, women, intersex adults and children to grow in holiness, 
being conformed to the image of God in Christ. 
Christ Jesus is “the image of the invisible God” (Col. 1:15) into whose image all 
Christians—male, female, intersexed—are “being transformed into his likeness with 
every every-increasing glory, which comes from the Lord, who is the Spirit” (II Cor. 
3:18). Despite its potential effectiveness as a rhetorical strategy for men, growth in 
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holiness must not be misconstrued as growth toward manhood. Holiness must be 
separated from any gendered understandings of virtue—masculine, feminine, intersex, or 
transgendered. Holiness must not be presented as pink, blue, or purple. Christ is the 
model for all. All Christians are to model his victory.126 All Christians receive his 
inheritance as sons.127 All Christians become his bride.128 These mixed metaphors 
illustrate the universal call to conformity to Christ but they do even more than this; they 
also testify to the mystery which remains in any exploration of the Christian life, no less 
in any exploration of the imago Dei.   
Eastern Orthodox theologian Sister Nonna Verna Harrison (in her exploration of 
the imago Dei for Christian formation entitled, God’s Many-Splendored Image), writes of 
the different facets of the imago recognizable in the Scriptures, Christian history, and 
contemporary thought. She explores the splendors of: 1) human freedom and responsi-
bility conditioned by finitude; 2) the love of God, forgiveness of Christ, and renewal in 
the Spirit; 3) spiritual perception and relationship to God and others; 4) virtue cultivated 
over a lifetime; 5) royal dignity—a dignity that “belongs equally to all who are human… 
the intrinsic value, honor, and splendor of the children of God that lies hidden at the 
inmost core of every human being;”129 6) the gift of human embodiment; 7) responsi-
bility for creation; 8) creativity and scientific advancement; and 9) human identity as 
fundamentally unique yet situated within wider human communities—“just as the divine 
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Trinity is three distinct persons in one essence.”130 She agrees with Stanley Grenz and 
John Paul II that the image of God is ultimately found in Christ, “the origin and center of 
a new humankind, a new community.”131 And yet, as she closes, she reminds her readers 
that the imago will always remain a mystery—for in this, too, humans image God. 
As Gregory of Nyssa says, human identity is an unfathomable depth of 
mystery, which is itself an image of the inexhaustible and boundless mystery 
of the divine being and life.132 This means that the divine image at the core of 
what we are as human remains multifaceted and is open to transformation in a 
future that is now unknown to us.133   
 
This mystery leads us not only to humility but also to worship and to hope.   
To live according to God’s image and likeness in the ways this book describes 
is to be truly alive. And we can dare to hope to become more fully alive in 
ways that we cannot now imagine. The human likeness to God is participation 
in God’s life and immortality; it is abundant new life here and now and eternal 
life with God in the age to come.134  
 
CONCLUSION: INTERSEX AND IMAGO  
BALANCING THE BINARY IN THE ALREADY/NOT YET 
 
This dissertation, “Intersex and Imago,” has attempted to explore a small slice of 
the many-splendored image of God, particularly the social view of the imago as it relates 
to human embodiment: to sex, gender, and sexuality. This study has shown that there is 
even more mystery with which Christians must wrestle as sex, gender, and sexuality are 
being recognized as more complex and elusive in the postmodern period.  
It can be disconcerting to have one’s presuppositions challenged—particularly 
presuppositions so closely tied to personal identity and theological assumptions, as 
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notions of sex, gender, and sexuality tend to be. To take up a defensive posture and resist 
change would be a natural and reasonable reaction, and yet, other aspects of the image of 
God require a different response. As Sister Nonna argued, the virtues “compose the most 
important dimension of the divine likeness for which every human being is called… 
Above all, we need the virtue of humility to keep us grounded and open to help and 
guidance from God and other people.”135 Humility and love for the other, particularly a 
love for the intersexed whose presence among us has been overlooked, marginalized, and 
outright oppressed, behooves us to make space for them and to listen to their concerns.  
This dissertation has attempted to heed the voices of the intersexed who are 
calling for recognition and inclusion in the human family as well as for better medical 
care—easier access to medical records, collaborative medical intervention, and a 
moratorium on non-consensual surgeries (chapter 1). In light of their voices, I have 
worked to show that Christian theological anthropologies, even conservative Evangelical 
and Roman Catholic theological anthropologies, do not necessarily stand in the way of 
these goals. On the contrary, Christian theological anthropology can aid the case of the 
intersexed by showing that intersex persons have been among the human family and 
recorded in the history of Christianity for millienia (chapter 1), that the intersexed were 
honored by Jesus (who raised them up from symbols of shame to become icons of radical 
discipleship), that the intersexed have participated in church leadership and public service 
in the Church and Christian societies, and that they have provided resources for thinking 
theologically about the significance of sex, gender, and sexuality in this life and the life 
to come—both in the early church and the middle ages (chapter 2), and again in the 
postmodern period (chapters 3 and 6).  
                                                 
135
 Ibid., 188. 
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Having established the validity of including the intersex in the human family as 
intersex, I went on to explore how intersex can challenge, correct, and help to construct a 
better theological anthropology for the postmodern period. I urged Roman Catholic and 
Evangelical theologians to move beyond discussions of the woman as paradigmatic 
“other” to include other others; revisioning the place of Adam and Eve as progenitors 
rather than paradigms of human difference-in-relation (chapter 4). I then argued that 
theological discussions of the social imago must retain their basis in the social Trinity—
inclusive of sex/gender difference as one important difference in the community without 
grounding relationality (human or divine) on sex differentiation or sexual desire/activity 
and without conflating the related but discrete categories of sex, gender, and sexuality 
(chapter 5). Moving from the binary pattern of Eden to the “not male and female” of the 
Eschaton, I worked to show how christology and eschatology both challenge and enrich 
our notions of human personhood made in the image of God in Christ, especially as it 
relates to sex, gender, and sexuality. I argued that, rather than dismantling the categories 
of male and female, space should be opened up for the addition and inclusion of intersex 
whose humanity was also taken up by Jesus Christ in the incarnation. I concluded by 
suggesting that while sex, gender, and sexual identities are not erased by identification 
“in Christ” they must, nevertheless, be de-centered, in order to promote the healing of 
individuals and reconciliation in the community so that male, female, and intersex can 
emulate and participate in the mutual-dependence of the perichoretic love of the Trinity 
in purity (chapter 6). In all, great mystery remains, even as we begin to explore the 
possibility of thinking beyond the binary framework of humankind made in the image of 
God.  
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